McGrath v Riddell: A flexible approach to the insolvency distribution rules?

The rules relating to the division of the insolvent estate assume considerable importance in the field of international insolvencies, where different legal systems interact. International instruments including the European insolvency regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency have provided a framework which governs the relationship between local and foreign distribution schemes. For English lawyers, questions remain however regarding the future role of the courts' statutory power to cooperate with the courts of ‘relevant’ countries or territories, and of the common law principle of universalism. An important issue connected to the determination of such questions is the established judicial approach to the pari passu rule, in the application of domestic law. This paper examines the manifestation of this tension in the litigation arising from the collapse of the HIH Casualty & General Insurance group of companies. It notes the scope which remains for continued resort to the statutory power of cooperation, and the potential for the Cross‐Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 to encourage a more flexible approach to resolving differences between distribution schemes. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Overreaction to Intra‐industry Information Transfers?

Prior research has documented that earnings announcements provide information not only about the announcing firm but also about other firms in the same industry. We document a stock market anomaly associated with this phenomenon of intra-industry information transfers by showing that the stock price movements of late announcers in response to earnings reported by early announcers are negatively related to subsequent price responses of late announcers to their own earnings reports. Apparently, the stock market overestimates the intra-industry implications of early announcers' earnings for late announcers' earnings, and that overestimation is corrected when late announcers disclose their earnings.     

When Hong Kong becomes SAR,is the mainland ready? Problems of judgments recognition in cross‐border insolvency matters

After Hong Kong's handover in the year 1997 to the People's Republic of China (PRC), two judicial systems began to operate in parallel in one country. To date, judicial convergence in cross‐border insolvency matters has not yet been established between the mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). By reviewing several recent court decisions, this article demonstrates some problems of judgment recognition in matters of cross‐border insolvency between the two regions. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta‐Analysis

The short‐run increase in prices following an unexpected tightening of monetary policy constitutes a puzzle frequently reported in empirical studies. Yet the puzzle is easy to explain away when all published models are quantitatively reviewed. We collect and examine about 1,000 point estimates of impulse responses from 70 articles that use vector autoregressions to study monetary transmission in various countries. We find that the puzzle is created by model misspecifications: especially by the omission of commodity prices, neglect of potential output, and reliance on recursive identification. Our results also suggest that the strength of monetary policy depends on the country’s openness, phase of the economic cycle, and degree of central bank independence.     

Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States

We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.     

Marking‐to‐Market: Panacea or Pandora's Box?

Financial institutions have been at the forefront of the debate on the controversial shift in international standards from historical cost accounting to mark‐to‐market accounting. We show that the trade‐offs at stake in this debate are far from one‐sided. While the historical cost regime leads to some inefficiencies, marking‐to‐market may lead to other types of inefficiencies by injecting artificial risk that degrades the information value of prices, and induces suboptimal real decisions. We construct a framework that can weigh the pros and cons. We find that the damage done by marking‐to‐market is greatest when claims are (1) long–lived, (2) illiquid, and (3) senior. These are precisely the attributes of the key balance sheet items of banks and insurance companies. Our results therefore shed light on why banks and insurance companies have been the most vocal opponents of the shift to marking‐to‐market.     

When Is a Treasury Security On‐the‐Run?

The literature contains two conflicting definitions of the on‐the‐run period for Treasury securities. We address the conflict by empirically examining the implications of the two definitions. We conclude that it is important that researchers clearly understand the implications of each definition. Our results suggest that on‐the‐run activity spans different auction calendar time in T‐notes and T‐bills.     

SME Reporting in Australia: Where to Now for Decision‐usefulness?

This paper develops recommendations for simplified decision‐useful SME financial reporting in Australia – a country that has traditionally allowed a wide range of reporting standards to be used by these entities. Drawing on interviews and comment letters from a number of stakeholders, and data from a survey of users of financial statements of non‐publicly accountable unlisted entities, we analyse stakeholder arguments for and against SMEs providing less detailed reports, and identify the line items that might be most useful to users for decision making.     

Do Not‐For‐Profits Need Their Own Conceptual Framework?

