Corporate citizenship and earnings attributes

This study examines the association between corporate citizenship and earnings attributes. We examine four accounting-based earnings attributes, including persistence, predictability, smoothness, and accrual quality. Our sample consists of 652 public companies used to select the 100 Best Corporate Citizens (BCC) published by Business Ethics Magazine in 2001 and 2002. We find that BCC's earnings are more predictable, more persistent, and smoother than non-BCC's. Consistent with prior research findings, our results also indicate that BCC report higher subsequent accounting returns than non-BCC in the three-year period following the publication of the 2001 and 2002 BCC lists. We attribute these findings to the effort of good corporate citizens to preserve their reputation and the public's trust.     

Corporate governance and earnings management at large U.S. bank holding companies

This paper examines whether corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings and earnings management at the largest publicly traded bank holding companies in the United States. We first find that performance, earnings management, and corporate governance are endogenously determined. Thus, OLS estimation can lead to biased coefficients and a simultaneous equations approach is used. We find that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), board independence, and capital are positively related to earnings and that earnings, board independence, and capital are negatively related to earnings management. We also find that PPS is positively related to earnings management. Finally, PPS and board independence are positively related and the relationship is bidirectional. While both PPS and board independence are associated with higher earnings, our results indicate that more independent boards appear to constrain the earnings management that greater PPS compels.     

公司治理结构与盈余管理模式的互动分析

公司治理结构影响会计信息质量,会计信息质量的高低对公司治理结构的完善起到关键作用.盈余管理通过会计政策的选择与公司治理结构产生关系,公司治理结构对盈余管理模式具有重要影响,这种影响体现在内部治理和外部治理两个方面.同时,不同的盈余管理模式对公司治理结构的完善起着不同的作用.     

Crossed-listed foreign firms' earnings informativeness, earnings management and disclosures of corporate governance information under SOX

The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) marks the beginning of the mandatory disclosure of audit-committee composition and other corporate governance information for cross-listed foreign firms. We posit that the provisions of SOX improve the effectiveness of an independent audit committee and other corporate-governance functions in monitoring the earnings quality of cross-listed foreign firms, and we use cross-listed firms' earnings informativeness and earnings management to measure earnings quality. Our findings show earnings informativeness is significantly associated with audit-committee independence as well as with board independence in the post-SOX period. In contrast, we do not find a significant association between earnings informativeness and audit-committee independence in the pre-SOX period. Our findings also show a consistently negative association between earnings management and audit-committee independence after SOX, an association that is not found in the pre-SOX period. Similarly, a negative association between earnings informativeness and the CEO duality as the chair of the board is only found in the post-SOX period. Furthermore, our results show a positive (negative) association between earnings informativeness (earnings management) and an aggregate corporate-governance score as a measure of overall corporate-governance functions in both the pre- and post-SOX periods. Our findings on the change of magnitude in the relationship between earnings informativeness (earnings management) and corporate governance suggest that the SOX provisions improve the effectiveness of cross-listed foreign firms' corporate-governance functions in monitoring the quality of accounting earnings.     

Does confucianism influence corporate earnings management?

This paper investigates the effect of Confucianism on corporate earnings management. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2017, we find that corporate earnings management is negatively associated with the popularity of Confucianism. Our findings also reveal that the effect of Confucianism is particularly strong among firms characterized with weaker internal control and external supervision or located in areas with lower level of marketization. Our findings shed important light on how culture improves the quality of financial reporting in emerging markets.     

Corporate social responsibility and dividend policy

This study outlines and tests two corporate social responsibility (CSR) views of dividends. The first view argues that firms are likely to pay fewer dividends because CSR activities lower the cost of equity, encouraging firms to invest or hoard cash rather than to pay dividends. The second view suggests that CSR activities are positive NPV projects that increases earnings and hence dividend payouts. The first (second) view predicts that firms with a stronger involvement in CSR activities should be associated with a lower (higher) dividend payouts. The finding supports the second view and is robust.     

Are red or blue companies more likely to go green? Politics and corporate social responsibility

Using the firm-level corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, we find that firms score higher on CSR when they have Democratic rather than Republican founders, CEOs, and directors, and when they are headquartered in Democratic rather than Republican-leaning states. Democratic-leaning firms spend $20 million more on CSR than Republican-leaning firms ($80 million more within the sample of S&P 500 firms), or roughly 10% of net income. We find no evidence that firms recover these expenditures through increased sales. Indeed, increases in firm CSR ratings are associated with negative future stock returns and declines in firm ROA, suggesting that any benefits to stakeholders from social responsibility come at the direct expense of firm value.     

