Information Disclosure and Stock Liquidity: Evidence from Borsa Italiana

This article examines the effect of increased corporate information disclosure on stock liquidity. Using the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Italy as a natural experiment we extend previous work examining the effect on one measure of liquidity—bid‐ask spreads—to others, specifically depth and the price impact of transactions (or effective bid‐ask spreads). Consistent with previous research we find that bid‐ask spreads of stocks decline following the introduction of IFRS, which implies that stock liquidity increases for small traders. However, we also provide evidence that depth at the best quotes declines, which challenges the proposition that liquidity increases for large trades following an increase in disclosure. In additional tests, we find that effective bid‐ask spreads of block trades also decline following the introduction of IFRS. Overall, this evidence confirms that stock liquidity for both small and large trades increases following an increase in corporate information disclosure.     

The Impact of the Reduction in Tick Increments in Major U.S. Markets on Spreads,Depth, and Volatility

This study presents an analysis of the impact of the introduction of quotes in sixteenths of a dollar on the AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE in mid-1997 on select market characteristics such as spreads, effective spreads, quoted depth, and volume. The findings of the study document reductions in the bid-ask spread, effective spread, and a statistically significant increase in the number of quotes. Interestingly, we find that liquidity, as measured by the total depth at the bid and ask, declines significantly on the AMEX and NYSE, but increases on the Nasdaq. Trading volume increases on the NYSE, but remains unchanged for the AMEX and Nasdaq. We also find that the proportion of even-increment quotes is a relevant factor affecting percentage spreads for Nasdaq both before and after and for the NYSE only after the change in quoting increments.     

What Explains the Bid‐Ask Spread Decline after Nasdaq Reforms?

This paper examines whether the decrease in bid‐ask spreads on Nasdaq after the 1997 reforms is due to a decrease in market‐making costs and/or an increase in market competition for order flows. Unlike previous studies, we jointly examine how competition and trading costs affect bid‐ask spreads. In addition, we separate the effects of informed trading and liquidity costs on bid‐ask spreads. Informed trading cost is directly estimated for each Nasdaq stock using a Bayesian theoretic model. Empirical results show that market‐making costs and competition significantly affect bid‐ask spreads. The post‐reform decrease in bid‐ask spreads is largely due to both an increase in competition and a decrease in informed trading and liquidity costs on Nasdaq.     

Differences in Trading Behavior across NYSE Specialist Firms

Using a sample of NYSE-listed equities from 1992, this study examines whether market maker performance differs across specialist firms. We find that spreads and depth differ across specialist firms, but the competitiveness of NYSE quotes relative to other exchanges does not appear to be affected by these differences. Differences are also evident in measures of transitory volatility and in the frequency and duration of order-imbalance trading halts. The results suggest that specialists have a significant effect on execution costs, liquidity, and noise in security prices and that these effects are not completely eliminated by competition or the NYSE's monitoring mechanisms.     

Trade Disclosure,Information Learning and Securities Market Performance

In this paper we examine the effect of information disclosure on securities market performance when liquidity traders are able to acquire information about inside trading. We show that the bid-ask spread increases with the liquidity trader's learning efficiency, which is greater when trade information is disclosed. The bid-ask spread is always higher when trade information is not disclosed. However, the discrepancy between the bid-ask spreads with and without information disclosure narrows when the learning efficiency increases. We also show that the gains of the informed traders in a market without trade information disclosure are reduced in the presence of the liquidity trader's learning. Nevertheless, liquidity traders do not necessarily benefit from increased transparency. In particular, liquidity traders may face higher trading costs.     

Penny pricing and the components of spread and depth changes

Recent studies show that decimal pricing led to significant reductions in the spread and depth on the NYSE. In this paper, we examine how the observed changes in the spread and depth can be attributed to different factors. We show that stocks with higher proportions of one-tick spreads and odd-sixteenth quotes, and more frequent trading before decimalization experienced larger declines in the spread and depth afterwards. We interpret this result as evidence of reduced binding constraints and increased price competition under decimal pricing. We also find that decimal pricing led to nontrivial changes in select stock attributes, and that these changes exerted an additional impact on spreads and depths. Our results suggest that sub-penny pricing may further reduce the spreads of high-volume, low-risk, or low-price stocks.     

