Competition and price asymmetries in the Greek oil sector: an empirical analysis on gasoline market

This article attempts to investigate the issue of asymmetries in the transmission of shocks to input prices and exchange rate onto the wholesale and retail price of gasoline respectively. For this purpose, we utilise the error-correction methodology in the Greek gasoline market. The sample consists of monthly data covering the period of January 1988 to June 2006. We also try to analyse by using impulse response functions the effect of competition on the dynamic adjustment of gasoline price to which has been paid scant attention in the past. The results favour the common perception that retail gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to cost increases and decreases both in the long and the short-run. At the wholesale segment, there is a symmetric response of the spot prices of gasoline towards the adjustment to the short-run responses of the exchange rate. Lastly, after the deregulation, wholesale prices of gasoline tend to gradually restore equilibrium triggered by a price shock compared to the regulated period.     

Short-term jobs and long-term job loss of large supermarket entry

This paper examines the effects of emerging supermarkets on local employment at the city level. Using a panel dataset for the period between 2000 and 2006, we find that entry of supermarkets largely increases employment in the wholesale and retail sector and other related sectors in the year of entry, but the positive effect on employment on the wholesale and retail sector only persists for a short period of time. It reverses two years later, due possibly to exits or contracting of small retailers. Further evidence from another dataset at the community level supports this explanation.     

Wholesale Spot Price Pass-Through

It has been proposed that, when electricity markets open to retail competition, incumbent distribution utilities should be required to sell to residential customers at wholesale spot market prices. It is argued here that this overestimates the value of spot-price sales to customers, and underestimates the costs and disadvantages of the proposed policy. Experience in San Diego illustrates the problems. But other policies such as shopping credits have deficiencies too. An alternative approach, based on transitional maximum price caps, has facilitated the development of a competitive and fully deregulated residential retail market in the United Kingdom.     

Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input

What price should downstream entrants pay a vertically integrated incumbent monopoly for use of its assets? Courts, legislators, and regulators have at times mandated that incumbent monopolies lease assets required for the production of a retail service to entrants in efforts to increase the competitiveness of retail markets. This paper compares two rules for pricing such monopoly inputs: marginal cost pricing (MCP) and generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR). The GECPR is not a fixed price, but is a rule that determines the input price to be paid by the entrant from the entrant's retail price. Comparing the retail market equilibrium under MCP and GECPR, the GECPR leads to lower equilibrium retail prices. If the incumbent is less efficient than the entrant, the GECPR also leads to lower production costs than does the MCP rule. If the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, however, conditions may exist in which MCP leads to lower production costs than does the GECPR. The analysis is carried out assuming either Bertrand competition, quantity competition, or monopolistic competition between the incumbent and entrant in the downstream market.     

Regulation and Access Pricing: Comparison of Regulated Regimes

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.     

Effects of wholesaler concentration on retailers by format: evidence from Japanese brand-level price data

Using unique brand-level wholesale price data, this article examines how purchase prices of commodities for retailers are influenced by wholesale concentration. Compared with studies focusing on retail prices, little empirical work has measured the impact of wholesale concentration on wholesale prices. Economic theory suggests that the sensitivity of purchase price in response to degree of wholesale concentration is smaller for large retail formats than for small retail formats in the presence of intra-format retail competition. To test the validity of the theoretical implication, I measure the impact of the concentration on purchasing prices for retailers by format. Empirical findings support the hypothesis that the large retail format tends to draw advantageous purchase prices when wholesalers become increasingly oligopolistic.     

Interest rate pass through and asymmetries in retail deposit and lending rates: An analysis using data from Colombian banks

Using a sample of Colombian banks, we examine retail interest rate adjustment in response to changes in wholesale interest rates. Interest rate pass through running from wholesale to retail rates is found to be both partial and heterogeneous across banks. This suggests that the effectiveness of monetary policy is limited. Further investigation reveals that the behaviour of retail deposit rates appears consistent with collusive behaviour between banks insofar as interest rates are more rapidly adjusted downwards than upwards. In the case of retail lending rates, it appears that banks more rapidly reduce than increase rates. This suggests that expansionary monetary policy in Colombia may be relatively more effective than contractionary policy.     

