ERODING MARKET IMPERFECTIONS,REINTERMEDIATION, AND DISINTERMEDIATION

In this paper a search model of a financial market, generalized to include costly contracting, is employed to demonstrate that: (i) relative cost efficiency for an intermediary is not sufficient to explain a role for intermediation services, and (ii) eroding market imperfections do not produce hypothesized effects on “reintermediation” from traditional depository-type intermediaries to brokerage-type intermediaries and on “disintermediation” from indirect financing to direct financing under a set of justifiable assumptions.     

Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i.e. there is one-sided commitment. We consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away, and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses. We demonstrate that not only autarky, but also partial and full insurance can obtain, depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries. Insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary. We then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings economy with one-period Arrow securities and a short-sale constraint, similar to Bulow and Rogoff [1989. Sovereign debt: is to forgive to forget? American Economic Review 79, 43-50]. From this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable, even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved.     

Customers and investors: A framework for understanding the evolution of financial institutions

Financial institutions are financed by both investors and customers. Investors expect an appropriate risk-adjusted return for providing financing and risk bearing. Customers, in contrast, provide financing in exchange for specific services, and want the service fulfillment to be free of the intermediary's credit risk. We develop a framework that defines the roles of customers and investors in intermediaries, and use it to build an economic theory that has the following main findings. First, with positive net social surplus in the intermediary-customer relationship, the efficient (first best) contract completely insulates the customer from the intermediary's credit risk, thereby exposing the customer only to the risk inherent in the contract terms. Second, when intermediaries face financing frictions, the second-best contract may expose the customer to some intermediary credit risk, generating “customer contract fulfillment” costs. Third, the efficiency loss associated with these costs in the second best rationalizes government guarantees like deposit insurance even when there is no threat of bank runs. We further discuss the implications of this customer-investor nexus for numerous issues related to the design of contracts between financial intermediaries and their customers, the sharing of risks between them, ex ante efficient institutional design, regulatory practices, and the evolving boundaries between banks and financial markets.     

Debt Financing,Corporate Financial Intermediaries and Firm Valuation

In this paper we consider the role of financial intermediaries in the valuation of firms and projects. We show that security prices should reflect both used and unused debt capacity if some corporations can act as financial intermediaries and can capture the tax benefits of debt capacity unused by the operating firm. We also provide some reasons why the value of the firm might be increased if the financing and operating risks of the firm are separated and financial intermediaries issue debt rather than the unit operating the asset.     

Financial Crises and Recapitalizations

We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions on both financial intermediaries and goods‐producing firms. Since financial intermediaries are highly leveraged, we show that the welfare gains from their recapitalization in response to large but rare net worth losses are as large as those from eliminating typical business cycle fluctuations. We also find that these gains are increasing in the size of the net worth loss, are larger when recapitalization funds are raised from the household rather than the real sector, and can be larger when lower idiosyncratic risk leads to higher leverage.     

Financial networks with electronic transactions: modelling,analysis and computations

Abstract

Advances in telecommunication networks, and, in particular, the Internet have transformed the economic landscape for financial decision-making. In this paper, we focus on financial networks with electronic transactions and with different tiers of decision-makers and we develop an integrated framework for the modelling, analysis and computation of solutions to such problems. Specifically, we consider an economy consisting of three types of decision-makers: those with sources of funds; intermediary ones, and consumers associated with the financial products at the demand markets. Those with sources of funds can transact with the intermediaries either physically or electronically as well as directly in an electronic manner with the consumers. The intermediaries, in turn, can also transact with the consumers either in a physical or an electronic fashion. We address the behaviour of the decision-makers, identify the network structure of the problem, derive the equilibrium conditions, and establish the variational inequality formulation. In addition, we propose a continuous time adjustment process for the study of the disequilibrium dynamics and prove that the set of stationary points of the resulting projected dynamical system coincides with the set of solutions of the variational inequality. We then utilize variational inequality theory to derive qualitative properties of the equilibrium price and financial flow pattern. Finally, we apply an algorithm for the determination of equilibrium prices and financial flows in several examples.     

Liquidity and leverage

In a financial system in which balance sheets are continuously marked to market, asset price changes appear immediately as changes in net worth, and eliciting responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets. We document evidence that marked-to-market leverage is strongly procyclical. Such behavior has aggregate consequences. Changes in dealer repos – the primary margin of adjustment for the aggregate balance sheets of intermediaries – forecast changes in financial market risk as measured by the innovations in the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index VIX index. Aggregate liquidity can be seen as the rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of the financial intermediaries.     

