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1.
A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
We study noncooperative multilateral bargaining games, based on underlying TU games, in which coalitions can renegotiate their agreements. We distinguish between models in which players continue to bargain after implementing agreements ("reversible actions") and models in which players who implement agreements must leave the game ("irreversible actions"). We show that renegotiation always results in formation of the grand coalition if actions are reversible, but that the process may otherwise end with smaller coalitions. On the other hand, we show that the grand coalition cannot form in one step if the core of the game is empty, irrespective of the reversibility of actions.  相似文献   

2.
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the Shapley value. In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. So, instead of allowing all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of N. In this paper, we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible coalitions also their union is feasible. We consider and axiomatize two solutions or rules for these games that generalize the Shapley value: one is obtained as the conjunctive permission value using a corresponding superior graph, the other is defined as the Shapley value of a modified game similar as the Myerson value for games with limited communication.  相似文献   

3.
An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all its subgames and investigate whether there are core stable coalitions in the induced hedonic coalition formation game. Besides several general results, in particular, we develop conditions on the game for the Shapley–Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index.  相似文献   

4.
A basic model of commitment is to convert a two-player game in strategic form to a “leadership game” with the same payoffs, where one player, the leader, commits to a strategy, to which the second player always chooses a best reply. This paper studies such leadership games for games with convex strategy sets. We apply them to mixed extensions of finite games, which we analyze completely, including nongeneric games. The main result is that leadership is advantageous in the sense that, as a set, the leader's payoffs in equilibrium are at least as high as his Nash and correlated equilibrium payoffs in the simultaneous game. We also consider leadership games with three or more players, where most conclusions no longer hold.  相似文献   

5.
We consider n-person games with quasi-concave payoffs that depend on a player's own action and the sum of all players' actions. We show that a discrete-time, stochastic process in which players move towards better replies—the better-reply dynamics—converges globally to a Nash equilibrium if actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements for all players around each Nash equilibrium that is asymptotically stable under a deterministic, adjusted best-reply dynamics. We present an example of a 2-person game with a unique equilibrium where the derivatives of the best-reply functions have different signs and the better-reply dynamics does not converge.  相似文献   

6.
We consider two models of n-person bargaining problems with the endogenous determination of disagreement points. In the first model, which is a direct extension of Nash's variable threat bargaining model, the disagreement point is determined as an equilibrium threat point. In the second model, the disagreement point is given as a Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. These models are formulated as extensive games, and axiomatizations of solutions are given for both models. It is argued that for games with more than two players, the first bargaining model does not preserve some important properties valid for two-person games, e.g., the uniqueness of equilibrium payoff vector. We also show that when the number of players is large, any equilibrium threat point becomes approximately a Nash equilibrium in the underlying noncooperative game, and vice versa. This result suggests that the difference between the two models becomes less significant when the number of players is large.  相似文献   

7.
Large newsvendor games   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We consider a game, called newsvendor game, where several retailers, who face a random demand, can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf. Profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers. A game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit. We consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors. We prove in great generality results about balancedness of the game, and we show that in a game with a continuum of players, under a nonatomic condition on the demand, the core is a singleton. For a particular class of demands we show how the core shrinks to a singleton when the number of players increases.  相似文献   

8.
The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of a specific class of the convex games: the almost positive games. These games have non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above result we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition.  相似文献   

9.
Dynamics for play of transferable‐utility cooperative games are proposed that require information regarding own payoff experiences and other players’ past actions, but not regarding other players’ payoffs. The proposed dynamics provide an evolutionary interpretation of the proto‐dynamic ‘blocking argument’ (Edgeworth, 1881) based on the behavioral principles of ‘aspiration adaptation’ (Sauermann and Selten, 1962) instead of best response. If the game has a non‐empty core, the dynamics are absorbed into the core in finite time with probability one. If the core is empty, the dynamics cycle infinitely through all coalitions.  相似文献   

10.
Game theoretic models of learning which are based on the strategic form of the game cannot explain learning in games with large extensive form. We study learning in such games by using valuation of moves. A valuation for a player is a numeric assessment of her moves that purports to reflect their desirability. We consider a myopic player, who chooses moves with the highest valuation. Each time the game is played, the player revises her valuation by assigning the payoff obtained in the play to each of the moves she has made. We show for a repeated win-lose game that if the player has a winning strategy in the stage game, there is almost surely a time after which she always wins. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each move the average payoff in the rounds in which this move was made. When all players adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability 1 there is a time after which strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff.  相似文献   

