Electronic reverse auction configuration and its impact on buyer price and supplier perceptions of opportunism: A laboratory experiment

Buying organizations are increasingly using electronic reverse auctions (eRAs) to source from suppliers. However, recent quasi-experimental and field research has suggested that the use of this sourcing technique can create perceptions of opportunism among participating suppliers. Yet from the buyer's perspective, online reverse auctions can yield lower purchase prices. Given the many ways in which to configure on-line auctions, we extend existing research by using a laboratory experiment to investigate how different reverse auction configurations jointly influence bid price and suppliers’ perceptions of buyer opportunism.Our findings suggest that supplier bid prices decrease over time as they participate in more eRAs, regardless of the configuration of auction parameters. However, the combination of rank (versus price) visibility, high (versus low) supplier need to win a contract, and six (versus three) competitors was significantly more effective than other combinations of variables in immediately reducing bid prices. The data also indicated that when suppliers’ bids dropped substantially across auctions, their perceptions of opportunism increased. Notably, auction parameter combinations such as price visibility, three competitors, and low need for the contract yielded comparably low bids by the third auction, without any increases in perceived buyer opportunism.     

Spread determinants and the day-of-the-week effect

In this paper, we examine the determinants of the dollar bid–ask spread for each day of the week over the period 1998–2008. Using a panel cointegration approach, we estimate the determinants of the spread in both the short-run and long-run. Our main findings suggest that: (1) there are day-of-the-week effects for certain groups of firms; (2) the panel error correction model also reveals day-of-the-week effects, and the speed of adjustment to equilibrium following a shock is faster on Fridays; and (3) the effects of volume and volatility on the spread are mixed, with only some sectors experiencing the day-of-the-week effect.     

Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study

This paper considers two multi-item auction formats (ascending and sealed bid) which both identify the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theoretical properties, there are behavioral aspects that are not easily captured. To explore this issue in more detail, this paper experimentally investigates what role the design of the auction format has for its outcome. The results suggest that the sealed bid mechanism performs weakly better in all of the investigated measures (consistent reporting, efficiency etc.). In addition, we find that the performance of the ascending auction is increasing over time, whereas the sealed bid auction shows no such tendency.     

Estimating the proportion of informed and speculative traders in financial markets: evidence from exchange rate

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination - We study the Glosten–Milgrom model and estimate the proportion of informed traders or speculators using bid–ask spread and price...     

A SHARP model of bid–ask spread forecasts

This paper proposes an accurate, parsimonious and fast-to-estimate forecasting model for integer-valued time series with long memory and seasonality. The modelling is achieved through an autoregressive Poisson process with a predictable stochastic intensity that is determined by two factors: a seasonal intraday pattern and a heterogeneous autoregressive component. We call the model SHARP, which is an acronym for seasonal heterogeneous autoregressive Poisson. We also present a mixed-data sampling extension of the model, which adopts the historical information flow more efficiently and provides the best (among all the models considered) forecasting performances, empirically, for the bid–ask spreads of NYSE equity stocks. We conclude by showing how bid–ask spread forecasts based on the SHARP model can be exploited in order to reduce the total cost incurred by a trader who is willing to buy or sell a given amount of an equity stock.     

An inflated multivariate integer count hurdle model: an application to bid and ask quote dynamics

In this paper we develop a model for the conditional inflated multivariate density of integer count variables with domain ?ⁿ, n ∈ ?. Our modelling framework is based on a copula approach and can be used for a broad set of applications where the primary characteristics of the data are: (i) discrete domain; (ii) the tendency to cluster at certain outcome values; and (iii) contemporaneous dependence. These kinds of properties can be found for high‐ or ultra‐high‐frequency data describing the trading process on financial markets. We present a straightforward sampling method for such an inflated multivariate density through the application of an independence Metropolis–Hastings sampling algorithm. We demonstrate the power of our approach by modelling the conditional bivariate density of bid and ask quote changes in a high‐frequency setup. We show how to derive the implied conditional discrete density of the bid–ask spread, taking quote clusterings (at multiples of 5 ticks) into account. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian

