Property appraisal in high-rises: A cooperative game theory approach

The construction of the higher stories in a building is utterly contingent upon the construction of the lower ones, while the construction of lower stories does not require the construction of the higher ones. This rationale underlies our adoption of a cooperative game theory methodology for examining the value of units based on the cost approach of land appraisal. Particularly, we propose the Shapley value solution to examine the allocation of the land and construction cost among the stories of the building. We explore the allocation mechanism and derive several closed-form properties by which the value pattern of stories in a building is rationalized. The proposed cost allocation may, among other things, generate values when comparable market prices are unobservable (consistent with the cost approach); may be used by courts in order to compute compensations in cases of disputes regarding expansions and redevelopments of existing structures among co-owners; and may determine the rent cost allocation in an organization with several profit centers located on different floors of a building.     

Productive efficiency of English football teams—a data envelopment analysis approach

This paper investigates how close to their potential English Premier League Clubs play. Using a deterministic Data Envelopment Analysis Approach, the productive efficiency of 20 teams in the 2000/2001 season is measured and weaknesses of individual teams are disclosed. The sensitivity of results is analyzed with regard to different model specifications and variable combinations. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Applying cooperative game theory to power relations

The power of people and the power of some people over others have long been a topic in sociology, politics, psychology, and, to a lesser extent, economics. This paper shows how cooperative game theory can be used to analyze the power relation between agents 1 and 2. First, we identify payoff reflections of the power of agent 1 over agent 2. Second, we suggest how to look for action reflections of power-over. We will provide many examples and reconsider (an important part of) the power-over literature from the viewpoint of our approach.     

Implications of game theory for theoretical underpinning of cooperative relations in workplace partnership

This article clarifies the ongoing debate over the key factors underpinning cooperative relations between management and trade unions by drawing on the once‐off and repeated prisoner's dilemma models. It argues that the lower the risk to achieve a ‘win‐win’ outcome and the longer the time horizon for workplace partnership, the more likely is for the two parties to cooperate.     

审计风险的博弈论模型

关于审计风险存在两种传统的理论:“风险分析理论”与“审计建模理论”,这两种理论都局限于静态分析,这种静态分析存在明显的理论缺陷。本文试图从博弈论的角度,通过分析审计师与经理层两者的互动结构,构建更为全面的审计风险分析模型,丰富和完善审计风险理论,为审计理论与实践提供更为新颖的视角。     

Inductive game theory: A basic scenario

The aim of this paper is to present the new theory called “inductive game theory”. A paper, published by one of the present authors with A. Matsui, discussed some part of inductive game theory in a specific game. Here, we present a more entire picture of the theory moving from the individual raw experiences, through the inductive derivation of a view, to the implications for future behavior. Our developments generate an experiential foundation for game theory and for Nash equilibrium.     

Learning curves—an axiomatic approach

A systematic mathematical analysis of learning curves is presented. It is shown that while a learning curve with learning factor k does necessarily satisfy the functional equation f(2x) = kf(x), this equation admits numerous other analytic, convex solutions as well so that it cannot be used to uniquely characterize learning curves. Rather, it is shown that a pair of functional equations f(rx) = kf(x) and f(sx) = jf(x) where rⁿ ≠ s^m for any positive integers n and m suffice to uniquely determine the learning curve; compatibility of the two equations requires that log_rk = log_sj or there will be no learning curve satisfying the pair of equations. Two classes of almost learning curves are generated and studied by means of suitable perturbation terms in the differential equation y = by/x of the true or standard learning curve and these curves are applied to describe data not exhibiting exact learning-curve behavior. Finally the concept of average marginal hours or cost is introduced and its behavior is found to also exhibit the learning-curve phenomenon except for an initial deviation.     

Business formation — a network approach

This article suggests that the key to entrepreneurial success is to be found in the ability to develop and maintain a personal network. In elaborating this proposition I regard the environment of the business venture as “enacted”. The inexperienced new entrepreneur needs support to create a personal network and to manage the enacted environment. The concept of the “organizing context”, defined as a clustered sociocentric network, is introduced to provide a tool with which the entrepreneur can deal more efficiently with the different subprocesses that create his or her reality. The approach supplies a framework within which various forms of entrepreneurship — indigenous, corporate, etc. — can be compared and analysed beyond their institutional differences. The interaction between various forms of entrepreneurship and organizing contexts is empirically illustrated from case studies.     

博弈论在企业应收账款中的应用分析

在激烈的市场竞争中,赊销作为一种销售策略普遍存在。文章就企业与竞争对手之间的"囚徒困境"博弈,分析了应收账款的产生背景和企业选择赊销的被迫性,进而通过企业与客户之间的相机决策博弈,构建模型,在动态的博弈中,依次剖析了企业赊销的选择前提和应收账款的后续管理策略。     

Planning models for non-cooperative situations: A two-player game approach

In the analysis of urban systems, attempts are usually made to subdivide the system into a set of interest groups, according to the.pursuit of certain common purposes. The behaviour of each group is described in terms on an objective and a set of variables under its control. Groups may be linked through the occurrence of variables controlled by other groups either in their objectives, in their constraints, or both. In this paper, the problem is addressed, whereby equilibrium states are sought for situations where one group is the planning authority, exercising policy instruments to influence system outcome at a level different to that required to reasonably describe the macro behaviour or objectives of all groups in the system, including the authority itself. The principles are illustrated on some specific models, and alternative means of handling various classes of intergroup linkages are investigated.     

