Unemployment duration and economic incentives—a quasi random-assignment approach

We investigate how economic incentives and spell duration affect hazard rates out of insured unemployment. We take into account that insured unemployment not always ends in employment, but also in disability, training programs, or benefit sanctions. Our empirical basis is Norwegian register data containing variation in economic incentives and spell duration similar to that of random-assignment experiments. We find that the employment and benefit-sanction hazards are negatively affected by the unemployment insurance replacement ratio, but that the effects vary considerably among individuals. There is negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the disability hazard.     

How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment

This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance—the benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential benefit duration (PBD)—affect the duration of unemployment. To identify such an effect we exploit a policy change introduced in 1989 by the Austrian government, which affected various unemployed workers differently: a first group experienced an increase in RR; a second group experienced an extension of PBD; a third group experienced both a higher RR and a longer PBD; and a fourth group experienced no change in the policy parameters. We find that unemployed workers react to the disincentives by an increase in unemployment duration, and our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of job search theory. We use our parameter estimates to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into costs due to changes in the unemployment insurance system with unchanged behaviour and costs due to behavioural responses of unemployed workers. Our results indicate that costs due to behavioural responses are substantial.     

Modelling labour market dynamics with on-the-job search

A flow model of the Dutch labour market is used to calculate the effects of policy options which aim to enhance employment, especially at the lower end of the labour market. The model distinguishes between good and bad jobs, allows for endogenous wage formation and job creation, and describes the flows between these jobs so that job-to-job mobility and the vacancy chain is made endogenous. In the matching process employed job seekers with bad jobs compete with short-term and long-term unemployed for the filling of vacancies for good jobs. In each period part of the good and bad jobs are destroyed which results in inflow into unemployment. The model explicitly describes the flow of unemployed through the various duration classes of unemployment and it allows for negative duration dependence so that the escape probability from unemployment for long-term unemployed is smaller than for short-term unemployed. The model is used to simulate the effects of external shocks, such as structural productivity shocks. An impulse response analysis using the model is also conducted considering labour market policies which aims especially to enhance employment at the lower end of the labour market. In particular, the effects are analysed of measures subsidising the opening of bad jobs (jobs at the lower end of the labour market) and a rise in the productivity of a bad job as compared to a good job which can be achieved by changes in the tax system.     

Work incentives and other effects of the transition to social assistance: Evidence from the Slovak Republic

In this paper we investigate whether the potential disincentive effects of the Slovak benefit system have an actual meaning. Using data from subsequent labour force surveys we study the determinants of the outflow from unemployment to a job and the determinants of the outflow to out of the labour force. We find that single unemployed, highly educated unemployed and unemployed living in the capital Bratislava have higher exit rates both to a job and to out of the labour force. The characteristic with a distinctly different effect on both exit rates is the previous labour market position We also find that there are fluctuations in the hazard rate over the duration of unemployment. However, these fluctuations are not very informative. The direct indicators of the type of unemployment benefit do not affect the exit rates, neither do the indirect indicators like, for example, the presence of young children. Although there are potential disincentive effects in the Slovak benefit system we find no evidence that these potential effects materialise.     

Estimating the relationship between labour market tightness,unemployment insurance benefits and union election activity

Using detailed data from the US National Labor Relations Board, we find labour market tightness, defined as the ratio of job vacancies to the number of unemployed, has a positive relationship with the likelihood of voting in favour of union representation. Specifically, a 1 SD increase in labour market tightness increases Vote Share in favour and the likelihood of union certification by roughly 1.5% and 3%, respectively. We also find that length of unemployment insurance benefits has a positive relationship with Vote Share in favour. Taken together, these results suggest that workers are more comfortable engaging in pro-union election behaviours when exogenous conditions, like labour market tightness and unemployment insurance benefit duration, shift in a way that more favourably insulates them from unemployment and income risk.     

Unemployment duration and workers' wage aspirations in Spain

This paper examines unemployed workers' declared willingness to work for wages lower than the one adequate for their qualification. We analyze which personal and economic characteristics determine this willingness and how it changes along the individuals' unemployment spells. The main results are: (i) Young workers, less educated and those living in regions or times of high unemployment are more willing to accept reduced wages while married women with a working husband are much less willing to do so; (ii) Once the individual fixed effect is controlled for, the willingness to work for reduced wages increases with the duration of unemployment; (iii) Not having access to unemployment benefits increases the probability that initially unwilling workers become willing to accept reduced wages.     

Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment*

This paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy. We consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment. Job search behavior is unobservable, which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance (UI) benefits intended for unemployed workers. As a consequence, pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment. We show that requiring unproductive activities (workfare) in exchange for UI benefits may generate a Pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers, and we characterize the situations where this is the case.     

The social costs of unemployment: accounting for unemployment duration

This article contributes to the literature on unemployment and well-being by investigating the linkage between personal life satisfaction and a macroeconomic indicator of the duration of unemployment. Using data for more than 50?000 individuals in 10 European countries, 1992–2002, we find that the social costs of unemployment, in terms of general unemployment's impact on life satisfaction, relate significantly and to a considerable extent to unemployment duration. It is thus not just the risk of becoming or staying unemployed that people worry about, but especially the prospect of staying long-term unemployed. This fear affects employed and unemployed people alike. Our findings provide a strong point for focusing labour market policies on long-term unemployment, in addition to considerations of human capital depreciation.     

Work incentive and other effects of social assistance and unemployment benefit policy in the Czech Republic

In this paper we provide an account of most of the passive labor market policies (unemployment compensation, social assistance, state social support and the pension system) in the Czech Republic during the 1990–1996 period. The eligibility requirements and benefit levels are described in great detail. Using Labor Force Survey data, we compare the characteristics of unemployed people receiving unemployment benefits with those receiving social assistance and those not receiving any benefits and we find significant differences in their characteristics. Finally, we provide an analysis of the work disincentive effects of the unemployment and social assistance benefits by comparing these benefits to market wages and by analyzing the effect of being in the system on the duration of unemployment of two cohorts of unemployed in 1994 and 1995. We find that social assistance benefits are fairly generous for low income families with more children, individuals with these characteristics have a higher probability of receiving social assistance and they tend to stay unemployed longer than those people with relatively fewer dependants. We conclude that the social assistance scheme seems to be having some disincentive effects for at least one group in the population.     

Unobserved Heterogeneity,Exit Rates,and Re‐Employment Wages

Exit rates from unemployment and re‐employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance‐related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.     

Unemployment insurance and union bargaining — an insider-outsider approach

A trade union is required to tax its own members to fund unemployment benefit paid to its unemployed members in an insider-outsider model of union bargaining over wages and employment. An increase in unemployment benefit imposed by the government increases employment overall but not necessarily the employment of insiders if the tax rate is exogenously fixed by the government.This paper has benefited from comments of Mick Common, Dipak Ghosh, Bob Hart, and Robin Ruffell. The comments of two anonymous referees and the advice of the Editor have greatly improved the presentation of the paper. Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.     

Does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes?

In this paper, we examine the disincentive effects of the public employment service on the search effort of unemployed workers and on their exit rate from unemployment. For that purpose, we specify a structural search model with fixed and variable costs of search in which unemployed workers select their optimal search intensity given the exogenous arrival rate of job contacts coming from the public employment agency. Because the theoretical effect of an increase in this exogenous job contact arrival rate on the structural exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous, we estimate this model using individual unemployment duration data. Our results show that the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service, especially for low-educated and low-skilled workers. They also show that the search effort is more costly for low-educated women and low-skilled adult unemployed workers. This last result suggests that a public employment agency that matches searchers and employers is beneficial, in the sense that it saves searchers in terms of search costs they would otherwise bear.     

Skill Loss, Ranking of Job Applicants and the Dynamics of Unemployment

Abstract. This paper investigates the consequences of skill loss as a result of unemployment in an efficiency wage model with turnover costs and on-the-job search. Firms are unable to differentiate wages and therefore prefer to hire employed searchers or unemployed workers who have not lost human capital. It is shown that if some fundamental factor in the economy changes, this will result in a lengthy adjustment process with substantial long-run unemployment effects. Moreover, the model is capable of generating persistence, but the amount depends on the duration of the shock itself.     

Recurrent unemployment,welfare benefits and heterogeneity

The objective of this paper is to investigate the causes of the recurrences of individuals in unemployment during benefit periods. So as to attain this objective, we use administrative data from the Spanish Employment Agency to estimate a duration model with multiple spells that allows for unemployment state dependence through lagged unemployment duration in order to distinguish the heterogeneity and scarring effects. We find that an increase in the duration of previous unemployment benefit periods lengthens the expected duration of future unemployment benefit periods. True state dependence and heterogeneity, intensity of job search and local labour market conditions are among the elements that explain this unemployment state dependence.     