We show that a profit maximizing monopolistic intermediary may behave approximately like a Walrasian auctioneer by setting bid and ask prices nearly equal to Walrasian equilibrium prices. In our model agents choose to trade either through the intermediary or privately. Buyers (sellers) trading through the intermediary potentially trade immediately at the ask (bid) price, but sacrifice the spread as gains. A buyer or seller who trades privately shares all the gains to trade with this trading partner, but risks costly delay in finding a partner. We show that as the cost of delay vanishes, the equilibrium bid and ask prices converge to the Walrasian equilibrium prices. Received: 2 February 1996 / Accepted: 28 March 1997     

Link-save trading

Transaction costs involved while trading several assets may be described using bid-ask spread of the asset prices. We assume that the prices of several assets may be linked, so that transactions involving several assets have prices that are not necessarily equal to the sums of (bid or ask) prices of the individual assets. The family of possible price combinations forms a convex (random) set which changes in time and is called the set-valued price process. It is shown that the necessary and sufficient condition for no-arbitrage is the existence of a martingale selection, i.e. a martingale that takes values in the set-valued price process. Examples and applications to option pricing are discussed.     

HOW DO YOU CAPTURE LIQUIDITY? A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON LOW-FREQUENCY STOCK LIQUIDITY

Researchers have various ways to measure liquidity but most of them come with both merits and demerits. This study provides a literature review of low-frequency liquidity measures with a primary focus on liquidity measurement as well as its implication on asset pricing. Based on the dimension it captures, a range of existing low-frequency measures are divided into four categories of liquidity proxies including transaction cost, volume, price impact, and multidimension-based measures. We review some well-established liquidity proxies, a new bid–ask spread estimator and price impact ratios proposed recently. Finally, we discuss how good low-frequency liquidity measures are at capturing standard liquidity benchmarks, which are constructed from high-frequency intraday data.     

Monetary general equilibrium with transaction costs

Commodity money arises endogenously in a general equilibrium model with separate budget constraints for each transaction. Transaction costs imply differing bid and ask (selling and buying) prices. The most liquid good—with the smallest proportionate bid/ask spread—becomes commodity money. General equilibrium may not be Pareto efficient. If zero-transaction-cost money is available then the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. Fiat money is an intrinsically worthless instrument. Its positive price comes from acceptability in paying taxes, and its use as a medium of exchange is based on low transaction cost.     

Learning through Simultaneous Play: Evidence from Penny Auctions

This paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature on penny auctions, a particular type of all‐pay auctions. We focus on the potential learning effects that bidders may experience over time but also (and particularly) across auctions as a result of their auction participation. Using detailed bid‐level information, we find that, similarly to earlier literature, bidders suffer from a sunk cost fallacy, whereby their probability of dropping out of an auction is decreasing in the number of bids they have already placed in that auction. Although we do find that learning through repeated participation alleviates the sunk cost fallacy, participation in simultaneous penny auctions emerges as a much more effective learning mechanism, ultimately contributing toward bidders earning higher individual surpluses.     

Fear of losing in a clock auction

We examine bidding behavior in a clock auction in which price is set by the lowest-accepted bid and provisional winners are reported each round (the LABpw auction). This format was used in the India 3G spectrum auction. In the standard theory, the auction performs poorly. In particular it yields lower revenues and is less efficient than the more standard clock auction with exit bids and highest-rejected-bid pricing (the HRB auction). However, the LABpw auction performs well in the lab, achieving higher revenues than the HRB auction. We show how fear of losing provides one motivation for the overbidding that causes higher revenues in the LABpw auction.     

He who must not be named

Landsberger et al. have studied a sealed bid first price auction with two players in which the ranking of the valuations is known. They argue that such a situation can arise in a sequential auction where only the name of the winner is revealed. In this paper we consider sequential auctions where two identical goods are sold sequentially to N players who are interested in both objects. In sealed bid auctions, no information is a priori revealed by the mechanism, but the seller can in principle reveal whatever he wants. We restrict our attention to the case where only the name of the winner is revealed to be in the context of Landsberger et al. for the second auction. The aim of the paper is to compare such a sequential auction with a simultaneous auction where both goods are sold as a bundle or equivalently with a sequential auction where no information is revealed. We first show that there exists an equilibrium of the sequential game in pure and monotone strategies. Then, the comparison of the seller's expected revenue in the two cases allows us to conclude that contrary to Landsberger et al.'s predictions, the seller can not use the information to increase his revenue. This result is obtained using simulations for a large class of distribution functions. The seller must not reveal the name of the winner between the two auctions and instead sell both goods using a simultaneous auction.Received: 31 July 2001, Accepted: 5 February 2003, JEL Classification: B44I wish to thank Laurent Linnemer, Thomas Ricke, Michael Visser and Shmuel Zamir for helpful comments and suggestions. I am very grateful to the referees and the associated editors in charge of my paper.     

