The Stability and Growth Pact: A Delicate Balance or an Albatross?

The EU's Stability and Growth Pact tries to strike a delicate balance: it imposes the constraints on national fiscal policy that were deemed necessary to protect the new European Central Bank from outside pressures; at the same time, it allows flexibility for a counter-cyclical policy. First, we review official institutions' studies of the flexibility embedded in the Pact and find a rather strong consensus: the Pact seems likely to constrain counter-cyclical fiscal efforts in the years ahead, or at least until EU governments bring their structural deficits into balance. Then, we review conventional academic arguments that suggest a new central bank might need to be protected from external pressures, and we ask if the constraints that were actually written into the Pact are likely to be helpful in this regard. We conclude that the Pact is closer to an albatross than a delicately balanced package of necessary fiscal constraints.     

A Note on the (Un)Pleasant Arithmetic of Fiscal Policy: The Case of Italian Public Debt

Using the simple arithmetic of government budget constraint, we perform an illustrative analysis on the Italian case, investigating the consequences on the main public finance aggregates of the adoption of a fiscal policy rule responding to past real debt/GDP ratio. Such a rule, firmly grounded in the economic analysis, would allow the reduction of Italy's outstanding stock of debt without requiring the strict adherence to the 3 per cent criterion for deficit/GDP ratio, as prescribed by SGP (Stability and Growth Pact). We perform a forecasting exercise under five alternative scenarios and analyse the details of a structural debt reduction strategy with alternative yearly step.     

The new stability and growth pact: A first assessment

The paper proposes a theoretical model of fiscal policy offering new insights on some of the key policy trade-offs involved in the recent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. As suggested by the proponents of the reform, greater room for case-specific economic judgment in the implementation of the pact may improve welfare. In our model, these gains occur because the consolidation path implied by the implementation of the pact does not discourage high-quality measures. In practice, however, the difficulty to extract true policy intent from budget figures may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy. Hence, reforming a rules-based fiscal framework with a view to enhance its “economic rationale” would also require closer monitoring, a better grasp of the policies underlying the budget, and ultimately stricter enforcement. In that sense, recent reforms are at best unhelpful.     

Neoliberal growth models,monetary union and the Euro crisis. A post-Keynesian perspective

The paper offers an account of the Euro crisis based on post-Keynesian monetary theory and its typology of demand regimes. Neoliberalism has transformed social and financial relations in Europe but it has not given rise to a sustained profit-led growth process. Instead, growth has relied either on financial bubbles and rising household debt (‘debt-driven growth’) or on net exports (‘export-driven growth’). In Europe the financial crisis has been amplified by an economic policy architecture (the Stability and Growth Pact) that aimed at restricting the role of fiscal policy and monetary policy. This neoliberal economic policy regime in conjunction with the separation of monetary and fiscal spheres has turned the financial crisis of 2007 into a sovereign debt crisis in southern Europe.     

On the Institutional Design of the European Monetary Union: Conservatism, Stability Pact and Economic Shocks

The aim of this paper is to design the optimal institutional arrangement for a monetary union. Using a two-country rational expectations model, the study analyses how the conservatism of the area-wide central bank and the penalty system for fiscal deviation (Stability and Growth Pact) should be designed with respect to different economic shocks. The optimal institutional arrangement is also dependent on who is the 'leader' of the policy game. When national governments move first, the independent area-wide central bank can exercise greater discipline over national fiscal policies, making the Stability Pact unnecessary.
(J.E.L.: E58, E63, F42).     

Ricardian fiscal regimes in the European Union

The prevalence of different fiscal regimes is important both for practical policy reasons and to assess fiscal sustainability, notably for European Union countries. The purpose of this article is to assess, with a panel data set, the empirical evidence concerning the existence of Ricardian fiscal regimes in EU-15 countries. The results give support to the Ricardian fiscal regime hypothesis throughout the sample period, and for sub-samples accounting for the dates of the Maastricht Treaty and for the setting-up of the Stability and Growth Pact. Furthermore, electoral budget cycles also seem to play a relevant role in fiscal behaviour.

Fiscal rules to tame the political budget cycle: Evidence from Italian municipalities

The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It uses data on Italian municipalities during the 2000s and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian sub-national fiscal rule (Domestic Stability Pact, DSP) introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 10–20 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that municipalities subject to the DSP show a pre-electoral increase in capital spending which is only a quarter of the one of municipalities not subject to the rule.     

