Effort, trade, and unemployment

Abstract.  This paper incorporates equilibrium unemployment caused by efficiency wages into a monopolistic competition model of trade. Worker effort is treated as an endogenous variable that depends on the optimizing behaviour of firms and workers. Opening up trade induces firms to demand greater worker effort and to cut the size of their workforce. This counteracts the positive employment effect due to entry of firms. Circumstances are indicated in which the two effects just balance, leaving aggregate employment unchanged. Trade unambiguously increases worker effort, thereby enhancing within-firm productivity.     

The welfare costs of union wage compression

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare costs of union wage compression. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). The labor market in this model is characterized as a right-to-manage contract, which allows unions to compress wage differentials between high- and low-skilled workers, by implementing a binding minimum wage. This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low-skilled workers. The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor, however, is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high-skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.     

Exploring the big jump in the Spanish unemployment rate: Evidence on an ‘added-worker’ effect

Spain is destroying more jobs than any other European country. In the third quarter of 2009, the unemployment rate stood at 17.9%, the second-highest rate in the 27-nation EU and the highest rate in the euro area (EA-16). The exponential growth of the Spanish unemployment rate is the by-product of falling employment rates. However, there is a second explanation which is often overlooked by unemployment forecasters: changes in labour force participation rates. On the one hand, in times of recession participation rates tend to increase in order to safeguard sustainable household incomes. This phenomenon is known as the ‘added-worker’ effect. On the other hand, there is also an opposite effect in that individuals leave the labour force in recessions because chances to find employment are low. This is the ‘discouraged-worker’ effect. Applying a threshold cointegration model to Spanish quarterly data over the period 1976-2008, we find that the added-worker effect dominates the discouraged-worker effect, but only when unemployment is below 11.7%. Above this threshold, the two effects cancel each other out so that the participation rate is not influenced by further deteriorations of economic conditions. Since Spain recently passed the 11.7% unemployment threshold, our model predicts that there will be no further increases in the participation rate in the near future.     

A “Managerial” trade union and economic growth

By setting up a simple Romer-type [Romer, P.M., 1989. Capital accumulation in the theory of long-run growth. In: Barro, R.J. (Ed.), Modern Business Cycle Theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA] endogenous growth model embodying a political trade union (rather than the traditional economic labor union), this paper explores the effects of unionization on unemployment, growth and welfare by highlighting the essence of internal conflict within the union. It is shown that the conflicting interests between the leadership and membership within the union play a decisive role in the unemployment, growth and welfare effects of unionization. Given the fact that taxation is another potential candidate besides unions in explaining the poor performance of a macro-economy, we re-examine the taxation effects within the growth model with equilibrium unemployment caused by the presence of the trade union and compare our findings with those for the traditional full-employment growth model. In general, we find that the taxation effects of income and consumption crucially depend not only on the institutional arrangements for taxing unemployment benefits, but also on the way the government budget is balanced.     

Labor market cycles, unemployment insurance eligibility, and moral hazard

If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the effects of UI to violations of its premises. Our baseline simulation shows that if the neutral contribution scheme derived in this paper were to be implemented, the average unemployment rate in the United States would fall from 5.7 to 4.7 percent. Also, the results show that with endogenous UI eligibility, one can simultaneously generate realistic productivity driven cycles and realistic responses of unemployment to changes in UI benefits.     

Banking crises,labor reforms,and unemployment

Using a sample of 97 countries spanning the period 1980–2008, we estimate that banking crises have, on average, a large negative impact on unemployment. This effect, however, largely depends on the flexibility of labor market institutions: while in countries with more flexible labor markets the impact of banking crises is sharper but short-lived, in countries with more rigid labor markets the effect is initially more subdued but highly persistent. These effects are even larger for youth unemployment in the short term, and long-term unemployment in the medium term. Conversely, large upfront, or gradual but significant, comprehensive market reforms have a positive impact on unemployment, albeit only in the medium term.     

Dismissal conflicts and unemployment

We analyse the institutional sources of dismissal conflicts when workers’ effort is not perfectly observable. We build an efficiency wage model with firing costs to capture their effect on employment through wages. In this context, whenever there is a dismissal, a double moral hazard problem can arise. Resolution of this problem by a third party will be imperfect due to asymmetric information. In turn, disciplinary dismissals will not be costless and firing costs will have a negative effect on aggregate employment. The solution to this problem does not necessarily imply the elimination of firing costs.     

Bargaining structure and nominal wage flexibility

In a model with wage setting by monopoly unions and monetary policy conducted by a central bank, the duration of nominal wage contracts is shown to be u-shaped in the degree of centralization, with intermediate bargaining systems yielding contracts of shorter duration and thus, more flexible nominal wages than both decentralized and centralized systems. The theoretical predictions of the model are tested on OECD data, and there is empirical support for the main results on contract length.     

