Antecedents of Budget Participation: Leadership Style,Information Asymmetry,and Evaluative Use of Budget

This study explores the causes or antecedents of budget participation to understand more fully the role of participation in the workplace. The study focuses on the reasons why superiors encourage the budget participation of their subordinates and draws upon several theoretical perspectives including leadership theory, agency theory and organizational justice. To examine the issues, a survey was administered to managers and supervisors in several companies. Results of path analysis suggest that superiors encourage subordinate participation when the superior's leadership style is considerate. This implies that budget participation may mediate the relation between leadership style and work outcomes. Results also suggest that superiors encourage participation when budget goals are used in the performance evaluation of subordinates, in which case, the study argues, the superiors encourage participation because of concerns about organizational justice. This finding implies that budget participation may mediate the relation between the evaluative use of budget and those work outcomes that prior research has linked to organizational justice. The proposed relation between information asymmetry and budget participation is not supported.     

Budget-Emphasis in Performance Evaluation and Managers’ Job Related Tension: the Moderating Effect of Information Completeness

Research examining a budget-emphasis style of performance evaluation has led to insights about those situations where it is likely to increase a manager’s job related tension. However, less is known about how the management accountant can use the budget process to ameliorate this effect. This paper focuses on the part of the budget process where subordinate managers have to explain budget variances to their superiors and, in particular, the information subordinates have available to explain those variances. The paper argues that the completeness of this information affects subordinate managers’ ability to understand budget variances and explain them to their superiors which, in turn, affects subordinates’ level of job related tension, especially where superiors use a budget-emphasis style of performance evaluation. A cross-sectional study, using interview and questionnaire techniques, empirically tests, and finds support for, this hypothesis.     

The propensity of managers to create budgetary slack: A cross-national re-examination using random sampling

Following a review of the slack literature, Merchant (1985a) proposed that the propensity of subordinate managers to create slack is positively related to the importance placed on meeting budget targets, negatively related to the extent of participation allowed in budgeting processes, negatively related to the degree of predictability in the production processes, and negatively related to their superiors' abilities to detect slack. The results of his empirical tests provided little overall support for these hypotheses. The mixed nature of his results is of some concern since the literature provides considerable support for the theoretical framework underlying his propositions. He concluded that his use of non-random sampling may have influenced the results of his study. The objectives of this paper are first to extend Merchant's (1985a) study using the same measures but employing random sampling in a cross-national setting to enhance result generalizability. Second to assess whether the ability of superiors to detect slack interacts with budgetary participation to affect a subordinate manager's propensity to create slack. The results provide support for the cross-national generalizability of all five hypotheses.     

The influence of organisational and personal factors on the use of accounting information: An empirical study

The study empirically investigates the relationship between styles of using accounting information and selected job related traits and organisational factors. Three styles of using accounting information for operational control and subordinate evaluation are defined, measured and compared with a previous operational measure. Evidence on the relationship between the styles and functional background, goal, time and structural orientations, management style and traits, and hierarchical position is presented and discussed.     

Performance-measurement system design and functional strategic decision influence: The role of performance-measure properties

Although conceptual research in the accounting literature suggests that the use of performance-measurement systems affects the influence of organizational actors, empirical evidence for this suggestion is largely limited to anecdotal evidence and a few qualitative case studies. Drawing on institutional theory, we develop predictions that link the use of performance measures to the influence of functional subunits in strategic decision making. Our research model tests the effects of two types of performance-measure use on functional strategic decision influence: (1) decision-facilitating use and (2) use for accountability. Moreover, we propose that the effects of using performance measures for these two purposes depend on the reliability and functional specificity of the measures the functional subunits use. We empirically test our hypotheses and a research question with survey data from 192 marketing directors of German firms. We find that the effect of performance-measure use on functional strategic decision influence depends on the two properties of the performance measures. We find no significant effects when these properties are not considered. However, decision-facilitating use of performance measures has a positive effect on functional strategic decision influence when the measures are specific to the functional subunit. With respect to the use of performance measures for accountability we find countervailing effects, as the effect on functional strategic decision influence is positive when the measures are more reliable but negative when they are more specific to the functional subunit. We discuss these findings in light of existing evidence and theory.     

