An extended Heckscher-Ohlin model with transaction costs and technological comparative advantage

Summary. This paper introduces technological differences and transaction costs into the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model and examines the HO theorem, factor price equalization theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem. It shows that the HO theorem can be refined, and that the factor price equalisation theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and the Rybczynski theorem do not always hold. It also shows that transaction costs play an important role in determining the equilibrium trade pattern.Received: 26 February 2001, Revised: 27 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: F10, F11. Correspondence to: Wenli ChengWe are grateful for comments from the anonymous referee, Hugo Sonnenschein, Guangzhen Sun and participants of the seminar on this paper at University of Washington.     

Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities

We analyze trade between a perfectly informed price setting party (seller) and an imperfectly informed price taker (buyer). Differently from most of the literature, we focus on the case in which, under full information, it would be inefficient to trade goods of sufficiently poor quality. We show that the unique equilibrium surviving D1 is characterized by market breakdown, although trade would be mutually beneficial in some state of nature. This occurs independently of the precision of the information available to the buyer. The model thus implies that signaling through prices may exacerbate the effect of adverse selection rather than mitigate it. Under D1, the seller would always benefit from committing to prices that do not reveal her information. We develop this intuition by analyzing the strategic advantages of price rigidities. We show that price rigidities help restore trade and could even enhance effectiveness of prices as signals of quality.     

中国股市隐性交易成本影响因素分析

在电子指令驱动的交易制度下,中国股票价格、市场深度、知情交易概率、信息冲击、股价波动和买卖指令的不平衡性,都是影响隐性交易成本的因素;中国股市流动性、波动性和有效性,都对隐性交易成本产生影响,即流动性差、有效性低、波动性高会导致隐性交易成本增大.这一结论从实证上得到了验证.因此,隐性交易成本是衡量股票市场运行效率的一个综合性指标.     

The Economic Efficiency of Policy Reform and Partial Market Liberalization under Transaction Costs

The article presents an integrated analysis of the effects of domestic and trade policy reform on resource allocation and welfare under transaction costs. It develops a general multiagent, multicommodity model, where transaction costs are the costs of resources used in the exchange process. The influence of domestic and trade policy (including both price and quantity instruments) on distorted market equilibrium is analysed. Alternative concepts of distorted equilibrium are presented and investigated. They provide a basis for evaluating the effects of multilateral partial market liberalization on resource allocation and welfare under transaction costs. New conditions are derived under which multilateral policy reforms generate Pareto improvements.     

Competition vs. collaboration in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies: a game theory approach

The study provides a game theoretic exploration of firms’ decisions on whether to compete or collaborate in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies. Different from models proposed by previous studies, which concentrates on process innovation and a two-strategy set (innovation or do nothing), the present game theory model emphasises product innovation and a three-strategy set (innovation, collaboration, or do nothing). The study makes three contributions. The proposed game theory model extends current understanding of the impacts of collaboration possibilities and collaboration cost in a dynamic game theory. Further, the model clarifies the impact of transaction costs on the outcome. Finally, the study finds that the relationship between collaboration costs is not univariate, but depends on the market type and various market characteristics, such as technology gap, technology level, the product substitution index, transaction costs, and the discount rate of price sensitiveness.     

A Neo-Heckscher–Ohlin Model of Trade with Endogenous Production Patterns*

We propose a Neo-Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) model of trade that combines comparative endowment advantage, comparative technological advantage, international capital mobility and trade costs. Using an inframarginal approach, we produce a partition of the exogenous parameter space in a host of parameter value subsets that demarcate the various equilibrium patterns of production and trade. The results are startling! They suggest that production within the diversification cone – a key assumption of the Heckscher–Ohlin theory that is required for its core propositions (such as factor price equalisation) to hold – may only prevail on the razor's edge, or under exceptional circumstances. In addition, our findings nominate a mechanism by which improvements in transaction efficiency facilitate international trade thereby stimulating cross-country division of labour. Contrary to other generalisations of the Heckscher–Ohlin (such as the various derivatives of the Kemp–Jones model of trade), our model does not assume a purely Ricardian character: comparative endowment advantage may determine the pattern of trade even in the presence of opposing technological differences, as long as total factor productivity coefficients adjusted for transaction efficiency and factor intensity do not confer unambiguous comparative (technological) advantage. Still, ‘intensity-efficiency’-adjusted comparative technological advantage supersedes factor endowments in determining the flow of trade.     

