Common risk factors in bank stocks

This paper provides evidence on the risk factors that are priced in bank equities. Alternative empirical models with precedent in the nonfinancial asset pricing literature are tested, including the single-factor CAPM, three-factor Fama–French model, and ICAPM. Our empirical results indicate that an unconditional two-factor ICAPM model that includes the stock market excess return and shocks to the slope of the yield curve is useful in explaining the cross-section of bank stock returns. However, we find no evidence that firm specific factors such as size and book-to-market ratios are priced in bank stock returns. These results have a number of important implications for the estimation of the banks’ cost of capital as well as regulatory initiatives to utilize market discipline to evaluate bank risk under Basel II.     

Safer ratios,riskier portfolios: Banks׳ response to government aid

Using novel data on bank applications to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we study the effect of government assistance on bank risk taking. Bailed-out banks initiate riskier loans and shift assets toward riskier securities after receiving government support. However, this shift in risk occurs mostly within the same asset class and, therefore, remains undetected by regulatory capital ratios, which indicate improved capitalization at bailed-out banks. Consequently, these banks appear safer according to regulatory ratios, but show an increase in volatility and default risk. These findings are robust to controlling for credit demand and account for selection of TARP recipients by exploiting banks? geography-based political connections as an instrument for bailout approvals.     

Board characteristics and Chinese bank performance

Using a sample of 50 largest Chinese banks during the period of 2003–2010, we explore a comprehensive set of board characteristics (size, composition and functioning of the board) and analyze their impacts on bank performance and bank asset quality in China. We find that the number of board meetings and the proportion of independent directors have significantly positive impacts on both bank performance and asset quality while board size has a significantly negative impact on bank performance. We find new evidence that the degree of bank boards’ political connection is negatively correlated with bank performance and asset quality. The findings suggest that the board of directors plays a significant role in bank governance in China.     

Bank resilience to systemic shocks and the stability of banking systems: Small is beautiful

Utilising a novel empirical approach and an extensive sample of listed European banks, we identify which bank characteristics offer a shelter from systemic shocks and compare the relative effects of several hypothetical prudential rules on a bank’s risk exposure. While the results show that restrictions on a bank’s leverage ratio and the imposition of liquidity requirements, as in the Basel III Accord, may improve the resilience of a bank to systemic events, they also demonstrate that bank size, the share of non-interest income and asset growth (none of which are at the centre of the new regulatory landscape) are key determinants of a bank’s risk exposure. In particular, the introduction of a cap on bank absolute size appears the most effective tool, ceteris paribus, to reduce the default risk of a bank given systemic events. Furthermore, in spite of the integration process of the financial industry in Europe, the analysis presented here shows that such a cap should be country-specific with smaller economies requiring smaller banks. Finally, we show that the strengthening of individual bank stability obtained via size restrictions is accompanied by a reduction of the contribution to systemic risk for banks which are relatively large compared to the domestic economy.     

Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity

We examine the effects of opacity on bank valuation and synchronicity in bank equity returns over the years 2000–2006 prior to the 2007 financial crisis. As expected, investments in opaque assets are more profitable than investments in transparent assets, and taking profitability into account, have larger valuation discounts relative to transparent assets. The valuation discounts on opaque asset investments decline over the 2000–2006 period only to be followed by a sharp reversal in 2007. The decline is coincident with a rise in bank equity share prices, decrease in transparent asset holdings by banks, and greater return synchronicity – evidence consistent with a feedback effect.     

Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.     

保险资金参与衍生品市场的境外经验及启示

无论坚持审慎原则的监管制度安排,抑或自由主义的监管价值取向,境外市场对保险资金从事衍生品交易的禁限性设置较少,其保险公司参与衍生品交易经验成熟,期货、期权等场内衍生品在保险资产管理中发挥了重要作用。借鉴成熟市场的制度经验和实践做法,有必要将保险资金的投资目的从严格的套期保值拓宽至替代交易、收益增强交易等风险管理活动;进一步丰富保险资金可投资的衍生品范围,尤其是国债期货等场内衍生品,以弥补债券为主的保险资产结构与利率风险管理工具缺乏的不匹配问题;在制定衍生品投资限额时可参考不同类型衍生品的风险价值衡量方式,进一步完善限额管理,以促进我国保险资金参与衍生品交易的市场化水平。     

Bank capital,interbank contagion,and bailout policy

This paper develops a theoretical framework in which asset linkages in a syndicated loan agreement can infect a healthy bank when its partner bank fails. We investigate how capital constraints affect the choice of the healthy bank to takeover or liquidate the exposure held jointly with the failing bank, and how the bank’s ex ante optimal capital holding and possibility of contagion are affected by anticipation of bail-out policy, capital requirements and the joint exposure. We identify a range of factors that strengthen or weaken the possibility of contagion and bailout. Recapitalization with common stock rather than preferred equity injection dilutes existing shareholder interests and gives the bank a greater incentive to hold capital to cope with potential contagion. Increasing the minimum regulatory capital does not necessarily reduce contagion, while the requirement of holding conservation capital buffer could increase the bank’s resilience to avoid contagion.     

