公司治理的若干维度及与代理冲突之间的关系

现代企业在降低交易成本的同时,也产生了代理成本。基于缓解代理成本目的而提出公司治理概念在实证层面具有多个度量维度,并非所有维度下的公司治理对于代理冲突都具有相同的效应。基于国内外文献,文章分析了基于表现形式、行为主体和与制度环境关系的公司治理度量与代理冲突之间的关系。清晰认识公司治理的度量维度及与代理冲突之间的关系,有助于完善公司治理相关研究的假设的提出、度量变量的选择和研究结果的解释。     

Democracy,rule of law,and corporate governance—a liquidity perspective

This study examines whether and how democracy and rule of law—two overarching country-level governance variables—influence corporate governance. Given that corporate liquidity (cash holdings) is a good channel for examining the quality of corporate governance, the effects of democracy and rule of law on corporate governance can be identified using the liquidity approach. A review of 67 countries from 1996 to 2010 demonstrates that democracy and rule of law indeed have bearings on corporate governance. More specifically, results indicate that firms are more inclined to hoard cash to take advantage of growth opportunities when the level of democracy is higher or rule of law is stronger, suggesting that agency costs are lower and interests of managers and shareholders are more aligned under such circumstances. In addition, the negative effect of debt issuance and dividend payment on cash is more pronounced when the level of democracy is higher or rule of law is stronger, suggesting that these two approaches become more effective in reducing agency costs and transitively cash holdings under such circumstances. Moreover, the positive effect of democracy and rule of law on corporate governance appears to be reinforced when rule of law is stronger and the level of democracy is higher, respectively. Furthermore, higher level of economic development helps reap the benefit of democracy and rule of law in terms of improving corporate governance and reducing agency costs.     

Agency costs,corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis

This paper examines the impact of governance and ownership variables on agency costs for a panel of large UK quoted companies. We use three measures of agency costs: the ratio of sales-to-total assets, the interaction of free cash flows and growth prospects and the number of acquisitions. We employ a range of techniques to analyse the data: fixed-effects, instrumental variables, and Tobit regressions. We find that the changes in board structures that have occurred in the post-Cadbury period have not, generally, affected agency costs. This suggests a range of mechanisms is consistent with firm value maximisation. We also find that having a nomination committee increases agency costs, which indicates that there are costs associated with certain governance mechanisms. Increasing board ownership also helps to reduce agency costs. We also find that debt reduces agency costs. Our results raise questions about the usefulness of the information sent to shareholders when firms adopt a recommended governance framework.     

Agency Theory,Institutional Sensitivity,and Inductive Reasoning: Towards a Legal Perspective

Making agency theory institutionally sensitive is a reasonable suggestion, as far as normal science stands. However, we argue that such a move has already been taking place, that it cannot address important problems with agency theory, and that the time is ripe for a critical re‐examination of this theory. We suggest that inductive studies can not only be more sensitive to institutional features than deductive studies, but they can also offer deeper understanding of governance practices in specific contexts, as well as the potential for analytical or moderatum generalizations. Drawing from legal theory, we offer an alternative conception of the principal, and of the role and status of the board of directors. We contend that this reformulated agency theory has a greater potential of being institutionally sensitive because it recognizes various stakeholders as team members, rather than just adding specific institutional features as variables to the dominant conception of agency theory.     

代理问题及其缓解机制——兼论会计信息及公司治理的作用

股东和经理人之间代理问题形成的根源在于所有权与经营权的分离。由于经理人和股东在目标函数、风险偏好、期限视野上的不一致导致经理人的行为偏离股东的最优目标。缓解代理问题的机制包括公司内部的经理人报酬设计、公司治理结构安排,外部机制包括经理人市场、资本市场、公司控制权市场及产品市场的约束。文章还讨论了信息,尤其是会计信息在缓解代理问题中的作用。     

企业经营行为短期化的"桎梏"审视

现代企业的一个显著特征是所有权与经营权的分离,这种私有产权的分离和让渡使公司从指导对生产活动和技能的大规模专门化中获取了收益,但收益增加的同时也产生了一种特殊成本--代理成本。代理成本是由一系列代理问题所引起的企业实际收益与预期的偏差,因而代理问题成为公司治理的主要问题。本文讨论的经营行为短期化是代理问题的重要表现,直接影响到企业的长远发展,也被认为是公司制企业发展最为完善的美国各大企业近年来竞争力减弱的重要原因之一。     