11.
A Nash equilibrium is an optimal strategy for each player under the assumption that others play according to their respective Nash strategies, but it provides no guarantees in the presence of irrational players or coalitions of colluding players. In fact, no such guarantees exist in general. However, in this paper we show that large games are innately fault tolerant. We quantify the ways in which two subclasses of large games – λ-continuous games and anonymous games – are resilient against Byzantine faults (i.e. irrational behavior), coalitions, and asynchronous play. We also show that general large games have some non-trivial resilience against faults.  相似文献   

12.
We consider the strategic correlativity principle in strategic form games and potential games, which indicate the relationship between an arbitrary pair of players under correlated equilibria. Importantly, the strategies of a pair of players are positively correlated when their expected payoff functions are supermodular, while negatively correlated when their expected payoff functions are submodular. Furthermore, we extend the strategic correlativity principle to strategic form games and potential games in social networks, and investigate the monotonicity of correlated equilibrium in each player's own degree.  相似文献   

13.
This paper examines a dynamic game in which each player only observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played. Our main result is that in a repeated prisoner's dilemma where defections are irreversible (at least for a long enough period of time), patient enough players may achieve almost efficient outcomes. Dealing with models of imperfect private monitoring is difficult because (i) continuation games are games of incomplete information, hence they do not have the same structure as the original game. In particular, continuation equilibria are correlated equilibria. (ii) Players are typically uncertain about their opponents' past observations and actions, and they use their entire own private history to learn about these actions. As a result equilibrium strategies are in general nontrivial and increasingly complex functions of past observations. We bypass these difficulties by looking at correlated equilibria of the original game and find correlated equilibria in which the decision problem faced by each player remains the same over time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72.  相似文献   

14.
This paper shows that the wisdom of many Founding Fathers of installing separate legislation powers to prevent each other from corrupt practices is at most only partially justified. Given the same culture, a political institution with veto players to counterbalance its multi-party legislature enables its legislative coalitions to extract larger amounts of bribes from interest groups than the one without such counterbalance veto players . This finding explains the rampant scandals of colossal bribes in regimes where an authoritarian president, prime minister, or party leader of the chronical dominant party, or a bicameral system is prevalent. Technically, this paper extends the weighted value allocation under a preset coalitional structure of the players to an apex game.  相似文献   

15.
The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-benefit payoff functions of pollution abatement for sixteen different world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and solved by combinatorial algorithms. Farsighted stability assumes perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted. All farsightedly stable coalitions are found, and their improvement to environment and welfare is considerable. The farsightedly stable coalitions are refined further to preferred farsightedly stable coalitions, which are coalitions where the majority of coalition members reach higher profits in comparison with any other farsightedly stable coalitions. Farsightedly stable coalitions contribute more to the improvement of environment and welfare in comparison to D'Aspremont et al.'s (1983) stable ones. Considering multiple farsighted stable coalitions, participation in coalitions for environmental protection is significantly increased, which is an optimistic result of our game theoretical model.  相似文献   

16.
An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each playerʼs payoff is a function of only his own strategy and an aggregate of the strategy profile of all players. Such games possess properties that can often yield simple characterizations of equilibrium aggregates without requiring that one solves for the equilibrium strategy profile. When payoffs have a quasi-linear structure and a degree of symmetry, we construct a self-generating maximization program over the space of aggregates with the property that the solution set corresponds to the set of equilibrium aggregates of the original n-player game. We illustrate the value of this approach in common-agency games where the playersʼ strategy space is an infinite-dimensional space of nonlinear contracts. We derive equilibrium existence and characterization theorems for both the adverse selection and moral hazard versions of these games.  相似文献   

17.
We study finitely repeated games where players can decide whether to monitor the other players? actions or not every period. Monitoring is assumed to be costless and private. We compare our model with the standard one where the players automatically monitor each other. Since monitoring other players never hurts, any equilibrium payoff vector of a standard finitely repeated game is an equilibrium payoff vector of the same game with monitoring options. We show that some finitely repeated games with monitoring options have sequential equilibrium outcomes which cannot be sustained under the standard model, even if the stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium. We also present sufficient conditions for a folk theorem, when the players have a long horizon.  相似文献   

18.
In this paper, we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian's (1994) voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian's model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.  相似文献   

19.
Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.  相似文献   

20.
A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We study repeated sequential games where players may not move simultaneously in stage games. We introduce the concept of effective minimax for sequential games and establish a Folk theorem for repeated sequential games. The Folk theorem asserts that any feasible payoff vector where every player receives more than his effective minimax value in a sequential stage game can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium in the corresponding repeated sequential game when players are sufficiently patient. The results of this paper generalize those of Wen (1994), and of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). The model of repeated sequential games and the concept of effective minimax provide an alternative view to the Anti–Folk theorem of Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) for asynchronously repeated pure coordination games.  相似文献   

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