Who do we tip and why? An empirical investigation

An important question about social norms is whether they are created to increase welfare. This is addressed by examining the characteristics of tipped and non-tipped occupations. Tipping prevalence is negatively correlated with worker's income and consumer's monitoring ability and positively with consumer's income and closeness between the worker and the consumer. The results refute a common belief that tipping exists to improve economic efficiency by lowering monitoring costs. Tipping, however, is more prevalent when consumers feel empathy and compassion for workers and want to show gratitude for good service, suggesting that tipping might increase welfare if welfare includes psychological utility.     

THE INCOME UNIT AND THE ANATOMY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION*

This paper focuses on a neglected aspect of the treatment of the income unit in the construction of size distributions of income. If the size distribution is to be an indicator of the distribution of economic welfare, and if the economic welfare of each individual in society is to count equally, then conventional distributions are inconsistent with individualistic welfare functions. We estimate size distributions with each person's welfare weighted equally, and contrast these results with those weighting each household unit's welfare equally. The choice of weights is shown to affect both the level and the trend in income inequality.     

Linkages among welfare,food assistance programmes and labour supply: evidence from the survey of programme dynamics

At the centre of the debate on welfare reform is whether incentives-based systems help poor families move out of poverty into jobs. Recent data from the first Survey of Programme Dynamics longitudinal and the 1998 experimental data files allow evaluation of the interaction among the Food Stamp Programme (FSP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programme and labour force participation under different programme design and economic conditions. A model that incorporates jointly determined programmes participation and work decisions is applied to a sample of working age, lower income and asset households. Participation in TANF increases the probability of FSP participation and decreases the probability of being in the work force; working decreases the probability of receiving food stamps. Work, TANF, and FSP participation are related, and TANF and FSP participation rates among poor households who are potentially eligible for TANF are sensitive to changes in programme parameters; as expected, labour force participation is affected by the general economic conditions.     

The eye of the beholder. Reconsidering the notions of pro‐poor growth and progressivity,with an application to Vietnam

Both policymakers and economists have tried to find criteria to assess whether economic growth is pro‐poor. In this paper we reconsider the inequality‐oriented approach originally proposed by Jenkins and Van Kerm. They look at the changes in the whole income distribution, and decompose the change in income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, into a progressivity and a reranking component. They define a pro‐poor (or progressive) change as one where the changes in income are more to the benefit of those who are initially poor than to the benefit of those who are initially rich. We challenge this assumption, and maintain that also the point of view of the finally poor and the finally rich should be taken into account when evaluating whether growth is pro‐poor. We suggest a new decomposition method, based on an inequality index of the generalized entropy family, which allows the change in income inequality to be decomposed exactly into a forward‐looking and a backward‐looking progressivity component. Our empirical illustration, using data from household surveys in Vietnam, shows that economic growth in Vietnam has been pro‐poor from a forward‐looking perspective, but not from a backward‐looking perspective.     

The Role of Natural Resources in Economic Development

Economists now recognize that, along with physical and human capital, environmental resources should be viewed as important economic assets, which can be called natural capital. Three recent debates have emerged over the role of natural capital in economic development. First, as many ecological services are unique, does the environment have an “essential” role in sustaining human welfare, and if so, are special “compensation rules” required to ensure that future welfare is not worsened by natural capital depletion today? Second, the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis has fostered empirical estimations of an “inverted U” shaped relationship between a variety of indicators of environmental pollution or resource depletion and the level of per capita income. Does the existence of such EKC relationships suggest that environmental degradation will eventually decline with growth? Finally, recent economic theories and empirical evidence have questioned whether lower income economies that are endowed with abundant natural resources develop more rapidly than economies that are relatively resource poor. Is it possible that resource abundant economies are not reinvesting the rents generated from natural resource exploitation into productive assets, or that resource booms actually divert economic resources from more productive and innovative sectors?     

Does less inequality among households mean less inequality among individuals?

Consider an income distribution among households of the same size in which individuals, equally needy from the point of view of an ethical observer, are treated unfairly. Individuals are split into two types, those who receive more than one half of the family budget and those who receive less than one half. We look for conditions under which welfare and inequality quasi-orders established at the household level still hold at the individual one. A necessary and sufficient condition for the Generalized Lorenz test is that the income of dominated individuals is a concave function of the household income: individuals of poor households have to stand more together than individuals of rich households. This property also proves to be crucial for the preservation of the Relative and Absolute Lorenz criteria, when the more egalitarian distribution is the poorest. Extensions to individuals heterogeneous in needs and more than two types are also provided.     

A concern about low relative income, and the alignment of utilitarianism with egalitarianism

A utilitarian social planner who maximizes social welfare assigns the available income to those who are most efficient in converting income into utility. However, when individuals are concerned about their income falling behind the incomes of others, the optimal income distribution under utilitarianism is equality of incomes.     

