多物品拍卖的最最优机制设计理论评述——兼论国有产权拍卖

拍卖是具有明确规则的市场制度,在参与者竞价的基础上,通过一系列规则来决定资源的配置和成交价格.迄今为止,人们对单物品拍卖的研究已相对完善.目前,有关拍卖理论的文献较多地关注时多物品拍卖和网上拍卖的研究,特别是对拍卖机制的效率和最优机制的设计等问题的研究.本文分析比较了单位需求和线性需求条件下同质多特品拍卖的最优机制设计,井尝试此结论分析我国国有资产分离过程中的拍卖方式的选择问题.     

多属性逆向拍卖理论研究进展

从多属性逆向拍卖机制的设计原理、经典模型、最优投标与实施以及网上多属性逆向拍卖机制等方面着手,梳理了多属性逆向拍卖理论的研究进展,并对未来的研究方向予以展望。     

拍卖理论综述

拍卖是具有明确规则的市场制度,在参与者竞标的基础上,通过拍卖规则来决定资源的配置和价格(McMee & McMillan,1987)。从狭义上看,它是有一定适用范围及特殊规则的交易类型;而从广义上理解,它反映了市场经济价格形成机制及资源配置     

向上叫价时钟双向拍卖机制设计

通过深入分析统一价格密封双向拍卖机制的诸多缺陷,充分借鉴单向拍卖市场上时钟拍卖的基本思想,将时钟拍卖引入双向拍卖市场,构建了一个无论从分配效率方面考虑还是从竞价风险方面考虑都优于统一价格密封双向拍卖机制,不仅为同类物品确定统一价格,还可以为不同类的物品确定其不同的价格的向上叫价时钟双向拍卖机制。     

排污权拍卖理论研究综述

排污权交易政策是受到世界各国普遍关注的环境政策之一,排污权拍卖交易机制的设计是决定排污权交易市场效率的关键问题,为了使排污权交易市场能顺利健康的运行,本文就排污权拍卖的起因、拍卖方式的选择以及不同信息条件下的排污权拍卖等相关研究文献进行综述和评介,并提出了未来的研究展望.     

多属性采购拍卖理论简述

实用中,仅以价格作为确定获胜者的唯一准则已经不能满足许多行业采购拍卖的实际要求。为确定获胜者,除价格外还需要考虑采购品的其他重要的非价格属性。因此,多属性拍卖理论的发展变得极其重要。但由单属性拍卖拓展到多属性拍卖已经引起一系列挑战性的问题。介绍了多属性采购拍卖的概念、发展动因、应用的广泛性、需要研究的理论问题及其分类。     

多属性拍卖与研发竞赛的激励效应比较

采购方向两个潜在的供应商之一采购某种需要研发的创新性技术或产品,并采用多属性拍卖机制或研发竞赛机制来确定哪一个供应商最终能赢得合约。假设供应商是同质的和风险中性的、研发成本具有随机性,且采购方和供应商之间在研发成本上信息不对称,分别研究多属性拍卖机制和研发竞赛机制中供应商的质量决策,比较这两种机制的创新激励效应。结果发现:多属性拍卖机制中,理性的供应商都不会进行研发和参与投标;研发竞赛中奖励金额必须要足够大才能激发供应商的研发与竞赛参与意愿,此时研发竞赛机制要优于多属性拍卖机制。     

最优拍卖理论及其实践述评

拍卖是机制设计理论的典型应用之一.最优拍卖所要解决的核心问题是卖者如何在不同的交易环境下通过有效的机制设计实现最大的期望收益.维克里的收益等价定理是拍卖理论的发展基石,但是收益等价定理依赖于独立私人估价假设,这些假设条件过于苛刻在现实中难以满足.因此,研究如何在独立私人估价假设不成立时实现最优拍卖就成为拍卖理论演进的基本线索.本文将沿着这一线索对最优拍卖理论及其实践加以评述,并揭示拍卖理论在中国的经济改革和发展中所具有的重要应用价值.     

交易机制的博弈演化理论综述

以交易双方市场地位的变迁为线索,系统地梳理了国外从上世纪60年代初至今半个多世纪以来使用博弈论方法研究市场交易机制的文献,按照交易双方所处的市场地位不同,将市场交易的博弈机制理论划分为以下四种:拍卖机制、谈判机制、双向拍卖机制、逆向拍卖机制理论.阐述了相关文章的研究假设、研究思路和主要研究结论.在中国市场不断国际化的进程中,这对于提高市场主体参与市场博弈的效率、有效地建设社会主义市场经济体制都具有重要的参考价值.     

Bidding between incumbent and entrant

Facing an informed incumbent who has cost advantages in two different states, the uninformed entrant bids cautiously due to the incumbent’s cost advantage in the low cost state. The incumbent bids aggressively, earning additional profits because of his cost advantages.     

