Managerial pay adjustments: Decomposition and impact on firm productive efficiency

This paper decomposes managerial pay adjustments and examines their impact on firm productivity based upon Taiwanese firm panel data. Pay adjustments are decomposed into components arising from three sources: a scheme based on the external labour market comparisons, a scheme derived from the changes in firm and manager characteristics, and transitory pay adjustments. The stochastic frontier model is used to test how these pay components affect firm productivity. Empirical results suggest that the pay adjustments based on the comparison between managers' actual pay and their market-clearing pay are positively related to the output and technical efficiency of the firms, whereas this productivity-boosting effect cannot be seen for other components. This paper shows the importance of the external labour market in connecting managerial pay to firm productivity, and provides a model for the research of managerial pay in an environment where the compensation structure does not have apparent stock incentives.     

The impact of adoptive management innovations on medium-sized enterprises from a dynamic capability perspective

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the nature of adaptive managerial innovation and its effects on organisational dynamic capabilities. Using an original model based on 16 items and PLS – SEM instrument on a sample of 261 Romanian companies, we conclusively demonstrated that dynamic capabilities are an important determinant for management of innovation. Our study further reveals the positive effects of sensing, absorptive and integrative capabilities upon the innovation process. We consider that our study contributes to the development of pragmatic approaches on organisational dynamic capabilities and management of innovation literature.     

A management model of fast European,centrally-planned economies

The paper presents a model of managerial effectiveness of a national industrial system in European socialist countries. Concentration is upon linking policy-determined variables - especially types of managerial bonuses and careers, the degree to which central authorities use specific performance indicators in judging enterprise success, and the degree of ambition incorporated into enforced plans of enterprises — to managerial system effectiveness by way of a set of intermediary variables.     

'Tying the manager's hands': constraining opportunistic managerial intervention

We discuss and examine empirically a firm-level equivalent ofthe ancient problem of ‘tying the King's hands’,namely how to avoid managerial intervention that is undertakento reap private benefits but is harmful to overall value creation,that is, ‘managerial opportunism’. The link frommanagerial intervention to firm-level value-creation is moderatedby employee motivation. Thus, intervention in the form of managersoverruling employees or reneging on delegation may demotivateemployees, particularly when the intervention is perceived asbeing unfair, undertaken for personal gain, etc. We argue thata number of mechanisms, such as managers staking their personalreputation, employees controlling important assets, strong tradeunions, etc. may function as constraints on managerial proclivitiesto intervene, thus reducing the problem of managerial opportunism.We derive four hypotheses from these ideas, and test them, usingpath-analysis, on a rich dataset, based on 329 firms in theSpanish food and electric/electronic industries.     

Managerial turnover and the theory of short-termism

This paper presents a novel theory of managerial short-termism that is based on managerial turnover. The key feature is that if managers' rewards are based on current profitability, and there is some probability of managerial turnover, then rational own-reward maximizing managers may choose projects that have intrinsically lower net present values but yield higher returns in the earlier part of their lives. This is because managers recognize that the existence of turnover means that there is some probability they won't be around to enjoy the returns generated by long-term projects.     

Fire the manager to improve performance?Managerial turnover and incentives after privatization in the Czech Republic

This paper analyses the effect of the introduction of managerial incentives and new human capital on enterprise performance immediately after privatization in the Czech Republic. We find weak evidence for the presence of managerial incentives: only from 1997, 3 to 4 years after privatization, does poor performance significantly increase the probability of managerial change. Nevertheless, replacing the managing director in a newly privatized firm improves subsequent performance. This indicates that the privatized firms operate below potential under the incumbent management. We show that the institutional framework matters as well: managerial turnover improves performance only if the management is closely interconnected with the board of directors and thus holds effective executive authority.     

