人们关注的是分配动机还是分配结果?——最后通牒实验视角下两种公平观的考察

本文通过设计一组最后通牒实验考察了分配动机的公平和分配结果的公平对人的行为决策的影响,并分别从浙江和北京两地获取了相关实验数据。采用角色随机分配的简化最后通牒实验,通过提议者不同可选分配方案向响应者发送的信号,考察对提议者的"动机是否公平"从而响应者是否有相应的不同拒绝率。实验结果表明,响应者对提议者"分配动机的公平"有显著不同的反应,说明基于动机的互惠偏好确实在人们的行为决策中扮演重要角色。同时本文通过一组修正型的最后通牒实验从分配结果公平的角度考察了其影响机制,发现分别在保证博弈实验中38%的被试拒绝行为,以及免惩罚博弈中89%的被试拒绝行为,不能被差异厌恶偏好理论进行解释。本文实验的结果在于说明分配动机的公平比分配结果的公平更会影响人们的决策行为,其暗含的政策含义即分配过程的公平比分配结果的公平更为重要。     

基于公平偏好的实验经济学研究综述

传统经济学建立在自利性假设之上,认为参与人仅仅关心自身利益,即使出现有悖于自利性假设的行为,也只是暂时性的偏离。而最近二十多年的实验经济学研究对该假设提出了质疑,利用大量实验数据不仅证明了人类行为中公平偏好的存在性,而且还表明这种存在性绝非是暂时性的偏离,其对人类的行为决策具有很强的系统性影响。目前相关学术研究主要体现在公平偏好与其他社会偏好的区分、有关人类行为决策中公平偏好存在性的实验证明、基于结果的公平偏好与基于动机的公平偏好的差异以及公平偏好对传统激励契约产生的影响。本文指出了国外学术界对公平偏好实验中包括实验对象、货币金额和文化等方面的质疑,同时也揭示了未来进一步的研究方向,构成了有关公平偏好实验经济学的研究进展及前沿趋势。     

公平偏好下收益共享契约供应链协调

供应链收益分配过程中零售商往往表现出公平偏好行为,文章研究了市场需求是随机的两阶段供应链中收益共享契约与供应链协调问题。在随机市场需求的收益共享契约基本模型的基础上,构建了考虑零售商公平偏好的收益共享契约模型,并通过数值分析了零售商公平偏好对收益共享契约协调供应链的影响。研究结果表明,将公平偏好这一行为因素引入到收益共享契约协调供应链问题中具有理论和实际意义,对收益共享契约具体的协调策略产生影响。     

利他偏好的内生模型及其经济学解释

利他行为对自利人性假设的挑战,要求经济学必须把偏好进行内生化处理。笔者首先构建了一个利他偏好内生模型,使得人类行为统一于效用最大化模式并具有了内在一致的规律性和可预测性;然后对利他偏好内生模型的合理性进行了解释。笔者认为,与利己行为不同,行为主体不是从利他行为后果而是从利他行为本身获得效用;通过整体间的生存适应性补偿机制,利他者不仅可以战胜利己者得以存在和持续,而且利他惩罚行为还为人类走出囚徒困境提供了有力的保证。     

涉他偏好效用理论研究述评

"最后通牒"等一系列行为博弈实验显示,人们在追求自身收益的同时也会关注其他人的收益。而在此基础上发展的涉他偏好效用理论,成功解释了大量传统经济理论所不能解释的实验结果和经济现象,并能更为准确地预测经济行为。该文对目前涉他偏好效用理论的主要模型——互惠意图模型、不公平厌恶模型和社会福利偏好模型进行研究、比较和分析,为解决我国经济改革和经济转型中公平、互惠和社会效率等方面问题提供所需的理论依据。     

利他偏好的内生模型及其经济学解释

利他行为对自利人性假设的挑战，要求经济学必须把偏好进行内生化处理。笔者首先构建了一个利他偏好内生模型，使得人类行为统一于效用最大化模式并具有了内在一致的规律性和可预测性；然后对利他偏好内生模型的合理性进行了解释。笔者认为，与利己行为不同，行为主体不是从利他行为后果而是从利他行为本身获得效用；通过整体间的生存适应性补偿机制，利他者不仅可以战胜利己者得以存在和持续，而且利他惩罚行为还为人类走出囚徒困境提供了有力的保证。     