This paper raises the issue of whether not‐for‐profit (NFP) oganisations require a conceptual framework that acknowledges their mission imperative and enables them to discharge their broader accountability. Relying on publicly available documentation and literature, it suggests the current Conceptual Frameworks for the for‐profit and public sectors are inadequate in meeting the accountability needs of NFPs. A NFP‐specific conceptual framework would allow the demonstration of broader NFP‐specific accountability and the formulation of NFP‐appropriate reporting practice, including the provision of financial and non‐financial reporting. The paper thus theoretically challenges existing financial reporting arrangements and invites debate on their future direction.     

Do Poorly Governed Acquirers Transfer Wealth to Targets in Cross‐Border Acquisitions?

We use the number of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) as a proxy for corporate governance and examine its impact in US domestic and foreign acquisitions made by US acquirers. We find that the targets of poorly governed acquirers earn higher postannouncement premiums, despite controls for deal characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and country‐level protections, suggesting that these acquirers overpay. Puzzlingly, in contrast with the domestic US findings of Masulis, Wang, and Xie, poorly governed acquirers in cross‐border deals experience higher announcement period returns. The relation between governance and target returns appears concave, but this nonlinearity disappears once differences in country‐level governance and deal characteristics are accounted for.     

Do Investment Banks Have Incentives to Help Clients Make Value‐Creating Acquisitions?

Many have long suspected that investment banks, when advising corporate clients on potential acquisitions, have strong incentives just to “get the deal done” with little if any motive for urging clients to walk away from “bad” deals. The incentive to complete deals comes from compensation arrangements in which the bulk of the bankers' fees depend upon completion of the deals. Several earlier studies have provided support for this suspicion by reporting findings that show banks' market shares of advisory services depending mainly on two variables—their previous market shares and their deal completion rate—with little if any connection to the value created (or destroyed) for their clients' shareholders. In their recently published study, the authors revisit that relationship and reach a number of different conclusions: (1) advisors in acquisitions that create more value for clients are more likely to be chosen for future deals; (2) the changes in bankers' advisory market shares are strongly related to the value created for prior clients; and (3) the changes in banks' market values are positively correlated with the value created for their acquirer clients. In sum, the findings suggest that banks have significant market‐related incentives to advise their clients to pursue value‐creating acquisitions and to avoid deals likely to reduce their market values.     

Raise Rates to Raise Inflation? Neo‐Fisherianism in the New Keynesian Model

Increasing the inflation target in a New Keynesian (NK) model may require increasing, rather than decreasing, the nominal interest rate in the short run. We refer to this positive short‐run comovement between the nominal rates and inflation conditional on a nominal shock as Neo‐Fisherianism. We show that the NK model is more likely to be Neo‐Fisherian the more persistent is the change in the inflation target and the more flexible are prices. Neo‐Fisherianism is driven by the forward‐looking nature of the model. Modifications that make the framework less forward‐looking make it less likely for the model to exhibit Neo‐Fisherianism.     

How Do Quasi‐Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk‐Taking?

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk‐taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk‐averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multiyear compensation plans, which generate two distinct types of variation in the timing of when large increases in new at‐the‐money options are granted. We find that, given average grant levels during our sample period, a 10% increase in new options granted leads to a 2.8% to 4.2% increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk is driven largely by increased leverage.     

Are Stock‐for‐Stock Acquirers of Unlisted Targets Really Less Overvalued?

Extant studies assume that targets’ private ownership mitigates acquirers’ incentives and opportunities to finance acquisitions with inflated stocks. This view stems from the observation that, although the average stock‐for‐stock acquirer's merger announcement return is negative when the target is listed, it is positive when the target is unlisted. Accordingly, extant studies often suggest that announcements of stock‐for‐stock acquisitions of unlisted targets convey favorable private information about the acquirers. However, an analysis of stock‐for‐stock acquirers’ stock performance, abnormal accruals, net operating assets, and insider trading suggests the opposite. Acquirers of unlisted targets are generally more overvalued than acquirers of listed targets.     

What Drives Sell‐Side Analyst Compensation at High‐Status Investment Banks?

