The Nature of Institutional Change in Transition

Contemporary empirical evidence of transition in Central and East European countries proves the importance of institutional change, as was claimed by advocates of this field of transition. The article assesses institutional change in the first phases of transition from the perspective of competing strategies: rapid changes versus gradualism. After pointing to some inconsistencies in this debate, the article discusses the possibility and prospects for development of a market for institutions in European transition countries. The main criterion which is used is the requirement for the rule of law as one of the foundations of a market economy. It concludes that undeveloped endogenous factors of institutional change still do not enable development of markets for institutions. Reluctance of national governments to act according to a long-run perspective is at present to a certain extent compensated by the presence of external factors of institutional change.     

New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation

ABSTRACT

Existing theories make divergent predictions about the impact of new powers on the global political economy. Some argue that a more even distribution of power will erode international cooperation, while others argue that cooperation can continue with the help of international institutions to overcome collective action problems. We argue that this debate overlooks a critical determinant of the shape of power transitions: the distribution of preferences amongst the major powers. It is primarily in the context of divergent preferences that power transitions are likely to give rise to conflict. Moreover, even where preferences diverge, the gains of cooperation provide a strong incentive to continue to pursue goals through multilateralism. This situation leads to forms of institutional change unanticipated by established theories. These include deadlock in expansive multilateral fora, institutional drift as old rules cannot keep up with the changing political and economic context, and fragmentation as countries seek minilateral solutions that reduce preference diversity. We develop this preference-based, institutional argument by examining the distribution of preferences and institutional change at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Round, where the power transition is relatively advanced.     

The foundations of constitutionalism: an analysis of debaathification

This article analyzes the administration of lustration—what Arthur Stinchcombe termed the “social basis of constitutionalism”—and its unintended consequences in comparative and international law and politics. It is concerned with the social function of animating ideas in the evolution of institutions. The article demonstrates that in the case of Iraq, the commitment of institutional engineers and transitional administrators to the idea of purifying the state, and their concomitant willingness to watch the institution of lustration naturally evolve in respect of that central idea, has had disastrous consequences for the foundations of constitutionalism. These consequences flowed from the institutional design of the U.S. occupation more generally. By reconstructing, for the very first time, the evolution of debaathification in contemporary Iraq, this article deepens our understanding of the foundations of constitutionalism. Aside from its contribution to the theory of institutional design, the article also speaks to the ongoing debate over the creation of governments, regimes, and states in the international system. In the context of this debate, which has important implications for the practice of institutional design, the administration of lustration—from within or from without—is an insufficiently understood phenomenon, making it a worthy subject for institutional analysis.

AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL POWER DISPERSION: THE CASE OF TURKEY

This study examines the effects of fragmented governments and fiscal authorities on budget deficits in Turkey along with political business cycle effects. For econometric analysis we will use annual data from the period 1960 to 2009. This article sheds light on various dispersion indices and their use in the field of political power and fiscal performance. The results show that the power dispersion indices of governments and fiscal institutions significantly explain the increases in the ratio of budget deficit to gross national product. The article draws attention to the unification and better coordination of fiscal authorities in Turkey. The analysis has important policy implications for Turkey and other developing countries from the viewpoint of fragmented political and administrative dispersion of power and poor budget performances. (JEL P16, H72, C22, C43)     

Adjusting an institutional framework to a globalising world: the creation of new institutions in the EEC, 1957-1992

ABSTRACT

This article explores the development of all new EEC institutions between 1957 and 1992 within policy areas relevant to the possible development of a European single currency. It argues that if most institutions created pre-1992 were not crisis management institutions as would be the case post-2008, some important institutions were created in response to the perception of a structural international banking/political/economic crisis, particularly in the 1970s. This comparison in time underlines the continuity of reflections about the missing elements of a functioning single currency area, the obstacles to reform, and sheds light on the radical institutional changes that occurred post-2008.     

The determinants of tax morale in comparative perspective: Evidence from European countries

Applying a multilevel model, we argue that tax morale is a function of individual- and contextual-level variables. Evidence presented in this article, based on the 2004–2005 European Social Survey and information on institutional settings, shows that tax morale in European countries varies systematically with socio-demographic characteristics, personal financial experiences, political attitudes, on the one hand, and regional GDP and tax arrangements on the other hand. Moreover, cross-national differences in tax morale are also related to ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations.     

