Product market competition,R&D composition and growth

We revisit the relation between product market competition and leading-edge growth in a model where horizontal and vertical innovations simultaneously occur. We show that competition exerts an important effect on the composition of aggregate R&D (vertical versus horizontal). In fact, when product market competition gets more intense, a larger fraction of R&D is engaged in improving the quality of products; this occurs at the expense of a lower rate of horizontal innovation. This effect, which is absent in the basic endogenous growth model with only vertical innovations, may overturn the inverse relation between product market competition and leading-edge growth found in prior theoretical models.     

Endogenous protection of R&D investments

Abstract .  We examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R&D investments from spilling over to competitors. We show that, contrary to findings in most of the literature, the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R&D investments. Consequently, as long as the R&D spillovers are not too strong, firms decide to let their R&D knowledge flow. Since, as we show, welfare is higher when R&D spillovers are present, it follows that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge could be welfare-enhancing.     

Anti-competitive conduct, in-house R&D, and growth

Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: Investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth.     

Product market competition and boundaries of the firm

Abstract .  This paper studies the effects of product market competition on firm boundaries. In a duopoly setting, each retailer is associated with a manufacturer who must decide how to allocate property rights over a retail asset. Delegating property rights over the retail asset to an indepedent retailer ('disintegration') transfers incentives from the manufacturer to the retailer and has the benefit of increasing product quality and profits, owing to the retailer's superior efficiency. However, it also forces the manufacturer to forfeit part of the profits. Competition increases the net benefit from delegation and leads to more efficient, vertically disintegrated structures.     

Welfare properties of strategic R&D investments in Hotelling models

In linear-city models, if firms are allowed (not allowed) to locate outside the linear city, they engage in excessive (insufficient) R&D investments from the normative viewpoint. This implies that the feasible set of locations drastically affects their investments.     

R&D competition between public and private sectors

We investigate a mixed market where a welfare-maximizing public research institute competes against profit-maximizing private firms. We investigate R&D competition by using a standard model of patent races where each firm chooses both its innovation size and R&D expenditure. We find that the innovation size (R&D expenditure) chosen by the public institute is too small (too large) from the viewpoint of social welfare, respectively, and so the government should control the public institute appropriately. We also discuss the welfare implications of privatization of public research institutes.     

Technology clubs, R&D and growth patterns: Evidence from EU manufacturing

This paper investigates the forces driving output change in a panel of EU manufacturing industries. A flexible modeling strategy is adopted that accounts for: (i) inefficient use of resources and (ii) differences in the production technology across industries. With our model we are able to identify technical, efficiency, and input growth for endogenously determined technology clubs. Technology club membership is modeled as a function of R&D intensity. This framework allows us to explore the components of output growth in each club, technology spillovers and catch-up issues across industries and countries.     

Union structure and firms' incentives for cooperative R&D investments

Abstract .  We investigate the impact of alternative unionization structures on firms' incentives to invest on cost-reducing R&D and to form Research Joint Ventures (RJVs), in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that if firms invest non-cooperatively and spillovers are low, R&D investments are higher under centralized rather than under decentralized wage-setting. In contrast, investments are always higher under decentralized wage-setting in the case of RJVs. Firms' incentives to form an RJV are stronger under centralized wage-setting if and only if spillovers are low enough. Finally, centralized wage-setting may hinder the formation of costly RJVs and their potential welfare benefits.     

Upstream and downstream horizontal R&D networks

The existing literature on R&D networks has focused on networks among firms who compete in the product market (downstream networks). This article develops the literature by casting the analysis in the context of a vertically related industry, where both downstream firms and their upstream suppliers can form horizontal R&D networks.     

Product market competition, R&D, and welfare

We compare the subgame perfect equilibrium emerging in four regimes of research and development (R&D) competition between duopolists: (i) full competition, (ii) coordination of research strategies, (iii) joint venture with cross licensing of patents, and (iv) full collusion in R&D and the product market. The outcome of the firms' interaction depends on the interplay of the degree of product market competition, the similarity of the research strategies, and the cost of R&D, relatively to market size. Our main result is that each of the four regimes can, for plausible parameter combinations, yield the highest level of welfare. Therefore it is problematic to draw general rules applicable to all proposed research joint ventures.     