A market test for natural monopoly in local exchange

Is the incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC) a natural monopolist? The analysis indicates that the LEC cost function is not supportable: LECs appear to be either nonsustainable natural monopolies or non natural monopolies over the set of services they currently offer. However, recent technological changes suggest that whether LECs are natural monopolies over their current offerings is immaterial for policy making, because competitors are enjoying economies of scope in offering both LEC and non LEC services. Based on these results, deregulation of LECs is discussed in a Type I/Type II error framework.     

Incentives to invest and to give access to non-regulated new technologies

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm, which is a regulated monopolist in the wholesale market and competes with an entrant in the retail market, to invest and to give access to a new wholesale technology. The new technology represents a non-drastic innovation that produces retail services of a higher quality than the old technology, and is left unregulated. We show that for intermediate values of the access price for the old technology, the vertically integrated firm may decide not to invest. When investment occurs, the vertically integrated firm may be induced to give access to the entrant for a low access price for the old technology. Furthermore, when both firms can invest, investment occurs under a larger set of circumstances, and it is the entrant the firm that invests in more cases. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the old technology.     

Does asymmetry in price transmission exist in the rice market in Sri Lanka?

This study analyses asymmetry in price transmission between wholesale and retail rice markets in Sri Lanka, using the threshold autoregressive model. We found that the wholesale and the retail rice markets in Sri Lanka are integrated, with price changes moving from the wholesale to the retail market. However, the price transmission process is asymmetric. In particular, price increases at the wholesale market transmit immediately to the retail market while price decreases transmit more slowly. Parameter stability test and follow-up analysis indicated that the price transmission process is asymmetric only during periods of price surges, suggesting that the rice market is not efficient during these periods.     

Customer ignorance, price-cap regulation, and rent-seeking in mobile roaming

Mobile phone usage when traveling abroad is expensive. Although the network connection switches frequently between available networks, the choice of network is largely independent of wholesale prices. As a consequence, we show that wholesale prices are strategic substitutes. The recent European price-cap regulation forces firms to reduce wholesale and retail roaming prices, but does not solve the underlying problem. There may thus be a permanent need for regulation analogous to what we have for domestic call termination. Furthermore, we show that there is a risk that wholesale price-cap regulation stimulates wasteful rent-seeking activity.     

The NOME law: implications for the French electricity market

In December 2010, France approved the law “Nouvelle Organisation du Marché de l’Electricité” (or NOME law) to promote competition in the retail electricity market. In practice, the law allows retailers to buy nuclear production from the incumbent, at a regulated access price. This mechanism works up to a ceiling of 100 terawatt hours, which represents one quarter of the incumbent’s production from nuclear plants. Each retailer is assigned a share of that amount proportionally to its portfolio of clients. We contribute to the debate raised by the NOME law regarding the evolution of retail market prices. We show that a price decrease results if the ceiling is sufficiently high compared to the market share of the retailers competing with the incumbent. This pro-competitive effect is stronger when the incumbent’s rivals take into account the impact of their market strategy on the redistribution rule. Finally, we find that, if the regulated price of the NOME electricity is set above the nuclear cost, the incumbent realizes a gain that may result in strategic withholding, weakening the pro-competitive effects of the law.     

生产者服务对制造业出口的影响——基于行业面板数据的实证分析

本文分析作为制造业中间投入的生产者服务对我国制造业出口的影响.首先,基于2000-2007年投入产出数据,我们计算了我国制造业出口的国内生产者服务增值份额,结果表明我国制造业单位产品出口中直接和间接的生产者服务投入处于波动中上升的趋势.其次,利用2004-2007年25个行业的数据,我们建立面板数据模型分析生产服务对制造业出口的影响,结果显示:生产者服务对我国制造业出口的增长起促进作用;与金融、保险等高端生产者服务相比较,制造业出口对批发零售、运输仓储等低端生产者服务依赖度较大.最后,论文基于上述研究结论给出了相应的政策建议.     

