A Classroom Tariff-Setting Game

The author outlines a classroom tariff-setting game that allows students to explore the consequences of import tariffs imposed by large countries (countries able to influence world prices). Groups of students represent countries, which are organized into trading pairs. Each group's objective is to maximize welfare by choosing an appropriate ad valorem tariff that may be changed intermittently throughout the game. The game is built on a computable general-equilibrium model, which allows each nation's utility and terms of trade under alternative tariff regimes to be expressed quantitatively. The exercise encourages students to consider terms-of-trade improvements and efficiency losses resulting from large-country tariffs and provides a framework to discuss the Nash equilibrium of a tariff war. The game is a useful supplement to traditional teaching methods.     

Reforming Tariffs and Subsidies in International Trade

This paper analyzes unilateral and multilateral reform of ad valorem tariffs and subsidies. The paper shows that under substitutability, extensive subsidization of exports is required for an increase in the lowest tariff rate to raise economic welfare. The paper derives also conditions for when a radial reduction of ad valorem tariffs and subsidies may fail to raise economic welfare.     

A Note on Ad Valorem and Per Unit Taxation in an Oligopoly Model

This note shows that per unit taxation welfare dominates ad valorem taxation in an oligopoly model, when the number of consumers is sufficiently high compared to the number of oligopolists. It aims to provide an alternative perspective to existing literature arguing instead the dominance of ad valorem over per unit taxation in oligopoly frameworks. Our result is obtained in a simple example which uses a strategic market game formulation to study strategic behavior at a general equilibrium level.     

Smuggling and Bhagwati's Nonequivalence Between Tariffs and Quotas

The authors extend Professor Bhagwati's analysis about the nonequivalence between trade policy instruments when domestic production is monopolized and the terms of trade are endogenous, by allowing for smuggling. They show that the dominance of the ad valorem tariff over the quota is not robust. Tariffication can lower welfare even when the level of illegal imports is quite small. However, tariffication with a specific tariff is always beneficial because the specific tariff dominates the ad valorem tariff and the quota with or without smuggling. Smuggling (or the threat) also tends to lower the second–best tariff/quota, and increases welfare when imports are restricted by a quota, but lowers it under a tariff.     

The Possibility of Inefficient Liberalization Through Tariffication*

A typical step in trade liberalization under the GATT is tariffication—the conversion of quantitative import restrictions to their ad valorem tariff equivalents. This paper shows that, if there is market power in the protected industry, tariffication may cause a global efficiency loss. In particular, in a small country, if the protected industry is a monopoly that is freely able to export but cannot profitably do so, then tariffication unambiguously imposes global efficiency costs. In a large country, the global efficiency effects are uncertain a priori. In both cases, however, tariffication unambiguously benefits the monopoly and lowers foreign welfare.     

Welfare‐ranking ad valorem and specific tariffs under monopolistic competition

Abstract.  Actual trade and tariff policy prefers ad valorem tariffs to specific tariffs. Yet in this paper we show that, in a setting of monopolistic competition, realizing a given restriction on imports via a specific tariff would generate more consumer utility than obtaining the same restriction via an ad valorem tariff. JEL classification: F12     

Trade taxes and subsidies with imperfect competition

Traditional results in the theory of international trade suggest that a country large enough to influence world prices can raise its national income by levying a tariff. In a partial equilibrium model Brander and Spencer (1984) suggest that a country facing a monopolistic supplier of importables may find it optimal to subsidize this activity rather that tax it. This result is reconsidered in a general equilibrium framework. It is, in general, correct; but specific and ad valorem forms of taxation may yield different results.     

Commodity taxes and welfare under endogenous market conduct

We consider consumption taxes in a model of endogenous Cournot versus Bertrand competition. It is argued that when the choice of unit versus ad valorem taxes affects longer-term decisions beyond the customary price or quantity decisions, the mix of the two taxes co-determines market conduct. This gives ad valorem taxes an anti-competitive effect that harms ad valorem taxes’ efficiency in comparison with unit taxes. We show that a mix of the taxes—or a unit tax alone if we compare one or the other of the taxes—is sometimes welfare superior on account of consumer-price and tax revenue effects. A practical implication of our findings is that pass-through rates are only sometimes useful guides for policy. In fact, we show when the proper response to demand for higher revenue is a higher unit tax rate and a lower ad valorem tax rate.     

