The Microfoundations of Austrian Economics through a New Classical Theoretical Lens

This paper is an attempt to contribute to the microfoundations debate by discussing the distinctive methodological characteristics of the Austrian school, and how they relate to different conceptions of equilibrium and general equilibrium models. Further, we shall focus on one specific branch of the Austrian school (those who see markets as exhibiting equilibrating tendencies) and one specific branch of neoclassical economics (the New Classical School) to highlight some hitherto overlooked points of tangency. Indeed, we shall use the monetary theories of Hayek and Lucas to argue that the limitations of New Classical models may lead to Austrian solutions.     

Microfoundations

This paper argues that the microfoundations programme can be understood as an implementation of an underlying methodological principle—methodological individualism—and that it therefore shares a fundamental ambiguity with that principle, viz, whether the macro must be derived from and therefore reducible to, or rather consistent with, micro-level behaviours. The pluralist conclusion of the paper is not that research guided by the principle of microfoundations is necessarily wrong, but that the exclusion of approaches not guided by that principle is indeed necessarily wrong. The argument is made via an examination of the advantages claimed for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, the relationship between parts and wholes in social science, and the concepts of reduction, substrate neutrality, the intentional stance and hypostatisation.     

Lombard Enlightenment and Classical Political Economy

Abstract

This paper discusses the formative steps of ‘Classical’ Political Economy under the joint influence of the Italian and Scottish Enlightenment. Pietro Verri is a leading figure of the Italian Enlightenment and he belongs to the Lombard branch of the Italian School of Political Economy (sometimes named ‘School of Milan’) during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Schumpeter's treatment of the ‘School of Milan’ describes Pietro Verri as ‘the most important pre-Smithian authority on Cheapness-and-Plenty’. A careful canvass of the texts substantiates Schumpeter's suggestion. Verri stands out as a key figure in the transition from Physiocracy to the Smithian system.     

作为社会理论的古典政治经济学

古典政治经济学实际上是一种社会理论 ,它认为社会由诸阶级构成 ,而阶级区分的依据是它们的不同经济职能 ,它们的社会和政治关系由其经济利益定位。斯密的社会阶级经济分析有首创之功 ,但因其未能前后一致地坚持劳动价值论 ,无法提供社会阶级关系的适当解释。李嘉图则在劳动价值论基础上提出了社会阶级冲突的可能性     

The Political Economy of Tax-Based Incomes Policy: Wealth Effects of Post Keynesian TIP

This paper explores the economics of electoral democracy, an almost entirely neglected subject. Running for office necessitates resources. But students of democracy have had almost nothing to say about how much money should be spent by candidates or where that money should come from. As a result, there is a gaping void in the theory of democracy. Joseph A. Schumpeter used a market analogy in his discussion of the electoral process, but even he did not discuss how electoral campaigns are to be paid for. In fact, the few citizens who largely fund campaigns for office in the United States purchase non-rivalrous influence. They obtain the ability to shape the policies that affect all citizens. In this way, political equality is undermined. The paper concludes that achieving a more representative political system can best be attained by treating political campaigns as a public good.     

The Political Economy of Frank Knight: Classical Liberalism from Chicago

Frank Knight, the founder of the Chicago School, isa leading twentieth century political economist who remains barelyknown in political science circles. The article surveys the politicaleconomy element in his work in the context of the classicalliberal tradition from the Scottish Enlightenment to Hayek. Itis argued that in the major compartments of Knight's politicaleconomy—his psychological assumptions of actor behaviour,his perspective on the nature of liberalism, his attention tothe maintenance of order by way of traditions and morals—herenews classical [as opposed to other versions of] liberalismin modern times. The final section deals with Knight's thoughtson political democracy which, it is contended, complement hisclassical liberalism.     

Marx,Finance and Political Economy

ABSTRACT

Shortly after the publication of Volume I of Capital, the financial requirements of capitalist enterprise forced the financial innovation of bond and stock finance for joint stock companies. Marx intended to re-write Capital in order to incorporate this change. He did not achieve this. The economic analysis of capitalism with long-term finance was undertaken by Hilferding in his Finance Capital. Thereafter, a strand of economic analysis of production and distribution emerged in the work of the Austro-Marxists, Veblen, Keynes, Kalecki, Steindl and Sweezy, and the Italian Kaleckians, Joseph Halevi and Riccardo Bellofiore, which incorporated the change made to the structure and dynamics of capitalism by long-term finance. However, this shift in capitalist financing has largely been ignored in economic theory, while much of the heterodox analysis that seeks to challenge the role of finance in contemporary capitalism has not integrated finance consistently. The change from the classic capitalism to finance capital raises important questions about the meaning and relevance of Marx’s work today.     

