Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Evaluating inflation targeting as a monetary policy objective for India

This study formulates a small open economy model for India with exchange rate as a prominent channel of monetary policy. The model is estimated using the Instrumental Variable-Generalized Methods of Moments (IV-GMM) estimator and evaluated through simulations. This study compares different cases of domestic and CPI inflation targeting, strict and flexible inflation targeting, and simple Taylor type rules. The analysis highlights the unsuitability of simple Taylor-type monetary rules in stabilizing the Indian economy and suggests that discretionary optimization works better in stabilizing this economy. There seems to be a trade-off between output gap stabilization and exchange rate stabilization in flexible domestic inflation targeting and CPI inflation targeting respectively. However, flexible domestic inflation targeting seems a better alternative from an overall macro stabilization perspective in India where financial markets are still not sufficiently integrated to ensure quick transmission of interest rate impulses and existence of rigidities in the economy.     

Liquidity risk, economic development, and the effects of monetary policy

Empirical evidence indicates that monetary policy is not super-neutral in many countries. In particular, in high inflation economies, inflation is negatively related to economic activity. By comparison, inflation may be positively correlated with output in low inflation countries. We present a neoclassical growth model with money in which the incidence of liquidity risk is inversely related to aggregate capital formation. Interestingly, there may be multiple monetary steady-states where the effects of monetary policy vary. In poor economies, the financial system is highly distorted and higher rates of money growth are associated with less capital formation. In contrast, in advanced economies, a Tobin effect is observed. Since inflation exacerbates distortions from a coordination failure in the low-capital steady-state, individuals become much more exposed to liquidity risk. Consequently, optimal monetary policy depends on the level of development.     

Does money have a role in the inflation process? Evidence from Australia

Inflation, defined as a sustained increase in the price level, is considered a monetary phenomenon, as it can be explained within the framework of money‐demand and money‐supply relationships. In the extant literature, money growth is shown to remain causally related to inflation across countries and over time, irrespective of the exchange rate regime and stability of the money‐demand function. Nevertheless, emerging literature suggests a diminishing role of money in the conduct of monetary policy for price stability, especially under inflation targeting. Monetary policy in Australia under inflation targeting since 1993 is an example of policy that denies a relationship between money growth and inflation. The proposition that money does not matter insofar as inflation is concerned seems odd in both theory and the best‐practice monetary policy for price stability. This paper uses annual data for the period 1970–2017 and quarterly data for the period 1970Q1–2015Q1. It deploys both the Johansen cointegration approach and the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration approach to investigate for Australia whether money, real output, prices and the exchange rate (non‐stationary variables) maintain the long‐run price‐level relationship that the classical monetary theory suggests in the presence of such stationary variables as the domestic and foreign interest rates. As expected, the empirical findings for Australia are consistent with the classical long‐run price‐level relationship between money, real output, prices and the exchange rate. The error‐correction model of inflation confirms the presence of a cointegral relationship among these variables; it also provides strong evidence of a short‐run causal relationship between money supply growth and inflation. On the basis of a priori theoretical predictions and empirical findings, the paper draws the conclusion that the monetary aggregate and its growth rate matter insofar as inflation is concerned, irrespective of the strategy of monetary policy for price stability.     

Long-Run Links among Money, Prices and Output: Worldwide Evidence

Abstract. Starting from the quantity theory of money we analyse the dynamic relationships between money, real output and prices for an unbalanced panel of 110 economies. Complementary to trivariate analyses we also adopt a P-star model explaining inflation via an equilibrium price level (P-star), which in turn depends on potential output and money. A key issue of the paper is the cross-sectional stability of estimation and inference results. We find cointegration among the considered variables. Particularly for high inflation countries homogeneity between prices and money cannot be rejected. Given homogeneity we find evidence for an error-correction mechanism linking current price changes and the lagged price gap. Parameter estimates indicating the adjustment towards the price equilibrium are larger in absolute value for high inflation countries. The latter results indicate that central banks, even in high inflation countries, can improve price stability by controlling monetary growth.     

