Labor Market Institutions, Wages, and Investment: Review and Implications

Labor market institutions, via their effect on the wage structure,affect the investment decisions of firms in labor markets withfrictions. This observation helps explain rising wage inequalityin the US, but a relatively stable wage structure in Europein the 1980s. These different trends are the result of differentinvestment decisions by firms for the jobs typically held byless skilled workers. Firms in Europe have more incentives toinvest in less skilled workers, because minimum wages or unioncontracts mandate that relatively high wages have to be paidto these workers. I report some empirical evidence for investmentsin training and physical capital across the Atlantic, whichis roughly in line with this theoretical reasoning. (JEL E22,E24, J23, J24, J31)     

A Note on Changes in the Earnings and Unemployment Structures in Spain Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study

This note tests whether the extraordinary rise in Spanish unemploymentin the 1980s can be traced back to rigidities in the earningsstructure in the face of relative net demand shocks againstthe unskilled (this claim is also known as the "Krugman hypothesis").I can establish that youth joblessness is key to the Spanishunemployment problem, but sampling procedures in the data setmake it impossible to track the youth unemployment problem acrosstime in a satisfactory way. Even though high youth unemploymentis consistent with the Krugman hypothesis, substantial skillupgrading of the Spanish labour force in the 1980s explainswhy the low education groups did not experience an increasein relative unemployment. (JEL J21, J31, J64)     

Regulation or Markets? The Case of Employment Contracts

Regulation of the employment contract is both wide spread anddiverse. The diversity of regulation is surprising because itsuggests that there is little consensus regarding optimal interventioninto the labor market. This paper discusses several economicreasons why it may be efficient for employers and employeesto enter into long term contracts that make employee dismissalexpensive. This analysis suggests that employment contractscan be expected to be complex in practice, and hence can beviewed as part of the technology of exchange. Given that knowledgeof a technology requires skill and know-how, one cannot expectall employee-employer matches to discover and use the most efficientcontract terms possible. It is suggested that the regulationof the employment relationship might be improved with the creationof a market for contracts, similar to the one that currentlyexists in the United States for construction projects.(JEL J300,J410, K310)     

Formal and Informal Labour Markets: Challenges and Policy in the Central and Eastern European New EU Members and Candidate Countries

The paper aims at comparing the formal and informal labour marketsin the Central and Eastern European new EU Member States andcandidate countries of the European Union. First, the currentsituation of the labour market is described, focusing on therecent developments since the breaking up of the East. Thenthe policy design of these labour markets is depicted and itseffects on formal and informal labour markets. The most importantchallenges for employment policy as well as the effects of enlargementon the labour markets are analysed. The paper ends with a shortsummary. (JEL J21, J23, H26, H11, O17, O57)     

National Labor Market Institutions and the EU Integration Process

This paper outlines theoretical insights regarding the motivationand effects of labor market institutions, and reviews empiricalstudies of relevant evidence from European and other countries'historical experience. Institutional interference with laissezfaire labor market outcomes has both economic and distributionalimplications, which depend on the structure of markets and onthe details of policy implementation. The resulting conceptualframework is brought to bear on a discussion of possible reformsof European labor markets in the context of the Economic andMonetary Union process. (JEL F02, J00)     

The Household, Time Use and Tax Policy

This paper is concerned with modelling household decisions andthe welfare effects of tax policy. It seeks to emphasise theimportance of a model that incorporates household productionand can take account of the evident female labour supply heterogeneityacross two-parent families. If, after having children, someproportion of households substitute domestic for market laboursupply, the income and consumption variables used as the taxbase in most countries may be poorly correlated with livingstandards. Taxes and welfare programs based on these variablesmay increase inequality by shifting the overall tax burden tolow and middle wage families with both partners in work, awayfrom families with much higher wages and in which only one memberworks to earn the same joint market income. The paper combinesdata on time use, income, taxes and benefits to show how theytrack female labour supply over the life cycle, resulting inmuch higher tax burdens on two-earner households. (JEL D13,D91, H31, J22)     

Did Partial Globalization Increase Inequality? The Case of the Latin American Periphery, 1950-2000

Inequality is an important threat to the globalization of theworld economy that we experience today. This contribution usesthe coefficient of height variation as a measure of inequality.This indicator covers not only wage recipients, but also theselfemployed, the unemployed, housewives, children, and othergroups who may not participate in a market economy, for theperiod 1950–79, for which income inequality data is mostlyunavailable or inconsistent. It turns out that within-countryinequality is higher in time periods of greater openness. Thisresult is confirmed for the time period 1950–2000, anda much broader model. (JEL I12, I32, N33)     

Generous actors,selfish actions: markets with other-regarding preferences

This paper points out that classical competitive outcomes arise in two different market environments even if agents have non-classical preferences. Consumers with separable, other-regarding preferences behave as if they have classical preferences in competitive equilibrium. These outcomes need not be efficient, but under plausible conditions will be efficient following a redistribution of income. In simple double-auction environments competitive outcomes arise under a wide range of assumptions on preferences even without assuming separability. I discuss the importance of the domain of definition of preferences and how the preferences present in the economy influence the performance of the trading institution.