Review article. Kalecki on imperfect competition, inflation and money

This paper reviews the final two volumes of Kalecki's CollectedWorks. It first discusses, based on the papers in Vol. VI, hiscontributions on cartels, on Nazi Germany, the development ofindices of business fluctuations and of national income accounts,and the movement of prices and costs over the business cycle.Drawing on the papers reproduced in Vol. VII, this paper continuesby discussing Kalecki's writings on rationing, inflation, imperfectcompetition and unemployment, money and finance, the nationaldebt and the welfare state, international economic arrangements,the post-war American economy and econometrics and methodology.     

Finite Horizons,Political Economy,and Growth

This paper analyzes the political economy of growth when agents and the government have finite horizons and equilibrium growth is inefficient. A “representative” government (i.e., one whose preferences reflect those of its constituents) endowed merely with the ability to tax and transfer can improve somewhat on the market allocation, but cannot achieve first-best growth. Efficiency requires in addition the ability to bind future governments. We argue that this ability is related to political stability, and we provide empirical evidence that stability and growth-related policies (namely education) are meaningfully related. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D9, H3, O5.     

Joseph Schumpeter and Thorstein Veblen on technological determinism,individualism and institutions

This article investigates Joseph Schumpeter's affinities with Thorstein Veblen with respect to technological change and determinism, the future of capitalism, individualism and institutions. From a methodological point of view, a common point in their analysis is their anti-teleological view regarding economics as a discipline. Also, in the Schumpeterian system, technology is the cornerstone of economic evolution and appears as the making of new combinations. In the Veblenian theoretical framework, the bearer of change is to be found, inter alia, in technology, just like in Schumpeter's works, although not without differences. They also share the opinion that technology revolutionises capitalism and has serious implications for its future as a system. Furthermore, regarding individualism, in his work Schumpeter stresses the importance of the social milieu on individual action, a fact which bears strong resemblance to the Veblenian notion of evolution as ‘depersonalized evolution’. In this sense, Schumpeter is very close to Veblen, although Schumpeter's approach could be classified in what is called institutionalist individualism, whereas Veblen could be classified as holist. Undoubtedly, the role of institutions is of great importance in both Schumpeter and Veblen. Ιnstitutions in the Schumpeterian schema play a central role closely related to the future of capitalism. Institutional and non-institutional factors enter into complex forms of interaction just like in Veblen's approach. There, institutions are part of the social milieu and their underlying framework, much wider than mere economic and social. Of course, the theoretical analyses of Schumpeter and Veblen are not devoid of differences springing mainly from their methodological approach such as the role of the individual in the capitalist process which is probably the most significant difference regarding the importance attributed to it in Schumpeter's early works. Also, the way technical change appears constitutes another difference. However, his views are quite close to Veblen's. After all, Schumpeter began to write in a social, political, theoretical and ideological environment at a time when evolutionary ideas dominated social thought.     

Forget English Freedom,Remember Atlantic Slavery: Common Law,Commercial Law and the Significance of Slavery for Classical Political Economy

Is the liberty to pursue individual self-interest in the capitalist market all that remains of the grand Enlightenment promise of human emancipation? The article addresses this question by returning to eighteenth century scholarship on the relationship between English common law and commercial law. Specifically, I explore the fundamental challenge posed to common law by the regulation, through commercial law, of enslaved Africans as labouring ‘things’. I show how key British scholars in the eighteenth century traditions of jurisprudence, moral philosophy and political economy struggled to address the radical unfreedom of the enslaved and the meaning of her/his radical emancipation. I explore how this Atlantic challenge was ‘indigenised’ to speak to the threat posed by enclosures in Britain, in particular, the possible destruction of the qualified unfreedoms and freedoms extant in the paternal social order upheld by common law. I explore how political economy traditions pre and post abolition and emancipation sought to deal with this challenge. And I conjecture on the significance of remembering the most radical process of commodifying labour – in Aimé Césaire's terms, thingification – for present day interpretations of the relationship between capitalism and freedom.     

Union bargaining power, employment, and output in a model of monopolistic competition with wage bargaining

This paper examines the implications of a rise in the bargaining power of workers on the real wage, income distribution, and the levels of employment and output using a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition and worker-owner Nash bargaining at the firm level. It thereby provides optimizing microfoundations to Kalecki's macroeconomic analysis of the positive effect on output of a rise in trade-union power, and contrasts it with the neoclassical view based on the diminishing marginal productivity of labor.