Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams

We demonstrate the value of "equal pay" policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances.     

THE POLITICAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF PRIVATE ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS*

Governments are able to manipulate economic transactions in order to achieve foreign policy goals. This article addresses the question: can managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) structure economic transactions in ways that will limit the costs resulting from government intervention? Using a transaction cost framework, the efficiency of alternative structures (exporting, joint ventures, licensing, or wholly owned subsidiaries) for protecting a firm's interests are assessed. We argue that the traditional focus on the dyadic relationship between supplier and buyer misses sources of transaction costs; by conceptualizing economic transactions as embedded in a political context, additional sources of transaction costs are revealed. We examine three cases of home government intervention in US MNE transactions with the Soviet Union. We find that the full range of structural alternatives is affected by government sanctions, although sanctions are imposed on exporting relationships first and removed last. We find that MNEs are, therefore, beginning to insulate international transactions by making their overseas subsidiaries more independent of US technology and supplies with the hope that the US government will be less likely to impose its will extraterritorially by intervening in foreign subsidiaries’private economic transactions.     

The Impact of Intermediate Information on Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants

Applying detailed within‐tournament information about intermediate scores and contestants' ability in rank‐order professional soccer tournaments, this study empirically analyzes the impact of interim results on the sabotage activities of heterogeneous contestants. Intermediate information that suggests that a contest is decided early decreases total sabotage. Splitting contestants into favorites and underdogs reveals that both contestants sabotage the most if intermediate information about the score compensates for or decreases ex ante heterogeneity between the teams. However, engaging in sabotage does not pay off for the contestants. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation

This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium, contestants who choose a higher productive effort are sabotaged more heavily. This might explain findings from psychology, where victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Moreover, sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The effect is most pronounced if the production functions are linear in sabotage, and the cost functions depend only on the sum of all sabotage activities: in an interior equilibrium, who will win is a matter of chance, even when contestants differ a great deal in their abilities. This, in turn, has adverse consequences for who might want to participate in a tournament. Because better contestants anticipate that they will be sabotaged more strongly, it may happen that the most able stay out and the tournament selects one of the less able with probability one. I also study the case where some contestants are easy victims, that is, easier to sabotage than others.     

Industry self‐regulation and adverse selection: a comparison across four trade association programs

In an attempt to avoid costly regulation and liability as a result of externalities, a number of trade associations have promoted industry self‐regulation – the voluntary association of firms to control their collective behavior. However, previous studies have found that, without explicit sanctions for malfeasance, such self‐regulatory programs are likely to attract more polluting firms. In this paper, we examine four environmental self‐regulatory programs in the chemical, textile, and pulp and paper industries. Using a sample of over 4000 firms within these industries, we find evidence that in at least one program more polluting firms tended to join, while in another cleaner firms were more likely to join. We propose that differences in the structure of the programs drive the appearance of this form of adverse selection. In particular, we speculate that only when self‐regulatory programs have explicit sanctions for malfeasance may they avoid adverse selection problems. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Rational and intuitive decision-making in sourcing teams: Effects on decision outcomes

According to dual process theory, individual decision-making can be based on rational procedures and experience-based intuition, and the decision-making approach can influence decision outcomes. We investigate how the application of rational procedures and experience-based intuition affects the outcomes of supplier selection decisions taken by cross-functional sourcing teams. Specifically, we examine whether the selected supplier׳s cost and quality/delivery/innovativeness performance is higher when more team members use a highly rational and/or a highly experience-based decision-making approach. From data on 54 teams, we find that the use of rational procedures enhances cost performance. Conversely, when sourcing team members use their experience-based intuition, the decision is more likely to result in satisfactory supplier performance along all tested performance dimensions.     

There is no ‘I’ in team: Career concerns,risk‐taking incentives,and team outcomes

The National Basketball Association contracting rules provide plausibly exogenous variation in career concerns near contract end. We use this setting to study how individual career concerns affect risk‐taking behavior and can sabotage team performance. Using the frequency and duration of player injuries from 1991 to 2013 we measure individual risk‐taking behavior. We find that the average player's likelihood of missing a game due to injury falls by 0.06 percentage points (or over 100% relative to the mean injury rate) in the final 3 months of his contract, and when missing games due to injury is unavoidable, his recovery time drops by 22 days. However, “elite” players with virtually no career concerns actually miss more games due to injury. Finally, we find that elite players missing too many games and “average” players playing before healthy, combine to hurt team performance. For each additional player in the last 3 months on contract, the win probability for that team falls by over 2.6%.     

