Global financial crisis,corporate governance,and firm survival:: The Russian experience

Using a unique dataset obtained from large-scale panel enterprise surveys conducted in 2005 and 2009, we clarify the survival status of Russian industrial firms before and after the global financial crisis and empirically examine the determinants of firm survival. The estimation of the Cox proportional hazard model provided evidence that the independence of company’s governance bodies, their human resource abundance, and influence over corporate management are statistically significant factors affecting the survival probability of the surveyed firms. In particular, the board of directors and the audit committee are likely to play a vital role in reducing the potential exit risk. We also found that there is a significant difference in the viewpoints of economic logic for firm survival held by independent firms and group companies.     

Capital structure and corporate governance quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

Grounded in agency theory, this study explores how capital structure is influenced by aggregate corporate governance quality. We measure governance quality using broad-based comprehensive governance metrics provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). The empirical evidence reveals a robust inverse association between leverage and governance quality. Firms with poor governance are significantly more leveraged. It appears that leverage substitutes for corporate governance in alleviating agency conflicts. Further, we utilize empirical methods that control for endogeneity and show that poor governance quality likely brings about, and does not merely reflect, higher leverage. Our results are important as they show that the overall quality of corporate governance has a material impact on critical corporate decisions such as capital structure choices.     

The use of trade measures against illicit fishing: Economic and legal considerations

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities are a threat for both the marine environment and society. By undermining effective management systems, IUU fishing activities affect economic performance, social welfare and compliance decisions. So far, “traditional” control and surveillance-like measures have had a limited success in deterring IUU fishing, so this paper aims at throwing light on several forms of trade-related initiatives that can be more effective. The paper suggests that both the effectiveness and further development of such measures strongly depend on the way they are designed, especially with respect to their trade-law compatibility. However, current discussions on future trade-based policy developments within some key economic areas suggest that trade measures are a sound option for policy makers. While the paper focuses on fisheries issues, it is also expected to inform the international debate surrounding the sustainable use of natural resources in general, as many sectors face similar biodiversity and trade challenges (e.g. tropical forest, mangroves, etc.).     

Mergers and corporate debt financing

We investigate the effect of mergers on corporate debt financing using time series analysis. We find that corporate debt use increases during periods of very high merger activity but is not significantly affected by variations within the normal range of merger activity. Traditional trade-off and pecking order variables also significantly affect corporate financing choice.     

Insider trading with public and shared information

We study the impact of public information and shared information on traders' trading behavior in the context of Kyle's (1985) speculative market. We suppose that there are four types of traders in our model: one insider, M outsiders, liquidity traders, and market makers. We explicitly describe the unique linear Nash equilibrium and find that public information harms the insider but benefits the outsiders and noise traders. Also, the market is more efficient because of the existence of public information.     

Commercial corporate governance ratings: an alternative view of their use and impact

The rise in the popularity of commercial corporate governance ratings is at once a source of dismay and a cause for alarm: the former because they do not appear to give accurate predictions of corporate performance and the latter because they add to the pressure on corporations to adapt their governance structures to a benchmark model that takes no account of the conditions in which they operate. This paper gives an alternative view of the potential use and impact of the commercially marketed governance ratings. It argues that their importance to institutional investors lies in providing them with information that accurately summarises corporate loyalty to shareholders rather than accurately predicts corporate performance. It goes on to argue that the commercial governance ratings can bring benefits to an economy by contributing to a new type of managerial control mechanism that is not only more efficient than hostile takeovers and stock options but also helps to reduce the governance role of these instruments.     

Pirates and fishermen: Is less patrolling always bad?

Motivated by the Somali fishermen-pirates, I explore the time allocation decision of potential pirates between piracy and an alternative non-violent occupation, fishing, when the returns of both piracy and fishing are sensitive to patrolling intensity. For a range of parameters, the static model yields multiple equilibria, an “efficient” one with no patrolling and low piracy, a less efficient equilibrium with intermediate levels of both piracy and patrolling and a highly inefficient high-patrolling high-piracy equilibrium. Analyzing the dynamic analogue, I obtain the surprising result that sufficiently low patrolling can be a good strategy.     

Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?

The paper studies bilateral contracting between N agents and one principal, whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents. It examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from (i) coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium, and (ii) making different contracts available to different agents. These effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more. The prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case, and have little or no effect in the latter case. The inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities, and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions.     

Interest-Rate Reforms and Financial Deepening in Botswana: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper, we examine the impact of interest-rate reforms on financial deepening in Botswana, one of Africa's economic development success stories. We employ three proxies of financial deepening against deposit rate, a proxy for interest-rate reforms. The financial deepening in this study is defined as the increase in the relative size and role of the financial system in an economy. The empirical results of our study show that the impact of interest-rate reforms on financial deepening is sensitive to the variable used as a proxy for financial deepening. When the ratio of bank deposits to GDP (BD/GDP) is used as a proxy for financial deepening, the interest-rate reforms impact positively on the level of financial deepening. However, when the monetization variable (M2/GDP) and the ratio of the private sector credit to GDP (DCP/GDP) are used, the coefficient of the deposit rate in the financial deepening model turns out to be statistically insignificant. Overall, our results show that the positive impact of interest-rate reforms on financial deepening in Botswana is minimal. This outcome, though contrary to our expectations, is not surprising given the high level of population dependency in Botswana. Our results show that there is a strong negative relationship between the dependency ratio and financial deepening in Botswana.     