Distortions,endogenous managerial skills and productivity differences

We develop a span-of-control model where managerial skills are endogenous and the outcome of investments over the life cycle of managers. We calibrate this model to U.S. plant-size data to quantify the effects of distortions that are correlated with the size of production units, and how these effects are amplified by managerial investments. We find a quantitatively important role for managerial investments. Distortions that consist of a tax rate of 20% on the top 50% managers reduce steady-state output by about 14.6% in our benchmark model. When skills are exogenous the reduction is about 9.2%.     

Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard

This article investigates managerial compensation and its incentive effects. Our econometric framework is derived from a multiperiod principal-agent model with moral hazard. Longitudinal data on returns to firms and managerial compensation are used to estimate the model. We find that firms would incur large losses from ignoring moral hazard, whereas managers only require moderate additional compensation for accepting a contract that ties their wealth to the value of the firm. Thus the costs of aligning hidden managerial actions to shareholder goals through the compensation schedule are much less than the benefits from the resulting managerial performance.     

Debt financing,soft budget constraints,and government ownershipEvidence from China1

Debt financing is expected to improve the quality of corporate governance, but we find, using a large sample of public listed companies (PLCs) from China, that an increase in bank loans increases the size of managerial perks and free cash flows and decreases corporate efficiency. We find that bank lending facilitates managerial exploitation of corporate wealth in government‐controlled firms, but constrains managerial agency costs in firms controlled by private owners. We argue that the failure of corporate governance may derive from the shared government ownership of lenders and borrowers, which nurtures soft budget constraints.     

外商直接投资与管理知识溢出效应:来自中国民营企业家的证据

本文从民营企业家的角度对FDI管理知识溢出效应的存在性进行了实证研究。我们运用中国 1 997、2 0 0 0、2 0 0 2年三次全国民营企业抽样调查数据 ,通过回归分析、TreatmentEffect方法和有限因变量模型 ,研究了中国民营企业家在“三资”企业工作的经历对其企业的经营业绩和管理方法的影响。本文所得到的经验结果显示 ,在企业业绩的最终表现上 ,FDI对中国企业家有一定的培训效果 ,但效果不十分显著 ;同时在“三资”企业的工作经历会带给民营企业家某些、而不是全面的先进管理理念。我们认为要获得更加显著的FDI溢出效应 ,政府应当着眼于制定政策来扶持本地企业 ,通过公平竞争缩小他们与先进企业的距离 ,促使FDI在激烈的市场竞争中带来真正先进的管理经验和知识 ;并通过教育培训投入 ,提高本地管理者对外来的先进管理方法的学习能力。     

Directors'' remuneration in the theory of the firm: Specification and testing of the null hypothesis

One basis for the managerial theories has been the strong correlation between firm size and executive remuneration. This may, however, simply reflect variations in managerial quality across firms. We also show that the absence of a correlation between profitability and remuneration is not evidence in favour of the managerial theories. In this paper we follow the rewards to individual U.K. managers over time, thereby controlling for quality variation. We conclude that growth is highly rewarded and involvement in mergers and takeovers attracts an extra premium. This may explain the continued popularity of mergers despite knowledge of their general unprofitability.     

企业的冗余资源及其有限理性来源观

企业对非常规活动的决策存在有限理性,使得与其相关的资源在价值和效率两个方面产生冗余,而重复决策产生的学习效应能够使人们认识冗余并通过创新来加以利用。     

管理创新增强中国企业核心竞争力

企业核心竞争力是企业长期生存与发展的基础,而管理创新符合核心竞争力的内在要求,管理创新给企业带来竞争力的同时也增强了企业的核心竞争力。充分发挥管理创新可以增强企业核心竞争力,同时,核心竞争力也可以表现在企业具有超强的管理创新能力方面。管理创新可以始终保证企业以先人一步的速度抢占市场机会,在以前领先的基础上通过管理创新可以达到步步领先的局面。     

