Managerial time constraints and young worker productivity: Natural experiments with NFL rookies

The 2011 National Football League lockout and movement of the 2014 draft to a later date compressed the off‐seasons preceding the 2011 and 2014 seasons, exogenously tightening time constraints within which managers—head coaches and their staffs—engage in short‐run training of players. We exploit these natural experiments to investigate how this impacted the productivity of young workers (National Football League rookies). Results estimated for a sample of over 1,500 rookies support hypotheses emanating from an economic model of worker training time allocation and indicate reduced productivity along several dimensions. Survival analysis shows evidence of shorter player career durations along certain lines, suggesting longer term consequences.     

Escalation effects and the player draft in the AFL

This study investigates escalation effects in the Australian Football League (AFL). We use a sample of players selected in the AFL player draft (National Draft) between 1986 and 2002, and test for escalation effects by examining whether a player's draft order affects his subsequent utilisation by the club to which he was drafted. Utilisation is represented with measures of games played and tenure. Limited evidence of an escalation effect is found. Any relation between a player's draft order and his games played and tenure at the club to which he was drafted is concentrated in the early years of his career, and this apparent relation can be explained by the information about a player's ability that is contained in the player's draft order and by incentives for clubs to provide greater playing experience to higher ability players. Escalation effects in the AFL competition are therefore much weaker than have been found in studies of the US National Basketball Association (NBA). It is suggested that differences in the structure of the competitions may explain why the escalation effect in the AFL would be weaker than in the NBA.     

Additional evidence of heuristic-based inefficiency in season wins total betting markets: Major League Baseball

The large majority of sports betting papers have addressed questions of market efficiency based on the outcome of single game, such as spread (sides) or point totals wagers. This research examines the Major League Baseball (MLB) season wins total over/under betting market with respect to questions of market efficiency and profitability. Woodland and Woodland (2013, 2015) investigated the season wins total markets for the National Football League (NFL) and the National Basketball Association (NBA) and found significant inefficiencies. Betting rules tested in this paper parallel those proposed by Woodland and Woodland for the NFL and NBA. They aim to take advantage of the implications of the representativeness heuristic, that is, individuals expect results from a small number of games to generalize to the entire population. The MLB market is found to be inefficient, and provides opportunities for profitable wagering. We establish a tendency for bettors to overreact to a team’s performance in the previous season, particularly for teams with winning records. Results are consistent with the findings for the NFL and NBA season wins totals betting markets. This may be the consequence of monetary betting limits and a structure requiring the completion of a sport’s season before the bet outcome is determined, both of which could discourage some bettors from participating.     

Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the termination of collective bargaining contracts

In 1984 the Supreme Court ruled that employers can unilaterally break an existing collective bargaining contract upon filing a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. This ruling changed both the contractual responsibilities of the employer to honor the collective bargaining agreement and the rights that workers have under the National Labor Relations Act. The purpose of this article is to show the conditions under which a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding will lead to the termination of a labor contract. Our results suggest that (a) legal rulings that reduce the costs of bankruptcy will increase the number of contractual dissolutions and (b) a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is more likely to occur when a firm operates in a climate of uncertain expectations.     

The employer's perspective on collective bargaining centralization: an analytical framework

Despite the continuing debates about the performance implications of different degrees of collective bargaining centralization, our understanding of the determinants of bargaining structures is still limited. While recent research has largely focused on macro-level factors, the role of micro-level determinants has still not been systematically scrutinized. This article develops a multi-disciplinary framework for analysing the employer's perspective on collective bargaining centralization and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different forms and levels of collective bargaining from the perspective of management, the main focus being on the comparison between single-employer and multi-employer collective bargaining. This framework can be used for qualitative and quantitative empirical research as well as for discussions of the costs and benefits of different levels of collective bargaining.     

The trend of strikes in coal mining 1949–1979

Explanations for the pattern of strike activity in British coal mining have focused upon the industry's changing economic fortunes or developments in its collective bargaining structure. The author examines these explanations and suggests four additional factors that account for the trend of coal mining strikes.     

The Labour Market Effects of Increases in Social Insurance Premium: Evidence from Japan

Exploiting heterogeneous variations in labour cost increases due to Japan's 2003 social insurance premium reform as a natural experiment, we estimate the impacts of the increased social insurance premiums on employment, working hours and payroll costs. Using the difference‐in‐differences method with establishment fixed effects, we find that firms reduce the number of employees and increase average annual earnings from longer working hours in response to an exogenous increase in labour costs without productivity gains. Firms manage to pay for this increase in the average wage paid to the remaining workers by reducing the number of employees to keep total payroll costs unchanged. In contrast, since social insurance premiums are shared equally between employees and employers, firms pay the remaining half premiums that they are imposed with. Sub‐sample analyses show that firms adhering to a labour hoarding policy did fire many workers taking advantage of the 2003 reform. This may indicate that the reform provided a good excuse to cut employment in firms that had been forced to comply with a labour hoarding policy even in an over‐employment situation, which is more likely in sectors and countries where dismissals are rigorously regulated.     