Managerial Objectives and the Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organizations

By investigating managerial objectives, we test the simultaneous need for both control (agency theory) and collaboration (stewardship theory) in public and non-profit governance. We construct a discrete choice experiment to elicit preferences of managers in Belgian public and non-profit nursing homes. The results confirm that boards of nursing homes may experience pressure to simultaneously control and collaborate with their managers, thereby suggesting that agency and stewardship theory can be combined into a more general internal governance framework. We conclude by providing some policy implications to improve public and non-profit governance.     

Social trust environment and firm tax avoidance: Evidence from China

We examine the impact of the social trust environment in which a firm is located on its tax avoidance in China and paying attention to the moderating effect of corporate governance and state-ownership. Drawing from theoretical and empirical work on firm tax avoidance and manager–shareholder agency conflict, we hypothesize that social trust can lower firm tax avoidance. It is because a high social trust environment can reduce agency conflict so that tax avoidance is less. Our findings are consistent with our hypothesis, and robust to a battery of robustness tests. Furthermore, we document that the association between social trust and firm tax avoidance is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance and state-owned. Moreover, we find that firms in more trustworthy provinces present less general and administrative expenses and higher asset turnover, corroborating our theoretical foundations with respect to agency cost in our hypothesis. Our findings suggest that social trust and its interactions with corporate governance and state ownership are important internal and external determinants on the variations in tax avoidance.     

受托责任观下的企业年金基金会计模式

本文对中国企业年金信托型治理结构中的代理问题和受托责任进行了分析,认为加强信息披露有助于改善企业年金基金治理。新颁布的企业年金基金准则,旨在规范企业年全基金向利益相关方披露财务状况、受托运营业绩和受托责任履行情况等方面的信息。然而,企业和企业年金基金这两个不同的会计主体在确认、计量和列报等方面存在诸多差异。本文从财务报告目标、会计要素的确认和计量、财务报表、应付受益人待遇、会计与报告主体、会计确认基础六个角度对比进行分析评价,并提出相关的建议。     

The existence of sampling designs with preassigned inclusion probabilities

Summary The question of the existence of a sampling design realizing given preassigned inclusion probabilities is treated. The question can be fully answered in the case of inclusion probabilities of first order. If the inclusion probabilities of second order are given it is shown why necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a corresponding sampling design can be derived only in very special cases.     

现代企业理论及其对我国公司治理的启示

本文认为,现代企业理论是公司治理研究的理论基础,企业是一系列契约的联结;契约是不完备的;所有权安排是重要的。公司治理则更侧重于分析企业内部组织结构与企业成员之间的代理关系。股份制改革是我国企业改革的方向,公司治理改革则是股份制改革的核心。按照现代企业理论和公司治理理论,我国公司治理要解决的基本问题是激励问题和经营者选择问题;剩余索取权与控制权的均衡问题;要使经理的补偿收入同公司经营业绩相联系。     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

公司治理结构对财务报告品质可靠性的影响*——从盈余门坎的角度分析

研究重点在于探讨台湾上市公司治理结构是否会影响公司财务报告品质可靠性.由于台湾上市公司的核心代理问题主要来自控制股东与小股东之间的利益冲突.本文预期,控制股东会通过盈余管理达到门坎.实证结果发现,代理问题较严重的公司,裁决性应计项目较大,并会通过盈余管理跨越前期盈余门坎,造成财务报告信息可靠性降低.相较于其他类型的控制股东,具有家族色彩的控制股东较会通过盈余管理达到门坎,并降低财务信息品质可靠性.     