Do commercial sales move coincidentally with business cycles in Japan? a dynamic two-mode regression approach

This paper examines the validity of including wholesale and retail commercial sales in the coincident index of business conditions in Japan. Specifically, we consider the movement of gross domestic product (GDP) as a reference cycle, and investigate whether commercial sales move coincidentally with GDP by applying the dynamic two-mode regression approach. The results show that wholesale commercial sales are not justified as a component of the Japanese coincident index, but that retail commercial sales may be considered a legitimate component of the Japanese coincident index.     

The price of broadband quality: tracking the changing valuation of service characteristics

This paper investigates how retail broadband prices, choice and quality are changing over time. Using a data set containing daily observations of plans offered in Ireland from 2007 to 2013, this paper applies hedonic modelling techniques to observe the changing pricing of service characteristics. Although we find that average nominal prices remain static throughout our sample period, quality of service has risen dramatically over time, particularly with respect to download speed. Some characteristics of broadband plans exhibit broadly stable valuations over time, but the elasticity of price with respect to advertised download speed and the premium on bundled services declined for most types of broadband plans during the sample period. In addition, the retail price premium enjoyed by the incumbent operator fell significantly since 2007.     

A Dynamic Model of Incumbent LEC Response to Entry Under the Terms of the Telecommunications Act of 1996

This paper dynamically models an incumbent Local Exchange Carrier's (LEC's) ability to control market entry with a profit squeeze. The model is consistent with the post-Telecommunications Act of 1996 local exchange market. The model shows that an unconstrained incumbent could choose output prices and input costs to discourage an entrant's output-market production. The impact of a regulatory constraint on incumbent behavior is examined. It is concluded that cost-based input prices may lead to little growth in the entrant's self-provision of inputs and that continuing oversight of output and input prices may be necessary.     

Access prices,unbundling and product variety in European Internet markets

A fundamental policy in European broadband regulation is unbundled access to the local loop of the incumbent telephone company. We present comparative static results that show as the access price decreases, the retail price decreases, the variety of plans offered by Internet service providers increases and the quantity of each variety increases when a threshold condition is met. Using data from 18 European countries from 2006 to 2012, we find empirical support for these results when Internet product variety is measured by variation in download speeds.     

Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts

We establish that non‐linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent's contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival. The optimal contract we describe is a three‐part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent's marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. The optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry.     

Capital Constraints and Employmen

Abstract
This article considers whether capital is a significant constraint on employment in Australia. We calculate the level of capital-constrained employment for seven sectors of the Australian economy. The calculations suggest that the manufacturing; transport, storage and communication; and recreation, personal and other services sectors have sufficient capital installed to increase employment. In two other sectors, mining and wholesale and retail trade, the potential for increases in employment through increased capital utilisation may be constrained by surplus labour (as of June 1993). While some sectors are capital constrained at the moment, we find that the investment requirements to increase employment in these sectors are not onerous. We also project investment requirements in each of the sectors for employment growth over the next five years. These projections suggest that a jump in investment followed by relatively modest growth is required to sustain growth in employment.     

Downstream and upstream oligopolies when retailer’s effort matters

This paper investigates the different terms of strategic interactions (non-cooperative, simultaneous move): wholesale versus retail pricing—between Bertrand competing retailers and an upstream oligopoly. The crucial extension is that retailers can play a significant role and this can turn conventional wisdom upside down, e.g.: retail competition need not benefit the upstream firms and wholesale pricing can dominate retail pricing in spite of double marginalization because of the incentives it provides to retailers. In addition, the consequences are investigated of differentiating both pricing instruments either at the downstream (this is motivated by Apple’s entry into the ebook market) or at the upstream level.