The rise of professional unions in Germany. Challenge and threat for established industrial relations?

The author analyses the rise of professional unions, one of the most remarkable developments in German labour movement since the early 2000s. By means of strikes, they managed to get officially accepted as autonomous partners for collective bargaining. The author asks whether their emergence challenges or even threats the established systems of industrial relations.     

Bargaining: separately or together?

This paper explores conditions under which economic agents will want to bargain collectively instead of individually with a common third party—when, for example, two firms (or unions), who are bargaining with the same, indispensable, outside party, will want to merge and bargain as one. I use a non-cooperative sequential bargaining model to analyze this question. Previous work has shown that agents prefer to bargain collectively if they are substitutes for each other in production. This result, however, depends on an exogenously fixed sequence of bargaining. I allow the bargaining sequence to be determined endogenously and investigate how incentives for collective bargaining vary with heterogeneity when delay is costly. The previous results are not robust when the agents are substitutes. In particular, substitute agents prefer individual to collective bargaining if they are heterogeneous and sufficiently patient. In the presence of transaction costs, substitutability of agents is no longer the sole determinant of collectivization. Rather, the degree of heterogeneity in production, in conjunction with the degree of substitutability between agents determine the incentives for collective action.     

Performance evaluation of National Football League teams

Most recent empirical analyses of production in the sports economic literature have focused on Major League Baseball. This paper extends that literature by analysing football production in the National Football League (NFL). Using the Poisson regression model, we measure the performance of NFL teams and head coaches. The measure is based on a production process where player skills are converted into games won. The evidence reveals that quality coaching is an important component in the production process. It appears that efficient coaching can account for an additional three to four victories in a given season. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

US professional football: The demand for game-day attendance in 1991

This paper examines the factors which affect game-day attendance at National Football League games during the 1991 season. Using a Tobit analysis, the model includes economic as well as quality of game variables as explanatory variables. This analysis reveals that: higher ticket prices reduce attendance with the demand appearing to be inelastic; and a winning home team spurs game-day attendance.     

Pricing Political Rallies

Why are political rallies free to attend? Fundraising is a central campaign activity and a perennial correlate of political victory. We argue that politicians set a zero price for rallies in order to reap a non‐pecuniary benefit: political support. An ‘allocation by waiting’ scheme selects those attendees with a lower opportunity cost of time relative to a standard ‘allocation by price’ scheme. Transactions costs mitigate Coasean bargaining by removing the secondary market, thereby altering the composition of the average rally crowd. This mechanism allows politicians to facilitate exchange with ‘general interests’: citizens who do not engage in rent seeking due to collective action costs but still stand to gain from redistributive policies.     

Is the Grass Greener? Switching Costs and Geographic Proximity in the High Status Affiliations of Professional Baseball

Professional baseball operates a tiered system of talent development facilitated by alliances between Minor League Baseball (MiLB) clubs and higher status Major League Baseball (MLB) parent teams. This study applies management theory to advance the literature on MiLB demand modeling by proposing and testing a new set of demand determinants based on interorganizational alliance principles. Team executives at the AA level should be alert to the high cost of switching team alliances and of changing to a parent club in closer geographical proximity. At the AAA level, affiliation with a winning MLB club exerts a positive effect on AAA demand. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Problems with partnership at work: lessons from an Irish case study

This article uses a case study of a celebrated enterprise partnership in Ireland that broke down to get an insight into why such arrangements are hard to sustain. The argument of the article is that meaningful enterprise partnerships require trade unions and management to accept agency costs, which in practice involves management modifying their right to manage and unions accepting that issues normally addressed by the collective bargaining process may have to be delegated to the partnership arrangement. The evidence of the case study is that neither management nor unions were prepared to incur such costs. The case study suggests that the following trinity – meaningful partnership, full-blown collective bargaining and management's right to manage is exceptionally difficult to operate at the same time.     