Management control of complex,mission-critical processes

Because the failure of complex, mission-critical systems—such as certain process control and manufacturing operations—can be exceptionally costly to an organization, appropriate management control of these systems is imperative. This paper presents a theory of management control of complex systems that is the potential basis for an intelligent DSS, which would be capable of supporting human agents monitoring complex systems. The theory is derived from field studies of agent decision making under procedural guidance, and it focuses on the most crucial—and interesting—aspect of agent behavior, i.e. the decision to deviate from a procedure when the procedure is considered detrimental to the achievement of organizational goals. The theory is instantiated in a computer model of the agents' decision processes. The computer model in turn embeds a simulation of the agents' situation and goal assessment processes that produce procedural non-compliance. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Flattening the organization: the effect of organizational reporting structure on budgeting effectiveness

This study investigates whether increasing a superior’s span of control improves the effectiveness of the budgeting process. We characterize the superior’s utility function as consisting of utilities for norm enforcement and wealth, leading the superior to reject profitable projects believed to contain excessive slack. We develop theory to predict that superiors become more willing to reject projects as their span of control increases. Further, subordinates anticipate superiors’ behavior and reduce slack as span of control increases. Experimental results are consistent with these predictions. As span of control increases, superiors show a greater willingness to reject projects that they believe contain excessive slack, and subordinates submit budgets with less slack. The net result is that superiors earn more profit per subordinate under an expanded span of control. Our study suggests that increasing span of control can improve the effectiveness of the budgeting process, an important component of most firms’ control environments.     

Vertical information sharing in the budgeting process

This study develops a model of vertical information sharing between superior and subordinate in the budgeting process. Upward information sharing involves the revelation of private information by subordinate to superior. Its proposed antecedents are budget participation and organizational commitment while job performance is a proposed outcome. Downward information exchanges from superior to subordinate are also examined by including role ambiguity in the model. Survey results suggest that vertical information sharing is an important intervening variable in understanding the performance effects of budget participation and organizational commitment.     

Capital budgeting techniques and firm specific contingencies: A correlational analysis

By combining analytic developments in the financial theory of capital budgeting with contingency theory, an empirically testable contingent theory for DCFT (discounted cash flow techniques) was constructed. This theory was tested by correlating an effectiveness measure for DCFT, based on stock return data of the sample firms, with hypothesized contingent variables, measured via interview and questionnaire. The results indicated positive correlations between the effectiveness of DCFT and predictable environments, the use of long-term reward systems, and the degree of decentralization of the capital budgeting process.     

The effect of information asymmetry on negotiated budgets: an empirical investigation

This study examines three issues: (1) the effect of information asymmetry on the budget negotiation process, (2) the effect of information asymmetry on budgetary slack when budgets are set through a negotiation process, and (3) whether subordinates consider superiors imposing a budget following a failed negotiation as being low in procedural justice, which in turn causes low subordinate performance. The results suggest that smaller differences in initial negotiation positions do not indicate a higher likelihood of agreement when initial differences are due to differential information symmetry. Further, information asymmetry affects the relationship between negotiation agreement and budgetary slack. Last, inconsistent with a pure economic perspective, having superiors impose a budget after a failed negotiation causes justice or fairness considerations to demotivate subordinates.     

Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?

This paper illustrates why firms might choose to implement stock option plans or other pay instruments that reward “luck.” I consider a model where adjusting compensation contracts is costly and where employees' outside opportunities are correlated with their firms' performance. The model may help to explain the use and recent rise of broad‐based stock option plans, as well as other financial instruments, even when these pay plans have no effect on employees' on‐the‐job behavior. The model suggests that agency theory's often‐overlooked participation constraint may be an important determinant of some common compensation schemes, particularly for employees below the highest executive ranks.     

