Endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D duopoly under uncertainty

Including R&D risk, this paper considers the choices of R&D spillovers in a simple non-tournament cost-reducing R&D duopoly game with Bertrand competition. It turns out that the two firms never disclose any of their R&D information when considering their R&D non-cooperatively. However, if the firms decide their R&D cooperatively, we show, though they would always fully share their information when the risk of R&D is low, they would not disclose any of their R&D information when the market competition is fierce, the R&D risk is high and the R&D is efficient.     

Innovation subsidy under duopoly

Innovation plays extremely important roles in the society, and underinvestment in innovation popularly exists. This article aims to capture innovative subsidy with game theory model. First, unilateral subsidy stimulates both innovation and outputs of subsidized firms, while it deters those of opponents. Second, under innovation subsidy, relationship between subsidized firm's innovation and product substitutability satisfies a U shape. For opponents, it is also a U-shaped relationship. Third, under unilateral subsidy, subsidizing high-efficiency firms yields more innovation than subsidizing low-efficiency firms. Finally, bilateral subsidy stimulates more innovation than unilateral subsidy. This study supports theory to subsidize innovation efficiently.     

On the relationship between product substitutability and tacit collusion

This paper examines the effect of increased product substitutability on quantity‐setting firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in a market. It uses a general demand function and the trigger strategy of Friedman (Friedman JW. 1971. A non‐cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies 38: 1–12) to show that while increased product substitutability hinders sustainability of tacit collusion in the case of linear and concave demand functions, it may either hinder or facilitate firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in the case of convex demand functions. Thus, this paper adds to the growing view that one must use a case‐by‐case analysis in judging whether firms in more homogenous product markets find it easier or harder to tacitly collude. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic management under duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to present a general conjectural variation model to provide an integrative treatment of strategic management under duopoly. It is shown that the nature of the desired distortion of managers' incentives depends critically on the magnitudes of the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs as well as the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives. In particular, it has been demonstrated that when the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives are zero, the owners will motivate their managers to maximize profits and provide no incentives for sales under consistent conjectures. However, the owners make their managers behave more (less) aggressively and produce more (less) than profit-maximizers if the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs are larger (smaller) than the actual response.     

Endogenous timing of managerial delegation contracts in a unionized duopoly

In a multiple‐stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and unionized labor market, this paper analyzes whether firms' owners decide managerial incentive contracts sequentially or simultaneously. When firms compete in quantities, firms' owners can choose incentive contracts simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the unions' relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation. Instead, when firms compete in prices, firms' owners set incentive contracts sequentially with substitute goods and simultaneously with complement goods.     

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: price competition with managerial delegation

We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the mixed duopoly model and examine its influence on price setting in a mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous‐timing problem. We obtain the result that owners of a public and a private firm prefer to delay the setting of the prices of their products as much as possible. Thus, in equilibrium, the firms choose their prices simultaneously in the latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the findings of the entrepreneurial case, according to which firms choose prices simultaneously in the former stage. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly,with and without commitment

In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that firms' owners use to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, profits and social welfare. If products are either sufficiently differentiated or sufficiently close substitutes, owners use Relative Performance contracts. For intermediate levels of product substitutability, they use Market Share contracts. When owners do not commit over the types of contracts, each type is an owner's best response to his rival's choice. Product substitutability has differential effects on output levels and profits, depending on the configuration of contracts in the industry. Finally, managerial incentive contracts are welfare enhancing if they increase consumers' surplus. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Privatisation and vertical integration under a mixed duopoly

This paper analyses the privatisation of public firms when private firms may be vertically integrated with their suppliers. We consider a mixed duopoly with a vertically integrated public firm. The private firm bargains the price of the input with its supplier if they are not vertically integrated. We find that for a given bargaining power of the private firm, it vertically integrates with its supplier if goods are weak substitutes. We also find that there is less vertical integration in the mixed duopoly than in the private duopoly. Finally, in general, the public firm is privatised when goods are close substitutes and the bargaining power of the private firm is low enough.     

Endogenous mergers under multi-market competition

This paper examines a simple model of strategic interactions among firms that face at least some of the same rivals in two related markets (for goods 1 and 2). It shows that when firms compete in quantity, market prices increase as the degree of multi-market contact increases. However, the welfare consequences of multi-market contact are more complex and depend on how two fundamental forces play out. The first is the selection effect, which acts to increase welfare, as shutting down the relatively more inefficient firm is beneficial. The second opposing effect is the internalisation of the Cournot externality effect; reducing the production of good 2 allows firms to sustain a higher price for good 1. This works to increase prices and, therefore, decrease consumer surplus (but increase producer surplus). These two effects are influenced by the degree of asymmetry between markets 1 and 2 and the degree of substitutability between goods 1 and 2.     

Gross substitutability of point-to-set correspondences

In this paper the notion of gross substitutability for the multi-valued case is studied. It is proved that, if in a pure exchange equilibrium model gross substitutability and some auxiliary conditions prevail, then (a) the set of equilibria is a Cartesian product of a convex set of equilibrium resource allocations and a convex cone of equilibrium prices; hence all equilibria are equiadvantageous for every trader; (b) the weak axiom of revealed preference holds in any equilibrium; (c) any equilibrium is stable with respect to reallocations of initial resources. Some situations in which Walras' law does not hold are considered as well.     