Patching up the Pact

The paper considers the implications for the EU accession candidates of Central and Eastern Europe of the fiscal‐financial constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact and the Maastricht Treaty. Our findings apply also to those current EU members whose initial conditions (e.g., infrastructure and progress in state pension reform) or other structural characteristics (e.g., demographic structure, growth potential, Balassa‐Samuelson equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation) differ significantly from the EU average. We find the existing criteria to be seriously flawed and propose an alternative rule, the Permanent Balance Rule, based on a strong form of tax smoothing.     

Have the euro area and EU governance worked? Just the facts

We test whether the two key EU and euro area economic governance pillars, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy, have had any impact on macroeconomic outcomes. We test this proposition on a panel of 27, some of which are non-EU (control group) using a programme evaluation approach. The impact of the EU economic governance pillars is evaluated based on both the performance before and after their application as well as against the control group. We find strong and robust evidence that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the Lisbon Strategy have had a significant beneficial impact on fiscal and economic performance outcomes. We conclude that a profound reform of these pillars is needed to make them work in the next decade.     

EMU: Optimal Fiscal Strategy and the Punishment Effectiveness

This paper investigates the ability of the Stability and Growth Pact to prevent governments in the "euro zone" from running excessive budget deficits. It is shown that in a static two-country game, the Pareto-optimal strategy of no excess deficits cannot be systematically enforced, whatever the toughness of the sanction under the Pact. However, in a multiperiod setting, the Pareto-optimal configuration of no excess deficits would prevail even if no sanctions were applied to deviant governments. In this case, neither a heavily punitive SGP, nor a centralized budget appears to be helpful in the EMU context.     

How to Achieve the Take-off into Sustained Growth: A Case Study for Slovenia

In this paper, we show that successful policy aimed at enhancing economic growth in the long run must be based on policies which improve human capital and technological progress. This is applied to Slovenia, a small open economy in the European Union and the Euro Area. In particular, we investigate how fiscal policies should be designed to support economic growth without violating the European Union Stability and Growth Pact. Using the SLOPOL10 model, an econometric model of the Slovenian economy, we analyse the effects of different fiscal policies in Slovenia over the next few years by means of simulations. The fiscal policy multipliers of the Slovenian economy are small and short-lived, which renders demand-side expansionary fiscal policies inappropriate as a means of achieving higher growth. However, if an increase in government expenditures directly related to technological progress is implemented (such as better funding for tertiary education or subsidies for firms’ investments in research and development), this can trigger a path of output which is permanently higher than that of the baseline simulation. Reducing income taxes and social security contributions has strong positive effects on employment. This result shows that the key to prosperity and sustained growth is investment in human capital and technology, also for a small open economy like Slovenia.     

Fiscal Discipline as a Social Norm: The European Stability Pact

This paper reviews the arguments for and against the “Stability and Growth Pact.” We find the theoretical debate to be inconclusive, as both externality and credibility arguments can be used to yield opposite and plausible conclusions. Empirical evidence in favor of a Pact‐like rule is also scant. We therefore suggest the view that the Stability Pact is a public social norm, that countries obey in order to preserve reputation among the other members of the European Union. Using this extreme—but not implausible—hypothesis, we build a simple model similar in spirit to Akerlof's (1980) seminal work on social norms, and we show that reputation issues may cause the emergence of a stable but inferior equilibrium. Increased heterogenity generally has the effect of further reducing aggregate welfare; we conclude that the problems posed by the Pact/social norm are likely to increase following the enlargement, when a number of countries anxious to prove their “soundness” joined the club.     

The macroeconomics of social pacts

In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade unions, the central bank and the fiscal policymaker. We explicitly model unions’ concern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. We also highlight the profoundly different incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. The former has unambiguously induced more efficient outcomes; the latter is likely to backfire!     

Fiscal Policy in New EU Member States: Go East,Prudent Man!

The European Union accepted 10 new member states (NMS) in 2004, eight of which were former socialist countries. New members have had to adjust their economic policies to EU standards. Perhaps most difficult has been fiscal policy, where NMS must comply with the Stability and Growth Pact rules. Indeed, four of the eight post-communist NMS breached the SGP limits and were put in the Excessive Deficit Procedure. While the SGP is being modified, fiscal policy is set to remain on the agenda for all NMS.

This article analyses fiscal policy in the eight NMS, focusing primarily on the period immediately preceding their EU accession. The structure and scale of these countries' fiscal policy are analysed and the main trends in the revenue and expenditure of their public budgets identified. Then the dynamics of fiscal policies in the NMS are explored and the main factors in them isolated. The authors show how much of the consolidation was due to the fiscal authorities' effort and how much was caused by external factors. They also show that most NMS governments have run rather inconsistent fiscal policies and have not consolidated their budgets appropriately, postponing politically difficult consolidation measures. However, they also identify a group of countries characterised by strong reform efforts and responsible fiscal policy making, supported usually by strong economic growth. In this context, room is given to economic as well as political economy factors.     