The Economics of Organizational Architecture

Drawing on the work of Michael Jensen and William Meckling, the co‐formulators of “agency cost theory,” the authors argue that there are two main challenges in designing the structure of organizations: (1) the “rights assignment” problem—that is, ensuring that decision‐making authority is vested in managers and employees with the “specific knowledge” necessary to make the best decisions; and (2) the “control” or “agency” problem—designing performance‐evaluation and reward systems that give decision‐makers strong incentives to exercise their decision rights in ways that increase the long‐run value of the organization. The authors provide a number of instructive applications and extensions of the Jensen‐Meckling organizational framework. Using a series of short case studies that range from the Barings Brothers' debacle in the early 1990s and the decade‐long restructuring of ITT to the cases of McDonald's and Century 21, the authors demonstrate the importance of designing performance‐measurement and reward systems that are consistent with the assignment of decision rights. In so doing, the authors also work to dispel the widespread notion, popular among advocates of Total Quality Management, that the widespread use of performance measures and incentives undermines efforts to promote teamwork within large organizations. A number of brief case histories of companies like Xerox and Mary Kay Cosmetics are used to show the critical role of performance measurement and individual rewards in reinforcing a quality‐centered corporate culture. As the authors conclude, “It is a mistake to think of the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ aspects of organizations as mutually exclusive or even as competing.”     

The effects of national culture on the role of participation in different task situations

Prior studies primarily in Anglo-American and Asian cultural settings have found that budgetary participation interacts with reliance on accounting performance measures and task situations to affect managerial attitudes. Researchers have questioned if such findings can also be found in different cultural environments. As France has a high power distance and high individualism culture which is different from those of both the Anglo-American and Asian nations, this study investigates if such cultural differences may affect the findings of prior studies. Based on a sample of 44 French managers, the results indicate a similar significant three-way interaction effect. However, they also indicate that French managers have low levels of budgetary participation. Participation also has an insignificant effect on managers' job satisfaction in high task difficulty situations. These results are contrary to those of prior studies in Anglo-American and Asian cultural settings and may have important implications for the study of cultural effects on management control systems.     

Decisions and desire

When we make decisions, we're not always in charge. One moment we hotheadedly let our emotions get the better of us; the next, we're paralyzed by uncertainty. Then we'll pull a brilliant decision out of thin air--and wonder how we did it. Though we may have no idea how decision making happens, neuroscientists peering deep into our brains are beginning to get the picture. What they're finding may not be what you want to hear, but it's worth listening. We have dog brains, basically, with human cortexes stuck on top. By watching the brain in action as it deliberates and decides, neuroscientists are finding that not a second goes by that our animal brains aren't conferring with our modern cortexes to influence their choices. Scientists have discovered, for example, that the "reward" circuits in the brain that activate in response to cocaine, chocolate, sex, and music also find pleasure in the mere anticipation of making money--or getting revenge. And the "aversion" circuits that react to the threat of physical pain also respond with disgust when we feel cheated by a partner. In this article, HBR senior editor Gardiner Morse describes the experiments that illuminate the aggressive participation of our emotion-driven animal brains in decision making. This research also shows that our emotional brains needn't always operate beneath our radar. While our dog brains sometimes hijack our higher cognitive functions to drive bad, or at least illogical, decisions, they play an important part in rational decision making as well. The more we understand about how we make decisions, the better we can manage them.     