Adverse selection and corporate governance

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of stocks listed on the Singapore Exchange. These companies have been identified by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) with the highest level of corporate governance among 25 emerging markets. We measure corporate governance by several criteria: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The results show that corporate governance has an inverse relationship with adverse selection. However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection. In addition, Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are shown to have a smaller adverse selection component than non-GLCs.     

Wage-setting institutions and corporate governance

We present a model in which wage-setting structures explain cross-country variation in corporate governance. The model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of centralization in wage-bargaining institutions and the levels of firm ownership concentration and investor protection legislation. Low and high degrees of centralization yield less concentrated ownership and more investor protection than intermediate degrees. Like recent research, this paper highlights labor as a key constituent in shaping corporate governance. However, our theory can resolve an important puzzle this research confronts, namely, why Scandinavian countries with higher than average labor strength also have higher than average investor protection legislation.     

Transferable Ageing Provisions in Individual Health Insurance Contracts

Abstract. We consider lifetime health insurance contracts in which ageing provisions are used to smooth the premium profile. The capital stock accumulated for each individual can be decomposed into two parts: a premium insurance and an annuitized life insurance, only the latter being transferable between insurers without triggering premium changes through risk segmentation. In a simulation based on German data, the transferable share declines in age and falls with an increasing age of entry into the contract. In spite of different benefit profiles, it is almost identical for women and men.     

Pyramidal groups and debt

This paper suggests that debt should be raised by subsidiaries in order to exploit the limited liability of the holding company. However, when this behavior increases the cost of funds, the holding might prefer to raise debt to a point where it would also default when subsidiaries are insolvent.After accounting for standard controls, we find that holding companies in Italian pyramids have higher leverage than subsidiaries and that the cash-flow share of the entrepreneur in the subsidiary does not play a significant role. These findings are consistent with the implications of our model of group capital structure.     

Earnings distribution,corporate governance and CEO pay

We investigate the relationship between earnings differentials and the pay of CEOs of 190 British companies between 1970 and 1990. We find that (i) changes in the differential between the 90th and 50th weekly earnings percentiles for non‐manual adult male workers [90:50] explain changes in the level of real CEO salary and bonus in our sample of companies; (ii) changes in this differential also account for changes in the elasticity of CEO pay to firm size; (iii) a broader measure of earnings inequality does far worse than 90:50 at explaining changes in both the level and the firm size elasticity of CEO pay; (iv) fitting the model on data for 1970–1983 and predicting pay levels for the period starting with the widespread adoption of executive share option schemes in 1984, we find a structural break in the relationship between lower management pay differentials and the pay of the CEO. We conclude first that top executive pay prior to 1984 was a stable function of both firm size and earnings differentials lower on the administrative ladder, consistent with a hypothesis advanced by Herbert Simon in 1957; and second that the use of share options from 1984 onward represents not simply a change in the mode of top executive compensation, but a de‐linking of the pay of top executives and that of their subordinates.     

BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL METHOD PATENTS, INNOVATION, AND POLICY

Court decisions in the 1990s are widely viewed as having opened the door to a flood of business method and financial patents at the US Patent and Trademark Office, and to have also impacted other patent offices around the world. A number of scholars, both legal and economic, have critiqued both the quality of these patents and the decisions themselves. This paper reviews the history of business method and financial patents briefly and then explores what economists know about the relationship between the patent system and innovation, in order to draw some tentative conclusions about their likely impact. It concludes by finding some consensus in the literature about the problems associated with this particular expansion of patentable subject matter, highlighting the remaining areas of disagreement, and reviewing the various policy recommendations.     

On the effective use of stigma as a crime-deterrent

Stigma affects convicted offenders if employers reduce their wage. Current research considers this kind of informal sanctioning as an effective means for reducing crime and proposes its fostering by the government. In this article, I first show that increasing stigma may even enhance crime. While stigma enhances deterrence of an unconvicted offender, it may drive a stigmatized ex-convict towards recidivism. Secondly, I provide a solution for guaranteeing stigma's effectiveness. Notably a harsh(er) punishment for repeat offenders is required. Finally, with the theoretical analysis as a background, stigmatization policies pursued in the States, Switzerland and Spain are compared.     

What drives international financial flows? Politics,institutions and other determinants

This paper uses a large panel of financial flow data from banks to assess how institutions affect international lending. First, employing a time varying composite institutional quality index in a fixed-effects framework, the paper shows that institutional improvements are followed by significant increases in international finance. Second, cross-sectional models also show a strong effect of initial levels of institutional quality on future bank lending. Third, instrumental variable estimates further show that the historically predetermined component of institutional development is also a significant correlate of international bank inflows. The results thus suggest that institutional underdeveloped can explain a significant part of Lucas [Lucas, Robert E. 1990. “Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?” American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 80 (2): 92–96. 1990] paradox of why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries. The analysis also does a first-step towards understanding which institutional features affect international banking.     

Beta-convergence and sigma-convergence in corporate governance in Europe

This paper tests for beta-convergence and sigma-convergence in the corporate governance models, using a sample of corporate governance ratings for 198 European corporations listed on the FTSE Eurofirst 300 index. A piecewise linear regression is deployed to select a model and the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator is also applied to estimate an exponential model. It concludes that there is statistical evidence of beta- and sigma-convergence within countries and the results suggest that institutional differences between countries are statistically relevant.