Open‐shop unions and product market competition

Abstract Evidence on the effect of product market competition on unionized wages is mixed. In this paper we show theoretically that the result may reflect genuine heterogeneity in the response of union wages to product market conditions. For low levels of unionization, union bargaining power may actually be enhanced by market competition, as firms have more to lose when there is a strike. Using recent data from the UK, we explore interactions between the level of industry competition and unionization, and find supporting evidence for this hypothesis.     

Imports, entry and competition law as market disciplines

Numerous countries have adopted or strengthened competition laws in the past two decades. At the same time, domestic industries in most countries are facing ever more intense pressure from imports. In this paper we study the impact of competition law on domestic competition for a large number of countries over time, controlling for the presence of imports and the number of domestic firms. We find that while industries that have higher import exposure or larger numbers of domestic firms tend to be more competitive, the direct effect of competition law on competition is insignificant. However, we also find that industries that operate under a competition law tend to have a larger number of domestic firms. This suggests that competition laws may have an indirect effect on domestic competition by promoting entry.     

Managerial risk-taking incentives, product market competition and welfare

Managers’ compensation may increase with the variance of the firm's profits. This paper investigates how this affects their choice of strategic variables, and how that affects managerial compensation. The social welfare aspects of this interaction are analyzed in a duopoly setting with uncertain linear demand and linear marginal cost. Compared to a situation in which the managers’ compensation does not depend on the variance of profits, social welfare may be either higher, lower, or remain unaffected, depending on the slope of the marginal cost curve and whether the competing firms produce goods that are demand substitutes or complements.     

Horizontal innovation-based growth and product market competition

The influence of the intensity of competition in the product market on economic growth is analyzed by developing an endogenous growth model with horizontal innovation. Product market competition is measured by (1 − Lerner index) and depends on both the share of factor inputs in total income and the degree of substitutability across goods. We find that the shape of the relationship between competition and growth can change dramatically according to which proxy of competition is used. We explain our results in terms of the interplay between the resource allocation and the profit incentive effects.     

GROWTH, R&D AND WELFARE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY

This paper analyzes the normative side of an R&D growth model in which market structure and growth are jointly determined in the equilibrium of a one‐sector economy under monopolistic competition. We find that a distortion in the allocation of R&D, namely the presence of technological spillovers between firms, generates two market failures: insufficient growth and excessive entry of firms. We show that this result is driven by the interplay between market structure and growth. A simple tax/subsidy scheme to support the efficient solution is proposed.     

Service-sector competition,innovation and R&D

The central prediction of the Aghion, Bloom, Blundell and Howitt model is an inverted U-shaped relationship between innovation and competition. The model is built on the assumption of a product market and has not yet been tested on the service sector. Using detailed firm-level data on Swedish service-sector firms, we find evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship for exporting service-sector firms. A further breakdown of innovation expenditures shows that the inverse U-shaped pattern holds for intramural R&D and training, but not for extramural R&D. Finally, the results indicate that as competition increases, small firms tend to seek strategic alliances with competitors, whereas large firms tend to reduce collaboration with competitors. The behavior of large firms can partly be due to their superior capacity to handle innovation projects internally, which will become more important if increased competition results in higher pay-offs to innovation.     

Technological convergence, R&D, trade and productivity growth

This paper analyses productivity growth in a panel of 14 United Kingdom manufacturing industries since 1970. Innovation and technology transfer provide two potential sources of productivity growth for a country behind the technological frontier. We examine the roles played by research and development (R&D), international trade, and human capital in stimulating each source of productivity growth. Technology transfer is statistically significant and quantitatively important. While R&D raises rates of innovation, international trade enhances the speed of technology transfer. Human capital primarily affects output through private rates of return (captured in our index of labour quality) rather than measured TFP.     

Growth,R&D,and uncertainty

I develop and analytically solve the stochastic Romer model in which the creation of ideas is driven by a stochastic process. I show that higher uncertainty about R&D, through the reallocation effects of resources among sectors, slows down economic growth and deteriorates welfare. The results suggest that persistently high uncertainty tends to severely restrict the scope of sustained income growth.     

Undesirable competition

We show that the entry of private profit-maximising firms makes the consumers worse off compared to having a nationalised monopoly. Such entry increases the nationalised firm’s profit, industry profit, and social welfare, at the expense of the consumers. Our result is important for competition policy.