A two-pillar DSGE monetary policy model for the euro area

The current financial crisis has revived the interest for monitoring both monetary and credit developments. Over the past two decades, consistent with the adoption of inflation targeting strategies by a growing number of central banks and the development of New Keynesian models for which monetary aggregates are largely irrelevant, money and credit have been progressively neglected in the conduct of monetary policy. A striking exception has been the Eurosystem, which has implemented a strategy known as the “two-pillar monetary policy strategy” giving a prominent role for money. In this paper, we develop a small optimizing model based on Ireland (2004), estimated on euro area data and featuring this two-pillar strategy. We evaluate an ECB-style cross-checking policy rule in a DSGE model with real balance effects of money. We find some evidence that indeed money plays a non-trivial role in explaining the euro area business cycle. This provides a rationale for the central bank to factor in monetary developments but also raises some issues regarding the reliability of M3 as an appropriate monetary indicator. We find some evidence that the ECB has systematically reacted to a filtered measure of money growth but weak evidence it has reacted more aggressively during excess money growth periods.     

Response to Seitz and Tödter, 'How the P* Model Rationalizes Monetary Targeting: A Comment on Svensson'

Seitz and TÎdter argue, counter to Svensson, that the P * model provides a rationale for money-growth targeting. In particular, they argue that 'money growth targeting is a special form of inflation forecast targeting based on a "limited" information set. In contrast to "full information" inflation forecast targeting, money growth targeting is likely to be more robust under changing conditions of the real world'.
However, money-growth targeting is better described as a special case of inflation targeting, namely when money growth is considered to be the only predictor of future inflation. But there is overwhelming empirical evidence that there are not only other, but also better, predictors of future inflation than money growth, which makes inflation-forecast targeting superior to money-growth targeting. Inflation-forecast targeting is indeed more robust (in the sense of using available information and allowing judgemental adjustments in a flexible way) than monetary targeting.
In particular, in the P * model, the real money gap is a better predictor of future inflation than money growth, as demonstrated theoretically by Svensson and empirically by Gerlach and Svensson (the empirical finding is also confirmed by Trecroci and Vega). Therefore, inflation-forecast targeting is superior also within the P * model. Under `changing conditions of the real world', for instance after the formation of a monetary union, money growth is likely to be particularly unreliable as a predictor of future inflation, making monetary targeting especially unsuitable and non-robust.     

Output gap measurement and the New Keynesian Phillips curve for China

The New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that the output gap, the deviation of the actual output from its natural level due to nominal rigidities, drives the dynamics of inflation relative to expected inflation and lagged inflation. This paper exploits the empirical success of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in explaining China's inflation dynamics with a new measure of the output gap. We estimate the output gap using the Bayesian multivariate Beveridge–Nelson decomposition method, based on a multivariate dynamic model featuring distinct interactions among inflation, money, and real output in China. The empirical results using quarterly data spanning 1979–2010 show that the new measure of the output gap outperforms the traditional measures in fitting the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This result provides useful insights for inflation dynamics and monetary policy analysis in China.     

Capital market imperfections in a monetary growth model

Summary. We consider a monetary growth model essentially identical to that of Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985), except that we explicitly model credit markets, a credit market friction, and an allocative function for financial intermediaries. These changes yield substantially different results than those obtained in more standard models. In particular, if any monetary steady state equilibria exist, there are generally two of them; one of these has a low capital stock and output level, and it is necessarily a saddle. The other steady state has a high capital stock and output level; either it is necessarily a sink, or its stability properties depend on the rate of money creation. It follows that monetary equilibria can be indeterminate, and nonconvergence phenomena can be observed. Increases in the rate of money creation reduce the capital stock in the high-capital-stock steady state. If the high-capital-stock steady state is not a sink for all rates of money growth, then increases in the rate of money growth can induce a Hopf bifurcation. Hence dynamical equilibria can display damped oscillation as a steady state equilibrium is approached, and limit cycles can be observed as well. In addition, in the latter case, high enough rates of inflation induce the kinds of “crises” noted by Bruno and Easterly (1995): when inflation is too high there are no equilibrium paths approaching the high-activity steady state. Received: November 18, 1995; revised version: March 26, 1996     

Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets

This article studies a two-period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain. The central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable (money growth) and its goal variable, inflation. Prior to setting its instrument, the central bank receives private, noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation. Monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank's type, in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting. This advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank's perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control. If the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision, over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer.     

How justified is abandoning money in the conduct of monetary policy in Australia on the grounds of instability in the money‐demand function?