资产透明度、监管套利与银行系统性风险

资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISK、MES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。     

Banks and markets in a monetary economy

Modern financial sectors consist of banks, asset markets and a central bank. This paper builds a model where these institutions provide different financial services, and their interaction supports efficient allocations. When one institution is missing equilibria are, by construction, inefficient. The paper analyzes how interest rates and asset prices depend on the structure of the financial sector and characterizes the central bank policy that supports efficient allocations. The analysis relies on the difference between liquidity and real shocks, and relates the notion of liquidity used in this paper to the one adopted in other studies.     

Investment,agency conflicts,debt maturity,and loan guarantees by negotiation

We consider an irreversible investment, of which the sunk cost is financed by a finite-term debt after entering into an option-for-guarantee swap (OGS) with negotiation. The OGS is a three-party agreement among a lender (bank), an insurer, and a borrower (entrepreneur), where the bank lends at a given interest rate to the entrepreneur and if the borrower defaults on debt, the insurer must pay all the principal and remaining interests to the lender instead of the borrower. In return for the guarantee, the borrower must allocate a perpetual American call option to purchase a fraction (guarantee cost) of his equity at a given strike price. We find that the investment threshold decreases but the exercise threshold of the insurer’s option increases with the borrower’s bargaining power. Both the investment and exercise threshold increase with debt maturity, but there is a U-shaped relation between the guarantee cost and debt maturity. The borrower postpones investment once the funding gap or project risk increases. The swap may overcome the inefficiencies from asset substitution and debt overhang, strongly depending on the debt maturity and borrower’s bargaining power.     

Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: A note

This paper examines theoretically the effects of more stringent capital regulation on bank asset portfolio risk. The analysis shows that, for a value-maximizing bank, incentives to increase asset risk decline as its capital increases. Thus, as long as regulatory efforts to contain asset risk and size are not reduced, more stringent capital regulation unambiguously reduces the expected liability of the deposit insurance system.     

Limited liability and bank safety net procedures ∗

A model is presented of bank behaviour which identifies the factors determining a bank's optimal capital/asset ratio, its optimal liquidity ratio, the expected value of non-performing loans and the probability of bank failure. We propose that this last variable can act as an index of bank credit-worthiness. The main factors determining this index are (i) the risk associated with bank asset returns, (ii) the variability of bank deposits, (iii) the costs associated with bank failure and (iv) the implicit or explicit government subsidy involved in depositor protection schemes. The principal general conclusion of the paper is that regulations governing capital requirements, liquidity requirements and depositor protection should be (a) risk related and (b) integrated. Depositor protection can be improved through relatively high capital requirements. However, the optimal strategy is for all bank safety net procedures and incentive mechanisms to be related to the riskiness of individual bank portfolios.     

The effect of capital adequacy guidelines on large bank holding companies

The United States federal bank regulators imposed numerical capital guidelines in 1981. If these guidelines are binding on bank holding companies, then theoretical evidence suggests that banking organizations may be increasing asset risk. This study tests empirically the hypothesis that the guidelines are binding. Two models of changes in bank holding company equity capital to assets ratios are developed and tested using maximum likehood estimation: a regulatory model and a market model. The results indicate that most large bank holding companies are influenced by regulatory forces.     

Asset financing with credit risk

This paper develops a model for the unified valuation of all forms of real asset financing, such as bank loans, leases, securitization vehicles, and credit guarantees, secured by assets that generate a stochastic service flow to the operator, or a rental stream to the lessor, and depreciate over a finite economic life to their scrap value. Examples include mobile equipment, such as aircraft, railroad equipment, ships, trucks and trailers, as well as energy generation assets, heavy factory equipment and construction equipment. In the event of obligor default, after a repossession delay and incurring costs of repossession, maintenance, re-marketing and re-deployment, the lender repossesses the asset and sells it on the secondary market and is, thus, subject to the risk of decline in the market value of the asset. The model we develop in this paper treats all forms of asset financing in a unified fashion as contingent claims on the collateral asset and the credit of the borrower. As an application, we estimate the collateral asset model on historical secondary market data for aircraft values and calibrate the financing model to the Enhanced Equipment Trust Certificates (EETCs) issued in 2007 by Continental Airlines and secured by a fleet of new aircraft. We then apply the calibrated model to value private market financing, including bank loans, leases, and credit guarantees, consistently with the capital market financing, and assess the impact of repossession delays on credit spreads. This analysis leads to a policy insight suggesting that bankruptcy laws limiting asset repossession delays lead to lower costs of asset financing.     

Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer – that is, maximize put option value – by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing charter value. Focusing on the relationship between Tobin’s q and an ex ante measure of the failure probability, this paper develops a semi-parametric model for estimating the critical level of bank risk at which put option value starts outweighing charter value. From these estimates, we infer the prevalence of moral hazard. Examining publicly held bank holding companies (BHC) during the tumultuous 1986–1992 period, we find that shareholders’ risk-taking incentives were confined to a small fraction of highly risky institutions. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the inflection point at which banks begin to tilt in favor of moral hazard increased substantially in 1993–2005. These findings are encouraging to bank regulators and legislators because they indicate that tighter capital rules and more rigorous supervision introduced by several legislative initiatives in the 1990s have helped squeeze a lot of the moral hazard incentives out of the banking system.     

The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis

We use country level data and bank level data from 71 countries and 857 banks to investigate the impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings. The results indicate that less cost efficient banks, with higher than average levels of provisions relatively to their income, and lower liquidity tend to have lower ratings. Larger and more profitable banks tend to obtain higher ratings. Higher equity to assets ratio results in higher ratings only when we do not control for bank supervision and regulations. Capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities, official disciplinary power, explicit deposit insurance scheme, higher deposit insurer power, liquidity and diversification guidelines, entry requirements, fraction of entries denied, and economic freedom have a significant impact on ratings in all of our specifications. Disclosure requirements and foreign banks entry have a significant impact on ratings only when we simultaneously control for the regulatory environment and the market structure, while auditing requirements have a significant impact only when we control for the regulatory environment alone. Finally, banks in developed countries are assigned higher ratings. However, this impact disappears when we include the regulatory and supervision variables in the models.     

Countercyclical contingent capital

We analyze the optimal capital structure of a bank issuing countercyclical contingent capital, i.e., notes to be converted into common shares in poor macroeconomic conditions. A comparison of the main effects produced by the countercyclical asset with the simple equity-debt capital structure, the non-countercyclical contingent capital and the countercyclical callable bond is conducted. We demonstrate that this type of asset reduces the spread of straight debt and is effective in reducing the asset substitution incentive. The reduction of bankruptcy costs is strong only when the countercyclicality feature is removed. Contingent capital is useful for macroprudential regulation and we show that the countercyclical feature is important depending on priorities (moderate the asset substitution incentive or reduce bankruptcy costs).     

Asset restructuring strategies in bank acquisitions: Does distance between dealing partners matter?

One of the most lively-debated effects of banking acquisitions is the change in lending and asset allocation of the target bank in favour of transaction-based products, at the expense of small and informationally opaque borrowers. These changes may be the result of two distinct restructuring strategies pursued by the acquirer with respect to the asset portfolio of the acquired bank: a cleaning strategy (CS), in which the acquirer makes a clean sweep of all the negative net present value activities in the portfolio of the acquired bank, and a portfolio strategy (PS), in which the acquiring bank permanently changes the portfolio allocation of the acquired bank. In this paper we focus on Italian bank acquisitions and test which asset restructuring strategy was predominantly pursued over the period 1997–2003. Moreover, we distinguish acquisitions according to their geographic diversifying character and to the physical and cultural distances that separate acquiring from acquired banks. When we look at the mean value, we do not find clear evidence of a primacy either of CSs or PSs. When we separate in-market from out-of-market bank acquisitions, however, results show that the CSs prevail only in the former type of deals, while in the latter the portfolio of acquired banks is subject to PSs. Finally, we find that differences in asset restructuring strategies can be explained by differences in corporate culture and the workplace environment of the dealing partners.     

Análisis de contagio en el sistema financiero mexicano combinando el modelo de Merton y redes aleatorias

The control of systematic risk and the contagion effect are very important on the regulation and Basilea context. This paper presents a two phase model (Merton Model on the first part and Random networks Erdös-Rényi in the second part) in order to analyze the contagion effect on the Mexican bank system. The conclusions are that the Banks could not be infected or fall into default depending of the behavior of liabilities, the structure of the network and (external asset/interbank asset) ratio and (capital/asset) ratio. The results are consistent with the regulation politics in order to avoid the contagion in Mexico Financial System.