Incomplete Information, Trading Costs and Cross‐autocorrelations in Stock Returns

This paper provides an economic rationale for the cross‐autocorrelation patterns in stock returns in the context of a microstructure model in which investors have incomplete information. The paper shows that in a market in which investors are informed about only a sub‐set of stocks, the emergence of lead‐lag, cross‐autocorrelations is a function of the cost of trading in other stocks based on information about the sub‐set of stocks. If cross‐trading costs are high, informed investors will trade only in the sub‐set of stocks they are informed about; if cross‐trading costs are moderate, informed investors will randomize between trading and not trading in other stocks; and if cross‐trading costs are low, they will trade in all stocks. When informed investors trade only in a sub‐set of stocks, prices of stocks with more informed trading will adjust to common factor information faster than the prices of stocks with less informed trading giving rise to asymmetric lead‐lag cross‐autocorrelations. When informed investors trade in all stocks, asymmetric lead‐lag cross‐autocorrelations will disappear as a result of their cross‐market arbitrage trading. These results provide a number of testable implications for lead‐lag cross‐autocorrelation patterns. The data is consistent with the empirical predictions .
(J.E.L.G12, G14).     

Learning by Holding and Liquidity

A number of assets do not trade publicly but are sold to a restricted group of investors who subsequently receive private information from the issuers. Thus, the holders of such privately placed assets learn more quickly about their assets than other agents. This paper studies the pricing implications of this "learning by holding". In an economy in which investors are price takers and risk-neutral, and absent any insider trading or other transaction costs, we show that risky assets command an excess expected return over safe assets in the presence of learning by holding. This is reminiscent of the "credit spread puzzle"—the large spread between BBB-rated and AAA-rated corporate bonds that is not explained by historical defaults, risk aversion, or trading frictions. The intuition is that the seller of a risky bond needs to offer a "coordination premium" that helps potential buyers overcome their fear of future illiquidity. Absent this premium, this fear could become self-justified in the presence of learning by holding because a future lemons problem deters current market participation, and this in turn vindicates the fear of a future lemons problem.     

On Choquet prices in a GEI-model with intermediation costs

This article analyses whether the representation of asset prices by Choquet integration can be justified from a general equilibrium point of view. We demonstrate that if transaction costs functionals are increasing in the volume of trade, positive homogeneous and satisfy an additivity condition, the equilibrium price functional typically does not satisfy all the Choquet properties. Whereas subadditivity and positive homogeneity can be shown to hold for the equilibrium price functional, this is generally not the case for monotonicity and additivity of prices for comonotone income streams.     

Market maker competition and price efficiency: Evidence from China

We test the relationship between market maker competition and stock price efficiency. Using the number of market makers as a proxy for competition, the results show a strong positive correlation between competition and stock price efficiency. Moreover, price efficiency is higher when competing market makers have higher research ability. We suggest that market maker competition increases price efficiency through two channels: 1) Competition decreases transaction costs, and 2) Uninformed market makers learn from orders submitted by informed market makers through competition. The latter happens only in the group of market makers with higher experiences. The results imply that the price efficiency can be improved by enhancing the competition of market makers with high research ability and experiences.     

ON THE SOURCES OF THE INFLATION BIAS AND OUTPUT VARIABILITY

Why do dynamic inconsistencies in monetary policy exist? In this paper, a traditional model with output inefficiencies is introduced, but monetary policy is allowed to be influenced by the various constituencies in the economy that pressure Congress in turn to pressure the Central Bank to adopt a particular policy stance. This paper shows that in this economy an inflation bias arises because of the lobbying pressures of outsiders. Furthermore, it shows that if lobbying pressures are high enough, an inflation bias cannot be avoided for any finite level of Central Bank independence. It also shows that introducing the realistic feature of lobbying pressures has an impact on the stabilization properties of monetary policy. When a supply shock occurs, the shock is totally absorbed by a non‐myopic trade union, which has no lobbying costs. This is independent of any finite degree of conservativeness of the central banker, who has to accept an extreme increase in price instability. It is shown that monetary policy delegation is therefore sub‐optimal in achieving price stability compared with labor‐market reforms meant to remove monopsonistic elements. However, the same structural policies will induce greater output instability by strengthening the power of conservative central bankers.     

Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm

The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs.     

Determinants of International R&D Outsourcing: The Role of Trade

This paper investigates the determinants of international R&D outsourcing, in particular the role of trade. We sketch a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms where outsourcing increases a firm's fixed transaction costs as well as its productivity. Financial constraints affect the decision to outsource R&D more to nonexporters than to exporters. In contrast, exporters are more sensitive to a lack of information because they have higher losses when there is technology leakage. We test these predictions using a panel database of Spanish companies. The results highlight the relevance of information in competitive markets, and the role of trade to induce companies to engage in other globalization strategies.     