Welfare–maximizing and revenue–maximizing tariffs with a few domestic firms

In this paper we compare the orthodox optimal tariff formula with the appropriate welfare–maximizing tariff when there are a few producing or importing firms. The welfare–maximizing tariff can be very low, voire negative in some cases, while in others it can even exceed the maximum–revenue tariff. The relationship between the welfare–maximizing tariff and the number of firms need not be monotonically increasing, because the tariff is not strictly used to internalize terms of trade externality. It is also used to manipulate cost asymmetries between producing and importing firms. Welfare–maximizing specific tariffs are never worse than their ad valorem counterparts. JEL Classification F13, L13
Tarif qui maximise le bien être et tarif qui maximise le revenu quand on est en présence de peu de firmes. Nous comparons le tarif optimal orthodoxe au tarif maximisant le bien être lorsqu'il y a peu de firmes productrices ou importatrices. Le tarif qui maximise le bien être est parfois très bas, même négatif, mais il peut excéder le tarif qui maximise le revenu dans d'autres cas. La relation entre le tarif et le nombre de firmes n'est pas nécessairement monotone parce que le tarif n'est pas strictement utilisé pour améliorer les termes d'échange. Il est aussi utilisé pour manipuler les asymétries dans les coûts des firmes productrices et importatrices. Le tarif spécifique n'est jamais dominé par le tarif ad valorem.     

Oligopoly and the redistribution of market share under commodity taxation

This paper examines the effect of ad valorem and specific commodity taxation on firm market share in a duopoly where firms have different costs. Two reasons suggested for these cost asymmetries are inter-firm differences in efficiency and differences in product quality. When cost differences are efficiency-based, then specific and ad valorem commodity taxation increases the market share of the lower-cost firm and decreases the market share of the higher-cost firm. If the cost difference results from differing product quality, the specific tax increases the market share of the high quality (higher-cost) firm and decreases the market share of the low quality (lower-cost) firm, whereas, the ad valorem tax has just the opposite effect.     

Specific taxation,asymmetric costs,and endogenous quality

This paper shows how a specific tax—in contrast to an ad valorem tax—alters industry structure and firm-level performance in a monopolistic competition framework, where firms chose product quality endogenously and differ exogenously in productivity (i.e., marginal production efficiency). Industry equilibrium mechanisms and selection based on productivity play a significant role: A specific tax shifts market shares and profits toward firms with costs and prices above the industry average at the expense of low-cost firms. This reallocation of market shares releases a novel scale effect such that low-cost firms may quality downgrade, while high-cost firms always quality upgrade. There exists a parameter subspace, where this combines to a decrease on average quality for the industry. In comparison: An ad valorem tax only reduces the number of firms/varieties in the industry due to demand absorption, but affects neither firm-level performance nor industry structure.     

Revenue raising trade-restricting policies under uncertainty: The sub-optimality of the expected welfare criterion and some safety-first results

The analysis of trade-restricting policies under uncertainty has typically argued in favour of the specific tariff over alternative commercial policies such as the ad valorem tariff and the quota, when the raising of revenue and maintenance of consumer's welfare are the policy objectives. This paper reconsiders this result. It is demonstrated that, when the shape of the welfare probability distribution is considered explicitly, the quota may be the dominant trade-restricting policy. In addition, the analysis of trade-restricting instruments is analysed for the case where the principle of safety-first is applied to the revenue-raising objective.We should like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Choice and design of regulatory instruments in the presence of green consumers

Using a vertically differentiated product model, this paper examines welfare implications of various government policies in a situation where consumers are environmentally discerning. It studies ad valorem taxes/subsidies and emission taxes. The optimal policy depends on the magnitude of damage parameter associated with environmental externality. For a given distribution of tastes and preferences, as the damage parameter increases from a low to a high value, the optimal policy shifts from an ad valorem tax to an ad valorem subsidy. It also shows that for a sufficiently low damage parameter, an ad valorem tax dominates an emission tax.     

