市场营销软件模型设计与实现

由于市场营销模式的变化与社会信息化相结合,市场营销必将步入信息化的进程,而且是构成ERP管理体系的重要环节。文章结合药品生产经营企业的产品销售与信息化的过程,描述了销售的业务流程到信息流程的转变,数据流图到软件模型的转变,E-R关联图到数据结构的转变,直至营销管理系统的实现。     

Vertical externality and strategic delegation

This paper examines the effects of vertical externality generated by the upstream monopoly on the incentives that owners of competing downstream firms give their managers. It is shown that the introduction of the upstream monopoly may have significant effects on the incentive schemes for the downstream firms' managers. In particular, it is shown that in equilibrium, each owner obtains the simple Nash equilibrium outcome regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price) in the downstream market. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The sales job and preparation for management

“The types of work that lead of the top jobs have ovious variations by industry with a few aberrations. There is, nonetheless, a consistent pattern: less law experience than generally supposed, not much engineering or research and among younger executives a lot of sales.”

1 Editors of Fortune Magazine, The Executive Life, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956, p. 31.

Is there something about sales that produces better mangers?     

The Bargaining–sales‐delegation Game

This article revisits the managerial delegation literature led by Vickers ( 1985 ), Fershtman and Judd ( 1987 ) and Sklivas ( 1987 ) by introducing a bargaining mechanism between owners and managers over managerial contracts. It shows that the degree of bargaining interacts with the extent of product differentiation in determining whether the sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium is sales delegation or profit maximisation. In contrast with the classical result, no sales delegation emerges and the typical prisoner's dilemma of the managerial delegation literature is solved. This holds in both contexts of Cournot and Bertrand rivalries. The article also provides results for the more general cases with heterogeneous managerial bargaining power and endogenous decisions of the owners regarding the bargaining power of the manager that should be or not be hired in a firm. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit‐oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price‐discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price‐discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner‐managed profit‐maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit‐maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial delegation games and corporate social responsibility

In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes.     

The profit equivalence of mill and uniform pricing policies

In this note we point out a simple fact that seems to have been overlooked in the voluminous literature on mill pricing and uniform delivered pricing in location theory — the profit maximization problems involved are mathematically equivalent when the demand functions are linear.     

Information and trade sizes: The case of short sales

In this study, we examine short selling of NASDAQ stocks and observe that more information about future returns is contained in small short sales than in medium-sized and large short sales, thus supporting the idea that NASDAQ short sellers stealth trade. These results are robust to different subsamples of stocks with and without tradable options and stocks that are more likely to face binding borrowing constraints. Further, these findings are contrary to the results in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) who find that large NYSE short sales contain the most information. Combined, our study supports the idea that NASDAQ's bid test is less restricting than the NYSE's uptick rule and therefore attenuates the likelihood of stealth trading (Diether, Lee, & Werner, 2009a).     

The challenges of using ranks to estimate sales

Researchers have frequently used data on product ranks to estimate nonpublic sales quantities, believing that there is a power-law-induced linear relationship between logged sales ranks and logged sales. Using essentially complete data on book sales, the most commonly used product in this literature, we find that the (double-logged) relationship between sales ranks and quantity sold is not linear, but robustly concave. We demonstrate that this concavity is likely to cause very poor sales predictions in many instances. We provide two concrete examples where applying this linear method to the concave relationship has led to serious errors in sales estimates. First, in the claim that the Internet's greater product variety in books has a large positive impact on social welfare, and second, in a claim about relative sales levels in top 20 and top 50 music “charts.” We also explore the use of nonlinear specifications as an alternative method to predict sales from ranks and find a simple specification that provides much better sales estimates. Finally, we examine the possibility that a particular type of biased sample might allow reasonable linear estimates of industry sales and conclude that it is possible but quite unlikely.     