On sabotage in collective tournaments

In this paper a tournament between teams (a collective tournament) is considered, where each contestant may spend productive effort in order to increase his team’s performance or sabotage the members of the opponent team. It is shown that each team directs all its sabotage activities at exactly one of the opponent team’s least able members. This is due to two effects, a decreasing-returns effect and a complementarity effect. The result is of particular interest, as findings on individual tournaments indicate that very able players should usually be sabotaged most strongly.     

Substitution and complementarity between managers and subordinates: Evidence from British football

We use data on British football managers and teams over the 1994-2007 period to study substitution and complementarity between leaders and subordinates. We find for the Premier League (the highest level of competition) that, other things being equal, managers who themselves played at a higher level raise the productivity of less-skilled teams by more than that of highly skilled teams. This is consistent with the hypothesis that one function of a top manager is to communicate to subordinates the skills needed to succeed, since less skilled players have more to learn. However, we also find that managers with more accumulated professional managing experience raise the productivity of talented players by more than that of less-talented players. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a further function of successful managers in high-performance workplaces is to manage the egos of elite workers. Such a function is potentially more important the more accomplished the workers are-as indicated, in our data, by teams with greater payrolls.     

Heterogeneous worker ability and team-based production: Evidence from major league baseball, 1920–2009

A detailed longitudinal dataset is assembled containing annual performance and biographical data for every player over the entire history of professional major league baseball. The data are then aggregated to the team level for the period 1920–2009 in order to test whether teams built on a more even distribution of observed talent perform better than those teams with a mixture of highly able and less able players. The dependent variable used in the regressions is the percentage of games a team wins each season. We find that conditioning on average player ability, dispersion of both batting and pitching talent displays an optimal degree of inequality, in that teams with too high or too low a spread in player ability perform worse than teams with a more balanced distribution of offensive and defensive talent. These findings have potentially important applications both inside and outside the sporting world.     

The Impact of Monitoring and Sanctions on Cheating: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia

Using a laboratory experiment in a developing country (Tunisia, North Africa), we investigate whether the level of monitoring and both the nature (monetary versus moral) and magnitude of sanctions influence cheating levels. Our findings show that the introduction of weak monetary sanctions and monitoring is likely to increase cheating. However, a perfect monitoring is found to decrease the level of cheating. Moreover, when combined with a perfect monitoring, moral sanctions matter and may be even more effective than strong monetary sanctions in reducing cheating. We draw some policy implications regarding cheating in various domains. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of political risk on FDI exit decisions

Do political risks drive exit decisions by multinational companies (MNC)? What mechanisms can protect a multinational subsidiary in a host country that is characterized by weak institutions and high political risks? Using multinational plant-level data for Russia in the period 2000-2016 and applying the Cox proportional hazard model, we find significant effects from elevated host-country political risk when we compare the year of entry to the year of exit. MNCs are particularly sensitive to problems associated with law, order, and social conditions in Russia and the presence of the military in politics in the home country. Institutional similarity does not reduce the hazard of exits, and MNCs from high-risk countries exit less when home-country risk increases. Subsidiaries from countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia are less likely to exit, though sanctions interact with host-country risks, making them more severe. Being large and being part of a greenfield project help subsidiaries to build resistance against host-country political risks. These findings provide empirical evidence that support our conclusions regarding foreign direct investment volatility in countries with high risk.     

Founder nativity,founding team formation,and firm performance in the U.S. high-tech sector

This paper is motivated by the movement of foreign-born entrepreneurs out of ethnic enclaves and into the mainstream, globally-connected economies of the countries of immigration, and from necessity to opportunity entrepreneurship. The theoretical contribution of the paper is to integrate the emerging literature on foreign-born entrepreneurship with work on the composition and impact of founding teams. Empirically, we draw on original quantitative and qualitative data on the U.S. high-tech sector. We find that homophily drives team formation and that nationality diversity in founding teams has a modest impact on firm performance.     

Is the Public Oversight of Auditors Effective? The Impact of Sanctions on Loss of Clients,Salary and Audit Reporting

This study examines the consequences of sanctions against individual Swedish auditors issued by the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants (SBPA). The results provide no support for individual auditor client loss after receiving a sanction. However, we find that Big 4 auditors have a lower salary after the sanction than before. Finally, we do not find that auditors become more conservative in their reporting after being sanctioned. Collectively, our results support that public oversight sanctions have relatively limited consequences for auditors of private companies.     

A Perfect Impasse? Cuba's Move Towards the Market and the United States' Move Towards Cuba

This article first analyses the internal economic trajectory of the Cuban economic reforms and evaluates their effectiveness in delivering the extensive and intensive development needed to correct Cuba's structural and economic imbalances. It concludes that without the lifting of the US economic sanctions success will at best be only partial, with serious implications for long‐term stability. The article then evaluates the reasons for the US economic sanctions against Cuba and argues that while the embargo policy might have failed to topple the Cuban communist regime, it has served other, largely unacknowledged, purposes that are important in explaining why the policy has persisted. The article concludes by suggesting that the US is not likely to jettison the sanctions regime while Cuba's single‐party, state‐led economic system remains. At the same time, Cuba is not likely to jettison its single‐party system while the sanctions remain.     