WELFARE COST OF AN OIL IMPORT FEE

This paper examines the impacts on the US. oil market of a $5-per-barrel tariff on imported crude oil. The analysis shows that the United States currently is a price taker in the world oil market. This means that "optimal tariff" arguments for an oil import fee have no validity. The author also argues that any economic losses that oil supply disruptions generate are better addressed with alternative policy tools. To forecast the effects of the tariff on US. production, the author uses a domestic oil supply model that she developed elsewhere. She calculates the resulting gains in producer surplus and then combines them with an estimate of consumer surplus losses and government revenues so as to yield an estimate of the tariff's welfare cost. This welfare cost amounts to approximately $17 billion (in present-value terms) over the 1988–1998 period.     

Revenue-Constrained Combination of an Optimal Tariff and Duty Drawback

A duty drawback is an export subsidy determined as a percentage of the tariffs paid on the imported inputs used in its production. This paper examines the revenue-constrained optimal tariff structure in a small open economy including a duty drawback as a trade policy tool. This paper has two main aims. First, we show that the revenue-constrained optimal combination of tariff and duty drawback for a given revenue level is not unique. Second, we show that if the optimal import tariff rates are all positive when the duty drawback rate is zero, then the optimal import tariff rates are always positive when the duty drawback is positive.     

Stackelberg竞争条件下的最佳福利关税与最大收入关税

文章考察Stackelberg竞争条件下的最佳福利关税与最大收入关税。分析表明,最佳福利关税与最大收入关税的相对大小主要取决于产品之间的相互关系和国内外企业的成本差异。当产品是互补品时,最佳福利关税总是小于最大收入关税;当产品是替代品时,最佳福利关税与最大收入关税的关系,既取决于产品间的替代程度又取决于国内外企业间的成本差异。产品的替代程度较弱时,最大收入关税总是大于最佳福利关税;产品的替代程度较强时,若国内外厂商间的成本差异越小,则最佳福利关税越有可能超过最大收入关税。     

How should commodities be taxed?: Market structure,product heterogeneity and the optimal structure of commodity taxes

This paper is concerned with the form in which commodity taxes are best imposed, and particularly with the appropriate balance between specific and ad valorem components. This neglected issue is of policy importance in relation to the harmonization of tax structures within the EEC, and of theoretical interest as a point of contact between optimal tax theory and models of non-price competition. The roles of the two taxes as purely corrective devices under a variety of market forms are established and discussed. The analysis suggests that heavily taxed commodities should normally be subject to high specific rather than high ad valorem taxes.     

Shipping the good fish out? An empirical study on the EU seafood imports under the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences

The impact of the EU (European Union) Generalized System of Preference (GSP) on the relative EU’s demand for seafood quality was evaluated in the study. We first explored the theoretical Alchian–Allen result of change in ad valorem tariffs in an n–good world, and then tested this result in the empirical study. The theoretical analysis suggests that whether a reduced ad valorem tariff in an n–good case raises the relative demand for high-value goods depends not only on the substitutability between high-value and low-value goods but also on the substitutability between these similar goods with their weak substitutes. In the empirical sections, we first estimated the elasticities of the substitutions and then used these elasticities to evaluate the quality composition of the EU’s seafood imports from the beneficiary countries. The empirical results in general confirm the occurrence of ‘shipping the good fish out’ due to the reduced tariff rates under the EU’s GSP arrangements.     

Will Economic Partnership Agreements Increase Poverty? The Case of Uganda

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and African Caribbean and Pacific countries are frequently criticized because of fears about negative implications for economic development. Using Uganda as a case study, this paper employs an integrated computable general equilibrium‐microsimulation model framework rich in household‐level detail to assess the consequences of the East African Community EPA for economic output and poverty in Uganda. Simulations of the agreement's tariff liberalization provisions indicate a very small negative economic impact and ambiguous outcomes for poverty. The poverty results depend in size and sign on the poverty line, on the way the government addresses tariff revenue losses and on labor market assumptions.     

How does a public innovator license a foreign rival?

This paper uniquely considers the optimal two‐part fee of a public firm innovator licensing to a more efficient foreign rival. This is both theoretically interesting and empirically relevant. While previous research emphasises the importance of fixed fees for public firms, we show that, in this case, ad valorem fees typically dominate both fixed fees and per unit royalties. This domination carries over when a private domestic competitor is also added to the market.