Banks as Tax Planning Intermediaries

We provide the first large‐scale empirical evidence of banks functioning as tax planning intermediaries. We posit that some banks specialize in assisting corporate clients with tax planning. In this role, banks make use of their centrality in financial relationships; access to private information; and ability to structure, execute, and participate in tax planning transactions for clients. We measure bank‐client relationships using loan contracts and measure client tax planning using either the cash effective tax rate or the unrecognized tax benefit balance. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that firms experience meaningful tax reductions when they begin a relationship with a bank whose existing clients engage in above‐median tax planning. The effects of pairing with such tax intermediary banks are concentrated in relationships with larger or longer maturity loans, clients with foreign income or greater credit risk, and when the bank is an industry specialist or has above‐median investment banking activities. Finally, we find that potential clients are more likely to choose tax intermediary banks than nontax intermediary banks, suggesting that tax intermediary banks benefit by attracting new business. Collectively, our results suggest that some banks act as tax planning intermediaries, a role beyond the traditional one of financial intermediary.     

Does competition aggravate moral hazard? A Multi-Principal-Agent experiment

We conduct an experiment to determine whether market structure affects financial intermediary behavior. The intermediaries (Agents) are perfectly informed regarding project types and can recommend that their clients (Principals) either proceed or discontinue a project. Intermediaries earn revenues only when they recommend proceeding with the transaction. Thus, our design captures some of the incentives faced by financial advisers in commercial banks, where compensation depends on sales performance, and also by money-managers, whose income depends on the size of their portfolios. We find that a monopolist intermediary protects the interest of clients better than when intermediaries compete. Our results are robust to a significant fee increase and provide additional evidence on the impact of market structure on individual incentives and equilibrium outcomes.     

Portfolio separation for stockholder owned depository financial intermediaries

The conditions leading to separation of asset composition and financing decisions for depository financial intermediaries have received considerable attention in the literature. Although research to date provides useful insights into the issue of separation, none analyze separation from the point of view of shareholder approval. In this paper a single-period model of investor behavior is developed and analyzed based on market equilibrium. The impetus for the existence of intermediaries is random cash payments of investors and liquidation costs. The conditions for shareholder unanimity and optimal rules for intermediary decisions are derived. The optimality conditions are then analyzed for separation.     

Financial hedging and corporate investment

Building on the well-documented relationship between corporate financial hedging and firms' borrowing costs, this study examines the impact of utilizing financial derivative instruments on corporate investment. We document that engaging in financial hedging enables firms to pursue more inorganic growth opportunities in the form of M&As. Acquiring firms with financial hedging programs have a lower borrowing cost and are more likely to pay for their deals with cash and use external borrowing. While financial hedging serves as a vehicle for firms to bring their inorganic investment plans to fruition by facilitating their financing, it also leads to inferior investment choices when conflicts of interest among managers and shareholders are more likely to arise. Our study shows for the first time that the financial flexibility emanating from corporate financial hedging can give rise to agency costs by instigating entrenched managers to overinvest.     

Cross-listing and legal bonding: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Using a sample of foreign acquisitions of US targets, this study examines the extent to which cross-listing in the US leads to legal and regulatory bonding, and/or whether reputational bonding proxied by financial intermediaries monitoring, an often ignored component of the bonding mechanism, is an important factor in US investors decision to hold shares in cross-listed firms. We find that compared to US firms, cross-listed firms are less likely to use equity in takeovers of US targets. Further, cross-listed firms from countries with poorer legal protections are less likely to finance with equity and pay higher premiums than cross-listed firms from countries with better legal protections. Using analysts’ coverage and institutional following as proxies for financial intermediary monitoring, we find some support for the importance of reputational bonding. The evidence suggests that while cross-listing reduces barriers to investment, there are limits to its ability to completely subsume both the legal environment and the importance of the monitoring of financial intermediaries. This further suggests that the extent of actual legal and regulatory bonding by cross-listed firms may be more limited than often assumed.     

Outsourcing with long term contracts: capital structure and product market competition effects

This paper analyzes how capital structure and product market competition affect the firms’ strategic choice between outsourcing with long term contracts and outsourcing to the spot market. When outsourcing to the spot market firms are exposed to price uncertainty, whereas a long term contract allows them to set in advance the outsourcing price. We show that, to the extent that leverage and uncertainty can lead to financial distress costs in bad states of nature, firms may use long term contracts as a risk management device to hedge input price uncertainty. With a monopoly in the final product market, the outsourcing decision involves a trade-off between a positive convexity effect of input price uncertainty under the spot regime and the option to avoid financial distress costs under the long term contract regime. Moreover, product market competition among buyers can lead to an increase in financial distress costs not only for firms outsourcing to the spot market but also for firms outsourcing with a long term contract. We examine the monopolist’s outsourcing decision and derive the equilibrium for an oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium depends on the magnitude of these costs and on the level of efficiency of the supplier.     