Accreditation in a differentiated duopoly

Accreditation is increasingly important worldwide; however, some industries have higher accreditation rates than others. We suggest a duopoly model to discuss how market characteristics affect the incentive for firms to seek accreditation. The discussion relates to the effects accreditation might have on the costs and demands in the markets, the degree of product differentiation (addressing both substitutable and complementary goods), type of competition (various Cournot and Bertrand games), and welfare for society. It follows that markets with high accreditation rates are either characterized by fierce competition (price competition in substitutable goods) or by a high degree of coordination (complementarity).     

Pricing strategy in the product and service market

Existing studies have mainly focused on pricing in either primary markets or aftermarkets. However, in practice, prices in primary markets and aftermarkets are closely correlated. This study examines the joint pricing strategy in both primary markets and aftermarkets based on customer utility and establishes a pricing model for profit-maximization firms. Our results show that overpricing in the aftermarket is caused by customer myopia, while the motivation of the firm to avoid customer myopia depends on its pricing strategy. A quantity–price contract in the aftermarket is designed to raise the firm’s profit.     

Price versus quantity in a duopoly with network externalities under active and passive expectations

This study examines the endogenous choice of strategic contracts in a duopoly composed of firms that produce goods with network externalities with some sort of compatibility. We adopt two types of expectations—active and passive—as consumers' expectations for each firm's equilibrium market share. In addition, we take into account the managerial case and entrepreneurial case with and without separation between ownership and management, as firms' internal structures. We derive the properties in the Cournot competition and the Bertrand competition as the equilibrium market structures under both passive and active expectations under imperfectly compatibility of networks.     

Optimal zoning of managerial duopoly

This paper investigates optimal zoning of two managerial firms in an unconstrained linear city. Comparing with the case in which firms are not managerial type, the strategic delegation increases the incentives of one firm to locate farther from the rival. Then, a welfare function is introduced to highlight zoning regulation as an influential competition policy tool. Depending on the regulator's objective function and the timing of location choice, we provide a new mechanism that allows the regulator to attain the optimal locations of managerial firms and can lead to strong or weak competition.     

Spatial duopoly with discriminatory pricing

The concept and existence of an equilibrium is established for profit maximizing competitors whose decisions involve choices of both delivered price schedules and firm locations. Each firm faces a production function; each is allowed to locate in the plane and to set discriminatory prices. Any transport cost function that is continuous in the firm location variable may be used. It is shown that the locations of the two firms are in equilibrium if each firm is minimizing social cost (i.e., the total cost to the firms of supplying the market with the good it demands is minimized) with respect to the opponent's fixed location.     

产品策略在企业的实际应用研究

文章以湖南株洲兴隆化工实业有限公司为例,扫描了白炭黑市场的营销环境,从产品的角度阐述了其面临的机会和挑战,最终形成了兴隆化工的产品策略。产品策略在兴隆化工的成功应用,为其他化工企业提供了重要的经验参考。     

Team vision in product development: How knowledge strategy matters

In today’s more complex multinational and technologically sophisticated environment, the group has re-emerged in importance as the project team. Work teams are important to organizations in general, but are especially critical in product development because they span many functional areas including engineering, marketing, manufacturing, finance, etc., and new product teams must frequently be composed of individuals from different backgrounds and perspectives. In these circumstances, this paper addresses the contingency role that knowledge strategy plays in explaining the relationship between team vision and product development performance. After studying the team vision on 78 new product developments from a wide variety of firms, we found that effective team vision varies depending on the knowledge strategy—defined in terms of punctuated equilibrium in the explorative cycle, low ambidexterity and high ambidexterity. Our results demonstrate that while trade-off is positively associated with success in all strategies, clarity is only associated with low ambidexterity strategies and strategy-fit is only associated with high ambidexterity strategies.     

内部渠道结构内生性选择下的要素定价研究

文章研究垂直市场结构,其中上游要素市场为垄断市场,下游为古诺寡头市场,下游企业同时需要选择它们的内部渠道结构。利用古诺数量博弈模型,采用逆向法求解子博弈完美纳什均衡,得到两个主要结论:第一,垄断要素供给者采用单一定价比采用差别定价获得的总福利要高;第二,对垄断要素供给者来说,采用单一定价比差别定价获利更多。     

Environmental taxes in a differentiated mixed duopoly

Beladi and Chao (2006) and Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006) considered the role of environmental policy on the decision whether to privatize a public firm in different market structures. This paper re-examines whether privatization improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed duopolistic framework with differentiated product and pollution abatement. It is shown that, due to privatization, less attention is paid to pollution abatement by all the firms coupled with less environment taxes levied by the government in a differentiated duopoly, and the environment is more (less) damaged when the product is less (more) substitutable. When the product is highly substitutable, industry profits increase because this softens the intensity of the product market, but social welfare deteriorates accompanied with the path of privatization because the loss of consumer surplus and tax revenue exceeds the increases in profits, even if the environment is less damaged.     

酒店行业发展环境及酒店产品设计策略探讨

文章分析了酒店行业发展形势,剖析了当前酒店行业发展的弊端和劣势,在总结酒店行业发展前景的基础上,提出了酒店产品设计的策略。