Market manipulation with sentiment traders

This article offers a new perspective for traders’ sentiment by bridging the relationship between feedback effect and market manipulation. Allowing access to information regarding manipulated orders confuses sentiment traders, leading to an overestimation of the true asset value which actually remains the same. We find that sentiment factor has a nonmonotonic impact on the responsiveness to order information and price informativeness. Furthermore, it is shown that informed traders behave like a contrarian, and can use order information to reassess the price, which results in the multiplicity of equilibria.     

Market Crashes and Informational Avalanches

This paper analyses a security market with transaction costs and a sequential trading structure. Transaction costs may prevent many traders from revealing their private information if they trade in a sequential fashion. Due to the information aggregation failure, hidden information gets accumulated in the market which may be revealed by a small trigger, yielding a high volatility in the absence of an accompanying event. The paper first characterizes the optimal trading strategy of the agent which constitute the unique equilibrium. Further properties of the price sequence are obtained using the concepts of informational cascade and informational avalanche.
The results are applied to the explanation of market crashes. In particular, the dynamics of market crashes are illustrated as evolving through the following four phases: (1) boom; (2) euphoria; (3) trigger; and (4) panic; where the euphoria corresponds to the informational cascade and the panic corresponds to the informational avalanche.     

Effects of Securities Transaction Taxes on Depth and Bid-Ask Spread

This note investigates the effects of introducing a transaction tax on depth and bid-ask spread using a static model where a competitive market maker faces informed and liquidity traders. When the degree of information asymmetry is low, an increase in the transaction tax can result into a smaller rise in the selling price and the depth may even increase in some cases. When information asymmetry is high, the dealer could increase the selling price more than the tax and sometimes lowers the depth. This can result in a market shutdown if the liquidity trader is driven out of the market. We thank Vincent Reinhart and Walter Fisher for helpful discussions. Special thanks are also due to an anonymous referee and the editor C.D. Aliprantis for insightful comments and suggestions which have helped us to improve the paper substantially. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Price Limits, Information Acquisition, and Bid–ask Spreads: Theory and Evidence

A number of futures markets use price limits which, in effect, preclude trade from occurring at prices outside certain exogenous bounds. Noting that such markets are characterized by heterogeneously informed traders, whereas previous work on price limits assumes symmetrically informed traders, we examine the effects of price limits in a setting where market participants are asymmetrically informed. We find that imposing price limits generally lowers the quality of information acquired in equilibrium, but lowers bid–ask spreads as well. Thus, depending on the relative weights placed by society on liquidity versus price efficiency, there may exist a set of price limits that are most efficient in achieving a trade-off between liquidity and informational efficiency. We perform empirical tests of some implications of the model using cross-sectional data on price limits. We find that price limits are strongly negatively related to both price volatility and trading volume. Though other explanations for our empirical findings cannot be ruled out, these results are not inconsistent with the model's implication that price limits should be tighter for contracts which offer greater profit potential for informed traders.     

Dynamic signaling and market breakdown

We consider the effects a public revelation of information (e.g. rating, grade) has on trading in a dynamic signaling model. Competing buyers offer prices to a privately informed seller who can reject them and delay trade. Delay is costly and the seller has no commitment to its duration. The external public information allows for signaling in equilibrium. More interestingly, we characterize the dynamics of trade and prices. If signals are noisy, no trade takes place just before the revelation of external information. If signals are fully revealing, then trade occurs even close to revelation, however, transaction prices are discontinuous.     

Law, trade, and development

This paper uses a Ricardian model to generate predictions about the influence of institutions on trade in differentiated (complex) and commoditized (simple) products and then uses a rich international trade data set for empirical tests. The model draws the distinction between the role of international transaction costs and domestic production costs in the trade of complex and simple products. The effects of institutions predicted by the model are identified with a three-step estimation procedure. We find that when countries have low quality institutions, institutional reform primarily influences production costs and has little influence on the volume of trade. Institutional reform, however, increases the diversity of exports in complex goods markets. Conversely, in countries with more developed institutions, institutional reform primarily influences transaction costs and is associated with gains in the volume and the diversity of complex exports.     

中国经济开放度与货币政策有效性研究

在Hau(2000)模型中引入工资交错调整和交易成本假设,以此构建开放经济条件下货币政策有效性分析基础模型,并通过一般均衡分析后发现,经济开放对货币政策的最终目标——价格稳定和产出增长都会产生影响。贸易开放程度和金融开放程度的加深,将增强货币供给对短期汇率调整的影响;而经济开放度的加深,虽然在短期内会削弱货币政策对产出的影响,但从长期来看,将会对产出调整起积极作用。同时,运用校准法模拟分析后发现,随着我国经济开放度的提高,货币政策调节短期消费和产出的能力将会下降,特别是宽松的货币政策将更多地表现在汇率波动上。