Stock price informativeness on the sensitivity of strategic M&A investment to Q

Using a strategic merger sample that covers the period from 1985 to 2011, we find that the acquirer’s stock price firm-specific information, the new information created by investors about the value of firm fundamentals, increases the positive sensitivity of strategic merger investment to the acquirer’s Q; the target’s stock price firm-specific information increases the negative sensitivity of merger investment to the target’s Q. These results suggest that managers learn from financial markets in identifying strategic merger investment opportunities by transferring assets from poorly managed firms to well managed firms. In addition, the target’s stock price firm-specific information itself increases the acquisition size, indicating that informed acquirer managers are more likely to take out large merger investment. Last but not the least, stock price informativeness increases merger synergies and post-merger performance, suggesting that informed managers make better merger investment that increases shareholder value. Our study contributes to the recent increasing stream of studies on managerial learning from the market.     

Do star analysts know more firm-specific information? Evidence from China

Using a unique database in China, we extend the literature to further distinguish the information production role of star vs. non-star analysts. We confirm the general conclusion of a positive association between analyst coverage and stock return synchronicity measured by a firm’s R² in China. The findings from star analysts, however, show that star analyst coverage actually decreases stock return synchronicity. We contend that the firm-specific human capital in star analysts helps the analysts overcome the challenges of information production in an emerging market. The superior firm-specific human capital argument of star analysts is further supported by the negative association of star analysts’ firm-specific experiences and stock return synchronicity. Our conclusions are robust to different specifications of star analyst presence and different definitions of analysts’ firm-specific experiences. We also find that star analysts exhibit a more accurate earnings forecast than non-star analysts.     

Whose money is smart? Individual and institutional investors’ trades based on analyst recommendations

This study explores how institutional and individual investors respond to analyst recommendations. Using a unique account-level trading dataset taken from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we obtain direct evidence to show that (1) active institutional investors are significantly net buyers (net sellers) on “strong buy” and “buy” (“hold” and “sell”) recommendations; (2) active institutional investors condition their trades based on the buy-side pressure of analysts; (3) institutional investors earn abnormal returns by incorporating analysts’ buy-side pressure into their trading reactions to analyst recommendations; and (4) individual investors, in contrast, exhibit abnormal trade reactions opposite to those of active institutional investors. Our results are robust to alternative measures and different specifications. This study provides evidence that active institutional investors are more sophisticated processors of information and provides support for regulators’ concerns about the sub-optimal investment decisions made by individual investors who are unaware of the potential conflicts of interest analysts may face.     

Who was informative? Performance of foreign and local analysts’ stock recommendations during the Asian financial crisis

This paper examines the performance of foreign and local analysts’ stock recommendations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea during the financial crisis of 1997–1998. Unlike most of the prior studies, our results provide strong evidence that neither of the two groups held a complete information advantage over the other during the period of crisis. Using a large dataset of analysts’ recommendations, we show that foreign analysts’ buy recommendations were more informative than local analysts’ buy recommendations, while the opposite held for sell recommendations, i.e. local analysts’ sell recommendations were more informative than foreign analysts’ sell recommendations. Our results provide evidence that neither of the frequently advanced explanations regarding relative performance of foreign and local analysts hold during the period of extreme uncertainty.     

监督抑或跟随：机构投资者治理角色研究——来自舞弊公司机构持股行为的经验证据

文章利用被中国证券监管部门处罚的舞弊公司及未舞弊公司为对象,考察机构投资者在公司治理中是扮演监督者还是跟随者角色。研究发现,从公司舞弊前一季度到后一季度机构投资者并未减持舞弊公司股份,不具备舞弊预测与识别能力;机构投资者倾向于利用分析师评级结果进行投资决策;机构投资者容易被舞弊公司误导,而分析师评级则有助于减轻机构投资者被误导程度。结果表明,目前机构投资者更多扮演着跟随分析师的消极角色而非有效监督者的积极角色,分析师评级具有一定的决策有用性。     

Underwriting Relationships and Analyst Independence in Europe

This paper examines the accuracy of security analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for firms in 13 European countries. We document at least three key findings. First, we find strong evidence that lead and co‐lead underwriter analysts’ earnings estimates and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic than those provided by unaffiliated analysts. Second, we find that lead and co‐lead underwriter analysts’ earnings forecast and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic for underwriter stocks than for those they provide for other stocks. Third, we also find evidence that these biases found within earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are not driven by one particular country. In short, these findings suggest that affiliated analysts are more optimistic perhaps to maintain investment banking relations.     

Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.     