经济实验对社会偏好识别的研究述评

实验经济学在分配方面观察到了大量相对经典理性假设的偏离行为,并总结认为这些"公平行为"受到了若干不同性质的社会性偏好的影响。本文将社会偏好的种类分为关心结果的分配性偏好和关心行为背后意图的互惠偏好两大类,然后从经典实验中行为背后的偏好识别问题出发,总结近年来实验研究的相关发现。这些发现可以为企业和社会治理提供一些新的思路。     

住房价格与居民风险偏好

基于全国范围的调查数据和省级层面数据,本文实证分析了住房价格对居民风险偏好的影响,发现房价水平和房价上涨都显著提高居民的风险偏好。具体而言,在房价水平高、房价增幅大的地区,居民的主观风险偏好态度和客观风险偏好行为显著提高;当居民没有住房贷款、对房屋具有完全产权时,房价对居民的风险偏好影响更强;居民健康状况和拥有房屋数量对房价与居民风险偏好关系的调节效应相对较弱;区域性住房价格与居民股市参与度的关系,也进一步表明住房价格能显著提高居民的风险偏好。     

公平偏好对员工努力水平的影响——基于行为经济学观点的实证分析

行为经济学和行为博弈的一些实验研究显示,对收入公平性的判断是影响参与人的行为和分配偏好的一个重要因素。本文通过对我国不同地区保险代理人的问卷调查结果进行信度分析和回归分析,讨论了公平对待与员工努力水平之间的关系。研究结果表明,公平对待与员工努力水平之间存在显著的正相关关系,而这一点并不被传统管理者所重视。进一步得出结论,基于公平偏好的激励机制是改善员工的工作努力水平的一个重要手段。     

参与者公平偏好对协作型众包创新绩效激励机制的影响

协作型众包创新是以最大化创新绩效为目标的众包模式,相关实践案例已有所显现,但协作型众包创新过程中参与方的努力行为经常受到其公平偏好心理的影响。针对这一问题,采用委托代理理论,通过设计仅基于个人创新绩效(AR)和基于总创新绩效(TR)的两种激励机制提升协作型众包创新绩效,并深入探讨公平偏好对激励机制的影响。结果表明,AR机制中参赛者不可能出现利他性努力行为,而TR机制下利己性努力和利他性努力均与公平偏好负相关;两种激励机制下众包创新绩效均随公平偏好敏感度增大而下降,参赛者数量增加是否有利于提升众包创新绩效也取决于公平偏好程度;TR机制一定会产生比AR机制更高的众包绩效及发包方经济收益,但这种价值效应会被参赛者的公平偏好心理所弱化。     

Fairness and intentionality in children’s decision-making

Few studies have addressed the role of different aspects of the Theory of Mind (ToM) (intentionality and false belief understanding) in decision-making by adults playing strategic games where the importance of fairness is crucial. Even more interesting, this topic has been less investigated with children. The goal of this research was to explore the development of the decisional behavior along with the understanding of fairness, intentions and first- and second-order false belief understanding in children who are just acquiring those abilities. Multiple rounds of the ultimatum game with a human and a non-human partner (child/roulette wheel) were played by 177 children in the age range of 5–10 years, who also completed classic false belief tasks. Results confirm the key role of fairness sensibility across age groups and different degrees of the relevance of ToM according to the variability of children’s decisional behavior (stable vs. dynamic).     

Further insights on endogenous money and the liquidity preference theory of interest

Abstract

We present a simple stock-flow consistent (SFC) model to discuss some recent claims made by Angel Asensio in a paper published in this journal regarding the relationship between endogenous money theory and the liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest. We incorporate Asensio’s assumptions as far as possible and use simulation experiments to investigate his arguments regarding the presence of a crowding-out effect, the relationship between interest rates and credit demand, and the ability of the central bank to steer interest rates through varying the stock of money. We show that in a fully-specified SFC model, some of Asensio’s conclusions are not generally valid (most importantly, the presence of a crowding-out effect is ambiguous), and that in any case, his use of a non-SFC framework leads him to leave aside important mechanisms which can contribute to a better understanding of the behavior of interest rates. More generally, this paper once more demonstrates the utility of the SFC approach in research on monetary economics.     