The information content of trading halts

We investigate the impact of trading halts of NYSE-listed stocks on informationally related securities that continue to trade during the period of the halt. Informational relationships are established for companies in the same four-digit SIC industry based on the correlation of returns, volume, volatility, and the adverse selection components of spreads. We find a significant liquidity impact on informationally related securities with spreads and price impact of trades having substantial increases. However, we also find that quoted depths, the number of trades, and trade volume significantly increase. Our results are consistent with the trading halt model of Spiegel and Subrahmanyam [2000. Asymmetric information and news disclosure rules. Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, 363–403] and with the informed trading model of Tookes [2008. Information, trading, and product market interactions: cross-sectional implications of informed trading. Journal of Finance 63, 379–413]. In addition, our results indicate that there is a common liquidity response of informationally related securities to firm-specific trading halts.     

Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?

Algorithmic trading (AT) has increased sharply over the past decade. Does it improve market quality, and should it be encouraged? We provide the first analysis of this question. The New York Stock Exchange automated quote dissemination in 2003, and we use this change in market structure that increases AT as an exogenous instrument to measure the causal effect of AT on liquidity. For large stocks in particular, AT narrows spreads, reduces adverse selection, and reduces trade‐related price discovery. The findings indicate that AT improves liquidity and enhances the informativeness of quotes.     

Dealer Markets Under Stress: The Performance of NASDAQ Market Makers During the November 15, 1991, Market Break

The liquidity of the NASDAQ market was seriously undermined during the crash on October 19, 1987, when bid-ask spreads widened dramatically and dealers reputedly withdrew from market making. This paper studies the liquidity of 36 NASDAQ issues on November 15, 1991, when average prices fell over 4%, representing the first major correction in the post-crash era. We find that bid-ask spreads, the percentage of dealers posting inside quotes, and trading volume remained virtually unaffected. Effective spreads were also largely unaffected, except for trades in excess of 1,000 shares among issues whose market makers avoided odd-eighth quotes. Our evidence implies that, unlike October 1987, the liquidity of the NASDAQ market did not deteriorate appreciably during this episode of unusual market stress.     

The Allocation of Informed Trading Across Related Markets: An Analysis of the Impact of Changes in Equity-Option Margin Requirements

We examine the impact of changes in equity-option margin requirements on the liquidity of options and underlying stock markets. We find that the decrease in margin was associated with an increase in spreads and trade informativeness, and a decrease in depth for the underlying stocks. In contrast, option spreads decreased indicating a change in the relative allocation of informed traders between the two markets. When the required margin was increased, no significant change was observed in the underlying stocks, but option spreads increased. Overall, our results indicate that uninformed traders are more sensitive to the margin dimension of trading costs.     

Subsidizing Liquidity: The Impact of Make/Take Fees on Market Quality

Facing increased competition over the last decade, many stock exchanges changed their trading fees to maker‐taker pricing, an incentive scheme that rewards liquidity suppliers and charges liquidity demanders. Using a change in trading fees on the Toronto Stock Exchange, we study whether and why the breakdown of trading fees between liquidity demanders and suppliers matters. Posted quotes adjust after the change in fee composition, but the transaction costs for liquidity demanders remain unaffected once fees are taken into account. However, as posted bid‐ask spreads decline, traders (particularly retail) use aggressive orders more frequently, and adverse selection costs decrease.     

Anonymity,liquidity and fragmentation

We examine the effects of the removal of broker identifiers from the central limit order book of the Australian Stock Exchange. We find that spreads and order aggressiveness decline, and order book depth increases, with the introduction of anonymous trading. This is consistent with the hypothesis that limit order traders are more willing to expose their orders when they can do so anonymously. Anonymous markets attract order flow from non-anonymous substitute markets, but this effect is only seen in large stocks. Our results suggest that exchanges operating in fragmented markets should consider anonymous trading to improve price competition and liquidity, although some of these benefits may be significant only if the stocks are sufficiently large and liquid.     

Internal control reporting and market liquidity

We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on information asymmetry by analyzing the relation between SOX Sections 302 and 404 control reports and market liquidity using bid-ask spreads. Lower market liquidity indicates higher levels of information asymmetry implying that market participants perceive financial statement misstatement risk is higher. If SOX disclosures contain relevant information, then one would expect firms reporting internal control material weaknesses to have lower market liquidity. Accordingly, we find that market liquidity is lower (i.e., bid-ask spreads are higher) for firms reporting ineffective control compared to firms reporting effective control using either annual SOX 404 internal control reports or quarterly SOX 302 disclosure control reports, which suggests that SOX 302 and 404 reports provide useful information for identifying firms with a higher risk of financial statement misstatement. However, we do not find consistent results using two alternative liquidity measures: trading volume and market quality indices. We then examine whether changes in control reports are associated with changes in market liquidity. We generally do not find that firms with improved (deteriorated) control reports experience a larger decrease (increase) in bid-ask spreads or larger increases (decreases) in trading volume and market quality indices compared to other firms, suggesting that market participants do not discern a change in information asymmetry when the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting changes.     

