Modelling Credit Risk for SMEs: Evidence from the U.S. Market

Considering the fundamental role played by small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the economy of many countries and the considerable attention placed on SMEs in the new Basel Capital Accord, we develop a distress prediction model specifically for the SME sector and to analyse its effectiveness compared to a generic corporate model. The behaviour of financial measures for SMEs is analysed and the most significant variables in predicting the entities' credit worthiness are selected in order to construct a default prediction model. Using a logit regression technique on panel data of over 2,000 U.S. firms (with sales less than $65 million) over the period 1994–2002, we develop a one-year default prediction model. This model has an out-of-sample prediction power which is almost 30 per cent higher than a generic corporate model. An associated objective is to observe our model's ability to lower bank capital requirements considering the new Basel Capital Accord's rules for SMEs.     

Loan pricing under Basel II in an imperfectly competitive banking market

The new Basel II Accord (2006), established new and revised capital requirements for banks. In this paper we analyze and estimate the possible effects of the new rules on the pricing of bank loans. We relate to the two approaches for capital requirements (internal and standardized) and distinguish between retail and corporate customers. Our loan-equation is based on a model of a banking firm facing uncertainty operating in an imperfectly competitive loan market. We use Israeli economic data and data of a leading Israeli bank. The main results indicate that high quality corporate and retail customers will enjoy a reduction in loan interest rates in (big) banks which, most probably, will adopt the IRB approach. On the other hand high risk customers will benefit by shifting to (small) banks that adopt the standardized approach.     

巴塞尔新资本协议与商业银行公司治理

巴塞尔新资本协议所倡导的不仅是全面风险管理的理念和先进的资本计量方法,更蕴含着丰富的公司治理原则和要求,包括:董事会应以全面风险管理的视角制定战略规划,董事会和高级管理层应积极参与全面风险管理体系的运作,商业银行应采取与审慎风险承担有效结合的薪酬激励机制等.在此基础上,本文从战略规划、董事会运作、沟通协调机制、风险管理...     

商业银行资本工具创新及定价研究

资本工具的创新可以拓展银行资本补充渠道和空间,提升银行补充资本的能力,强化银行业的资本约束,增强风险管理水平,推动商业银行业务转型,增强服务实体经济的能力.本文在阐述我国资本工具的应用及创新背景的基础上,通过建立二叉树模型,探讨了我国新型资本工具定价问题并提出相关建议.     

A note on foreign bank ownership and monitoring: An international comparison

This paper empirically analyzes the relation between foreign bank ownership and the three pillars of the New Basel Capital Accord (i.e., capital regulatory oversight, supervisory oversight, and market discipline). Using a new database covering 153 countries, we find that countries with greater market discipline have a lower presence of foreign banks operating in their economy. Furthermore, our evidence indicates that capital regulatory oversight and supervisory oversight are not significantly related to foreign bank ownership.     

Capital shocks, bank asset allocation, and the revised Basel Accord

In contrast to the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I), the revised risk-based capital standards (Basel II) propose regulatory capital requirements based on credit ratings. This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze how banks will adjust their low and high credit risk commercial loans under the proposed newer standard. Capital-constrained banks respond to an adverse capital shock by reducing high credit risk loans, while under certain circumstances, low credit risk loans may actually increase. When compared to Basel I, it is shown that high-risk loans are reduced more under Basel II, but whether a bank reduces total lending more under Basel I or under the revised standards depends on a complex interaction of factors.     

国有商业银行资本充足监管有效性及其前提条件

资本充足问题一直是各国商业银行外部监管和内部控制共同关心的问题.<巴塞尔协议>出台以来,我国国有商业银行内部激励缺乏,而外部监管又流于形式,资本充足率持续下降.本文从国有悖论、监管宽容和实证推算三个方面重点对国有商业银行资本充足监管的有效性进行分析,认为当前对国有商业银行资本充足监管是无效或低效的.但在我国已经加入WTO的宏观背景下,对国有商业银行进行资本充足监管又是必要和必须的,而前提是对不良贷款进行二次剥离和彻底改制,以建立起现代商业银行制度,从而为国有商业银行资本充足有效监管奠定制度基础.     

Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature

This paper reviews the theoretical literature on bank capital regulation and analyzes some of the approaches to redesigning the 1988 Basel Accord on capital standards. The paper starts with a review of the literature on the design of the financial system and the existence of banks. It proceeds with a presentation of the market failures that justify banking regulation and an analysis of the mechanisms that have been suggested to deal with these failures. The paper then reviews the theoretical literature on bank capital regulation. This is followed by a brief history of capital regulation since the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and a presentation of both the alternative approaches that have been put forward on setting capital standards and the Basel Committee's proposal for a new capital adequacy framework.     

The new Capital Accord and banks’ lending decisions

Capital requirements (‘pillar one’ of the new Capital Accord) rising with the increase in borrowers’ PDs were thought as being likely: (i) to have a serious impact on the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (usually riskier than large corporates) and (ii) to increase the procyclicality of the supply of credit.

The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical evaluation of the possible impact of the new Accord proposals on the lending policies of Italian banks. We compare the interest rate charged to a large set of Italian firms with the cost brought about by the change in the calculation of capital requirements. Since the two variables move together in response to an increase in borrowers’ PDs, we conclude that the new regulatory approach to measuring capital adequacy appears consistent with banks’ own risk evaluations. This result is supported by a ‘stress testing’ exercise: the relationship also holds in a distressed economic scenario, which replicates the financial conditions of the Italian corporate sector in the 1993–1994 recession.     

The New Basel Capital Accord: Making it Effective with Stronger Market Discipline

In January 2001 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed a new capital adequacy framework to respond to deficiencies in the 1988 Capital Accord on credit risk. The main elements or 'pillars' of the proposal are capital requirements based on the internal risk-ratings of individual banks, expanded and active supervision, and information disclosure requirements to enhance market discipline. We discuss the incentive effects of the proposed regulation. In particular, we argue that it provides incentives for banks to develop new ways to evade the intended consequences of the proposed regulation. Supervision alone cannot prevent banks from 'gaming and manipulation' of risk-weights based on internal ratings. Furthermore, the proposed third pillar to enhance market discipline of banks' risk-taking is too weak to achieve its objective. Market discipline can be strengthened by a requirement that banks issue subordinated debt. We propose a first phase for introducing a requirement for large banks to issue subordinated debt as part of the capital requirement.     

Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II

We analyze the relationship between bank size and risk-taking under the Basel II Capital Accord. Using a model with imperfect competition and moral hazard, we show that the introduction of an internal ratings based (IRB) approach improves upon flat capital requirements if the approach is applied uniformly across banks and if the costs of implementation are not too high. However, the banks’ right to choose between the standardized and the IRB approaches under Basel II gives larger banks a competitive advantage and, due to fiercer competition, pushes smaller banks to take higher risks. This may even lead to higher aggregate risk-taking.     

论我国商业银行内部审计制度和模式的创新

内部审计是公司治理的重要控制和监督环节,在公司治理结构中发挥着越来越重要的作用.当前,加强银行公司治理是我国商业银行改革的关键环节,如何更好地发挥内部审计在银行治理结构中的作用,从而为银行机构增加价值并促使其高效率、高质量地运转,是一个具有重要现实意义的课题.本文从既有的研究成果出发,通过考察银行治理结构和内部审计的关系及西方国家商业银行内审理念的演变趋势,针对巴塞尔新资本协议等对商业银行内审工作提出的新要求,指出我国商业银行内部审计应从财务型审计转向增值型审计,在内审理念、内审体制及方法手段等方面进行创新.     

On the Role of Regulatory Banking Capital

In this paper the authors study the role of regulatory banking capital and analyze the incentive effects of the Basel II Accord. They argue that Basel II may become a source of systemic risk due to endogenous risk and the risk sensitivity of the capital requirements. In this context they note that financial instability may enter via the asset side of the banks' balance sheets when banks are forced to sell assets in order to maintain the capital buffer prescribed by Basel II.     

Potential Competitive Effects of Basel II on Banks in SME Credit Markets in the United States

We examine the likely competitive effects of implementation of Basel II capital requirements on banks in the market for credit to SMEs in the U.S. Similar competitive effects from Basel II may occur for other credits and financial instruments in the U.S. and other nations. We address whether reduced risk weights for SME credits extended by large banking organizations that adopt the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (A-IRB) approach of Basel II might significantly adversely affect the competitive positions of other organizations. The analyses suggest only relatively minor competitive effects on most community banks because the large A-IRB adopters tend to make very different types of SME loans to different types of borrowers than community banks. However, there may be significant adverse effects on the competitive positions of large non-A-IRB banking organizations because the data do not suggest any strong segmentation in SME credit markets among large organizations. JEL classification: G21, G28, G38, L51     

