State regulation and the structure,conduct, efficiency and performance of US auto insurers

This research investigates the impact of regulation on state automobile insurance markets while controlling for other state insurance market characteristics that may be related to performance. Data for a large sample of insurers are analyzed. The results suggest that insurers in competitive and non-stringently regulated states may benefit from market power by charging higher unit prices, however insurers in these states are on average more cost X-efficient and cost X-efficient insurers charge lower prices and earn smaller profits. The empirical results also suggest that insurers in some rate regulated states are less revenue and cost-scale efficient than in competitive states.     

The “price puzzle” reconsidered

A large literature has employed structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models to investigate the empirical effects of U.S. monetary policy. Many of these models regularly produce a “price puzzle”—a rise in the aggregate price level in response to a contractionary innovation to monetary policy—unless commodity prices are included. Conventional wisdom maintains that commodity prices resolve the price puzzle because they contain information that helps the Federal Reserve forecast inflation. I examine a number of plausible alternative indicator variables and find little correlation between an ability to forecast inflation and an ability to resolve the price puzzle. Additionally, a sub-sample investigation reveals that evidence of a price puzzle is associated primarily with the 1959-1979 sample period, and that most indicators—including commodity prices—cannot resolve the puzzle over this period.     

The Capital Structure of Firms Subject to Price Regulation: Evidence from the Insurance Industry

Automobile and workers' compensation insurance are relatively homogeneous products sold under varying regulatory systems among the states. This paper investigates how price regulation affects the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing insurers who sell insurance in both competitive and/or regulated markets. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that insurers subject to price regulation will choose to hold less capital. In addition, we hypothesize insurers subject to more stringent regulatory pricing constraints will choose even higher degrees of leverage because the benefits of holding additional amounts of capital are suppressed. We conduct empirical tests using cross-sectional data on insurers and find evidence consistent with both hypotheses. These findings have important implications for insurance price and solvency regulation. Stricter price regulation increases the default risk (i.e., reduces the financial quality) of insurance contracts purchased by individuals and firms.     

Price setting in forward-looking customer markets

If consumers form habits in individual goods, firms face a time-inconsistency problem. Low prices in the future help attract customers in the present. Firms, therefore, have an incentive to promise low prices in the future, but price gouge when the future arrives. In this setting, firms benefit from “committing to a sticky price.” If consumers have incomplete information about costs and demand, the firm-preferred equilibrium has the firm price at or below a “price cap.” The model therefore provides an explanation for the simultaneous existence of a rigid regular price and frequent “sales”.     

“Crises” in medical malpractice insurance: Evidence of excessive price-cutting in the preceding soft market

Prior work suggests that heterogeneous information or weak incentives for solvency could have caused some general liability insurers to charge low ex ante prices during the early 1980s and mid-to-late 1990s, putting downward pressure on other firms’ prices and plausibly aggravating subsequent periods of rapid premium growth. We analyse whether the 1994–1999 “soft” market in medical malpractice insurance led some firms to underprice, grow rapidly, and subsequently experience upward revisions in loss forecasts (“loss development”), which could have aggravated subsequent market “crises”. Consistent with the underpricing hypothesis, the results indicate a positive relation between loss development and premium growth among growing firms. Underpricing was likely more prevalent among non-specialist malpractice insurers.     

House prices, non-fundamental components and interstate spillovers: The Australian experience

Using Australian capital city data from 1984Q3--2008Q2, this paper utilizes a dynamic present value model within a VAR framework to construct time series of house prices depicting what aggregate house prices should be given expectations of future real disposable income - the “fundamental price” - and continues by comparing capital city fundamental prices with actual prices. The extent to which revealed capital city “non-fundamental” components spillover from state to state, as well as their long-term impact is also investigated. Results provide evidence of periods of sustained deviations of house prices from values warranted by income for all state capitals with the greatest deviations arising in the NSW market and starting around 2000. In general NSW is relatively more susceptible to spillovers transmitted from other states while ACT and WA are most isolated from the rest of the country.     

Does futures exhibit maturity effect? New evidence from an extensive set of US and foreign futures contracts

In a seminal article, Samuelson (1965) [Samuelson, P. A. (1965), “Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly,” Industrial Management Review 6, 41-49.] proposes the maturity effect that the volatility of futures prices should increase as futures contract approaches maturity. This study provides new evidence on the maturity effect by examining a more extensive set of futures contracts than previous studies and analyzing each contract separately. Using 6805 futures contracts drawn from 61 commodities, including some data from non-US markets, we find that the maturity effect is absent in the majority of contracts. In addition, the maturity effect tends to be stronger in agricultural and energy commodities than in financial futures. We also examine the hypothesis in Bessembinder et al. (1996) [Bessembinder, H., J. F. Coughenour, P. J. Seguin, & M. M. Smoller (1996), “Is there a term structure of futures volatilities? Reevaluating the Samuelson hypothesis,” Journal of Derivatives 4, 45-58.], which states that negative covariance between the spot price and net carry cost causes the maturity effect in futures. Our results provide very weak evidence in favor of this hypothesis.     