Interdependent welfare functions and optimal income distribution

The relationship between income distribution and social welfare is empirically analyzed, while explicitly allowing for the interdependence of individual welfare functions. The social welfare function is taken to be an additive function of individual welfare functions of income (WFIs). On the basis of Dutch data it is found that under certain conditions (such as absence of effects of income redistribution on productivity) an equal distribution of incomes is suboptimal. The interdependence of WFIs appears to have a pronounced effect on policy conclusions concerning the desirability of income redistribution vis-à-vis economic growth.     

The failure of the ISEW and GPI to fully account for changes in human-health capital — A methodological shortcoming not a theoretical weakness

Andrew Brennan (Ecological Economics, 2013--this issue) has argued that the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) and Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) are theoretically flawed because, as indicators designed to capture the net psychic income generated by economic activity, they fail to incorporate net changes in human-health capital. To a lesser extent, Brennan is also critical of the fact that the ISEW and GPI are unable to reflect both economic welfare and sustainability. Whilst I'm happy to concede that the two indicators fail to fully account for changes in human-health capital, it is my contention that this failure represents, at most, a methodological shortcoming. It does not amount to a theoretical weakness. Despite Brennan's best efforts, the ISEW and GPI remain soundly based on Irving Fisher's distinction between income and capital. Indeed, Brennan's suggested modifications to the ISEW and GPI do nothing but conflate income and capital, which, if taken on board, would lead to misleading indicators of total economic welfare. As for not reflecting both economic welfare and sustainability, I have long argued that the ISEW and GPI merely reflect the former and need to be supplemented by biophysical indicators to determine whether the economic welfare being enjoyed by a nation is sustainable. The fact that the ISEW and GPI only reflect economic welfare is not a weakness, since no indicator can or should attempt to reflect both conditions. The use of strong sustainability approaches to calculate the environment costs incorporated in the ISEW and GPI is not an exercise designed to measure sustainability. It is an exercise in good economic accounting.     

Does Preferential Trade Benefit Poor Countries? A General Equilibrium Assessment with Nonhomothetic Preferences

We develop a Ricardian model of trade with nonhomothetic preferences to analyze preferential trade agreements (PTAs) among countries of different stages of economic development. The richer a country is, the more likely will PTAs improve its terms of trade, also when it is a non‐member. Rich non‐member countries are also less likely to incur welfare losses from PTAs. PTA membership only guarantees welfare gains for countries that are too poor to import the goods rich countries produce. For all other countries, the welfare effects of joining PTAs depend on the world income distribution and on the strength of comparative advantages.     

Carbon-reducing taxes and income inequality: general equilibrium evaluation of alternative energy taxation in Taiwan

Recently, several studies have been a detailed evaluation of the economic implications of energy taxation as a policy instrument to conserve energy and reduce carbon emissions. However, little attention has been devoted to inquiring about the economic implications of energy taxation in the newly industrialized countries (the so-called NICs). In this paper, we use a multisector, multihousehold computable general equilibrium model to assess the distributional effects of alternative energy taxation on the Taiwan economy. The counterfactual simulation technique is applied to investigate the income distribution implications of: (1) an increase in the import taxes of crude oil; and (2) an increase in the excise taxes of petroleum products. Our empirical results basing on Taiwan's data show that both energy taxes increase government revenue and the Gini coefficient, but reduce net value-added, private consumption, disposable income and equivalent variation. A raise in the Gini coefficient implies that there is a worsening in the distribution of income. The lowest income group suffers relatively large welfare and income loss, but the highest income group suffers a relatively small welfare and income loss. The distributional effects differ from household to household depending on the composition of their total consumption and the source of their factor income. Our findings reveal that the energy tax appears to be mildly regressive, there are broadly consistent with those cases of developed countries reported in previous studies.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Decomposing poverty changes into vertical and horizontal components

Variations in aggregate poverty indices can be due to differences in average poverty intensity, to changes in the welfare distances between those poor of initially unequal welfare status and/or to emerging disparities in welfare among those poor of initially similar welfare status. This note uses a general cost‐of‐inequality approach that decomposes the total change in poverty into a sum of indices of each of these three components. This decomposition can serve inter alia to integrate horizontal and vertical equity criteria in the poverty alleviation assessment of social and economic programmes. The use of these measures is briefly illustrated using Tunisian data.     

AN EMPIRICAL ESTIMATE OF THE RELATION BETWEEN TWO MEASURES OF ECONOMIC WELFARE*

The main objective of this paper is to explore and quantify the difference between two measures of comparative economic welfare: (a) the more or less conventional measure of per capita national income, and (b) the capitalized value of expected future income per capita. The paper begins with a brief summary of the argument in favor of the present value of expected future income per capita as a measure of economic welfare. This is followed by an examination of the empirical relationship of the ratio of the suggested alternative measure to per capita income and an analysis of the variables used to compute the present value of expected income per capita. The main conclusion drawn from the calculations is that very substantial differences occur in the measurement of relative economic well-being depending on which measure is used. A final section discusses the implications of this finding for international comparisons of economic welfare.     