Political Participation of Mobile Citizens and the Size of the Welfare State

This paper deals with the implications of personal mobilityfor political participation of citizens and for the resultingsize of the welfare state. We show that mobility of citizensmay influence the individual decision to participate in thepolitical process and thereby may change policy outcomes. Ifcitizens who prefer a larger public sector are relatively immobile,the size of the welfare state may increase with mobility. (JELD72, J61)     

EU Enlargement, Migration and the New Constitution

The paper deals with the effects of migration resulting fromEU Eastern enlargement on the welfare states of Western Europe.Although migration is good in principle, as it yields gainsfrom trade and specialization for all countries involved, itdoes so only if it meets with flexible labour markets and ifit is not artificially induced by gifts of the welfare state.This is not the present state of affairs in Western Europe.In addition to measures that make labour markets more flexible,the introduction of delayed integration of working migrantsand the home country principle for nonworking migrants is arational reaction of the state. The proposed new EU constitution,which contains far-reaching rules for a European social union,should be amended accordingly. (JEL E2, F2, H0, J3, J6)     

The Evolution of Income-related Health Inequalities in Switzerland Over Time

This article presents new evidence on income-related healthinequality and its development over time in Switzerland. Weemploy the methods lined out in Van Doorslaer and Jones (2003,"Inequalities in self-reported health: validation of a new approachto measurement", Journal of Health Economics 22(1), 61–78)and Van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004, "Explaining the differencesin income-related health inequalities across European Countries",Health Economics 22(7), 609–628) measuring health usingan interval regression approach to compute concentration indicesand decomposing inequality into its determining factors. Nationallyrepresentative survey data for 1982, 1992, 1997, and 2002 areused to carry out the analysis. Looking at each of the fouryears separately the results indicates the usual positive relationshipbetween income and health, but the distribution is among theleast unequal in Europe. No clear trend emerges in the evolutionof the inequality indices over the two decades. A small butsignificant increase over the first 15 years is followed bystabilization if not a slight decrease in total income-relatedhealth inequality. The most important contributors to healthinequality are income, education and activity status, in particular,retirement. Regional differences including the widely varyinghealth care supply, in contrast, do not exert any systematicinfluence. (JEL codes: D32, I10, I12)     

Flexicurity Labour Market Performance in Denmark

Unemployment is at a low and stable level in Denmark. This achievementis often attributed to the so-called flexicurity model combiningflexible hiring and firing rules for employers with income securityfor employees. Whatever virtues this model may have, a low andstable unemployment rate is not automatically among them sincethe basic flexicurity properties were also in place during the1970s and 1980s where high and persistent unemployment was prevalent.Labour market performance has changed due to a series of reformsduring the 1990s, the main thrust of which was a shift froma passive focus of labour market policies to a more active focuson job search and employment. The policy tightened eligibilityfor unemployment benefits and their duration as well as introducedworkfare elements into unemployment insurance and social policiesin general. Thereby, policy makers attempted to strengthen theincentive structure without taking resort to general benefitreductions. We argue that the workfare policies have playedan important role running primarily via motivation/threat andwage effects. However, active labour market policies are resourcedemanding, and although the workfare reforms have improved costeffectiveness, there is still an issue as to whether the resourcesgoing into active labour market policies are used efficiently.(JEL codes: J30, J40, J60, H53)     

Unemployment and Labor–market Reform: A Contract Theoretic Approach

Why do many democracies fail to reform their labor–market institutions? To answer this question we study the feasibility of reforms that include compensation to insiders for the removal of labor–market regulations. Under asymmetric information, a reformer who wants to buy the approval of voters has to pay them an informational rent in addition to the pure costs of compensation that would arise under symmetric information. In this setting, unemployment may be constrained Pareto–efficient. Labor–market reforms may fail politically because none of the reform packages proposed wins the approval of a majority of voters. We also discuss the role of capital taxation in a reform program. JEL classification: D70; E61; J68     

Global inequality and international trade

The paper analyses the effect of widespread trade liberalisationon global income inequality. The analysis of the trend in globalinequality during 1981–97, presented in the first partof the paper, shows that the apparent growth of income inequalityamong countries conceals a process of convergence. Some developingcountries achieved significantly faster economic growth thanthe advanced industrialised countries and, though small in number,they actually account for a majority of the population of thedeveloping world. Thus international inequality (i.e., the inequalityof distribution of per capita incomes among the world's population)in fact declined even though the inter-country income inequalityincreased. The analysis in the second part of the paper shows(i) that while improved trade performance did have a stimulatingeffect on growth performance of countries, trade liberalisationhad extremely varied effects on trade performance across countries,and (ii) that the distribution of benefits and costs of tradeliberalisation across countries has been such as to reduce internationalinequality without affecting inter-country inequality.     

