Raising Capital in an Insurance Oligopoly Market

We consider an oligopoly market where firms offer insurance coverage against a risk characterised by aggregate uncertainty. Firms behave as if they were risk averse for a standard reason of costly external finance. The model consists in a two-stage game where firms choose their internal capital level at stage one and compete on price at stage two. We characterise the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and focus attention on the strategic impact of insurers capital choice. We discuss the model with regard to the insurance industry specificities and regulation.     

The Capital Structure of Firms Subject to Price Regulation: Evidence from the Insurance Industry

Automobile and workers' compensation insurance are relatively homogeneous products sold under varying regulatory systems among the states. This paper investigates how price regulation affects the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing insurers who sell insurance in both competitive and/or regulated markets. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that insurers subject to price regulation will choose to hold less capital. In addition, we hypothesize insurers subject to more stringent regulatory pricing constraints will choose even higher degrees of leverage because the benefits of holding additional amounts of capital are suppressed. We conduct empirical tests using cross-sectional data on insurers and find evidence consistent with both hypotheses. These findings have important implications for insurance price and solvency regulation. Stricter price regulation increases the default risk (i.e., reduces the financial quality) of insurance contracts purchased by individuals and firms.     

Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation

This paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control. It is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance. Bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk. Utilizing the mean-variance model, the following results are shown: (a) the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks; (b) as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation, the “theoretically correct” risk weights under the risk-based capital plan are explicitly derived; and (c) the “theoretically correct” risk weights are restrictions on asset composition, which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms.     

Capital standard,forbearance and deposit insurance pricing under GARCH

We propose a multiperiod deposit insurance pricing model that simultaneously incorporates the capital standard and the possibility of forbearance. The model employs the recently developed GARCH option pricing technique in determining the deposit insurance value. Our model offers two distinctive advantages. First, it explicitly considers the implications of the strict enforcement on capital standard as stipulated in FDIC Improvement Act of 1991. Second, the use of the GARCH model allows us to capture many robust features exhibited by financial asset returns. By the GARCH option pricing theory, the value of a contingent claim is a function of the asset risk premium. This unique feature is found to be prominent in determining the bank's deposit insurance value. We also examine the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard behavior in this multiperiod deposit insurance setting.     

The risk implications of insurance securitization: The case of catastrophe bonds

Catastrophe (Cat) bonds are insurance securitization vehicles which are supposed to transfer catastrophe-related underwriting risk from issuers to capital markets. This paper addresses key, unanswered questions concerning Cat bonds and offers the following results. First, our findings show firms that issue Cat bonds exhibit less risky underwriting portfolios with less exposure to catastrophe risks and overall less need to hedge catastrophe risk. These results show that the access to the market for insurance securitization is easiest for firms with less risky portfolios. Second, firms that issue Cat bonds are found to experience a reduction in their default risk relative to non-issuing firms and our results, therefore, demonstrate that Cat bonds provide effective catastrophe hedging for issuing firms. Third, firms with less catastrophe exposure, increase their catastrophe exposure following an issue. Therefore, our paper cautions that the ability to hedge catastrophe risk causes some firms to seek additional catastrophe risk.     

Analysing the determinants of insolvency risk for general insurance firms in the UK

This paper estimates a reduced-form model to assess the insolvency risk of General Insurance (GI) firms in the UK. In comparison to earlier studies, it uses a much larger sample including 30 years of data for 515 firms, and also considers a much wider set of possible determinants of insolvency risk. The empirical results suggest that macroeconomic and firm-specific factors both play important roles. Other key findings are the following: insolvency risk varies across firms depending on their business lines; there is default clustering in the GI industry; different reinsurance levels also affect the insolvency risk of insurance firms. The implications of these findings for regulators of GI firms under the newly launched Solvency II are discussed.     

The impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage

The governance effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance), an important tool for risk diversification, are of strong concern in the capital market. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2018, we examine the impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage. We find that D&O insurance is negatively associated with excess corporate leverage and that this result is consistent with a series of robustness tests. Further analyses show that D&O insurance impedes excess corporate leverage mainly because of its effect on external monitoring. The effect is more pronounced for firms that are state-owned, have political connections and are located in provinces with low marketization than for other firms.     

Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements

We analyze the loan pricing implications of the reform of bank capital regulation known as Basel II. We consider a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, a single risk factor explains the correlation in defaults across firms. Our loan pricing equation implies that low risk firms will achieve reductions in their loan rates by borrowing from banks adopting the IRB approach, while high risk firms will avoid increases in their loan rates by borrowing from banks that adopt the less risk-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only a very high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed IRB capital charges, partly because the net interest income from performing loans is not counted as a buffer against credit losses. A net interest income correction for IRB capital requirements is proposed.     

Convex risk measures for the aggregation of multiple information sources and applications in insurance

We propose a novel class of convex risk measures, based on the concept of the Fréchet mean, designed in order to handle uncertainty which arises from multiple information sources regarding the risk factors of interest. The proposed risk measures robustly characterize the exposure of the firm, by filtering out appropriately the partial information available in individual sources into an aggregate model for the risk factors of interest. Importantly, the proposed risks can be expressed in closed analytic forms allowing for interesting qualitative interpretations as well as comparative statics and thus facilitate their use in the everyday risk management process of the insurance firms. The potential use of the proposed risk measures in insurance is illustrated by two concrete applications, capital risk allocation and premia calculation under uncertainty.     

The Risk‐Sharing Implications of Disaster Insurance Funds

We study the risk‐sharing implications that arise from introducing a disaster insurance fund to the cat insurance market. Such a form of intervention can increase efficiency in the private market, and our design of disaster insurance suggests a prominent role of catastrophe reinsurance. The model predicts buyers will increase their demand in the private market, and the seller will lower prices to such an extent that their revenues decrease upon introduction of disaster insurance. We test two predictions in the context of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). It is already known that the introduction of TRIA led to negative abnormal returns in the insurance industry. In addition, we show this negative effect is stronger for larger and for low‐risk‐averse firms—two results that are consistent with our model. The seller’s risk aversion plays an important role in quantifying such feedback effects, and we point toward possible distortions in which a firm may even be overhedged upon introduction of disaster insurance.     

Bank capital and equity investment regulations

This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks' minimum required capital–asset ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries forbids, banks' investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms. There are two sources of moral hazard in the model: one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance, and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project. Among other things, the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank's stability and can also be Pareto-improving. Equity regulation is never Pareto-improving and does not increase the bank's stability.     

Risk Capital: Theory and Applications

After a brief review of the current theory and practice of risk capital by financial firms, the authors define the concept of risk capital and identify the costs and benefits of using more or less of it. Next, they present their procedure for allocating risk capital to assets and lines of business on the basis of marginal default values, and in a way designed to prevent risk shifting and internal arbitrage. Then, they show how allocations of risk capital are likely to be affected by, and in turn influence, a financial firm's decisions about both the scale and composition of its portfolio of businesses. Finally, the authors present a number of applications and consider their implications for maximizing the value of financial firms. In so doing, the authors also show how their method produces very different allocations of risk capital than those based on two measures that have long been widely used by financial firms: value at risk (VaR) and risk‐adjusted return on capital (RAROC). Moreover, the adjusted present value (APV) rule for evaluating investment opportunities is shown to be workable for nonfinancial as well as financial firms.     

Capital regulation,deposit insurance and bank risk: International evidence from normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the impact of capital regulation on bank risk and the moderating role of deposit insurance on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk during both normal and crisis periods. Using an international sample of banks from 111 countries, our results show that stringent capital regulation reduces bank default risk, in general, during normal growth period, and this effect is not conditioned by the existence of explicit deposit insurance. Further, stringent capital regulation in place during the pre-crisis period reduces bank default risk during the crisis period, and this effect is stronger for countries with explicit deposit insurance during the pre-crisis period. These results have important policy implications to design the optimal bank regulations.     