Economic and regulatory capital allocation for revolving retail exposures

We present two internal capital allocation models and compare the capital ratios they generate with those prescribed by the latest revision of Basel’s New Capital Accord proposal for advanced retail portfolios, which allows for explicit future margin income recognition. Given a test portfolio of credit card exposures that we assemble, we find that Basel’s ratios are closer to those generated by our models for low credit risk segments. We attribute the discrepancies to the different ways Basel and our models account for future margin income, to Basel’s assumptions about asset correlations and to one model taking macroeconomic conditions into account.     

《新资本协议》对商业银行信贷运行的影响——兼论其宏观经济效应

《新资本协议》的出台和实施是银行监管历史上一个具有里程碑意义的事件。本文认为,《新资本协议》特别是内部评级法极大地提高了资本监管的风险敏感度,将对商业银行的信贷增长方式、信贷结构调整和贷款损失准备计提、以及宏观经济运行产生一定的影响。按照目前我国商业银行资本充足水平和资产质量,无论是实施标准法还是内部评级法都将强化信贷扩张的资本约束效应。我国应慎重选择《新资本协议》的实施时机,避免由此对信贷供给和宏观经济运行造成的负面冲击。     

商业银行资本金补充机制研究

本文在<巴塞尔协议Ⅲ>要求的基础上,分析了我国各类商业银行所面临的资本金和资本结构约束.研究表明,中国银行业面临的资本约束同欧美银行业存在明显差异,我国商业银行应在遵守新资本协议的基础上丰富核心资本,规范利用附属资本,优化资本金结构.     

The Impact of Basel II on Lending to Small- and Medium-Sized Firms: A Regulatory Policy Assessment Based on Spanish Credit Register Data

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact on bank credit exposures to small- and medium-sized Spanish firms of the current proposal for reform of the 1988 Capital Accord using information from the Spanish Credit Register. Capital requirements for exposures to those firms, according to the various revisions of the proposed capital reform (from the January 2001 consultative document to the April 2003 one), are calculated to analyze whether the existing pattern of bank financing of small- and medium-sized firms might be altered. Finally, the incentives for individual banks to adopt the advanced internal ratings-based approach proposed by Basel II are evaluated.     

资本计量方法改革、商业银行风险偏好与信贷配置

为提高银行业风险管理水平与信贷配置效率,监管部门于2014年开展了资本管理高级方法的试点工作。本文基于上市银行2010至2016年的微观数据,与银监会公布的行业信贷风险进行匹配,采用双重差分和三重差分法,实证分析前述改革如何影响试点银行的风险偏好和信贷调配。研究发现,在资本管理高级方法实施后:(1)试点银行显著降低了风险加权资产的规模;(2)试点银行风险偏好的变化存在非线性的特征,在调减高风险行业贷款的同时,并未显著增加最安全行业的贷款,而是增加了风险略高行业的贷款,体现出试点银行对风险与收益的权衡;(3)进一步将行业划分为“虚”与“实”,研究发现试点银行减少了房地产业(“虚”)、制造业(“实”)和建筑业(“实”)贷款,显著增加了金融业(“虚”)贷款。本文研究不仅丰富了资本监管方面的文献,也对金融支持供给侧结构性改革具有启示意义。     

Use of loan loss provisions for capital, earnings management and signalling by Australian banks

This study examines whether and to what extent Australian banks use loan loss provisions (LLPs) for capital, earnings management and signalling. We examine if there were changes in the use of LLPs as a result of the implementation of banking regulations consistent with the Basel Accord of 1988, which made loan loss reserves no longer part of Tier I capital in the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio. We find some evidence to indicate that Australian banks use LLPs for capital management, but we find no evidence of a change in this behaviour after the implementation of the Basel Accord. Our results indicate that banks in Australia use LLPs to manage earnings. Furthermore, listed commercial banks engage more aggressively in earnings management using LLPs than unlisted commercial banks. We also find that earnings management behaviour is more pronounced in the post‐Basel period. Overall, we find a significant understating of LLPs in the post‐Basel period relative to the pre‐Basel period. This indicates that reported earnings might not reflect the true economic reality underlying those numbers. Finally, Australian banks do not appear to use LLPs for signalling future intentions of higher earnings to investors.