The Effect of Regulation on Insurance Pricing: The Case of Germany

This article analyzes the impact of policy form regulation on the unit price of insurance and determinants of premium changes using the 1994 deregulation of the German property–liability market as a natural experiment. Our result show that policy form regulation did not increase prices above competitive levels. Factors influencing premium changes are significantly different for the two time periods, pre‐ and post‐deregulation, indicating that regulation affects insurance pricing. Focusing on highly competitive lines after deregulation, we find a significant price decrease, and this decrease is offset by higher prices in the remaining other lines.     

Price Regulation in Secondary Insurance Markets

Secondary life insurance markets are growing rapidly. From nearly no transactions in 1980, a wide variety of similar products in this market has developed, including viatical settlements, accelerated death benefits, and life settlements and as the population ages, these markets will become increasingly popular. Eight state governments, in a bid to guarantee sellers a “fair” price, have passed regulations setting a price floor on secondary life insurance market transactions, and more are considering doing the same. Using data from a unique random sample of HIV+ patients, we estimate welfare losses from transactions prevented by binding price floors in the viatical settlements market (an important segment of the secondary life insurance market). We find that price floors bind on HIV patients with greater than 4 years of life expectancy. Furthermore, HIV patients from states with price floors are significantly less likely to viaticate than similarly healthy HIV patients from other states. If price floors were adopted nationwide, they would rule out transactions worth $119 million per year. We find that the magnitude of welfare loss from these blocked transactions would be highest for consumers who are relatively poor, have weak bequest motives, and have a high rate of time preference.     

Competition in the general insurance industry

Using a large sample of cross-sectional data for 1998 of companies operating in the general insurance industry we attempt to shed some light on the issue of competition in this industry. Companies offering products and services in the general insurance market are believed to trade under very competitive conditions. In order to test this widely-held claim we investigate whether firms’ pricing policies reflect competitive or monopolistic market features. Under competitive conditions companies are forced to pass on any increase in costs in prices and thus their revenues will rise pari passu should wages, underwriting costs or other expenses are increasing. By contrast, a firm operating under monopolistic competition responds to an increase in marginal and average costs by increasing price and reducing output, resulting in a less then complete pass-through in revenue; profit falls. Our study is the first, to our knowledge, to apply this research methodology to the general (casuality/liability) insurance industry. Firms in this industry generate revenue through underwriting of insurance risks and from investing their assets. As underwriting and capital markets are in general segmented (catastrophe bonds apart), our empirical approach is based on the insurance and portfolio behaviour of firms and not on an integrated view of both. Previous investigations of this kind have focussed on the banking industry. Contrary to widely held views we find that competition is less than perfect.     

Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and financial system risks

Empirical evidence is presented to show that in modern times banks can hedge liquidity shocks but could not do so prior to FDIC insurance. However, the government's limitations in properly pricing FDIC insurance are leading to many current examples of moral hazard. A model is presented to show that if insurance premiums are set to be “actuarially fair,” incentives for banks to take excessive systematic risks remain. Motivated by empirical evidence that money market mutual funds also can hedge liquidity shocks, I consider an alternative government insurance system that mitigates distortions to risk-taking yet preserves liquidity hedging and information synergies.     

The interplay between risk adjustment and risk rating in voluntary health insurance

Many regulated health insurance markets include risk adjustment (aka risk equalization) to mitigate selection incentives for insurers. Empirical studies on the design and evaluation of risk-adjustment algorithms typically focus on mandatory health insurance schemes. This paper considers risk adjustment in the context of voluntary health insurance, as found in Chile, Ireland, and Australia. In addition to the challenge of mitigating selection by insurers, regulators of these voluntary schemes have to deal with selection by consumers in and out of the market. A strategy for mitigating selection by consumers is to apply some form of risk rating. Our paper shows how risk adjustment and risk rating interact: (1) risk rating reduces the need for risk adjustment and (2) risk adjustment reduces premium variation across rating factors, thereby increasing incentives for consumers to select in and out of the market.     

Price trends and patterns in technical analysis: A theoretical and empirical examination

While many technical trading rules are based upon patterns in asset prices, we lack convincing explanations of how and why these patterns arise, and why trading rules based on technical analysis are profitable. This paper provides a model that explains the success of certain trading rules that are based on patterns in past prices. We point to the importance of confirmation bias, which has been shown to play a key role in other types of decision making. Traders who acquire information and trade on the basis of that information tend to bias their interpretation of subsequent information in the direction of their original view. This produces autocorrelations and patterns of price movement that can predict future prices, such as the “head-and-shoulders” and “double-top” patterns. The model also predicts that sequential price jumps for a particular stock will be positively autocorrelated. We test this prediction and find that jumps exhibit statistically and economically significant positive autocorrelations.     

