Unsuccessful patent application and cooperative R&;D

We show that uncertainty in patent approvals may induce the firms to do cooperative R&D. With an exogenous probability of success in patent application, we show that, if all firms apply for patents under non-cooperative R&D, the firms prefer cooperative R&D than non-cooperative R&D for moderate (high) probabilities of success in patent applications, if the cost of patenting is small (large). We also show the implications of entry of non-innovating firms and endogenous probability of success in patent applications.      

Process R&;D and Product Line Deletion by a Multiproduct Monopolist

Relative to single-product firms, a multiproduct monopolist can internalize the negative externalities of its R&D investments (the ``cannibalization effect') in two ways: (1) To lower R&D investment for each product; and (2) To delete some of its product lines so as to enlarge the market size for the remaining lines. It is shown that line deletion is profitable if products are close substitutes. If products are not close substitutes, the multiproduct monopolist keeps all product lines and invests less in cost-reducing R&D than single-product firms engaging in Cournot competition with product differentiation. However, it invests more in R&D than single-product firms if there are significant economies of scope in R&D, or if the oligopolistic firms can cooperate in their R&D decisions.      

A computational analysis of R&D support programs

We compare two common government R&D support programs, R&D tax credits and direct R&D grants. To study their effectiveness and the extent to which their design matters, we analyze these programs within a dynamic equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive industries. Adopting comprehensive welfare measures that take into account government, producer and consumer surpluses, we find that both schemes exhibit positive social returns. Mid-range R&D-intensive sectors exhibit higher social returns than either high or low R&D-intensive sectors. Both incentive schemes generate positive measures of R&D input additionality of magnitudes consistent with empirical R&D research. However, R&D grants that require firms to allocate subsidy funds to R&D spur less R&D than a more flexible R&D tax credit. Subsidy schemes can even induce competing firms to over-spend on R&D, generating negative producer surplus and possibly negative social returns.     

Effects of coordinated strategies on product and process R&;D

Using a game theoretical model on firms’ simultaneous investments in product and process R&D, we advance and empirically test hypotheses on the role of externalities on the optimal R&D portfolio of cooperating firms and independently competing firms. We use Community Innovation Survey data on 3,696 Italian manufacturing firms. In line with our model we find that members of a group of firms invest significantly more into product, process, and aggregate R&D than independent firms. Further, their R&D portfolios tend to show a higher product versus process ratio. However, with regard to R&D performance and efficiency we find that independent firms are superior.      

Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects

Abstract

We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.     

Synergizing independent and cooperative R&D activities: the effects of organisational slack and absorptive capacity

Firms undertaking independent and cooperative research and development (R&D) activities simultaneously often have difficulties to realise their synergistic effects. This study contends that such difficulties are caused by tensions between two types of R&D activities in terms of resource competition and knowledge leakage. Moreover, organisational slack and absorptive capacity may affect these tensions and thereby play important role in synergizing independent and cooperative R&D activities. Based on a survey data of 286 firms, this study finds that such two types of R&D activities jointly have a negative impact on firm performance. Furthermore, organisational slack aids in synergizing them, while absorptive capacity has an adverse impact. These findings enrich our knowledge on the interrelation of independent and cooperative R&D activities and shed light on how firms can synergize them.     

A comparative analysis of the change in R&D efficiency: a case of R&D leaders in the technology industry

This paper measures the cumulative change in research and development (R&D) efficiency of globally leading R&D companies in the technology industry. We use Data Envelopment Analysis /Malmquist index to analyse 49 such companies. The change in R&D efficiency is analysed by decomposing the Malmquist index into ‘catch-up’ and ‘frontier shift’ indices, and by comparing cumulative indices to those at the starting period. Those cumulative indices are obtained at both a firm and an industry level. Results indicate that the overall R&D efficiency of these globally leading R&D companies declined slightly during the period 2007–2013. At a firm level, this study determines in detail how the trend of each firm in R&D activities differs from other companies.     

The productivity effects of local R&D outsourcing: the moderating role of subsidiary mandate and internal R&D

This study examined the moderating effects of two kinds of internal R&D (parent R&D and subsidiary R&D) on the relationship between local R&D outsourcing and subsidiary productivity as internal R&D challenges the collaborative relationships in the local environment. Due to the specific feature of a subsidiary mandate, we further investigate whether two distinct kinds of internal R&D have different moderating effects between exploitation-oriented subsidiaries and exploration-oriented subsidiaries, based on a sample of longitudinal data set of 263 Taiwan-based manufacturing subsidiaries over the period 2006–2009. The empirical results show that for exploitation-oriented subsidiaries parent R&D plays a significant and negative moderating role on the impact of local R&D outsourcing based on local collaboration, while a positive moderating role is observed with parent R&D and subsidiary R&D for exploration-oriented subsidiaries.     

Assessing the influence of differentiation strategy and R&D subsidies on R&D cooperation

This paper explores the R&D cooperation determinants of the innovative companies belonging to the Spanish manufacturing sector. Our findings suggest that the variable R&D subsidy is endogenous, significant, and has a strong positive influence on R&D cooperation. This is a clear indication that the achievement of public aid is often conditioned by the obligation for companies to cooperate in R&D. We have also found that the differentiation strategy variable is significant and has a negative influence on R&D cooperation. Companies positioned in a differentiation strategy probably own and use some different knowledge from other companies. Consequently, they will not have much interest in taking advantage of the spillovers generated by other companies. It is therefore logical that they are reluctant to establish cooperation agreements on R&D. Therefore, companies positioned in the differentiation strategy need public policies to support R&D that are not conditioned to the establishment of cooperation agreements.     