The role of money in the design and conduct of monetary policy has reemerged as an important issue in both advanced and developing economies, especially since the 2007 global financial crisis. A growing body of recent literature suggests that the causal relationship between money supply growth and inflation remains intact across countries and over time and that this relation is not conditional on the stability of the money‐demand function or whether money is endogenous or exogenous. Moreover, critical for a rule‐based monetary policy is the presence of a long‐run stable money‐demand function, rather than a short‐run money‐demand model that may exhibit instability for many reasons, including problems with estimating a money‐demand model with high‐frequency data. Provided that a stable money‐demand function exists, it could be useful to establish long‐run equilibrium relations among money, output, prices, and exchange rates, as the classical monetary theory suggests. Within this analytical framework, this paper addresses the question of whether money has any role in the conduct of monetary policy in Australia. The conventional wisdom is that the money‐demand function in Australia has been unstable since the mid‐1980s due to financial deregulation and reforms; this led to a change in the strategy of monetary policy for price stability in the form of inflation targeting that ignores money insofar as inflation and its control are concerned. This paper reports empirical findings for Australia, obtained from a longer quarterly data series over the period 1960Q1–2015Q1, which suggest that instability in the narrow‐money‐demand function in Australia was primarily due to the exclusion of variables which have become important in the deregulated environment since the 1980s. These findings are confirmed by an expanded form of the narrow‐money‐demand function that was found stable over the past two decades, although it experienced multiple structural breaks over the study period. The paper draws the conclusion that abandoning the monetary aggregate as an instrument of monetary policy in Australia, under a rule‐based monetary policy such as inflation targeting, cannot be justified by instability in the money‐demand function or even by lack of a causal link between money supply growth and inflation.     

Inflation targeting in emerging economies: Panel evidence

This paper shows there is no evidence that the inflation targeting regime (IT) improves economic performance as measured by the behavior of inflation and output growth in developing countries. The control of common time effects results in less negative and less significant IT impacts on inflation, inflation volatility and output growth volatility than previously found in the literature. Additionally, our analysis shows robust evidence of lower output growth during IT adoption. On balance, although lower long-run mean inflation signals that the central banks of emerging economies with inflation targeting are more inflation-averse, the costs of disinflation have not been lower than under other monetary regimes.     

The unbearable tightness of being in a monetary union: Fiscal restrictions and regional stability

We study how constrained fiscal policy can affect macroeconomic stability and welfare in a two-region model of a monetary union with sticky prices and distortionary taxation. Both government spending and taxes can be used to stabilize regional variables; however, the best welfare outcome is obtained under some tax variability and constant regional inflations. We use a variety of rules to characterize constrained fiscal policy and find that strict fiscal rules coupled with a monetary policy that targets union-wide inflation result in regional inflation stability and the welfare costs of such rules are not as unbearable as one would expect. Fiscal authorities can enhance welfare by targeting the regional output gap, while targeting regional inflation is less successful since inflation stability is guaranteed by the central bank.     

Some Thoughts on Monetary Targeting vs. Inflation Targeting

We offer some empirical evidence on the likely scale of control and indicator problems surrounding alternative monetary targets and a direct inflation target. The links between monetary policy actions and inflation are estimated in dynamic linear models using the Kalman filter. We compare alternative intermediate-target and final-target monetary strategies using German data from the end of the Bretton Woods system until 1997. The estimation results show that broad money dominates narrow money as an intermediate target, while control problems involved in targeting broad money are larger than for direct inflation targets.     

Fiscal and Monetary Policies in a Transactions‐Based Endogenous Growth Model with Imperfect Competition

This paper's model is capable of explaining the empirical evidence on the mixed growth‐rate effects of fiscal and monetary policies and a nonlinear inflation–growth relation. When monopoly power in the product market is strong/weak, an increase in the money growth rate or the income tax rate promotes/reduces the output growth rate through lowering/raising the equilibrium gross markup and increasing/reducing the net rate of return on capital. The fact that money can generate a positive growth rate effect allows for the appearance of a nonlinear inflation–growth relation. Such a nonlinear relation cannot be caused by changes in the income tax rate.     

The Sovereign Yield Curve and the Macroeconomy in China

A dynamic Nelson–Siegel model is adopted to estimate three time‐varying factors of yield curves, the level, the slope and the curvature, and a vector autoregressive model is built to study interactions between macro variables and the yield curve. Results show that, first, money supply growth is a more effective instrument to curb inflation than the monetary policy interest rate; however, the central bank also adjusts the interest rate to stabilize money supply. Second, investment is an important measure to stimulate the Chinese economy, but it also pushes up money supply growth, which results in higher inflation. Third, the yield curve reacts significantly to innovations to investment growth and money supply growth. The segmentation of China's bond market hinders the efficient implementation of monetary policy, and the monetary policy transmission mechanism is still weak in China. Finally, interactions between the yield curve and the macroeconomy in China are nearly unidirectional. Macroeconomic variables reshape the yield curve, but direct adjustments of the yield curve do not significantly change macroeconomic variables. Due to the incomplete liberalization of financial markets, there exists a wide disjunction between the real economy and financial markets in China.     