R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests

Considering oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If R&D spillovers are zero, a managerial firm will have a strong strategic advantage when competing with an entrepreneurial firm. If both owners endogenously decide about delegation, each owner's dominant strategy will be to delegate, given that the manager's reservation value is not too large. (3) If R&D spillovers are maximal, collusive market outcomes become very likely, which makes strategic delegation less important. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The failure of Ricardian equivalence under dynastic altruism

This paper investigates the theoretical accuracy of the Barro [Barro, R.J., 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy, 82, 1095–1117] debt neutrality proposition. We first identify a discrepancy between the transversality condition of a social planning problem and the one of altruistically linked overlapping generations. Then, this discrepancy is exploited to construct public debt policies which affect the competitive equilibrium allocation even when bequests are strictly positive in all periods: a violation of Ricardian equivalence.     

The sales response to advertising: A reconsideration

The paper surveys briefly the literature on the shape of the sales-advertising response relationship. Knowledge of this relationship is an important requirement for optimal marketing decisions. The role of theory is to specify the structure of models for testing. The paper presents a plausible model of this relationship based upon the consumer's response to advertising when qualitative uncertainty exists in a market. The relationship is seen to contain a ‘catastrophe change’ or discontinuity when certain assumptions are made about optimizing behaviour. The implications for marketing strategy and optimal levels of promotional outlays are discussed.     

Social preferences and sales performance

We use an incentivized experimental game to uncover heterogeneity in social preferences among salespeople in a large Austrian retail chain. Our results show that the majority of agents take the welfare of others into account but a significant fraction reveal selfish behavior. Matching individual behavior in the game with firm data on sales performance shows that agents with social preferences achieve a significantly higher revenue per customer. However, at the same time, they achieve fewer sales per day. Both effects offset each other, so that the overall association with total sales revenue becomes insignificant. Our findings highlight the nuanced role of selfish versus social preferences in sales contexts with important implications for economic research.     

The structure of british industry's sales in foreign markets

The structure of British industry's foreign sales is analysed by its principal components: exports, sales arising from licenses issued abroad and the output from facilities financed by British foreign direct investment. Total foreign sales are analysed by industry and by foreign market and differences in structure on both these dimensions are considerable. The literature is analysed in order to determine a preliminary set of variables which explain the structure at this highly aggregated level. Examination of the data allows us to focus on the most important explanatory variables, which include exchange rates, government policies and supply and demand factors.     

Asset sales and takeover threats

This research addresses the question of whether the existence of a recent takeover threat affects the market reaction to a subsequent sale of assets. The effect of a prior takeover threat on the stock price reaction to an asset sale is examined from the perspective of both the buying firm and the selling firm. The total gains to the transaction are estimated as a market weighted average of the abnormal returns to the two firms. The results show that when there has not been a recent takeover threat on the selling firm, abnormal returns are significantly positive for the seller, the buyer and in total. However, if the selling firm has faced a takeover threat within the previous year, the abnormal returns upon announcement of an asset sale are insignificant for the seller, negative for the buyer, and negative for a portfolio of the two. Hence, the market has a lower estimate of the overall gains in transactions that follow takeover threats on the selling firm; in fact, these transactions result in a net wealth reduction.     

汽车销售的影响因素分析及其应对策略

本文认为,国家政策、环保、油价、交通环境、新能源车型等因素对汽车销售有着较大影响,为此,提出在汽车营销工作中,应关注国家宏观经济政策导向,加强自主品牌的建设和发展,对企业的发展和销售做出规划,加强与汽车类职业学校的联合与协作,发展网络营销,建立跟踪式销售新体系等。     

Revenue equivalence and income taxation

This paper considers the classical independent private values model of auction theory in the presence of income taxation. We show that revenue equivalence remains valid if income taxes are proportional. Progressive and regressive taxes lead, in general, to asymmetries between bidders with the well-known consequence that revenue equivalence no longer holds. However, if symmetry of the bidders is maintained, progressive (regressive) income tax implies a higher (lower) expected revenue in first-price than in second-price auctions. Financial support by theDeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledge.     

论国家审计工作的专家支持系统

<审计署2003至2007年审计工作发展规划>提出,五年规划期间要"着力加强三项基础工作",其中有一项就是,"实行科学的审计管理,整合审计资源,促进提高审计工作层次和水平.