Order imbalance and liquidity supply: Evidence from the bubble burst of Nasdaq stocks

In this study we analyze the effect of order imbalance on the quotation behavior of Nasdaq market makers. We find that Nasdaq market makers use both price and quantity quotes when dealing with order imbalances. However, order imbalance affects only price movement, not spreads. We also find that Nasdaq market makers quote more shares and compete more intensively on bid-side (ask-side) when public sells (buys) exceed public buys (sells). These suggest that market makers increase liquidity supply when order imbalances exist. More interestingly, we show that both market conditions and price movements affect investors' trading behavior.     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

ADVERSE SELECTION,INVENTORY‐HOLDING COSTS,AND DEPTH

We examine whether specialist depth quotes are related to the adverse‐selection and inventory‐holding‐cost components of the spread. Consistent with theory that predicts an inverse relation between depths and informed trading risk, we find that depth quotes are strongly inversely related to the adverse‐selection component of the spread. We also find that depth quotes are inversely related to the inventory‐holding‐cost component, though this relation is weaker than the relation between depths and adverse selection. Our evidence suggests cross‐sectional variation in depths is driven primarily by variation in informed trading risk, as proxied for by the adverse‐selection component, rather than by inventory concerns. JEL classification: G10, G14     

Option market making under inventory risk

We propose a mean-variance framework to analyze the optimal quoting policy of an option market maker. The market maker’s profits come from the bid-ask spreads received over the course of a trading day, while the risk comes from uncertainty in the value of his portfolio, or inventory. Within this framework, we study the impact of liquidity and market incompleteness on the optimal bid and ask prices of the option. First, we consider a market maker in a complete market, where continuous trading in a perfectly liquid underlying stock is allowed. In this setting, the market maker may remove all risk by Delta hedging, and the optimal quotes will depend on the option’s liquidity, but not on the inventory. Second, we model a market maker who may not trade continuously in the underlying stock, but rather sets bid and ask quotes in the option and this illiquid stock. We find that the optimal stock and option quotes depend on the relative liquidity of both instruments as well as on the net Delta of the inventory. Third, we consider an incomplete market with residual risks due to stochastic volatility and large overnight moves in the stock price. In this setting, the optimal quotes depend on the liquidity of the option and on the net Vega and Gamma of the inventory.      

Against the tide: the commencement of short selling and margin trading in mainland China

China's recent removal of short‐selling and margin trading bans on selected stocks enables testing of the relative effect of margin trading and short selling. We find the prices of the shortable stocks decrease, on average, relative to peer A‐shares and cross‐listed H‐shares, suggesting that short selling dominates margin trading effects. Contrary to the regulators' intention and recent developed market empirical evidence, liquidity declines and bid‐ask spreads increase in these shortable stocks. Consistent with Ausubel (1990), these results imply that uninformed investors avoid the shortable stocks to reduce the risk of trading with informed investors.     

Does proprietary day trading provide liquidity at a cost to investors?

Capitalizing on the special case of Malaysia in which proprietary day traders (PDTs) are mandated to boost liquidity and the recent availability of trading data, this paper empirically examines the liquidity effect of proprietary day trading. Using daily data spanning October 2012 to June 2018, we find evidence that PDTs' trade volume is associated with higher aggregate liquidity in the Malaysian stock market, which can be attributed to the theoretical channel of intense competition among informed traders. However, such improved liquidity comes at a cost to investors, as proprietary day trading is found to be associated with higher conditional volatility and conditional skewness of closing percent quoted spreads. The former is due to the exchange-imposed immediacy for PDTs to close their open positions, whereas the latter can be attributed to the exclusive rights granted to PDTs to engage in intraday short selling.     

Making a Market with Spreads and Depths

Abstract:   In this paper we study the quote revision behavior of NASDAQ market makers by analyzing inter‐temporal changes in their spread and depth quotes. Using individual dealer quote and trade data for a sample of 2,319 stocks, we find that NASDAQ dealers make more frequent revisions in depths than in spreads and the extent of liquidity management is greater for stocks of smaller companies, lower‐priced stocks, and stocks with larger trade sizes and fewer number of transactions. We show that intraday variation in the number of quote revisions follows the U‐shaped pattern, indicating that the extent of liquidity management is greater during the early and late hours of trading than during midday.