东道国外资税收激励政策效应的国际研究综述

东道国对外资实行税收激励政策已成为全球现象,有关税收优惠效应的讨论一直延续至今。早期研究者应用调查法和计量经济学方法,综合分析了东道国税收激励对外资区位选择的影响;20世纪80年代中期,研究者分析了不同跨国公司对东道国税收激励政策的反应和东道国不同税收工具对FDI影响的差异;最新研究围绕母国税制与东道国税收激励效应、国家之间税收激励政策的竞争与协调以及税收激励成本等内容而展开;未来将有5种研究方向。     

东道国税收激励政策的福利效应分析

应用税收激励来吸引外商直接投资是目前世界上大多数国家常用的政策手段。然而,税收激励政策在促进东道国经济增长的同时对东道国福利的影响是不确定的,需要对税收激励政策的成本和收益进行综合评估。本文对经典的Macdougall一般福利效应模型做进一步拓展,引入税收激励来分析外商直接投资对福利效应的影响,结果表明:税收激励政策能否增进一国福利水平主要取决于外资企业的技术外溢。从这个结论出发,本文对我国当前税收优惠政策的福利效应进行评述,进而对我国外商投资税收优惠提出政策建议。     

中国外商直接投资政策研究综述

我国现在已经成为最大的投资输入国家,如何更好的利用外资已经成为我国经济发展的一个重要方面。外资政策是东道国政府干预外资活动的目标及其工具的统称。从外资政策的定义就可以看出外资政策是东道国影响外商投资的主要手段之一。所以研究外资政策对我国利用外资是有重要意义的。但国内对于外商投资政策的研究还较为有限,主要集中在外资政策的建议探讨及关于外资政策有效性的研究,利用外资政策中的博弈研究。     

FDI激励政策约束对发展中国家的影响

如今东道国对FDI实行激励政策已成为全球现象,激励政策的过度竞争会产生很多负面影响,且对于东道国有不少负效应。经济全球化的发展要求投资领域国际协调和监管的必要性与日俱增。多边投资框架的最终建立必然对世界各国普遍使用的FDI激励政策加以限制或约束,从而对发展中国家产生重要影响。对于中国来说,激励政策的约束会对中国利用外资产生积极的促进作用,同时有利于外资“超国民待遇”的规范化。     

FDI激励政约束对发展中国家的影响

如今东道国对FDI实行激励政策已成为全球现象,激励政策的过度竞争会产生很多负面影响,且对于东道国有不少负效应.经济全球化的发展要求投资领域国际协调和监管的必要性与日俱增.多边投资框架的最终建立必然对世界各国普遍使用的FDI激励政策加以限制或约束,从而对发展中国家产生重要影响.对于中国来说,激励政策的约束会对中国利用外资产生积极的促进作用,同时有利于外资"超国民待遇"的规范化.     

FDI激励政策约束对发展中国家的影响

如今东道国对FDI实行激励政策已成为全球现象，激励政策的过度竞争会产生很多负面影响，且对于东道国有不少负效应。经济全球化的发展要求投资领域国际协调和监管的必要性与日俱增。多边投资框架的最终建立必然对世界各国普遍使用的FDI激励政策加以限制或约束，从而对发展中国家产生重要影响。对于中国来说，激励政策的约束会对中国利用外资产生积极的促进作用，同时有利于外资“超国民待遇”的规范化。     

中国吸引外资政策的再选择

外资的流入,对东道国可以产生许多积极效应,如弥补投资缺口、带来先进生产技术、促进对外贸易增长、引入市场竞争机制等。随着越来越多的国家认识到这一点,无论是发达国家,还是发展中国家,都在吸引外资方面展开了激烈的竞争,外资政策选择自然成为各国竞争的一个重要内容。     

FDI与经济增长:基于东道国金融市场的分析

作为影响外资吸收能力的重要因素,东道国金融市场在FDI经济增长效应中有着举足轻重的作用。东道国金融市场发展可以通过技术创新实现效应、人力资本转移效应、产业前后向联系效应,以及优化投资效率效应等四个渠道推动FDI促进东道国的经济增长。     

外资并购对我国的影响及法律对策

随着经济全球化的发展,外资并购已成为国际直接投资的主要方式,这一方式在推动东道国经济的发展的同时,也会对东道国经济和社会的发展造成冲击.主要表现在:冲击国内市场份额、民族工业及国有品牌;冲击政府经济政策;阻碍获得国际先进技术等方面.对外资并购,我国应采取反并购的法律手段,健全关于规制外资并购的法律制度,完善外资并购的法律环境,有效规范、控制外资并购行为.     