Quality-enhancing trade liberalization

This paper examines the effect of trade liberalization on the quality of industrial goods produced by a developing country. The intermediate goods used as inputs to industrial production are assumed to be non-traded and produced by firms with market power. It is shown here that for a certain range of human capital levels, exposure to free trade, instead of resulting in de-industrialization, can raise welfare through an improvement in the quality of domestically produced industrial goods.     

Efficiency of two sided investments in an equilibrium unemployment framework

This paper investigates the efficiency of investments by firms and workers in a matching model with high- and low-productivity jobs. Search is sector specific and random within sectors. Search frictions and ex-post bargaining imply that wage inequality arises as a result of the difference in investment costs between the sectors. The efficiency properties of the equilibrium are analyzed under the particular division in bargaining proposed by Hosios (1990). The conclusion is that the equilibrium is inefficient, with a too low fraction of workers and a too high vacancy-unemployment ratio in the high-productivity sector. The opposite happens in the low-productivity sector.     

Trade theorems with search unemployment

Abstract We revisit the Heckscher‐Ohlin‐Samuelson model in the presence of labour market frictions à la Mortensen‐Pissarides. Relaxing the assumption of the one‐worker‐one‐firm matching rule, we show that the Stolper‐Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem may not hold in specific circumstances. We also demonstrate that the Factor Price Equalization theorem is valid only for capital and unemployed labour across countries, but not for employed labour. In equilibrium, trade patterns are determined by countries’ factor endowments and relative factor intensities in sectors (independent of factor intensities in production). Finally, our results suggest an additional explanation for the ‘missing trade’ phenomenon.     

Monopoly,economic efficiency and unemployment

The objective of this paper is to analyze the efficiency consequences of monopoly from the perspective of an efficiency-wage model of unemployment based on Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). An important feature of our model is that a firm can raise the probability that a shirking worker is detected by increasing its effort or investment in the monitoring of workers. Using this model we study how a monopolist's decision with regard to employment, output and monitoring is affected by exogenous variables such as job separation rate, technological advances, market size, and unemployment benefits. Furthermore, by comparing with the competitive equilibrium we find that monopoly is associated with higher unemployment rate, smaller output, and less monitoring. Surprisingly, however, monopoly does not necessarily lead to lower welfare level.     

Experiments on unemployment benefit sanctions and job search behavior

This paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the threat of getting a benefit sanction imposed (the ex ante effect). We find that both effects matter. Moreover, the ex ante effect turns out to be substantial and bigger than the ex post effect. Benefits sanctions stimulate the outflow from unemployment.     

Recurrent unemployment,welfare benefits and heterogeneity

The objective of this paper is to investigate the causes of the recurrences of individuals in unemployment during benefit periods. So as to attain this objective, we use administrative data from the Spanish Employment Agency to estimate a duration model with multiple spells that allows for unemployment state dependence through lagged unemployment duration in order to distinguish the heterogeneity and scarring effects. We find that an increase in the duration of previous unemployment benefit periods lengthens the expected duration of future unemployment benefit periods. True state dependence and heterogeneity, intensity of job search and local labour market conditions are among the elements that explain this unemployment state dependence.     

Reforming Social Welfare in Germany: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis

Abstract. In this paper, the effects of social assistance reform proposals are discussed for the case of Germany using a computable general equilibrium model that incorporates a discrete choice model of labour supply. This allows us to identify general equilibrium effects of the reforms on wages and unemployment. The simulation results show that general equilibrium wage reactions mitigate labour supply effects and that unemployment in fact decreases. Wage reactions are thus sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher unemployment. The simulations indicate that major cuts in welfare payments are necessary to produce substantial employment effects.     

Directed search, unemployment and public policy

Abstract .  We examine the effects of public policy parameters in a simple directed search model of the labour market, and contrast them with those in standard random matching models with Nash bargaining. Both finite and limit versions of the directed search model are considered, and the value of the limit model as an approximation of the finite one is assessed. As with the random matching model, job creation is the key channel through which the policy parameters affect the equilibrium of the directed search model. Both comparative static effects of the policy parameters and optimal configurations are identified.     

Trade unions vs. statistical discrimination: Theory and application to post-apartheid South Africa

A simple model of statistical discrimination is analyzed, which captures some stylized facts of the South African labor market. It shows that this type of discrimination disappears when the wage rates are determined by efficient bargaining between a representative firm and a union, with endogenous membership. This may explain why the wage gap between Black and White workers in post-apartheid South Africa is smaller among unionized workers than among non-unionized ones.     

Economic recession, skilled unemployment and welfare

The paper develops a three-sector, specific factor, general equilibrium model with two high-skill sectors and unemployment of skilled labor. One of the two high-skill sectors produces a non-traded commodity whose aggregate demand consists of both domestic demand and an exogenously given foreign demand. The consequences of a decline in the foreign demand for the non-traded good resulting from worldwide economic recession on the skilled and unskilled labor markets in a developing economy have been examined. The analysis finds that the effects on the labor markets crucially hinge on the relative factor intensities of the two high-skill sectors and that through the adoption of appropriate fiscal measures; the country can shield its workforce from the rage of global economic downturn.