Employers' hiring practices,employment protection,and costly search: A vacancy-level analysis

An employer with a vacancy may respond to high search costs by lowering hiring requirements. While such an adjustment increases the employer's chances of filling the vacancy, it also more likely results in a match that terminates when the match is hit by match-specific productivity shocks. Drawing on a novel Slovenian vacancy dataset, we find that employers who are searching to fill temporary positions are more likely to hire underqualified workers when search costs are high. We find that search costs are taken into consideration when employers are searching to fill permanent positions in some specifications but not all. These findings suggest that for employers who are searching to fill a permanent position, the benefits of lowering hiring requirements when search costs are high are likely outweighed by: a) high firing costs if an under-qualified worker is hired on a permanent contract or b) the costs of undertaking a new search later if an under-qualified worker is hired on a temporary contract. These are novel findings about the employers' hiring practices in the presence of employment protection laws and costly search.     

Who Controls the Controller? People Reaction to Social Control Agent's Decisions about Organizational Misconduct

Social control agents (SCAs) discipline organizations and draw the line between appropriate organizational behaviour and misconduct. While prior research focuses on the SCA-organization relationship, we theorize how a key audience (people) interacts with an SCA depending on its decisions to sanction or not organizational misconduct. Building on sociological and organizational research on social norms and their enforcement, we expect that people are more likely to agree with an SCA that sanctions a behaviour that violates rule-based as opposed to value-based norms. Violations of rule-based norms generate more agreement because such norms are less ambiguous and ascertaining when they are violated is easier to establish. As people agree more with SCA decisions to sanction rule-based violations, we expect that the propensity of people to resort to the SCA increases. We find support for our hypotheses with a survey, a series of experiments, and the analysis of complete data on complaints by UK citizens to the Advertising Standards Authority – the UK SCA on advertising – over the period 2007–10. Our paper contributes to research in organizational misconduct by showing how SCAs are both an evaluating entity and an evaluated one and by shedding light on how people co-determine what an acceptable or unacceptable behaviour is. Our paper uniquely links macro- and micro-level studies on corporate misconduct, putting centre stage that SCA's authority essentially depends on a key audience's agreement with the SCAs' underlying norms that underpin their decisions.     

Rankings,Performance, and Sabotage: The Moderating Effects of Target Setting

Competitive performance rankings are widely used in organizations. Such incentive systems enable agents to improve their performance ranking not only by increasing their own performance, but also by undermining their competitors’ performance. While previous accounting studies have stressed the positive effect of ranking systems on managerial effort, the present paper investigates when such ranking systems may induce sabotage, and how this unintended effect can be mitigated. Our study is based on a laboratory experiment designed to investigate (a) whether competitive performance feedback increases an agent’s inclination to disrupt the efforts of competitors, in a case where ranking has no effect on compensation and (b) whether the presence of a self-set absolute performance target moderates these effects. Our results show that ranking increases both performance and sabotage. Adding an absolute performance standard appeared to reduce sabotage. However, when there is an absolute target, performance is higher in the absence of ranking. Overall, our results thus suggest that performance benefits from the use of either a relative or an absolute performance target, but not from their simultaneous use.     

Team Incentives under Relative Performance Evaluation

This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives in the repeated setting with many agents under the restriction that only relative performance evaluation is feasible for contracting. We show that the optimal contract in the repeated setting may take a different form than that in the static setting. In the repeated setting, it may be optimal for the principal to arbitrarily divide the agents into teams and compensate them based on team ranking, as it allows the principal to motivate the agents through peer sanctions. The situation draws a clear contrast to the static setting where such a strategy is never optimal. The result indicates that the concept of team plays an important role in the repeated setting even when performances can only be evaluated in relative terms.     

The role of HR managers in international mergers and acquisitions: a multiple case study

The article departs from the existing research treatment of expatriation as an individual-level phenomenon, and looks at the expatriation of work teams. We examine the performance management of expatriate teams brought in from 17 independent organizations to work on a new-product development project. We find that the teams faced diverse stakeholder expectations and that these stakeholders' expectations were a source of tension for the teams. The teams responded by adopting performance management strategies that tended to prioritize their respective home organizations' expectations. We discuss the vulnerability of contextual performance and the relative insignificance of national cultural differences in this expatriation context. We propose practical considerations and an agenda for further international human resource management (IHRM) research on expatriate teams.