Are Analysts’ Recommendations Informative? Intraday Evidence on the Impact of Time Stamp Delays

We demonstrate that time stamps reported in I/B/E/S for analysts’ recommendations released during trading hours are systematically delayed. Using newswire‐reported time stamps, we find 30‐minute returns of 1.83% (?2.10%) for upgrades (downgrades), but for this subset of recommendations we find corresponding returns of ?0.07% (?0.09%) using I/B/E/S‐reported time stamps. We also examine the information content of recommendations relative to management guidance and earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that analysts’ recommendations are the most important information disclosure channel examined.     

Market reaction to optimistic bias in the recommendations of chaebol-affiliated analysts

Using the setting of chaebol industrial organizations in Korea, which allows for the study of a unique affiliation between a chaebol group and financial analysts, we examine whether investors react to an optimistic bias in affiliated analysts’ recommendations. Our initial market return tests, abnormal trading volume tests and independent analysts’ reaction tests suggest that investors and independent analysts recognize and discount an optimistic bias in chaebol-affiliated ‘buy’ recommendations. However, long-term market returns are more profitable in terms of affiliated analysts’ ‘buy’ recommendations than independent analysts’ recommendations, which suggests that investors excessively discount chaebol-affiliated ‘buy’ recommendations in the short-term.     

Underlying risk preferences and analyst risk-taking behavior

We investigate the relationship between underlying risk preferences on analysts’ work-related decisions. Specifically, we examine whether facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR), an innate personal characteristic that has been linked to financial risk tolerance, is associated with analysts’ stock coverage decisions and the boldness of their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. We find that high-fWHR analysts cover firms with lower earnings predictability, and issue bolder forecasts and recommendations. Our findings shed new light on the black box of analyst decision making, assisting investment practitioners in evaluating the information content produced by different types of analysts and understanding the observed dispersion in analyst forecasts.     

ABNORMAL RETURNS AND ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECAST REVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUBLICATION OF “STOCK HIGHLIGHTS” BY VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY

We examine the reaction of stocks and the response of financial analysts' earnings forecasts to securities recommended as “Stock Highlights” by Value Line Investment Survey. Significant abnormal returns appear around the publication of stock highlights. Stock price responses are relatively efficient and permanent. Using earnings expectation data provided by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System, we find analysts raise their forecasts significantly following Value Line recommendations. Near-term forecast revisions are significantly related to stock returns at the time of the recommendations. Thus, an explanation for Value Line's security recommendation success is its ability to generate firm-specific earnings information.     

Security Analysts’ Site Visits and Stock Price Synchronicity

This paper investigates how security analysts’ corporate site visits impact listed firms’ stock-price informativeness. Examining a sample of security analysts’ visits to Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2019, we find that security analysts incorporate firm-specific information into share prices through site visits, significantly reducing the visited firms’ stock price synchronicity. This finding is robust to an alternative measure of stock price informativeness and a two-stage least-squares approach using the introduction of high-speed rail as the instrumental variable. We also find that the impact of analysts’ site visits on firms’ stock price synchronicity is more pronounced for firms with lower information disclosure quality and poor corporate governance than for other firms. Further analysis on firm characteristics documents that this effect is stronger for large-size firms, firms in the manufacturing industry, and state-owned enterprises.     

Book Review

This paper investigates the role of intellectual capital information (ICI) in sell-side analysts’ fundamental analysis and valuation of companies. Using in-depth semi-structured interviews, it penetrates the black box of analysts’ valuation decision-making by identifying and conceptualising the mechanisms and rationales by which ICI is integrated within their valuation decision processes. We find that capital market participants are not ambivalent to ICI, and ICI is used: (1) to form analysts’ perceptions of the overall quality, strengths and future prospects of companies; (2) in deriving valuation model inputs; (3) in setting price targets and making investment recommendations; and (4) as an important and integral element in analyst–client communications. We show that: there is a ‘pecking order’ of mechanisms for incorporating ICI in valuations, based on quantifiability; IC valuation is grounded in valuation theory; there are designated entry points in the valuation process for ICI; and a number of factors affect analysts’ ICI use in valuation. We also identify a need to redefine ‘value-relevant’ ICI to include non-price-sensitive information; acknowledge the boundedness and contextuality of analysts’ rationality and motives of their ICI use; and the important role of analyst–client meetings for ICI communication.     

Are chartists artists? The determinants and profitability of recommendations based on technical analysis

The value of technical analysis (TA) has been debated for decades; however, limited evidence exists on the profitability of investment recommendations issued by technical analysts. These ‘chartists’ sometimes claim that TA is an art rather than a science. We evaluated > 5000 TA-based buy and sell recommendations for stocks and a market index in the Netherlands issued during the period 2004–2010. The sign of a recommendation was generally in line with trading signals resulting from technical trading rules. While recommendation levels were positively associated with price trends prior to the recommendation, we did not find evidence of (abnormal) stock returns after the publication of these recommendations. In addition, stop-loss levels did not contain informational value as no meaningful returns were detected after these trigger levels were met. Given that technical recommendations follow well-known trading rules and that these recommendations are not associated with future abnormal returns, we conclude that technical analysts do not exhibit ‘artistic’ skills.     