A dynamic CGE model for jointly accounting ageing population,automation and environmental tax reform. European Union as a case study

We develop a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model based on the combination of different versions of GTAP utilities where alternative scenarios on ageing population trends are combined with projections on the incidence of automation into production processes and the adoption of unilateral decarbonisation policies. By simultaneously controlling for these different challenges that especially developed countries should face in the next decades, it is possible to disentangle non-linear mechanisms that will influence sustainability of public budget when the three issues are jointly combined. The European Union is taken as a case study. The first result is that ageing trends will impact fiscal sustainability reducing the EU capacity to respect the Stability and Growth Pact parameters. Second, when also considering technical change related to automation and robotics in the production process, fiscal sustainability will improve only in the case of input-neutral technological change. On the contrary, if biased technical change produces unemployment impact, negative impacts of ageing population are reinforced by automation. Third, the adoption of an environmental tax, here modelled in the form of a carbon price, leads to an improvement in environmental sustainability but has non-linear effects of fiscal sustainability.     

Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU

This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries’ most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.     

ACCRUAL BUDGETING AND FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN THE EMU

Drawing on modern macroeconomic literature focusing on the study of politico-institutional determinants of public policies, this article analyzes the institutional design of the European fiscal policy laid down by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Stability and Growth Pact. Both documents provide countries in the EU, and in particular those that have adopted the euro, with a common code of fiscal conduct that is expected to uphold discipline in the management of government finances. Nevertheless, a simple review of this code of conduct shows the existence of serious drawbacks mainly derived from the asymmetry between the treatment given to outcomes of fiscal policy in comparison with that given to the procedures followed in generating them. It seems that the current design of the European fiscal coordination system does not really take into account the findings of modern macroeconomics and does not pay due attention to the relation between budgetary processes/institutions and outcomes in fiscal policy. Moreover, this article argues that in the implementation of the broad reforms needed to achieve a sustainable fiscal consolidation, there are political complementarities (in the sense that the ability to gain political consent for one reform depends on the acceptance of other reforms) between the setting up of new fiscal policies of expenditure containment and new fiscal procedures.
All in all, this analysis points to a sorely needed procedural reform in public sector budgeting as the best contribution to pursuing the stabilization of European public finances: the fuller use of accrual concepts in budget reporting. Much more than an isolated technical exercise, the shift to accrual budgeting could be quite a useful tool to facilitate wider reforms aimed at improving public sector financial management and performance while enhancing transparency and accountability.     

Co-ordinating Stability: Some Remarks on the Roles of Monetary and Fiscal Policy under EMU

The launch of Monetary Union in Europe has prompted calls for enhanced policy co-ordination among economic policy-makers. This paper sounds a note of caution and argues that the problem of policy co-ordination needs to be placed in the broader context of the efficient assignment of tasks and responsibilities among separate actors. In the presence of incentive and information problems, overly ambitious attempts at EXPLICIT forms of policy co-ordination may actually turn out to undermine the IMPLICIT co-ordination properties of the clear division of responsibilities enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. A single monetary policy that is credibly geared to the maintenance of price stability and national fiscal policies that genuinely accept the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact already go a long way in securing macroeconomic stability. Additional channels for dialogue among policymakers should be helpful to the extent that they enhance the understanding of individual responsibilities and do not dilute accountability.     

Compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under EMU

The debate over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a part of European Monetary Union, has highlighted the need to assess the extent to which fiscal policies of union members should be constrained as a pre-requisite for price stability within the union. In this paper, we develop a two country open economy model, where each country has overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. We examine the case where the two countries have formed a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. We show that the fiscal response required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived. In principle, this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments, but we show that the scope for compensation is limited. The monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise the debt of at most one fiscal authority, and any other combination of policies will either result in price level indeterminacy and/or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies. Finally, in a series of simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal authorities meet the (weak) requirements of fiscal solvency. However, when monetary policy is forced to abandon its active targeting of inflation, then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and inflation.     

The Economic Agenda: a View from the US

The paper surveys the agenda needed to restore noninflationary growth in industrial countries. The role of fiscal policy as short‐run stimulus both on the spending side and on the tax side is discussed. The author comments on trade, specifically the new trade round, and international finance. Long‐run fiscal imbalances due to aging are analyzed. The role of fiscal institutions such as the European Growth and Stability Pact, the Japanese bad‐loan problem, and structural problems are put into the perspective that advanced economies should nurture their reforms globally so as to provide successful examples of reforms and prove helpful trading partners.