The Participatory Economy. An Evolutionary Hypothesis and a Strategy for Development

This article proposes a synthetic new concept of logics of action, intending to apply it to the market, the family, and the polity (inclusive of the state and the community) as crucial instances of what may be termed provisioning domains. These are the broadest or most general domains in which economic activities take place. This article defines a logic of action as a set of socially shared rules of thought and behavior (i.e., socially shared mental models and behavioral rules) that involve a domain of action, the metric used, and the objectives or obligations associated with the positions people occupy in this domain. The domain by itself does not suffice to characterize a logic, and it has to be combined with the other two aspects. The article further discusses the relation between logics of action and institutions, arguing that logics of action are institutions with specific characteristics. They are conceived in relation to very broad provisioning domains and, as such, they have a high degree of generality. The market, the family, and the civic logics may be called provisioning institutional logics, but important differences do exist between the proposed concept herein and some treatments of institutional logics.     

Seniority and Incumbency in Legislatures

In this article, we elaborate on a strategic view of institutional features. Our focus is on seniority, though we note that this general approach may also be deployed to understand other aspects of institutional arrangements. We have taken the initial game‐theoretic model of seniority of McKelvey and Riezman ( 1992 ), simplified it in order to characterize its fundamental implications, generalized these results in several ways, and extended the model by deriving additional implications. The broad messages of our article, articulated by McKelvey and Riezman as well, are two. First, the endogenous choice of institutional features like seniority by self‐governing groups is strategic. While the fine‐grained ways of doing things in an institutional context surely serve internal functional objectives, these are not the only objectives. Agents making choices on how to govern themselves have private motivations – in the case of elected politicians they often revolve around re‐election. This leads to our second broad message. The institutions through which self‐governing groups conduct their business do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in a broader context. Those offering functional explanations for various institutional features overlook this. Particular institutional arrangements have effects outside the governance institution itself. These effects, in principle, could be accidental by‐products. Our strategic approach, however, argues that they may well be the primary reasons for a practice being instituted.     

The self-organisation of strategic alliances

This paper is based upon an analysis of various experiences of electronic commerce. It analyzes the role of private institutions in the organization of systems of transactions. Private institutions take place between public institutions (that are insufficiently specialized) and inter-individual governance structures (that do not benefit from scale and cognitive economies). These private institutions are very diverse and the paper points out the various types of services provided by diverse institutions depending on their constitutional mode.

While various possible institutional frameworks have very different features in terms of coordination, there is no most efficient institutional environment. Moreover, the emergence process of these institutional framework strongly influences their ability to survive. Very different institutional frameworks can therefore organize electronic trade quite differently in the various industries     

Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects

Institutions shape social outcomes, yet institutions themselves are products of political choices. When institutional choices are determined by the same political and social processes that they shape, institutions are endogenously selected. Here I address the question of whether this endogenous institutional selection necessarily implies endogenous institutional effects. If it does, the use of institutional parameters as independent variables explaining policy outcomes and properties of the resulting political regimes, widespread in the literature on comparative political institutions, is hard to justify. I argue, however, that strategic choice of the rules of the game implies designers' ability to obtain their preferred institutional effects only under conditions of complete information. Under incomplete information, ex-post institutional effects do not need to be endogenous, since at the time of designing the rules the designers were not in position to control the selection of these effects. The reason why the choice of the rules does not imply the choice of their effects lies in the intervening and interactive (rather than additive) role played by the environmental parameters, including players' own characteristics, that are not revealed at the time of the institutional choice. Additionally to the model which illustrates the logic of the argument and the workings of intervening structural effects, I find supporting evidence in the processes of design of election laws in post-communist Europe, where stages of design and implementation followed each other in a very quick succession yet were characterized by substantial changes in manifested institutional preferences of the key political players.     