房地产开发用地招拍挂制度的市场绩效研究

我国的土地出让招拍挂制度是具有重大意义的市场竞争性交易制度和社会资源配王方式.论文运用拍卖理论简要回顾了土地招拍挂制度影响市场绩效的经济学原理,对全国(2003-2005)和北京(2005-2007)城市土地有偿出让市场进行了分类统计,并以此数据为基础对招标、拍卖和挂牌三种不同出让方式的市场绩效进行了对比分析,得出了我国土地出让市场中存在理论和实践并不一致的结论,并指出了造成该问题的原因是政府对招拍挂制度的干预,最后提出了提高招拍挂制度绩效的建议.     

A model for sealed-bid auctions with independent private value and common value components

This paper shows how a decision-making model can be applied to a sealed-bid auction with both independent private value (IPV) and common value (CV) components. The model yields estimates for the winning bid and for the actual value and error components of the winning bid as functions of the number of bidders and the underlying value and error distributions, assuming that these distributions are normal. The winner's curse and the special cases of IPV and CV auctions are examined using the model.     

The effect of bid withdrawal in a multi-object auction

The Federal Communications Commission currently utilizes a simultaneous multi-round ascending bid auction to allocate Personal Communication Services licenses. In the auction, participants are allowed to withdraw standing bids at a penalty. The penalty is equal to the maximum of zero or the difference between the value of the withdrawn bid on a license and the highest bid after the withdrawal on that license. The withdrawal rule is designed to assist bidders wishing to assemble combinations of licenses who find themselves stranded with an assortment of licenses for which their bids sum to more than their value. This paper reports results of experiments that examine the effect of the withdrawal rule in environments in which losses can occur if packages of licenses must be assembled piecemeal. The experiments demonstrate that there is a tradeoff with using the rule: efficiency and revenue increase, but individual losses are larger. Furthermore, the increased efficiency does not outweigh the higher prices paid so that bidder surplus falls in the presence of the withdrawal rule. Received: 10 October 1997 / Accepted: 10 September 1998     

Auctions with endogenous participation

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999     

Information Consequences of Accounting Conservatism

Abstract

We study the information consequences of conservatism in accounting. Prior research shows that information asymmetries in capital markets lead to firm-level increases in conservatism. In this paper, we further argue that increases in conservatism improve the firm information environment and lead to subsequent decreases in information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders. We predict and test if this decrease in information asymmetries manifests itself through: (a) a decrease in the bid–ask spread and in stock-returns volatility, and (b) an improved information environment for financial analysts, leading to more precise and less dispersed forecasts, and to more analysts following the firm. Using a large US sample for the period 1977–2007 and several proxies for conservatism we find robust evidence consistent with our expectations. Our results are in line with conservatism being useful not only for debt-holders, but also for equity-holders.     

Bid-ask dynamic pricing in financial markets with transaction costs and liquidity risk

According to the classic no arbitrage theory of asset pricing, in a frictionless market a No Free Lunch dynamic price process associated with any essentially bounded asset is a martingale under an equivalent probability measure. However, real financial markets are not frictionless. We introduce an axiomatic approach of Time Consistent Pricing Procedure (TCPP), in a model free setting, to assign to every financial position a dynamic ask (resp. bid) price process. Taking into account both transaction costs and liquidity risk this leads to the convexity (resp. concavity) of the ask (resp. bid) price. We prove that the No Free Lunch condition for a TCPP is equivalent to the existence of an equivalent probability measure R that transforms a process between the bid price process and the ask price process of every financial instrument into a martingale. Furthermore we prove that the ask (resp. bid) price process associated with every financial instrument is then a R super-martingale (resp. R sub-martingale) which has a càdlàg version.