The just design and use of management control systems as requirements for goal congruence

Management control systems (MCS) are designed to achieve the greatest possible goal congruence, such that people pursue personal goals that are conducive to the organizational goal. Both the use and the design of MCS are crucial for achieving goal congruence, but they are thought to be contingent to specific external situations. We analyze the basic concepts of justice and fairness, and argue that these two facets of justice, which we label “formal” and “informal” justice, need to be put in the context of MCS use and design. We argue that both formal and informal (in)justice are determinants for MCS to achieve specific levels of goal congruence, independently of the situation.We conclude that there are two stable types of goal congruence, labeled “maximum goal congruence” – where both MCS design and MCS use are just – and “minimum goal congruence” – where both design and use are unjust; and two unstable types of goal congruence, labeled “occasional goal congruence” – where the MCS design is unjust but its use is just – and “perverse goal congruence” – where the design is just and the use is unjust. This provides a framework for future empirical research on the subject.     

非财务指标采用的业绩后果实证研究——代理理论Vs.权变理论

对于采用非财务指标的业绩后果,代理理论和权变理论给出了不同的理论指导。本文以158家中国企业为样本,分析了非财务指标采用程度对企业业绩的影响,分别对代理理论和权变理论进行了验证。研究表明,不管企业具有什么样的权变特征,非财务指标采用的程度越高都会带来越好的企业业绩。而且,相对于选择差异化战略的企业而言,选择成本领先战略的企业,采用非财务指标后会得到更好的业绩后果。     

CVS/Caremark: The Costs and Strategy of a Tobacco‐Free Pharmacy

This instructional case presents CVS/Caremark's decision to discontinue tobacco sales at its U.S. pharmacies effective October 1, 2014. The case provides data on the strategic issues underlying the decision and examples of the nonfinancial factors that affect product‐line decisions. The case illustrates the use of the broad array of costs in management decision making, including hidden costs, contingent costs, reputational costs, and social costs. It also provides data to explore the decision from the perspective of customer profitability analysis and the differential costs of serving tobacco customers compared with general retail customers.     

The Impact of Social Influence Pressure on the Ethical Decision Making of Professional Accountants: Australian and New Zealand Evidence

This paper reports the results of an online survey examining whether inappropriate social influence pressure, in the form of obedience and conformity pressure generated by superiors and colleagues, influences the ethical decision making of members of four professional accounting institutes in two countries, namely Australia and New Zealand. We also evaluate the effects of organisational and professional commitment and what role, if any, such commitment plays in mitigating inappropriate social influence pressure. The results indicate that despite the members of the professional bodies displaying a high level of ethical judgement, obedience and conformity pressure do influence their ethical decision making. Furthermore, high levels of organisational and/or professional commitment were found to mitigate inappropriate social influence pressure, in that respondents who exhibit high levels of organisational and/or professional commitment are less likely to succumb to inappropriate social influence pressure. Our findings contribute to an understanding of the influences on ethical decision making by professional accountants, which could make workplace environments more conducive for ethical decision making by focusing on reducing inappropriate social influence pressure by taking steps to increase organisational and/or professional commitment.     

What you don't know about making decisions

Most executives think of decision making as a singular event that occurs at a particular point in time. In reality, though, decision making is a process fraught with power plays, politics, personal nuances, and institutional history. Leaders who recognize this make far better decisions than those who persevere in the fantasy that decisions are events they alone control. That said, some decision-making processes are far more effective than others. Most often, participants use an advocacy process, possibly the least productive way to get things done. They view decision making as a contest, arguing passionately for their preferred solutions, presenting information selectively, withholding relevant conflicting data so they can make a convincing case, and standing firm against opposition. Much more powerful is an inquiry process, in which people consider a variety of options and work together to discover the best solution. Moving from advocacy to inquiry requires careful attention to three critical factors: fostering constructive, rather than personal, conflict; making sure everyone knows that their viewpoints are given serious consideration even if they are not ultimately accepted; and knowing when to bring deliberations to a close. The authors discuss in detail strategies for moving from an advocacy to an inquiry process, as well as for fostering productive conflict, true consideration, and timely closure. And they offer a framework for assessing the effectiveness of your process while you're still in the middle of it. Decision making is a job that lies at the very heart of leadership and one that requires a genius for balance: the ability to embrace the divergence that may characterize early discussions and to forge the unity needed for effective implementation.