We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to “All‐Star” recognition, investment‐banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination based. Additional analyses indicate that “All‐Star” recognition proxies for buy‐side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment‐banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high‐status bank and obtain similar results.     

Copula‐Based Formulas to Estimate Unexpected Credit Losses (The Future of Basel Accords?)

The model used to estimate the capital required to cover unexpected credit losses in financial institutions (Basel II) has some drawbacks that reduce its ability to capture potential joint extreme losses in downturns. This paper suggests an alternative approach based on Copula Theory to overcome such flaws. Similarly to Basel II, the suggested model assumes that defaults are driven by a latent variable which varies as a response to an unobserved factor. On the other hand, the use of copulas allows the identification of asymmetric dependence between defaults which has been registered in the literature. As an example, a specific copula family (Clayton) is adopted to represent the association between the latent variables and a formula to estimate potential unexpected losses at a certain level of confidence is derived. Simulations reveal that, in most of the cases, the alternative model outperforms Basel II for portfolios with right‐tail‐dependent probabilities of default (supposedly, a good representation for real loan portfolios).     

Has Financial Regulation Been a Flop? (or How to Reform Dodd‐Frank)

Recent bank regulations have imposed large compliance costs on banks of all sizes, and have increased the costs of borrowing to both consumers and companies. But in this summary of his recent book, the author argues that the problems with banking system regulation go well beyond the excessive costs. Indeed, Dodd‐Frank and other post‐crisis regulatory reforms have failed to address the major shortcomings that produced the crisis of 2007–2009. Most importantly, excessive housing finance risk was not dealt with adequately, and is already on the rise again. And prudential standards for banks, while much stricter, remain unreliable in a severe economic downturn. After providing evidence of the shortcomings of major parts of the regulatory structure created after 2008, the author points to fundamental problems in the thinking underlying the post‐crisis regulatory changes that made those reforms unlikely to succeed. Moreover, he argues that the new processes of financial regulation have fostered many abuses of the rule of law, which have politicized regulation, adding to its cost and discrediting important supervisory and regulatory agencies. The author suggests that simpler, more effective, less costly, and more respectable approaches to regulation are possible. He offers a set of principles to guide reform and proposes over 20 specific actions that would enhance the effectiveness, reduce the costs, and improve the processes of bank regulation.     

Can Interest‐Bearing Money Circulate? A Small‐Denomination Arkansan Experiment, 1861–63

Legal restrictions theory suggests that dominance of non-interest-bearing currency is possible only because legal impediments prevent financial institutions from offering interest-bearing alternatives. A viable interest-bearing medium must be issued in denominations low enough for day-to-day use, however, and without historical examples of small-denomination interest-bearing issues we cannot properly test whether interest-bearing currency will circulate as legal restrictions theory predicts. Civil War Arkansas offers a rare instance where large quantities of small-denomination interest-bearing money were actually issued, mostly below $5. The results of this Arkansan experiment show that small-denomination interest-bearing issues can indeed function as the primary medium of exchange.     

Risk‐Sharing or Risk‐Taking? Counterparty Risk,Incentives, and Margins

Derivatives activity, motivated by risk‐sharing, can breed risk‐taking. Bad news about the risk of an asset underlying a derivative increases protection sellers' expected liability and undermines their risk‐prevention incentives. This limits risk‐sharing, creates endogenous counterparty risk, and can lead to contagion from news about the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad news can improve protection sellers' incentives and in turn enhance risk‐sharing. Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed to preserve risk‐prevention incentives.     

Stock Return Predictability of Residual‐Income‐Based Valuation: Risk or Mispricing?

In an influential paper, Frankel and Lee (1998) conclude that the stock return predictability of the value‐to‐price ratio (V/P) results from market mispricing. This paper confirms whether the V/P reflects the rational risk premiums associated with the V/P factor or is better explained by market inefficiency. Following Daniel and Titman (1997), this paper examines whether the V/P characteristics or the V/P factor loadings predict stock returns. The findings show that the V/P loadings are positively associated with average returns even after controlling for the V/P characteristics in both time series and cross‐sectional tests. The overall results suggest that the mispricing explanation of the V/P effect is premature.