外商直接投资技术外溢正、负效应的探讨

伴随全球资本流动的日益加快,国际直接投资已经成为当今促进世界经济发展最重要、最活跃的因素,在一国经济发展中具有举足轻重的作用。但人们越来越关注大量外资的流入对东道国经济与社会发展所产生的影响,其中焦点问题之一就是外商直接投资的技术外溢效应。本文就国内外理论界对外资技术外溢效应的研究动态进行分类汇总,综合分析其对东道国经济发展所产生的影响,进而提出不同的经济发展现实制定不同的引资战略。     

Increasing returns, multinationals and geography of preferential trade agreements

This paper uses a model of horizontal multinational enterprises to explore the relationship between transportation costs and trade policy cooperation. Tariffs have the effect of attracting foreign direct investment to the benefit of consumers in the host country. As transport costs fall, the incentive to impose tariffs falls and the benefits to cooperation rise. Thus, in a repeated game in which cooperation is limited by a self-enforcement constraint, a reduction in transport costs facilitates free trade. This logic is applied to a three-country model to examine preferential trade agreements. It is found that if any country is too distant from the others, then global free trade is not attainable. Rather, if two of the countries are within a critical distance of each other and distant from the third country, then the unique outcome is an exclusive free trade agreement between the two adjacent countries. Thus, the model predicts a strong regional bias in preferential trade agreements.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Training in the Host Country: The Tariff-Jumping Argument Revisited

We analyze the direct investment versus export decision of a multinational firm in competition with a potential entrant in a host country. We consider a workers' skills asymmetry between the host and the multinational home countries. We also give the multinational the possibility to train all (or a part of) the hired workers when investing. We show that an improvement in the workers' skills in the host country does not systematically increase the multinational incentive to invest. We also demonstrate that the tariff-jumping investment can improve the welfare of the host country even if it excludes the local firm from the market.     

Temporary social dumping,union legalisation and FDI: a note on the strategic use of standards

This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation as a policy instrument to attract inward foreign direct investment. While its presence may discourage a foreign multinational (MNE) from locating in the host country, unionisation is an important rent-extracting instrument for the host country. We show that if the MNE benefits from dynamic effects, the host country government may have an incentive to adopt temporary social dumping: banning the union in the short run to extract higher rents in the future. However, if the government can use a fiscal instrument in conjunction with union legalisation, the former can circumvent the need to engage in social dumping.     

Foreign investment and control of transnational enterprises

Foreign investment by transnational enterprises (TNEs) in less developed countries has been explained by the differential rates of return available to foreign capital at home and in the host country. However, an equally significant aspect of such investment is the issue of control of TNE operations in the host country. This forms the basic difference between foreign direct and foreign indirect investment. This paper addresses this issue showing that foreign direct investment is better for the host than indirect investment. We discuss how host government policy can affect the decisions of TNEs and achieve the best outcome for the host economy.     

The accelerating effect of institutional environment unfamiliarity on subsidiary portfolio expansion in a new host country

In forming external networks in a host country, a foreign subsidiary acquires knowledge which contributes to the parent’s stock of country-specific knowledge and capabilities. Building on this notion, we argue that an MNE unfamiliar with the institutional environment of a newly entered foreign country has an incentive to expand its subsidiary portfolio in that country at a higher rate. We test this using a longitudinal dataset of German public firms which made investments into 2220 new host countries between 1985 and 2015. We find that unfamiliarity accelerates subsidiary portfolio expansion most when the initial investment is a wholly-owned subsidiary, and that the effect becomes weaker over time. Our study contributes to the internationalization process literature by showing that being unfamiliar with a host country is not necessarily an obstacle to subsidiary portfolio expansion – indeed it can accelerate it.     