Auction design with opportunity cost

This paper studies revenue-maximizing auctions in an independent private value setting where potential bidders have known positive opportunity cost of bidding. The main findings are as follows. Firstly, there is no loss of generality in deriving the revenue-maximizing auctions within the class of threshold-entry mechanisms. Secondly, for any given set of entry thresholds, a second-price sealed-bid auction with properly set reserve prices and entry subsidy is revenue-maximizing. Thirdly, a variety of auctions are revenue-maximizing within the symmetric threshold-entry class. Two of them involve no entry subsidy (fee). Fourthly, we identify sufficient conditions under which it is in the seller’s interest to limit the number of potential bidders even if the revenue-maximizing symmetric threshold-entry auction is adopted. Lastly, the revenue-maximizing auction implements asymmetric entry across symmetric bidders in many cases. I am grateful to Jean-Jacques Laffont for his advice. I thank Isabelle Brocas, Juan Carrillo, Indranil Chakraborty, Jeff Ely, Jinwoo Kim, Vijay Krishna, Preston McAfee, Isabelle Perrigne, Eric Rasmusen, Guofu Tan, Quang Vuong, Joseph Wang for helpful comments and suggestions. Insightful comments and suggestions from the associate editor and two anonymous referees have greatly improved the paper. Earlier versions have been presented at the 2004 International Industrial Organization Conference, the 2005 Pan Pacific Game Theory Conference and the 2007 International Game Theory Conference. All errors are mine. Financial support from National University of Singapore (R-122-000-088-112) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions

We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k₁ objects are sold in the first round and k₂ in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k=k₁+k₂ objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the first-round winning bids are announced, we also identify a positive informational effect on the second-round price. Total expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement may be greater or smaller than in a single-round uniform auction, depending on the model's parameters.     

Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions

When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment rules will not ensure truthfulness).We develop a set of techniques that allow constructing efficiently computable truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the special case where each bidder desires a specific known subset of items and only the valuation is unknown by the mechanism (the single parameter case). For this case we extend the work of Lehmann, O'Callaghan, and Shoham, who presented greedy heuristics. We show how to use If-Then-Else constructs, perform a partial search, and use the LP relaxation. We apply these techniques for several canonical types of combinatorial auctions, obtaining truthful mechanisms with provable approximation ratios.     

累积创新框架下的知识产权保护研究

本文通过构建累积创新框架下的拍卖模型来探讨知识产权制度的社会福利效应,比较各种具体制度的效率及在各种特殊的产业中的应用保护。基于存在领先厂商情况下累积创新过程中的创新竞赛问题的分析,可以得到三种不同策略情形下的社会福利函数,并确定知识产权保护程度的适用范围。研究结论的应用扩展表明:以生物技术、电子和医药等为主的行业,适用比较严格的保护制度进行保护,如专利制度;以计算机软件、音乐、书籍和期刊等为主的行业,适用比较宽松的保护制度进行保护,如版权制度。     

A modified yardstick competition mechanism

This paper expands Shleifer’s (Rand J Econ 16:319–327, 1985) theory of yardstick competition and develops a modified yardstick competition mechanism (MYC), where the yardstick employed consists of a tariff basket and total costs. This mechanism has a significant information advantage: the regulator “only” needs to observe total costs, prices and output of all firms. The MYC mechanism can ensure a socially optimal outcome when allowing for spatial and second degree price discrimination. We also introduce regulatory lags to the model. In addition, we compare the two approaches for the case of unobserved firm heterogeneity, and provide numerical estimations of the effects. The MYC mechanism fares better in the case of unobserved heterogeneity, and may thus be a useful extension of Shleifer’s yardstick mechanism.      

基于PSO算法的股权拍卖机制设计及仿真分析

运用PSO群体智能算法模拟信息交互条件下外部投资者报价决策的学习机制和演化规律,在此基础上设计了实现风险投资退出的股权拍卖机制。Netlog仿真结果表明,所设计的股权拍卖机制能在一定程度上揭示股权的真实价值,并降低竞买人和卖方之间的信息不对称程度。进一步的仿真分析结果表明:适当的激励力度对外部投资者的投标报价具有显著影响;引入更多的竞买人能产生更有利于风险投资家的拍卖结果;即使外部投资者过于强化单一的学习能力,最终也可得到相对理想的拍卖结果,从而证明了所设计的股权拍卖机制具有广泛的适用性。     

All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction

This paper completely characterizes the set of equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there are at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive bids below the maximum valuation. In this class, above a threshold value all bidders bid truthfully on all units. One of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation is below the threshold; the other bidders bid zero in this range. In the second class of equilibria there are as many bids at or above the maximum valuation as there are units. The allocation of these bids is arbitrary across bidders. All the remaining bids equal zero. With any positive reserve price equilibrium becomes unique: Bidders bid truthfully on all units for which their valuation exceeds the reserve price.