Optimal Insurance With Costly Internal Capital

We introduce costly internal capital into a standard insurance model, in which a risk‐averse policyholder buys insurance from a risk‐neutral insurer with limited liability. The unique optimal contract and internal capital lead to a strictly positive probability for insurer default. Some risks are uninsurable in that the insurer chooses not to provide insurance against such risks. An increase in the cost of capital may lead to a higher optimal amount of internal capital. The results extend to multiple policyholders in a symmetric setting. Our extension of the classical model to include costly internal capital provides a fruitful approach to many real world insurance markets.     

Risk-based capital for credit insurers with business cycles and dynamic leverage

This paper develops a risk-based capital pricing model for credit insurance portfolios held by a vulnerable insurer. The model accounts for business cycles using a two-state Markov switching model, and allows for dynamic leverage adjustment by the insured firms. The new proposed model, which incorporates risk-based capital practice, is better for both the insurer and the insured firms. Based on the risk-adjusted performance metric, we found that the insurer is better off insuring short- and medium-term loans in expansion and steady states, while it is better off backing both short- and long-term loans in recessions. Our results also emphasize that macroeconomic uncertainty significantly impairs the creditworthiness of the insurer and insured firms.     

Risk Management: History,Definition, and Critique

The study of risk management began after World War II. Risk management has long been associated with the use of market insurance to protect individuals and companies from various losses associated with accidents. Other forms of risk management, alternatives to market insurance, surfaced during the 1950s when market insurance was perceived as very costly and incomplete for protection against pure risk. The use of derivatives as risk management instruments arose during the 1970s, and expanded rapidly during the 1980s, as companies intensified their financial risk management. International risk regulation began in the 1980s, and financial firms developed internal risk management models and capital calculation formulas to hedge against unanticipated risks and reduce regulatory capital. Concomitantly, governance of risk management became essential, integrated risk management was introduced, and the chief risk officer positions were created. Nonetheless, these regulations, governance rules, and risk management methods failed to prevent the financial crisis that began in 2007.     

THE EFFECTS OF COMPLEX CAPITAL STRUCTURE ON THE MARKET VALUES OF FIRMS

The familiar Modigliani and Miller risk class model is the basis of a test for differences in value between simple and complex capital structure groups of firms. Cluster analysis, using market risk measures and debt-equity ratio as input, provides the method for obtaining the risk class sample of firms. Crosssectional tests at three annual dates are made on twenty-six simple and twentysix complex capital structure firms. For all periods examined, the complex capital structure firms are valued lower than the simple capital structure firms. Possible explanations for the results include failure of the arbitrage mechanism and the presence of certain costs associated with different types of capital structures.     

Displacement risk and asset returns

We study asset-pricing implications of innovation in a general-equilibrium overlapping-generations economy. Innovation increases the competitive pressure on existing firms and workers, reducing the profits of existing firms and eroding the human capital of older workers. Due to the lack of inter-generational risk sharing, innovation creates a systematic risk factor, which we call “displacement risk.” This risk helps explain several empirical patterns, including the existence of the growth-value factor in returns, the value premium, and the high equity premium. We assess the magnitude of displacement risk using estimates of inter-cohort consumption differences across households and find support for the model.     

Climate risk: The price of drought

We document a significant positive relation between drought risk and the cost of equity capital. Our estimation shows that the cost of equity capital is 92 basis points higher for firms affected by severe drought conditions. We provide evidence that when firms are affected by droughts, firms with higher local institutional holdings exhibit a higher cost of equity capital. This result supports the well-known local bias of institutional investors, and suggests that diversification cannot fully eliminate the loss in wealth caused by droughts. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that drought duration and drought intensity further increase a firm's risk premium. However, for firms with diversified cash flows/investments, geographically dispersed business operations, and high cash holdings, the impact of drought on the expected return is significantly lessened. Overall, our findings show that investors require a higher rate of returns on firms affected by droughts and offer implications on how firms can mitigate the impact of droughts on their cost of capital.     

Application of Coherent Risk Measures to Capital Requirements in Insurance

Risk measurements go hand in hand with setting of capital minima by companies as well as by regulators. We review the properties of coherent risk measures and examine their implications for capital requirement in insurance. We also comment on the specific risk-based capital computations.