A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation

The two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are: When a game is played, what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen? Few solution concepts or theories in the current literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions; answers are especially lacking for the first one. In this paper we introduce a new bargaining set, which is the first solution concept in cooperative game theory that provides answers to both fundamental questions endogenously. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.     

On Bargaining for an Indivisible Good

This note studies contracts involving lotteries for the purpose of trading an indivisible good. Lottery contracts allow players to reach agreements for trading the good even if the reservation price of the potential buyer is below that of the potential seller. When certainty exchanges are possible, lottery contracts often dominate them. An interesting feature of the contracts is that the probability of trading the good depends on the players' bargaining powers, but the payments do not.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C78.     

Bargaining and inequity aversion: On the efficiency of the double auction

In a bargaining setting with asymmetrically informed, inequity-averse parties, a fully efficient mechanism (i.e., the double auction) exists if and only if compassion is strong. Less compassionate parties do not trade in the double auction in the limit of strong envy.     

Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners

This paper analyzes the effect of competition for bargaining partners on the prices that prevail in thin markets, as well as how the matches are simultaneously determined. Three trading processes or bargaining procedures are described. In all the variants that we consider, except for one case of public offers, either there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium or such equilibria exhibit delay in reaching agreement.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43.     

Bargaining and Boldness

We study a multiperson bargaining problem with general risk preferences through the use of Shaked's game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown. If preferences are “smooth,” then as the risk of breakdown vanishes, the limiting outcome is one in which bargainers are equally marginally bold; where a bargainer's marginal boldness measures his willingness to risk disagreement in return for a marginal improvement in his position. Under smoothness, any (ordinal-)Nash solution is an equally marginally bold outcome. However, unlike the concept of the (ordinal-)Nash solution, a unique equally marginally bold outcome exists in natural cases—in particular, if all bargainers have risk-averse preferences of the rank-dependent expected utility type. For these preferences, the equally marginally bold outcome maximizes a “bargaining power”-adjusted (asymmetric) Nash product where the degree of asymmetry is determined by the disparity in the marginal valuation of certainty among bargainers. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D81.     

生态社会主义核心价值观论析

生态社会主义为寻求全球性生态危机的解决之道,通过批判与重构两条路径为人类指出未来社会发展前景,深刻批判资本主义的反生态性、非正义性,主张以民主方式从经济模式、政治体制、社会构建和文化培植多维度构建生态社会主义理想社会,体现生态社会主义对结果平等、公正的终极价值追求。     

On the Interpretation of Nonsymmetric Bargaining Solutions and Their Extension to Nonexpected Utility Preferences

In a recent paper, Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson reexamine the foundations of the axiomatic bargaining theory as formulated by Nash. In it they reinterpret the Nash bargaining solution and extend it to a family of nonexpected utility preferences, providing an interpretation of this solution concept and an axiomatization by means of a suitable translation of Nash axioms. This paper extends the work of these authors to the family, characterized by Kalai, of nonsymmetric solutions that appear from the Nash bargaining solution when the symmetry axiom is dropped. This extension requires an axiom relating the solution outcomes of isomorphic games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78.     

Bargaining and competition revisited

We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods).     

电子商务与企业核心竞争力

21世纪是高度信息化的时代,信息和速度决定着企业的成败.电子商务是保持企业可持续发展的重要手段,它能够有效地提高企业的核心竞争力,再次拓展企业的发展空间.     

利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构

企业的契约性与利益相关者理论具有一致性 ,它们都隐含了企业是一种再谈判机制。利益相关者对企业的所有权分配进行谈判 ,谈判结果决定出企业的治理结构。在这个过程中 ,各方的谈判破裂结果效用、谈判力和对谈判破裂的担心程度是关键变量。我们使用Nash谈判模型及其推广模型分析了这个过程。我们的结论是 ,企业治理结构是内生的 ,每个企业的治理结构都是特殊的个案 ,一种治理结构并不具有普适性。这个结论具有重要的立法含义。     

Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field

We explore the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for nontransferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution is to establish that theconsistent fieldis intimately related to the concept ofsubgame perfectionfor finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. We then show that in the general NTU case—unlike the transferable utility and pure bargaining cases—the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria need not approach the consistent value.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72.     

企业核心能力论

1990年,C·K·普拉哈拉德和G·哈默在《哈佛商业评论》上发表论文“公司的核心能力”（“The Core Competence of the Corporation”）,这是管理学界程碑式的一篇经典之作,它成为《哈佛商业评论》杂志有史以来重印次数最多的文章之一。从此,企业核心能力（“Core Competence”）,的理论在欧美管理学界和企业界迅速成为战略管理的主流,流行至今十余载,依然强势不衰。     

论企业的核心竞争力

核心竞争力是企业竞争力的高级形式。根据核心产品的世界制造份额及企业的核心资源存 量,提出企业核心竞争力评价模型和形成的机理。     

试论产业群的核心能力

对产业群的定义进行了回顾,以企业核心能力为基础,从产业群的角度对产业群的核心能力进行初步的探讨,阐述了产业群核心能力的现实意义。     

Delegation and Threat in Bargaining

Two principals (“nations”) appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously (autarchy). The high-authority equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the low-authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, and C72.     

Bargaining and efficiency in networks

We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. The global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining, in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements, create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium. For many networks all Markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game are inefficient, even as players become patient. We investigate how incentives need to be structured in order to achieve efficiency via subgame perfect, but non-Markovian, equilibria. The analysis extends to an alternative model in which individual players are selected according to some probability distribution, and a chosen player can select a neighbor with whom to bargain.     

Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge

We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate,patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the'amount of knowledge disclosed', by the leading to the laggingagent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In hersequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee.     

Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power

Abstract. We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal–agent (P–A) framework by varying the agent's outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent's bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P–A model and in the alternating offer game.