Labour-supply impacts of effective welfare programme parameters: a reanalysis

We quantify the impact of effective welfare programme parameters on the labour supply of single female household heads – the primary group of welfare recipients in the USA. Our panel of data is derived from the US Census Bureau's Current Population Survey for the years 1979 to 1990 inclusive. Behavioural impacts from a range of economic variables are consistent in sign with predictions made by economic theory. We find that effective welfare gurantee levels and the effective tax rate on earned income both significantly decrease labour supply. The marginal effects of these welfare programme parameters are economically small: a US$1000 increase in the expected welfare guarantee level reduces annual labour supply by about 36 hours; a 10 percentage point increase in the effective tax rate on earned income reduces annual labour supply by about 7.5 hours.     

THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION STATISTICS

In both political discussions and scientific literature the income distribution has come to occupy a central position for the consideration of social welfare and economic equalization. It has been assumed that an individual's income reflects his consumption opportunities and therefore his standard of living or economic welfare. The thesis of this paper is, however, that there are reasons for being quite pessimistic about drawing meaningful conclusions from income distribution data. As illustrated by the use of Swedish data, the distribution of income gives an extremely incomplete picture of the distribution of consumption for a wide variety of definitional and statistical reasons. The distribution of consumption, furthermore, cannot be transformed into a corresponding distribution of welfare, since there is no well defined concept of welfare. The treatment of public consumption in empirical analysis of the distribution of welfare also raises problems. The paper closes with the presentation of the conceptual basis for an alternative to the traditional method of analyzing the distribution of income.     

Global Distortions to Agricultural Markets: Indicators of Trade and Welfare Impacts, 1960 to 2007

Despite recent reforms, world agricultural markets remain highly distorted by government policies. Traditional indicators of those price distortions such as producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) can be poor guides to the policies' economic effects. Recent theoretical literature provides scalar index numbers of trade‐ and welfare‐reducing effects of price and trade policies which this paper builds on to develop more‐satisfactory indexes that can be generated using no more than the data used to generate PSEs and CSEs. We then exploit a new Agricultural Distortion database to provide time‐series estimates of index numbers for 75 developing and high‐income countries over the past half‐century.     

A COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF ANNUAL AND LIFETIME INCOME: SWEDEN AROUND 1970.

The concern with income distribution has always mainly existed because of a concern with individuals' economic welfare. In recent years, the question has arisen whether the distribution of annual income—the distribution most often studied—is the best proxy for the distribution of economic welfare. Other measures, such as lifetime income, have been proposed instead.
The paper starts with a discussion of how to define and measure the distribution of lifetime income. By using a simulation model, which partly consists of estimated functions and partly of tax functions taken directly from tax laws, distributions of lifetime income, variously defined, are then constructed. These distributions are compared with each other, and with distributions of annual income. The simulations indicate that the distribution of lifetime income is considerably less unequal than the distribution of annual income. Whether inheritances are included or not seems to be of no importance for the inequality of lifetime income. If, on the other hand, we include the value of leisure time in lifetime income, inequality increases by about 10–15 percent. Distributions of income after tax have Gini coefficients which are approximately 25 percent less than the Ginis for the before-tax distributions. We thus find that the picture of inequality we get is very much dependent on which income concept we use.     

损失规避与经济波动的福利成本研究

目前经济波动的福利成本研究均建立在基于消费的效用函数基础上，而引入收入波动后我们发现：收入波动导致的福利成本才是更为重要的因素。本文定义的偏好具有损失规避的特点，在比较温和的参数设定下，考虑了收入波动后得到的福利成本指标A在1．4％--13．4％之间，比此前各种技术方法得到的A值提高了1—2个数量级。采用中国转型期以来的统计数据，消除短期波动的福利效果等同于将消费的长期增长率再提高约0．25个百分点，这表明如能进一步稳定经济的运行，仍会带来可观的福利提升。     

Optimal Income Maintenance and the "Unemployable"

This paper examines optimal income maintenance policy with asymmetric information about individuals' abilities. A minimum skill level is required for employment. The unemployable are those (low) ability types who find this minimum investment too costly. To guarantee some minimum income level, the government chooses between welfare, workfare, earnings subsidies, and training. Results show that the optimal scheme entails training. Moreover, though complex separating mechanisms are both feasible and encourage investments in skills, the least‐cost income maintenance scheme is quite simple: the government offers training at the lowest level consistent worth employment to all who want it.