A note on the theory and measurement of trust in explaining differences in economic growth

This paper takes issue with the trend to attribute differencesin economic growth rates to differences in interpersonal trust.I discuss the World Values Survey (WVS) measure that is usedto operationalise trust at the macro level. I hypothesise thatthere is a mismatch between the theoretical argument and theempirical operationalisation of trust. Instead of measuringtrust, the WVS measure may instead proxy the well-functioningof institutions. I provide circumstantial evidence for thisthesis by a principal components analysis of trust and institutionsand a robustness test of Zak and Knack's (2001. Trust and growth,Economic Journal, vol. 111, 295–321) seminal study ontrust and economic growth.     

Growth, Inequality, and Well-Being: Intertemporal and Global Comparisons

We use several well-being measures that combine average incomewith a measure of inequality to undertake intertemporal andglobal comparisons of wellbeing. The conclusions emerging fromthe intertemporal analysis are that the impact of these measureson temporal trends in well-being is relatively small on average,but changing across the decades. In particular, it suggeststhat changes in well-being were understated in the 1960s and1970s and overstated in the 1980s and 1990s. Our global analysiscovering ca. 81 per cent of the world's population demonstratesthat global well-being is at least 50 per cent smaller thanworld per capita income if the unequal income distribution isalso factored in. Conversely, growth in world well-being hasbeen larger than world income growth between 1970–1998.Since the inclusion of inequality has an important impact onwell-being comparisons, it is of great importance to generatemore consistent and intertemporally as well as internationallycomparable data on inequality. (JEL I31, D63)     

Education, Social Equality and Economic Growth: A View of the Landscape

Education has been one of the key determinants of economic growtharound the world since 1965. In this paper, we discuss threedifferent measures of education, and consider their relationshipto the distribution of income as measured by the Gini coefficientas well as to economic growth across countries. The three measuresare: (a) gross secondary-school enrolment, (b) public expenditureon education relative to national income and (c) expected yearsof schooling for girls. We show that all three measures of educationare directly related to income equality across countries. Ina sample of 87 countries at all income levels, we also findthat more and better education appears to encourage economicgrowth directly as well as indirectly through increased socialequality and cohesion. Our regression results survive the introductionof regional dummy variables for Africa, Asia and Central andSouth America. We argue that the empirical relationship betweeneducation, on the one hand, and growth and equality, on theother hand, can help account for the positive correlation betweenthe two latter variables that has been documented in the literature.(JEL 128, O15, O40)     

Consumption and the Within-household Income Distribution: Outcomes from an Australian "Natural Experiment"

Does the within-household distribution of income influence householdconsumption patterns? In one attempt to answer this question,Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) exploited the ‘naturalexperiment’ of a change in family benefits in the UK.They found that the within-household income distribution didhave a significant impact on expenditure. This paper exploitsa similar natural experiment in Australia. During the 1990s,unemployment benefits for unemployed married couples changedfrom being paid almost entirely to husbands, to being paid primarilyto wives. Using household expenditure data it is found that,although the changes in the within-household income distributionwere large, the changes in expenditure patterns were small andnot in the expected direction. The data do not, therefore, providesupport for the hypothesis that women's control over householdexpenditure was increased. The paper concludes with a discussionof the possible reasons for this. (JEL J10, J12, I38)     

Welfare Migration: Is the Net Fiscal Burden a Good Measure of its Economic Impact on the Welfare of the Native-Born Population?

Migration of young workers (as distinct from retirees), evenwhen driven in by the generosity of the welfare state, slowsdown the trend of increasing dependency ratio. But, even thoughlow-skill migration improves the dependency ratio, it neverthelessburdens the welfare state. Recent studies by Smith and Edmonston(1977), and Sinn et al. (2003) comprehensively estimate thefiscal burden that low-skill migration imposes on the fiscalsystem. However an important message of this paper is that inan infinite-horizon set-up, one cannot fully grasp the implicationsof migration for the welfare state, just by looking at the netfiscal burden that migrants impose on the fiscal system. Inan infinite-horizon, overlapping generations economy, this netburden, could change to net gain to the native born population.(JEL F22, H3, J10)     

Welfare Leakage and Immigration Policy

This paper analyzes the interaction between the welfare stateand immigration policy. We establish a negative relationshipbetween the number of dependents and the extent of the welfarestate due to the leakage of benefits. We also explain the determinationof immigration policy as the outcome of a lobbying game betweendomestic interest groups and the government. Our results indicatethat there is evidence for welfare leakage and for lobbyingas a determinant of immigration policy. In our baseline specification,a 10 percentage points increase in the share of dependents leadsto a 7–10 percentage point decrease in the labor tax rate.Furthermore, an increase by 10 percentage points in union densityleads to a decrease of one percentage point in the share ofimmigrants in the population. In the context of EU enlargementand the ensuing migration flows, our model predicts a reductionin the size of the welfare state in the old member countries.(JEL H5, J1, J61)