Locals, foreigners, and multi-market trading of equities: Intraday evidence from Thailand

We study stock market orders and trades in a developing country, Thailand, where foreign ownership limits partially segment local and foreign investors into two distinct markets. Some foreigners forgo voting rights and distributions to trade on the “local board”, while some locals forgo such benefits and pay a price premium to trade on the “foreign board”. Regardless of nationality, these cross-market traders typically submit orders when liquidity is high, fill orders at relatively beneficial prices, exploit patterns in stock prices across markets, display profitable holding-period returns, and enhance price discovery. This suggests that skilled, informed trading that affects market quality does not depend on trader nationality.     

Homeowners Insurance With Bundled Catastrophe Coverage

We estimate the demand for homeowners insurance in Florida and New York with indicated loss costs as our proxy for the quantity of real insurance services demanded. We decompose the demand into the demand for coverage of catastrophe perils and the demand for noncatastrophe coverage and estimate these demand functions separately. Our results are relatively consistent in New York and Florida, including evidence that catastrophe demand is more price elastic than noncatastrophe demand. We also find evidence that consumers value options that expand coverage, buy more insurance when it is subsidized through regulatory price constraints, and consider state guaranty fund provisions when purchasing insurance.     

Do stock prices influence corporate decisions? Evidence from the technology bubble

We study the capital investment, stock issuance, and cash savings behavior of non-tech manufacturers (old economy firms) during the 1990s technology bubble. Our empirical results show that high stock prices affect corporate policies because they relax financing constraints. During the tech bubble, constrained non-tech firms' investment responded strongly to “high stock prices” (specifically, the component of price that is not captured by fundamentals). They also issued stock in response to that overvaluation effect, saving part of the proceeds in their cash accounts. We find no such patterns for unconstrained non-tech firms, nor for tech firms. Our findings are not consistent with the notion that managers systematically issue overvalued stocks and invest in ways that transfer wealth from new to old shareholders. More broadly, they suggest that what appears to be overvaluation in one sector of the economy may have positive externalities for other sectors.     

The Dynamics of Insurance Prices

We develop a continuous-time general-equilibrium model to rationalise the dynamics of insurance prices in a competitive insurance market with financial frictions. Insurance companies choose underwriting and financing policies to maximise shareholder value. The equilibrium price dynamics are explicit, which allows simple numerical simulations and generates testable implications. In particular, we find that the equilibrium price of insurance is (weakly) predictable and the insurance sector always realises positive expected profits. Moreover, rather than true cycles, insurance prices exhibit asymmetric reversals caused by the reflection of the aggregate capacity process at the dividend and recapitalisation boundaries.     

The autumn effect of gold

This paper studies recurring annual events potentially introducing seasonality into gold prices. We analyze gold returns for each month from 1980 to 2010 and find that September and November are the only months with positive and statistically significant gold price changes. This “autumn effect” holds unconditionally and conditional on several risk factors. We argue that the anomaly can be explained with hedging demand by investors in anticipation of the “Halloween effect” in the stock market, wedding season gold jewelery demand in India and negative investor sentiment due to shorter daylight time. The autumn effect can also be characterized by a higher unconditional and conditional volatility than in other seasons.     

The subprime credit crisis and contagion in financial markets

I conduct an empirical investigation into the pricing of subprime asset-backed collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and their contagion effects on other markets. Using data for the ABX subprime indexes, I find strong evidence of contagion in the financial markets. The results support the hypothesis that financial contagion was propagated primarily through liquidity and risk-premium channels, rather than through a correlated-information channel. Surprisingly, ABX index returns forecast stock returns and Treasury and corporate bond yield changes by as much as three weeks ahead during the subprime crisis. This challenges the popular view that the market prices of these “toxic assets” were unreliable; the results suggest that significant price discovery did in fact occur in the subprime market during the crisis.     

有限理性的价格认识在保险消费中的作用

保险产品本身的特殊性和复杂性以及消费者自身的心理因素,使得消费者在保险价格认识中仅具有有限理性。有限理性的价格认识使消费者在保险消费决策中难以做出主动购买的决策,并容易盲目购买低价产品,使市场总保险需求的价格敏感度较低,并使价格在财产保险消费中的作用大于在人身保险中的作用。保险企业应该有针对性地采取价格策略和相应的营销支持,使消费者对价格的认识成为促进保险产品销售的手段而不是障碍。