Firms' price and wage adjustment in Europe: Survey evidence on nominal stickiness

This paper presents new evidence on the patterns of price and wage adjustment in European firms and on the extent of nominal rigidities. It uses a unique dataset collected through a firm-level survey conducted in 17 European countries and covering various sectors. Several conclusions are drawn from this evidence. Firms adjust wages less frequently than prices, on average every 15 and 10 months, respectively. Price and, especially, wage adjustment exhibit a substantial degree of time-dependence. In particular, wage changes tend to cluster at a specific time of the year, mostly January in the majority of countries. The results of a multivariate analysis indicate that prices are more flexible when competitive pressures in product markets are strong and when labor costs account for a lower fraction of firms' total costs, whereas wages are more flexible when bargaining is decentralized and when the coverage of collective bargaining and the stringency of employment protection legislation are low. Price rigidities are higher in firms with a larger share of high-skilled/white-collar workers.     

Skill gaps in the workplace: measurement,determinants and impacts

Optimal training decisions require employers to have accurate information about their workers’ training needs. However, little is known with regard to the key factors determining the accurate transmission of worker training requirements. Using one of the few linked employer–employee surveys in the world, the 2006 Irish National Employment Survey, this article identifies the key factors determining the correct identification of skill gaps within firms. The impact of skill gaps on average training expenditures and labour costs is also measured. The research finds that both HRM and collective bargaining arrangements are important factors in facilitating the accurate identification of skill gaps within firms. The analysis confirms that skill gaps are a key determinant of training expenditures and tend to raise average labour costs. Finally, the evidence suggests that employee perceptions of skill gaps may be prone to higher levels of subjective bias relative to those based on the employers’ views.     

Free riders: the rise of alternative unionism in Denmark

In this article we analyse some disturbing trends in the Danish labour market: while collective bargaining coverage is still relatively high, union density has been declining and—worse than that—there has been a substantial shift away from recognised and in favour of alternative unionism. The alternative unions are not parties to collective agreements, and they offer membership much cheaper than the recognised unions, in effect taking a free ride on the institutional supports that used to be effective only for the recognised unions. The article explains this conundrum by pointing to the political and institutional backgrounds to this development, which threatens to erode the very basis for the Danish collective bargaining system. On the background of general statistics and of a general employee survey, we point out the reasons behind the challenges confronting the recognised unions, pointing out that the recognised unions must become both more efficient in the member services and more cost efficient, if they wish to halt the present downhill trend.     

Trade unions,collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance: a review

Coordination through collective bargaining is recognised as an influential determinant of labour market outcomes and macroeconomic performance. This article provides a systematic review of the empirical literature on the subject. What emerges from the review is that it is different types and coverage of bargaining coordination, rather than cross‐country variation in trade union density, that matter for economic performance. High levels of bargaining coverage tend to be associated with relatively poor economic performance, but this adverse relationship can be at least mitigated by high levels of bargaining coordination. In the absence of formal bargaining arrangements, economies often develop informal bargaining mechanisms whose effects are similar to those arising from formal bargaining provided they both operate at similar levels of coordination. The consequences of labour market coordination or absence thereof depend on the monetary policy regime as non‐accommodating monetary policy can eliminate some of the adverse unemployment consequences otherwise associated with industry‐level collective bargaining. Finally, bargaining coordination seems to matter most in times of rapid economic change rather than under more stable conditions. Overall, we conclude that it is the total ‘package’ of (formal and informal) labour market institutions that matters for the performance of the economy rather than unionisation as such or individual aspects of unionism.     

Bargaining and strikes: Towards an evolutionary framework

Conventional models of strikes start with the assumption that the bargainers' uniquely rational beliefs can be worked out in advance. Strikes are then explained as either the result of institutional constraints or of the possibility of irrationality. By contrast the evolutionary approach begins with a recognition that bargaining is naturally indeterminate and that, in the absence of a unique model of rational bargaining, conflict-free agreements between rational trades unions and firms reflect the evolution of one out of many possible conventions. This paper explores the alternative interpretation of strikes afforded by this perspective. In particular, it shows how strikes help shape the dispositions of bargainers (as opposed to just revealing it), how periods of conflict are succeeded by periods of industrial peace (and vice versa), and how the stability of bargaining protocols depends not only on the conventions regulating the relations between unions and firms but also on those between workers and union leaders as well as on technological innovations.     

Contributions of Managerial Levels: Comparing MLB and NFL

Sports differ according to the number of players, interdependencies among them, complexity of strategy, and other dimensions. For example, baseball has been described as ‘an individual game in which a team score is kept’. These differences suggest differences in the relative importance of managerial inputs: owners, general managers, and managers (or head coaches). Using panels over 1970–2011, I estimate performance production regressions for Major League Baseball and the National Football League that permit the relative importance of these managerial inputs to be assessed within and across sports while taking explicit account of the hierarchical structure of management levels. In addition, with predicted individual effects, I present rankings of best and worst managers, general managers, and owners. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.