Information and strategic voting

We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting. Voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur and focus on how information about the preference distribution affects strategic behavior. We also vary the relative importance of the second preferred option. Quantal response equilibrium analysis is used to analyze the game and derive predictions. Our results indeed show that strategic voting arises. Its extent depends on (i) information availability; (ii) the relative importance of the intermediate candidate; (iii) the electorate’s relative support for one’s preferred candidate; (iv) the relative position of the plurality-supported candidate in one’s preference ordering. Our results show that information serves as a coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality-preferred candidate’s chances of winning.     

A reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists

Summary. One version of the Coase Theorem is, If property rights are fully allocated, competition leads to efficient allocations. This version implies that the public goods problem can be solved by allocating property rights fully. We show that this mechanism is not likely to work well in economies with global externalities because the privatized economy is highly susceptible to strategic behavior: The free-rider problem manifests itself as a complementary monopoly problem in an associated private goods economy. Thus, our work relates the validity of the Coase Theorem to the literature on the incentives for strategic behavior in economies with complementarities. Received: 12 May 1999; revised version: 9 July 1999     

The political economy of global carbon emissions reductions

The discussion about what reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are required and how the emissions rights might be distributed globally has fostered the belief that there is a fundamental conflict between the rich nations of the “North” and the poor but populous nations of the “South.” The argument is that grandfathering the rights will only reinforce existing global inequalities, while per capita distribution of the rights would lead to such huge transfers of wealth to the South as to be unacceptable to the North. However, a very simple general equilibrium model highlighting key elements of the global economy shows that this perception is incorrect under a plausible interpretation of the goal of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to “avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Instead of using an economic damage function to determine the optimal level of emissions reductions, the model's utility functions are calibrated to reflect scientific understanding of what would be required to stabilize the atmosphere at safe concentrations of greenhouse gases. Among policy options that would accomplish this, the United States has a preference for grandfathering the allocation of emissions rights over a per capita allocation, but this preference is not strong and could be offset by other geopolitical considerations.     

Social responsibility promotes conservative risk behavior

Previous studies show that group risk taking can be more conservative than individual risk taking. Two common, but untested reasons for this greater caution are the influence of social responsibility and a tendency to conform to the preferences of others. We study changes in risk taking in simple settings, where another’s risk taking can sometimes be observed, and where decisions affect not only one’s own payoffs but sometimes also affect those of a passive, second party. We find that social responsibility leads to more conservative risk behavior in group decision making. Conformism has a more symmetric effect: observing the choice of another tends to lead both individual and social decisions toward whatever the other’s expressed risk preference is. Direct tests fail to link the social behavior we observe to the social preference for distributional fairness common in decision-making under certainty.     

企业制度变革中的博弈与均衡——一个关于国有企业民营化的实证研究

企业制度运行以利益相关者之间的共有理念为心理依托；这种共有理念体现在人们博弈均衡之中，是人们行为选择的默认前提，其形成和发展具有不以个人意志为转移的客观规律；企业制度变革的任务，是通过企业利益相关者之间的博弈和信任，在适应和调整共有理念的基础上，塑造合理的企业控制权主体。     

Women’s rights and development

Why has the expansion of women’s economic and political rights coincided with economic development? This paper investigates this question by focusing on a key economic right for women: property rights. The basic hypothesis is that the process of development (i.e., capital accumulation and declining fertility) exacerbated the tension in men’s conflicting interests as husbands versus fathers, ultimately resolving them in favor of the latter. As husbands, men stood to gain from their privileged position in a patriarchal world whereas, as fathers, they were hurt by a system that afforded few rights to their daughters. The model predicts that declining fertility would hasten reform of women’s property rights whereas legal systems that were initially more favorable to women would delay them. The theoretical relationship between capital and the relative attractiveness of reform is non-monotonic but growth inevitably leads to reform. I explore the empirical validity of the theoretical predictions by using cross-state variation in the US in the timing of married women obtaining property and earning rights between 1850 and 1920.