Fiscal and monetary policy co-ordination: A differential game approach

In this paper the interaction between the Treasury and the central bank is examined in the case of both cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour. Differential games are used in the framework of a continuous-time econometric model of the Italian economy. The Nash and the Stackelberg non-cooperative equilibrium solutions are computed, and the case for cooperation is analysed by considering the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining models. It is shown that, in the Italian case, the government has a stronger bargaining position than the central bank. A comparison is then made between the different solutions to show that the drawbacks that emerge from non-cooperation are not simply those depending on the players' payoffs. Other features are in fact considered which constitute a further argument for policy co-ordination.     

Design and implementation in major investments — A project network approach

Many investments in modern society take place in project networks. This article proposes a project network approach for describing the design and implementation processes in major investments. The design process of major projects is “fuzzy”, takes a long time, and is hard to capture. The implementation process, on the other hand, takes place in “semi-hierarchical” networks, and is easier to plan and control. The actor that controls the transformation of the political design process into the implementation process has a unique strategic position in the dynamically changing network. This means linking processes that are characterized by separate logic and network structures. Data from processes of design and implementation of three shopping malls illustrate the theoretical framework.     

博弈分析视角下内部控制与公司治理的结合

本文从博弈的角度进行研究,得出结论：公司治理结构对内部控制的影响体现在权力的博弈中,只有各种权力在博弈中达到均衡,内部控制才会逐渐完善。     

The strategic audit: A game theoretic approach to corporate competitive strategy

To bring the highly developed quantitative approaches of middle management in accounting and control to the aid of corporate strategists is not easy. Specific operational problems are less overt and therefore formal optimization techniques are less easy to apply. The paper considers that the difficulty lies less in the absence of techniques and more in the failure of top management to state its objectives with precision. To do this a strategic audit is suggested. This can aid in goal specification. Industrial economics and game theory can then be applied to the problem so delineated.     

Ecological tax reform—a value chain level approach

This study assesses the effects of an ecological tax reform on three value chains. These case studies lead to an analysis of the business strategy options when companies face a shift in the relative prices of their production factors. The results support earlier research findings that the direct effects of an ecological tax reform on the price competitiveness of companies is on average rather small. However, the effects of the reform are shown to vary significantly between the different parts of the value chain. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment     

Learning strategic cooperative behavior in industrial symbiosis: A game‐theoretic approach integrated with agent‐based simulation

This paper investigates the negotiation phase of industrial symbiosis relationships, where companies exchanging wastes for inputs need to develop strategies on how to share the additional costs to operate the industrial symbiosis business. The business behavior is approached as a “coopetition” problem where companies need to cooperate to reduce waste discharge costs and traditional input purchase costs and dive into competition to pay a minimum share of additional costs (i.e., waste treatment, waste transportation, and transaction costs) of operating industrial symbiosis. A noncooperative game‐theoretical model for sharing the additional costs is proposed that highlights the two strategies that companies can adopt aimed at sharing costs: a fair strategy and an opportunistic strategy. Then, an agent‐based model is used to simulate the game iterated over time and investigate how the players can adapt their strategies according to their past experience. Simulation results show that players learn that playing the fair strategy is beneficial in the long period, despite in the short period they can gain more benefit by playing the opportunistic strategy. Findings of the paper are critically important to reduce the business and managerial barriers against the formation of industrial symbiosis networks and to stimulate innovative thinking of company managers to foster the development of the circular economy. The paper proposes theoretical, managerial, and policy implications, which are discussed in detail in a comparative manner between linear and circular economy.     

Mapping walkability. A subjective value theory approach

The analysis of urban walkability has been extensively explored in the last decades. Despite this growing attention, there is a lack of studies attentive on how citizens' values, individual abilities and urban environment favour or hinder the propensity to walk. Hence, there is a need to explore how preferences and values of citizens vary in space in order to design walkability policies able to improve the capability set of citizens. In this perspective, the design of spatial decision tools aimed to plann public policies for the development of walkable cities needs further investigation. We propose a Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) method aimed to elaborate walkability decision maps for different groups of citizens that reflect their capability to walk in the urban environment. We tested the method in the city of Alghero (Italy). First, we analysed walkability under a normative model named CAWS; then we made a survey with 358 participants in order to study the driving values that influence their choice to walk and finalised to build an evaluation model attentive to individual differences. Cluster analysis was employed to group citizens into 11 groups based on their sociodemographic characteristics and preferences on spatial criteria of walkability. Finally, by integrating GIS with MCDA we built a set of decision maps representative of the walkability of the 11 groups of citizens. Results highlight the importance of citizens’ values for policy design, allow the interpersonal comparison among individuals and group preferences and give new suggestions for the formulation of walkability oriented urban policies. Moreover, the results confirm the usability of the general method as a decision support tool supporting the design of urban policies.     

基于博弈论的个人所得税逃税行为分析

在我国,由于税制不健全、征管水平比较低以及纳税人依法纳税意识淡薄,个人所得税的逃税问题更是极为严重,给国家经济秩序和税法体制造成了很大的危害。通过建立个人所得税税收稽查博弈模型,分析影响个人所得税纳税人逃税行为选择的因素,以期能对我国税收征管制度的完善提供理论依据。