管理防御对公司业绩影响实证分析——来自中国上市公司的证据

在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下,自利管理者与股东之间的利益冲突,引发了管理者固守职位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行为。本文从影响管理防御的管理者特征、管理者激励和管理者监督3个方面选择了8个变量,选取2003—2008年这6年连续上市的A股公司的面板数据,考察管理防御与公司业绩之间的关系。研究表明,管理者防御程度会对公司业绩产生负面影响,其中管理者年龄、管理者受教育水平、管理者薪酬和董事会独立性与上市公司业绩显著正相关,管理者任期、管理者持股比例对业绩有负面影响,股权集中度与公司业绩呈U型关系。     

Endogenous Choice of Strategic Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with Bargaining Over Managerial Delegation Contracts

We revisit the endogenous choice problem of strategic contracts for the public firm and the private firm in a managerial mixed duopoly with differentiated goods. We consider the situation wherein the managerial delegation contracts are determined by maximising social welfare within the public firm, which is equal to the objective function of its owner, and through bargaining over the content of managerial delegation contracts between the owner and manager within the private firm. We show that, in equilibrium, when the manager of the private firm has high bargaining power relative to that of the owner, the public firm chooses a price contract, while the private firm chooses a quantity contract. However, there is no equilibrium market structure under the pure strategic contract class when the manager has sufficiently low bargaining power relative to that of the owner.     

Managerial Skills Acquisition and the Theory of Economic Development

Why don't all countries converge rapidly to the use of most efficient or best practice technologies? Micro level studies suggest managerial skills play a key role in the adoption of modern technologies. In this paper we model the interactive process between on-the-job managerial skill acquisition and the adoption of modern technology. We use the model to illustrate why some countries develop managerial skills quickly and adopt best practice technologies, while others stay backwards. The model also explains why managers will not migrate from rich countries to poor countries, as would be needed to generate convergence. Finally we show why standard growth accounting exercises will incorrectly attribute a large proportion of managerial skills' contribution to total factor productivity and we quantify the importance of this bias.     

The organizational politics of information technology: Studies from the UK financial servies industry

The article critically appraises two recent contributions to studies of organizational change: processual analysis and the firm-in-sector perspective. These studies argue that managerial practice is intensely political. They also attempt to firmly locate that practice in its organizational and environmental or sectoral context. Drawing upon these studies the article examines the management of information technology (IT) in the UK life insurance sector. This examination uses a case study and sectoral research-in-progress. The article argues that organizational IT use and development is a politicla and social process characterized by tension and conflict between managers. This conclusion suggests that organizational studies of IT use need to develop more sophisticated theories of management and managerial practice. By so doing they may then be able to shed a more penetrating light on the relationships between managers, technologies and organizational change.     

供应链与同业联系对企业创新类型的影响

商业联系是企业获取创新资源、市场信息，实现技术知识更新的有效路径。针对现有研究在商业联系细分、作用机理复杂性及不同创新作用潜在差异性方面存在的不足，构建了多维度商业联系、探索式创新和应用式创新的概念模型，运用274份企业调研数据进行实证检验。结果显示，供应链联系与应用式创新呈正U型关系，但与探索式创新呈倒U型关系；同业联系与探索式创新呈正U型关系，但与应用式创新呈倒U型关系。     

不同发展阶段新创企业创业者胜任力与创业团队成员信任关系研究

基于胜任力理论和创业动态观,实证检验了不同维度创业者胜任力对创业团队成员认知信任和情感信任的差异性影响效应,以及可能随着新创企业不同发展阶段而呈现的阶段性特征。结果表明,创业者的创业胜任力和管理胜任力有助于提升创业团队成员的认知信任,而创业者的社交胜任力,包括社交知觉与社交适应力可以促进创业团队成员情感信任的发展。此外,随着新创企业从初创期进入早期成长阶段,创业者的创业胜任力对创业团队成员认知信任的影响有所下降,而管理胜任力对创业团队成员认知信任的影响有所提高。