The impact of corporate governance and agency effect on earnings management – A test of the dual banking system

This study investigates the impact of the Board characteristics, Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) power and Shariah supervision on Earnings Management (EM) within conventional and Islamic banks. We provide evidence that EM levels do not significantly differ between Islamic and conventional banks. Contrary to public belief, additional value-based attributes such as the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) that promotes ethical and religious values, do not help in the restriction of opportunistic behaviour in Islamic banks. Additionally, attributes such as board size, firm size and leverage have a significant negative influence on EM of both Islamic and conventional banks. Our results are important in deliberating that the word ‘Islamic’ must not be used merely as a profit manifestation, but instead must promote a value-based business, which in turn could ensure reliability and sustainability.     

Does Earnings Quality Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Performance? Empirical Evidence of the Causal Link

The study examines the causal links between earnings quality and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance using a large sample of United States (US) firms from 1992 to 2013. We first find that the association between earnings quality and CSR performance is positive and significant. We then test the flow of causality using Granger's (1969) lead–lag analysis to determine whether changes in earnings quality cause changes in CSR performance or vice versa. Our findings show that changes in earnings quality cause changes in a firm's CSR performance but not vice versa. Further analysis shows that earnings quality reduces the cost of equity capital for firms with higher CSR performance. These findings suggest that one plausible means by which firms with higher earnings quality can maintain better CSR performance is to reduce their cost of equity capital.     

Corporate governance,earnings management,and IFRS: Empirical evidence from Chinese domestically listed companies

This research used 1,329 Chinese publicly listed companies’ data from 1998 to 2009 to investigate how IFRS, state ownership, and board of directors (BOD) influence earnings management. We conclude that state-ownership to an extent discourages earnings management in the current environment of China. However, IFRS implementation does not seem to deter earnings management. When state-ownership is not the case, increasing the number of independent BOD seems to be a good practice to discourage earnings management, although non-independent BOD does not make any difference.     

Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosures: Evidence from India

Over the last few decades, a number of studies, mostly in the western countries, have investigated the nature and frequency of corporate social responsibility disclosures, their patterns and trends, and their general relationships with corporate size and profitability. This study seeks to extend the knowledge regarding the relationship between a number of financial and non-financial corporate characteristics and the level of social responsibility disclosures based on an extensive sample of top Indian companies. Corporate size and industry category are found to correlate with the corporate social disclosures of the companies and the corporate reputation as recognised through awards and social ratings has also been observed to be a significant factor that influences the social disclosures made by the Indian companies.     

Debt,diversification and earnings management

In this article we use panel-estimation techniques to calculate discretionary accruals (DAC) and to produce a better understanding of the nature of the relation between debt and earnings management. Consistent with the transparency hypothesis (which suggests that diversification increases the complexity of firms’ activities and reduces their transparency to outsiders), we find that for less-diversified (more transparent) firms, debt reduces positive discretionary accruals, whereas in relatively more-diversified (less transparent) firms the impact of debt becomes positive. Our paper shows that marginal increases in debt provide the incentives for managers to manipulate earnings, and diversification provides the needed context for this accounting practice to be possible. We have also found that only in the sub-sample of aggressive firms, those that manage discretionary accruals with enough magnitude to increase income, do lenders exert their control. Some firms, however, take advantage of diversification to avoid this control. Our findings are robust to several earnings-management measures and methodologies.     

Reversing an impairment loss and earnings management: The role of corporate governance

This paper examines whether the reversal of a previously recognized impairment loss provides an opportunity for earnings management, and whether such behavior is associated with managers' incentives. It also examines whether a corporate-governance mechanism can mitigate this behavior. Since 2005, listed companies in Taiwan have been required to comply with accounting standards, equivalent to International Accounting Standards (IAS) No. 36 “Impairment of Assets,” which allow reversals of asset-impairment losses. Data on a sample of 55 firms that reversed impairment losses between 2005 and the first quarter of 2007 were matched by industry and size with 55 control firms. Empirical results show that firms recognizing more impairment losses are more likely to reverse impairment losses when doing so would avoid an earnings decline in a subsequent period, which is consistent with the “cookie jar” reserve hypothesis. We also show that such behavior is more pronounced for firms with higher debt ratios, consistent with earnings management being associated with the incentive to avoid violation of debt covenants. However, an effective corporate governance mechanism could mitigate such behavior. Our study may contribute to the debate on global convergence with IFRS, especially convergence between IFRS and U.S. GAAP with respect to the “Impairment of Assets,” by providing a rationale for the latter's prohibition of reversals. It may also contribute to the corporate-governance literature by showing the effect of governance mechanisms on deterring earnings management.