Selective disclosure and the role of Form 8-K in the post-Reg FD era

We investigate the impact of Form 8-K filings on cross-firm differences in analysts’ private or idiosyncratic information in the post-Reg FD era. Using firms’ connections to the investment community to identify the likelihood of selective disclosure, we document differences in analysts’ idiosyncratic information arising from selective disclosure before 8-K filings. While filings of 8-Ks pursuant to Reg FD attenuate the link between connections and analysts’ idiosyncratic information, they do so only after selective disclosures have already resulted in some analysts having better private information. In addition, the connections continue to facilitate private information search after the filings of non-Reg FD-specific 8-Ks.     

The influence of buy-side analysts on mutual fund trading

We present evidence on the trading and performance impact of buy-side analysts. Using data provided by a large global asset manager, we relate buy-side analysts’ recommendations to fund transactions on a daily basis. We show that buy-side analysts significantly influence trading decisions: Fund managers strongly follow recent recommendation revisions, even after controlling for other trading determinants. Positive abnormal returns to buy-side analysts’ revisions are also reflected in the performance of mutual fund trades: Trades triggered by buy-side recommendations have higher returns than other trades. Overall, the impact of buy-side analysts is more pronounced than that of sell-side analysts.     

Analyst Impartiality and Investment Banking Relationships

This study examines whether investment banking ties influence the speed with which analysts convey unfavorable news. We hypothesize that affiliated analysts have incentives to respond promptly to good news but prefer not to issue bad news about client companies. Using duration models of the time between an equity issue and the first downgrade, we find affiliated analysts are slower to downgrade from Buy and Hold recommendations and significantly faster to upgrade from Hold recommendations, in both within‐analyst and within‐issuer tests. We also find affiliated analysts issue recommendations sooner and more frequently after an offering than unaffiliated analysts, and that unaffiliated analysts are more likely than affiliated analysts to drop coverage of sample firms. Our findings indicate that banking ties increase analysts' reluctance to reveal negative news, and that reform efforts must carefully consider the incentives of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts to initiate coverage and convey the results of their research.     

Gender heterogeneity in the sell-side analyst recommendation issuing process

Using analyst stock recommendations issued between January 1996 and December 2006 we show that the odds for female financial analysts to issue optimistic investment advice is 40% lower than for male analysts. Although 17% of our sample of analysts is female, 48% is employed by a top financial institution and for them the odds to issue optimistic recommendations are 16% lower than their male colleagues. The odds are even 30% lower than their female counterparts at non-top institutions. The observed gender heterogeneity cannot be attributed to differences in the risk characteristics of recommended stocks, experience or task complexity.     

Measure for Measure: The Relation between Forecast Accuracy and Recommendation Profitability of Analysts

We examine the contemporaneous relation between earnings forecast accuracy and recommendation profitability to assess the effectiveness with which analysts translate forecasts into profitable recommendations. We find that, after controlling for expertise, more accurate analysts make more profitable recommendations, albeit only for firms with value‐relevant earnings. Next, we show that conflicts of interest from investment banking activities affect the relation between accuracy and profitability. In the case of buy recommendations, more accurate forecasts are associated with more profitable recommendations only for the nonconflicted analysts. For hold recommendations, higher levels of accuracy are associated with higher levels of profitability for conflicted analysts, provided these recommendations are treated as sells. Finally, we find that regulatory reforms aimed at mitigating analyst conflicts of interest appear to have improved the relation between accuracy and profitability. Specifically, the integrity of buy and hold recommendations has improved and the change is more pronounced for analysts expected to be most conflicted.     

The Impact of NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 on Analyst Behavior: The Strategic Timing of Recommendations Issued on Weekends

Amendments to NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, enacted in May 2002, mandate that sell‐side analysts disclose the distribution of their security recommendations by buy, hold and sell category. This regulation enhances the transparency of analysts’ information and mitigates the long‐recognized optimistic bias in their recommendations. However, we find that analysts are more likely to issue sell recommendations or downgrade revisions on weekends when investors have limited attention after these rule changes. This pattern is more pronounced for prestigious analysts, who are more likely to influence stock prices. Market reaction tests reveal an incomplete immediate response and a greater drift to unfavorable recommendations issued on weekends. Finally, analysts who are more likely to release unfavorable recommendations on weekends exhibit higher future forecast accuracy. Our findings suggest that, while these regulatory changes effectively reduce analysts’ optimistic bias, they are also associated with an increased prevalence of a different form of distortion in the capital market.