Willingness to pay and the demand for lotto

The way that unemployment duration affects employment prospects, is investigated using Norwegian micro transition data encompassing detailed accounts of 14 807 unemployed adults. A generalized non-proportional Weibull model is estimated, with two possible exits from the unemployment pool: a job or a labour force exit. On average the probability of obtaining a job is fairly constant at the individual level, while the probability of exiting the labour force increases significantly as unemployment duration is prolonged. For some particular groups of unemployed, there is also a marked negative duration dependence in the probability of obtaining a job.     

Accelerating the transition to employment at benefit exhaustion: still possible after four years of unemployment?

This paper provides evidence of how the long-term unemployed react to the threat of running out of unemployment insurance (UI) after receiving it for nearly 4 years. To identify the effect of UI exhaustion, we make use of a 1999 Danish legislative change that progressively reduced potential benefit duration from 5 to 4 years. We find that shortening UI duration hastens the transition to employment throughout the unemployment spell up to benefit exhaustion even if it occurs as long as 4 years later. However, although the proportional effect is large, it is small in absolute value.     

A new look at the UI effect on transitions from unemployment into wage employment in Spain: the limited duration of the UI benefits entitlement

This article is a new look at the study of the unemployment insurance effect on the transition probability from unemployment into wage employment in Spain. It is found that individuals increase their search effort and reduce their reservation wage as the unemployment insurance benefit entitlement exhaustion approaches, and their exit rate equals that of the unemployed who never got benefits from the exhaustion moment. Financial constraints are not important in Spain. Business cycle affects more to long-term unemployed. And, finally, it is found that the probability of being offered a vacancy decreases with time spent in unemployment, having allowed for unobservable heterogeneity.     

Unemployment durations and the pattern of duration dependence over the business cycle of British males

This paper examines the relationship between the business cycle and individuals’ duration in unemployment. I use multi-spell unemployment duration data of British males and monthly series of regional vacancies over unemployment, referred to as labour market tightness, to control for the business cycle. In line with most previous studies I find that the observed negative duration dependence on an aggregate level is explained by both sorting and strong negative individual duration dependence, and that the individual hazard of leaving unemployment increases with labour market tightness. The new empirical findings emerge from the interactions between individual duration dependence and the business cycle. Individual heterogeneity, and in particular the variation over the business cycle in the composition of the newly unemployed, explains most of the systematic variation over the business cycle in duration dependence on an aggregate level. Individual duration dependence does not vary over the business cycle in a way that would lend support to the predictions concerning this of the matching model of Lockwood (Rev Econ Stud 58:733–753, 1991) or the ranking model of Blanchard and Diamond (Rev Econ Stud 61:417–434, 1994).     

Unemployment Durations in West Germany Before and After the Reform of the Unemployment Compensation System during the 1980s

Abstract. This paper analyzes empirically the distribution of unemployment durations in West Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. It therefore covers periods before and after the changes during the mid‐1980s in the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits for older unemployed. The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample containing administrative data for about 500,000 individuals. Since these data only partly reveal the unemployment duration in an economic sense, we use a narrow and a wide proxy for unemployment. Our empirical analysis finds significant changes in the distribution of non‐employment durations for older unemployed. At the same time, the distribution of unemployment durations between jobs remained unchanged after the reforms. Our findings clearly show that many firms and workers used the more beneficial laws as a part of early retirement packages. Surprisingly, for those workers who found and accepted a new job, we do not observe a prolongation of their search periods to a sizeable extent.     

Benefit duration and unemployment entry: A quasi-experiment in Austria

Apart from being an important aspect of job-search behavior of individuals, potential benefit duration can also have effects on unemployment entry rates. In this paper, the causal connection between the two is investigated for the case of Austria, using a quasi-experimental situation that arose following the enactment of a law that extended benefit duration for older workers in specific regions of the country. Unemployment entry is found to have risen between 4 and 11 percentage points due to the new law. Several robustness checks are presented to see if a causal interpretation of this result is possible. Preliminary analysis shows that this increase in unemployment entry can be best understood not as voluntary quits but layoffs by firms who want to get rid of high-tenured and expensive older workers.