Inflation volatility,economic growth and monetary policy in Bangladesh

This article provides an overview of the trends and movements of CPI-inflation in Bangladesh since the early 1950s and examines the key issues in rule-based monetary policy for price stability, implying low and stable inflation, in this country. Under a fixed exchange rate system, inflation in Bangladesh was moderately high and volatile during the 1950s and 1960s. Since the country’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, inflation in Bangladesh has remained moderately high on average and highly volatile and persistent under a fixed-pegged exchange rate system or under a managed floating system since 2003. Using data from the early 1970s or earlier depending on data availability, the article undertakes both Granger-causality and the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) analysis with two models. The first model is comprised of such variables as inflation, the real interest rate, the real exchange rate and output growth, and the second model is comprised of the volatilities of money growth, real output growth and inflation. Then, based on the empirical findings, the article concludes that a rule-based monetary policy, namely monetary targeting or inflation targeting, remains appropriate for Bangladesh provided that it adopts a more flexible, if not freely floating, exchange rate system. The article suggests that the use of monetary policy to achieve multiple objectives under a fixed-pegged exchange rate system creates a time-inconsistency problem, reduces monetary policy credibility and makes it (monetary policy) ineffective in lowering inflation and its volatility. Low credibility of monetary policy in particular raises inflation persistence. Within the present monetary-policy framework in Bangladesh, the article illustrates how the fixed-pegged exchange rate system has generated money growth volatility in the presence of large-scale inflows of overseas workers’ remittances and readymade garments export earnings. This does not seem to be a concern of the central bank of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank); rather, it (Bangladesh Bank) pursues monetary-base targeting to keep inflation low and stable after considering economic growth. The consequent diminishing credibility of monetary policy has kept inflation volatile and persistent, which has adversely affected economic growth.     

Price‐level versus inflation targeting with financial market imperfections

Abstract Price‐level targeting (PT) is compared with inflation targeting (IT) in a DSGE model augmented with imperfections in both debt and equity markets. The PT regime outperforms the IT regime, and the gain depends on the degree of financial market frictions. This is because inflation is better anchored under PT, owing to the expectation channel, and therefore the monetary authority has more leverage to deal with the financial market distortions. We also find that the gain is higher if the optimal rule reacts to asset prices instead of the output gap, and the rule requires a positive response to asset prices.     

Inflation Targeting versus Nominal Income Targeting

In this paper we analyze two different target regimes, flexible inflation targeting and nominal income targeting, under discretion in a simple dynamic macro model. The key results of our paper are: First, for both targeting regimes optimal monetary policy response leads to a shock-dependent feedback rule. Second, a demand shock is completely offset by both monetary strategies. Third, in case of a supply shock there is a significant difference between the two different targeting regimes. Under inflation targeting the policy makers face a trade-off between inflation and output stabilization. This trade-off depends on the weight Φ the policy makers attach to output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization in the loss function. In contrast, under nominal income targeting policy makers face a constant trade-off between inflation and real output growth: an increase in inflation leads to a fall in real output growth by an equal amount. Furthermore, in Appendix A we analyze a (linear) commitment solution for inflation targeting and compare it with the discretionary case. Under commitment, inflation is smaller and the output gap is larger than under discretion. In Appendix B, we investigate inflation targeting in a two-period time-lag version of the model. The qualitative results on the trade-off between inflation and output growth remain the same as in the basic model without time lag. Received May 3, 2000; revised version received December 3, 2001 Published online: February 17, 2003     

Search, money, and inflation under private information

I study monetary exchange and inflation when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for certain goods. Introducing imperfect information in the Lagos-Wright [A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113(3) (2005) 463-484] economy shows that the existence of monetary equilibrium is a more robust feature of the environment. In general, my model has a monetary steady state in which only a proportion of the agents hold money. Agents who do not hold money cannot participate in trade in the decentralized market. The proportion of agents holding money is endogenous and depends (negatively) on the level of expected inflation. As in Lagos and Wright's model, in equilibrium there is a positive welfare cost of expected inflation, but the origins of this cost are very different.