Is Tinkering with Institutional Quality a Panacea for Firm Performance? Insights from a Semiparametric Approach to Modeling Firm Performance

There is a large and growing literature on the impact of institutional quality on economic performance and the broad consensus is that “good” institutions facilitate better economic performance. The literature that provides micro‐level support for the policy discourse about institutional quality does not, however, account for significant intra‐country variation in reactions of firms to changes in business environments, even within the same industry, and it generally ignores the possibility that the impact of institutional quality on firm performance may not be neutral. In this paper, we analyze the impact of institutions on firm performance using an approach that enables us to overcome these problems with the stylized approach. Using cross‐country firm‐level data, we demonstrate that not only does the marginal impact of institutional quality vary significantly within countries, but also that the impact is economically significant only at the two extremes of the distribution. We view this as prima facie evidence that policies that tinker with institutional quality on the basis of the popular wisdom about the impact of these institutions on the average firm may not have the desired or expected impact, at least at the micro level.     

Narrating Crisis,Constructing Policy: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in Syria

During crises, ideas play a decisive role in shaping radical paradigm shifts in economic governance. However, not all crises immediately produce such ‘great transformations’. Why do some ideas result in incremental rather than abrupt change after crisis? To identify mechanisms potentially explaining this variation, I conduct an exploratory process tracing of an understudied case of incremental institutional change: post-independence Syria. Competing political actors in Syria converged on identical policy responses to crisis despite their very different interpretations of its causes. Although power oscillated between these increasingly bitter rivals in the early 1950s, their ideational consensus on economic issues nevertheless led to a decade of steady institutional change that transformed previously fragile government institutions into powerful vehicles of statism. I derive from this analysis the potential causal significance of two new variables – crisis narrative and crisis response – and hypothesise that their configuration can explain variation in post-crisis patterns of institutional change. Ideas can explain not only the new direction of economic governance after crisis, but also the speed and scale of its movement.     

Institutional support for technological improvement — The case of Hungary

The technological “time warp” in which Hungary, like other Central and Eastern European countries, has found itself since the 1950s is at an end. This article concentrates on the transformation of institutional structures that support innovation and industrial technological development. First, it summarizes the types of institutions that support technological development. In a market economy, the process of generation and diffusion of innovation largely depends on the institutional and economic structure of the country. In a narrower sense, those institutions might be included in this group whose aim is wholly or in part to assist firms in experimenting with, understanding, and implementing new products and new production processes and improving quality. This article then details forms of inter-firm cooperation and highlights some empirical research findings based on three sectors — the pharmaceutical, machine tool, and car parts industries — which represent three different cases in the restructuring of Hungarian manufacturing. The main lesson of the study is that industry during its redeployment can create few demands for technology development institutes. Because of inherited structure, the accumulated knowledge of existing institutes and the supply and scattered demand of industry for technological support do not regularly coincide.     

OIL CURSE AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES: WHICH INSTITUTIONS ARE MOST VULNERABLE TO THE CURSE AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?

This article extends recent analyses linking the alleged oil curse to a broader set of institutions (13 in number) than democracy, the institution that has received the most attention in the literature. It does so using panel data for over 100 countries between 1975 and 2005, wherever possible, and compares the effects obtained with several different measures of both the importance of oil and experience in the industry and of the interactions between them. Most importantly, instead of simply examining the effect of oil and experience in the industry on the contemporary levels of these various institutions, this study focuses on the effects on changes in the various institutional indicators from one decade to another. While not surprisingly our results reveal considerable sensitivity in the effects of oil resources, oil experience, and interactions across different specifications, they also suggest a number of important findings. The most robust of these are the significant negative effects of oil rents on bureaucratic quality and on socioeconomic conditions. We also find that the number of years since peak oil discovery has a positive effect on government stability, but a negative one on bureaucratic quality. When interactions are allowed for, still more negative effects on institutions are identified, at least partially re‐enforcing several of the institutional links in the oil curse hypothesis. (JEL O13, P16)     

Engines of Growth in China: The Limits of Informal Institutions

Abstract:

Since the 1978 reforms, China has experienced rapid economic and social development. GDP growth has been in the double digits on average yearly, creating the fastest sustained economic growth recorded by a major economy in history. Not only did this transform the economy and society at large, China reached important milestones in terms of reducing poverty and creating prosperity in a short period of time. This article uses the conceptual framework of new institutional economics to examine China’s economic growth and how growth has been achieved largely by ‘informal institutions’ that are grounded in culture, customs, and private interactions that emerge spontaneously. The trajectory by which these informal institutions left their imprint on China’s complex economic landscape and how they can constrain future economic growth are also of central importance. After examining decentralization and risk management practices, property rights, and the legal system, we emphasize the importance of creating formal institutions necessary for long-term growth, most importantly innovation. Preliminary evidence shows total factor productivity is tapering off which may reflect the constraints of China’s institutional environment. This ought to be reversed if China is to enjoy long-term sustained growth.     

Migration and intention to return: entrepreneurial intentions of the diaspora in post-conflict economies

This article examines the intentions of the diaspora to return to their homeland and engage in entrepreneurial activity. We focus on post-conflict economies where the development potential of return migration is significant. Our article demonstrates that the entrepreneurial intentions of returning diaspora are affected by their level of trust and perceptions of risk in institutions at home. Through a survey of diaspora returning to Kosovo, the paper finds that business experience has a negative relationship on probability to return, but it has a positive relationship on entrepreneurial intentions. However, those with professional and qualified jobs are more likely to have intentions to return, but less likely to have entrepreneurial intentions. The paper contributes to academic research on the central importance of institutions to post-conflict development, demonstrating that by enhancing the institutional environment investment can be attracted home.     

The institutional change under lobbying and the distribution of power

In this paper, we develop a model of institutional change of land property right in China, which include the influences of lobbying and the political power division in 1978. The model illustrates how extra gains are produced under different institutions and how lobbying and political power division can affect the change. It is clear that the institutional innovation has something to do with the leaders’ legal income, the cost of institutional change and the conversion rate. Given the pattern of leader’s power division, it is the best way for the people in rural areas to change their institutional framework, and it is efficient to mix local and central governmental policies. And lobbying and leading power division can affect the direction and the course of institutional changes that would lead different result among different areas. __________ Translated from Nankai jingji yanjiu 南开经济研究 (Nankai Economic Research), 2007, (6): 17–32     

From Friction to Free Trade Negotiations: Australia's Engagement with the European Union

Following decades of skirmishes, Australia's relationship with the European Union (EU) has finally come of age. With the commencement of negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement, the outlook is promising for enhanced cooperation. Yet there are distinctive—and at times diverging—hierarchies of interests. This article argues that, although the EU and Australia regard each other as like‐minded partners, their interests and domestic pressures do not necessarily denote comprehensive convergence. This is due to the burden of memory, divergent concerns and values, some mutual neglect and an element of mutual misunderstanding.     

The Role of Foreign Bond Issuance: The Case of Australia

We examined the recent development of the foreign bond—termed Kangaroo bond—market in Australia. Overwhelmingly, issuers in this market are of high credit quality and comprise sovereign, supranational and major international financial institutions. Local institutional investors have a preference for simple, fixed‐rate pricing structures, with foreign issuers reliant upon converting their Australian dollar‐denominated bond proceeds into the currency and coupon type of choice using cross‐currency swaps. The Kangaroo bond issuers provide a natural counterparty to Australian residents issuing in foreign currency in offshore markets, where cross‐currency swaps allow them to easily convert their proceeds into Australian dollars.     

Institutional quality and the effectiveness of aid for trade

Trade policy barriers and high transaction costs hinder developing countries from taking the full advantages of the global trading system. In order to help developing countries overcome the problem, the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched the Aid for Trade (AFT) initiatives in its Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong in 2005. We examine the effects of AFT inflows on bilateral trade costs facing 133 developing countries while accounting for differences in their location on the contours of various measures of institutional quality. Our results from the estimation of a mixed effects (random-intercept and random-coefficient) model indicate that institutional quality significantly affects the extent to which AFT reduces bilateral trade costs. An important policy implication of our findings is that an economically robust and sustainable reduction in bilateral trade costs facing developing countries requires the presence of both promulgated and effectively functioning institutions such as regulatory power and the rule of law.