Information disclosure ratings and managerial short-termism: An empirical investigation of the Chinese stock market

Information asymmetry between managers and outside investors creates agency problems and impedes efficient capital allocation. Information disclosure is critical in alleviating information asymmetry in capital markets. This study investigates the effect of information asymmetry on managerial short-termism by examining information disclosure ratings (IDRs). Using real earnings management as a proxy for managerial short-termism, our analysis of a sample of Chinese A-share companies during 2001–2018 indicates that high IDRs mitigate managerial short-termism. The results also indicate that the effect of IDRs in reducing managerial short-termism is driven mainly by stock liquidity. This conclusion holds after consideration of endogeneity and application of two-stage least-squares and generalized method of moments methods, adjustment of the definition of IDRs, consideration of alternative proxies for managerial short-termism, and control for firm characteristics that might affect the extent of managerial short-termism. This study also examines the effects within three subsamples: companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board, small and medium enterprise board, and growth enterprise market board. IDRs substantially reduce managerial short-termism among firms listed on all three boards. These findings indicate that enterprises have corrected previous internal governance problems, and IDRs have helped to improve internal governance through stock liquidity. Therefore, external supervision also helps to reduce the agency problem of managerial short-termism.

     

Are All Private Benefits of Control Ineffective? Principal–Principal Benefits,External Governance Quality,and Firm Performance

Private benefits of control (PBC) are benefits that controlling shareholders consume, but that are not shared with minority shareholders. Research focusing on the value protection role of corporate governance typically frames PBC as principal–principal (PP) agency costs, and interprets them as a form of minority shareholder expropriation that decreases firm performance. Taking a value creation perspective of corporate governance, however, we propose a more nuanced role for PBC. Specifically, we see them also as PP agency benefits that compensate controlling shareholders for their monitoring and advisory services, which can increase firm performance. Since both PP costs and benefits affect firm performance, we theorize that PBC enhance firm performance at a diminishing rate. Furthermore, we show that the effect of PBC on firm performance is more positive when country‐level external governance mechanisms are strong.     

构建适应教育产业化的高校财务控制机制

当前,我国高校财务治理结构存在着诸多问题,直接影响着学校的内部财务控制机制的建立。本文提出,应在教职工大会、校务会和财经领导小组的委托代理链条上分别设置审计委员会、内部审计机构和总会计师,建立起适应教育产业化的高校财务控制机制。     

财务会计信息与公司治理

财务会计系统不但给公司控制机制提供直接的财务信息,而且还提供股票价格中反映的所有间接信息。会计治理研究中的一个基本目标是为财务会计提供的信息,在多大程度上减缓由所有权和经营权两权分离所带来的代理问题,以及减少信息不对称问题提供证据。本文着重探讨财务会计信息在公司治理机制中的作用,公司治理机制对财务会计信息反作用的互动研究,并提出了公司治理的对策。     

剩余控制权配置与家族企业继任冲突——香港新鸿基地产控制权争夺事件的案例研究

华人社会盛行的诸子析产制是代际传承中分裂家族和家族企业的根本原因吗?本文通过剖析香港新鸿基地产控制权争夺事件的案例发现,在代际传承过程中分离剩余索取权和控制权,集中配置剩余控制权并未根本解决上述问题,原因在于这种产权安排造成了控制权与剩余索取权的不对称,甚至控制权反向控制剩余控制权的情况,在代际传承导致家族原有内部治理...     

Governance practices and agency cost in emerging market: Evidence from India

In this study, we examine whether governance practices brings down agency cost. We find that board size, board attendance, and CEO duality are important governance characteristics that influence the agency cost. We also bring out systematic differences in governance practices of the business group affiliated firms and stand‐alone firms. Larger board and proportion of independent director helps in reducing the agency cost for group affiliated firms supporting monitoring hypothesis. On the other hand, the governance structure of stand‐alone firms supports commitment hypothesis where we observe that board busyness and CEO duality help in reducing the agency cost.     

Agency Problems in Diverse Contexts: A Global Perspective

abstract    Bruce, Buck and Main (2005 ) offer two criticisms of agency theory as a valid model of executive behaviour. First, they suggest that because researchers have failed to find a strong empirical link between executive pay and firm performance, and since this research generally rests on models derived from agency theory, then we must question the theory. Second, they suggest that agency theory is under-socialized and therefore lacks generalizability to settings where social solutions would seem to eliminate the agency problem. In our response we make three points. First, agency theory rests on an assumption of self-interest that does not necessarily reflect opportunism. Second, agency theory does not make any reference to pay-performance sensitivity, and the failure of this research can be attributable to a variety of problems with the research. Third, we agree that agency theory does not explicitly recognize contextual factors, but suggest that this abstraction from context, gives agency theory greater generalizability. Finally, we review the UK and German contexts discussed by Bruce, Buck and Main to show that socialized solutions do not prevent the occurrence of agency problems.