The Going-Public Decision and the Development of Financial Markets

This paper explores the linkages between stock price efficiency, the choice between private and public financing, and the development of capital markets in emerging economies. Generally, the advantage of public financing is high if costly information is diverse and cheap to acquire, and if investors receive valuable information without cost. The value of public firms generally depends on public market size, which implies that there can be a positive externality associated with going public, so that an inferior equilibrium can exist where too few firms go public. The model is consistent with empirical observations on financial market development.     

Should business groups be dismantled? The equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets

We analyze the relationship between conglomerates’ internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation, and we identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework. Because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect investor protection, conglomerates that engage in winner-picking (Stein, 1997 [Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources. Journal of Finance 52, 111–133]) find it optimal to allocate scarce capital internally to mediocre projects, even when other firms in the economy have higher-productivity projects that are in need of additional capital. This bias for internal capital allocation can decrease allocative efficiency even when conglomerates have efficient internal capital markets, because a substantial presence of conglomerates might make it harder for other firms in the economy to raise capital. We also argue that the negative externality associated with conglomeration is particularly costly for countries that are at intermediary levels of financial development. In such countries, a high degree of conglomeration, generated, for example, by the control of the corporate sector by family business groups, could decrease the efficiency of the capital market. Our theory generates novel empirical predictions that cannot be derived in models that ignore the equilibrium effects of conglomerates. These predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence that the presence of business groups in developing countries inhibits the growth of new independent firms because of a lack of finance.     

在不同融资模式中金融中介的作用分析

如何认识金融中介在不同融资体系的发展?这是把握当前金融机构发展现状与未来趋势所应该搞清的重要问题.本文从两种融资模式的渊源出发,对市场导向的融资体系和银行导向的融资体系中金融中介的作用进行比较分析,并探讨我国融资的发展现状及未来趋势.     

现代金融中介理论视角下的我国金融体系模式选择

现代金融中介理论表明,商业银行等金融中介与经济增长之间存在密切的相关性。金融中介在促进经济增长的同时,也面临着许多复杂问题。本文从现代金融中介理论的视角出发,对银行导向型金融体系与市场导向型金融体系进行了国际比较,并从融资关系、风险管理、信息生产、公司治理等角度进行对比分析,得出在中国现实的环境下中介与市场发挥着不同作用,但金融中介的优势明显。因此,我国应选择以金融中介为主、资本市场为辅的金融体系,并加紧推出金融机构的混业经营模式。     

On the Perils of Financial Intermediaries Setting Security Prices: The Mutual Fund Wild Card Option

Economic distortions can arise when financial claims trade at prices set by an intermediary rather than direct negotiation between principals. We demonstrate the problem in a specific context, the exchange of open-end mutual fund shares. Mutual funds typically set fund share price (NAV) using an algorithm that fails to account for nonsynchronous trading in the fund's underlying securities. This results in predictable changes in NAV, which lead to exploitable trading opportunities. A modification to the pricing algorithm that corrects for nonsynchronous trading eliminates much of the predictability. However, there are many other potential sources of distortion when intermediaries set prices.     

金融同业活动与实体企业经营风险——来自地区层面同业存单业务的证据

本文研究了地区层面金融同业活动对实体企业经营风险的影响。基于各省份金融机构开启同业存单业务的研究表明,地区层面金融同业活动显著提升了当地上市企业股价大幅下跌的风险。进一步研究表明,随着同业存单业务的发展,当地上市企业债务融资成本和风险水平有所上升,而业绩表现和市场价值有所下降。上述发现表明,企业融资链条变长后,信贷市场道德风险上升,部分企业因风险偏好增强导致经营风险上升,更容易突然出现负面事件而导致股价大幅下跌。本文的发现揭示了金融同业活动存在监管规避的可能性及其影响实体企业的潜在路径,凸显了完善金融监管以更好服务实体经济发展的重要现实意义。     

Managerial compensation and the debt placement decision

Extant research argues that borrowing from financial intermediaries subjects managers to external monitoring. However, given managers' flexibility in choosing the type of debt financing, why would managers submit themselves to external monitoring? Recent theory points to the role of managerial incentive compensation. Specifically, it is argued that managers will borrow from financial intermediaries if their compensation is tied to firm performance. Additionally, it is noted that a more optimal compensation scheme will induce managers to undertake intermediated loans only when the firm is sufficiently profitable. Such a compensation scheme is likely to exist in opaque firm settings where borrowing from financial intermediaries can serve to signal firm profitability. Our study provides corroborative evidence. We find that the choice of syndicated bank loans is positively associated with CEO equity incentives. Second, this syndicated debt-incentive compensation link is influenced by firm profitability, particularly among information problematic firms. Overall, our study points to the role of incentive compensation in the debt placement decision.