Strategic R&D and the innovation of products: understanding the role of time preferences and product differentiation

We evaluate the effects of innovation on competition using an optimal control approach that incorporates firms' time preferences. Using a model where firm(s) innovates by investing in research and development to create a more appealing product for heterogeneous consumers, we examine conditions that maximize social welfare. When firm(s) choose discount rate regardless of market structure, a monopoly will develop more innovative products. However, we show that duopolies may increase innovation if competition alters firms' outlook. Finally, we identify firm incentives to behave myopically, which in the context of collusion may impede industry-wide innovation.     

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D incentives under incomplete information

This paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research in an incomplete information framework. We show that with quantity competition under asymmetric information, the expected payoff from non-cooperative research goes down compared to the case of symmetric information; hence research joint venture incentives of the firms are larger under asymmetric information. In either case, however, the larger is the size of the cost-reducing innovation the lower is the incentive for cooperative research. Finally, in our model, incomplete information does not affect the consumers' welfare, but the firms become worse off.     

R&D and productivity: evidence from large UK establishments with substantial R&D activities

ABSTRACT

We use Office for National Statistics' micro data for large UK establishments in the production industries in the period 1997–2008 to study the relationship between their productivity and the presence of substantial R&D activities, either at the production unit itself, or at other UK reporting units owned by the same enterprise group. We estimate that total factor (revenue) productivity is on average about 14% higher at the establishments which have substantial R&D themselves, compared to those with no R&D. Among the establishments with no R&D themselves, we estimate that productivity is on average about 9% higher at those which belong to enterprise groups which do have substantial R&D elsewhere in the UK in the same sub-sector. For the establishments with substantial R&D themselves, we also estimate a significant positive relationship between current productivity and past R&D expenditure using dynamic specifications which allow for both establishment-specific ‘fixed effects’ and a serially correlated error component.     

Effect Of Liquidity On Firms' R&D Spending

The effect of firms financial condition on their R&D investment is explored using a relatively long panel data set for five high-technology industries. We find that financial condition, whether measured as cash flow, the stock of liquid assets or the ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities, does affect the R&D spending of small firms. The effect persists after controlling for unobserved permanent firm effects, and the pattern of significance of lagged effects supports the interpretation of causality running from liquidity to R&D. For larger firms, there is no evidence of such an effect. Using these data, we cannot say whether the absence of an effect in larger firms results from better access to capital markets or from higher adjustment costs in R&D.     

R&D cooperation with scientific institutions: a difference-in-difference approach

Economists and business managers have long been interested in the impact of research and development (R&D) cooperation with scientific institutions on the innovation performance of firms. Recent research identifies a positive correlation between these two variables. This paper aims to contribute to the identification of the relationship between R&D cooperation with scientific institutions and the product and process innovation performance of firms by using a difference-in-difference approach. In doing so, we distinguish between two different types of scientific institutions: universities and governmental research institutes. For the econometric analyses, we use data from the German Community Innovation Survey. In total, data from up to 560 German service and manufacturing firms are available for the difference-in-difference analyses. The results suggest that R&D cooperation with universities and governmental research institutes has a positive effect on both product innovation and process innovation performance of firms.     

Strategic timing in R&D agreements

We study the endogenous formation of R&D agreements in a R&D/Cournot duopoly model with spillovers where also the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows us to consider the incentives for firms to sign R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In this case, the stability of an agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When spillovers are sufficiently high, the coordination of R&D efforts becomes a profitable option, although firms may also have an incentive to sequence noncooperatively their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, investing as follower may become extremely profitable, making R&D agreements hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.     

Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

R&D strategy and innovation performance: the role of standardization

Firms now increasingly recognise the important role of R&D strategy in building technological advantage. However, few attempts have linked standardisation with specific R&D strategies in explaining innovation performance. To bridge this gap, this study empirically examines the relationships between R&D strategies, standardisation, and firms’ innovation performance. Based on a sample of 371 firms in China, we use structural equation modelling (SEM) and find that novelty-oriented R&D strategy generates greater accumulation of standardisation knowledge and standards diversity, while R&D openness only positively relates to this standardisation knowledge accumulation. Moreover, standardisation knowledge accumulation is positively related to both administrative and technical innovation performance, while a greater variety of standards only leads to higher administrative innovativeness. More importantly, our results reveal that accumulation of standardisation knowledge mediates the relationships between R&D novelty and administrative and technical innovation performances. Both the theoretical and practical implications that arise from these findings are discussed.     

International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.     

Location factors of international R&D activities: an econometric approach

A model is developed of the relation between adoption of an innovation by firms and firm size. Decision making is represented as a group assessment of the perceived ratio between expected returns after succesful introduction, and the risk that implementation will fail or will last too long to makc adoption worth while. In view of differences in thc assessment of uncertainty and corresponding demands on the perceived return-to-risk ratio, among influencers of decisions in the firm, decision making is taken as stochastic, with a probability of adoption related to (objective) net benefits, and probability of non-adoption related to risk. The model gives a new way of looking at the fact that small firms lag behind in the adoption of new technology. In contrast with previous models proposed by David and Davies the explanation has nothing to do with there being some critical size below which adoption is not profitable. The present model explains the adoption lag for smaller firms as the result of expected returns being proportional to size while risk of failed implementation is independent of size. The model is tested and estimated empirically on data for the adoption of computers in small scale retailing, in the Netherlands.     

Timing and Commitment of Environmental Policy,Adoption of New Technology,and Repercussions on R&;D

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adoptnew technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms. We consider four different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies: ex post taxation (or issuing permits), interim commitment to a tax rate (a quota of permits) after observing R&D success but before adoption, and finally two types of ex antecommitment before R&D activity, one with a unique tax rate (quota of permits), the other one with a menu of tax rates (permit quotas). We study the second best tax and permit policies and rank these with respect to welfare. In particular, we find that commitment to a menu of tax rate dominates all other policy regimes.