The effect of non-conventional outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) on the domestic employment of multinational enterprises (MNEs)

Using a sample of 787 Japanese MNEs operating in 60 countries from 1996 to 2010, this study examines the impacts of MNEs’ three most commonly observed forms of non-conventional outbound FDI (i.e., as a means to counter trade barriers, to achieve a financial hedge, or to obtain tax breaks) on domestic employment levels of MNEs at home. We build on a conceptual classification of ‘motivation-activity’ of MNEs as a theoretical framework, and evaluate the impacts of MNEs’ non-conventional outbound FDI on their domestic employment levels in relation to the MNEs’ specific combination of ‘motivation’ and ‘activity’ as they conduct outbound FDI in host countries. The 3SLS regression results show strong evidence that non-conventional outbound FDI in core business activities reduces MNEs’ domestic employment levels when the investment is primarily for responding to country-specific conditions, such as circumventing host country restrictions (e.g., FDI to counter trade barriers) or escaping from home country restrictions (e.g., FDI for tax incentive packages), while FDI in non-core business activities (e.g., FDI for financial hedging or FDI in tax havens) has either a positive or insignificant effect on MNEs’ domestic employment levels depending on whether it aims to develop FSAs or not. We conclude the study with public policy implications from these findings.     

East—West joint ventures and buyback contracts

Contractual joint ventures (CJVs) and the buyback form of countertrade are popular methods that Socialist countries use to attract foreign investment. In this paper we explore some reasons why this is so and also explain two predominant characteristics of these contracts: the existence of sharing rules and minimum standard requirements on inputs. The model stresses the incentive problems involved when a (Socialist) host country, which does not allow foreign direct investment, uses a CJV to obtain the fruits of some knowledge-based production process from a multinational enterprise.     

当地成分要求研究动态与评述:东道国的视角

当地成分要求是外商直接投资东道国为发展国内产业而普遍采用的一种措施,发展中国家对其应用最为广泛。世贸组织《与贸易有关的投资措施协议》禁止使用当地成分要求。当地成分要求直接影响中间产品市场,间接影响外商直接投资和贸易自由流动,国外有许多文献专门研究当地成分要求对东道国经济效应的影响。通过文献梳理发现,当地成分要求应是一种有益于东道国发展的政策,但其对经济发展的作用因不同国家和不同市场条件而异。     

How does economic policy uncertainty affect cross-border M&A: Evidence from Chinese firms

Based on the data of Chinese cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 29 countries from 2008 to 2017, we adopt the index of world economic policy uncertainty constructed by Baker et al. (2016) to empirically test the impact of economic policy uncertainty triggered by financial crisis on the scale and performance of M&A behavior. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) Economic policy uncertainty in host country can significantly reduce the scale of cross-border M&A of Chinese enterprises. (2) The negative impact of economic policy uncertainty is more evident in non-state-owned enterprises. (3) Economic policy uncertainty in the host country has a U-shaped influence on short-term M&A performance of enterprises; (4) Economic policy uncertainty in host country has a negative impact on mid-term M&A performance of enterprises. Our results can provide reference for enterprise investment and home country policy.     

The interplay between home and host country institutions in an emerging market context: Private equity in Latin America

This study examines how the interplay between home and host country regulatory institutions affects the investment strategy of private equity (PE) firms in an emerging market context. To answer this question, we consider three different mechanisms: (1) the institutional hazard avoidance effect, (2) the institutional escapism effect, and (3) the dysfunctional institutions effect. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that regulatory institutional differences between home and host countries can sometimes have a positive rather than a negative effect on investment likelihood. Our findings show that when a host emerging market has a strong regulatory institutional system relative to other emerging markets, it is more likely that this country will attract PE investments from firms based in home countries with very strong and very weak institutional systems. The empirical analyses, based on a polynomial specification and a dataset covering more than 300 PE firms that made close to 1500 investment transactions in Latin America during 1996–2011, are consistent with our main theoretical arguments.