Learning about fiscal policy and the effects of policy uncertainty

In this paper we ask how uncertainty about fiscal policy affects the impact of fiscal policy changes on the economy when the government tries to counteract a deep recession. The agents in our model are uncertain about the conduct of fiscal policy and act as econometricians by estimating fiscal policy rules that might change over time.We find that assuming that agents are not instantaneously aware of the new fiscal policy regime in place leads to substantially more volatility in the short run and persistent differences in average outcomes. We highlight issues that can arise when a policymaker wants to announce a policy change. From a methodological perspective, we introduce a novel way to model learning in the face of discrete policy changes.     

Monetary and fiscal policy under deep habits

Allowing habits to be formed at the level of individual goods – deep habits - can radically alter the fiscal policy transmission mechanism as the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in rather than crowding-out private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy. We find that the presence of deep habits at empirically estimated levels can imply large externalities that significantly affect the conduct of monetary and tax policy. However, despite the rise in government spending multipliers implied by deep habits, government spending is barely used as a stabilisation tool under the optimal policy.     

On the speed and boundaries of structural adjustment when fiscal policy is tight

Governments of transition economies are subject to fiscal constraints (e.g. credit constraints). However, exaggerated fiscal discipline might feed into the structural adjustment process. The government designs and times the privatisation programme, yet may find itself in a fiscal squeeze because restructuring moves costs from firms to the public budget. This paper models this problem in a simple dynamic set-up. Several distinct reform strategies, which differ in the speed and level of structural adjustment, are identified. Tight fiscal discipline in early stages of transition may delay or halt privatisation. A different sequencing of policy or different taxation, benefits, and privatisation sales rules, can rectify this problem.     

Budget regimes and internal governance: considerations for the sustainability of fiscal policy

In a fiscal policy set-up with Ricardian equivalence and rational expectations, the decision-making of private agents is based on the knowledge that current deficits will be met with future tax increases or spending decreases. This view requires that the government's budget exhibit intertemporal balance, or that fiscal policy be sustainable. This paper examines the extent to which sustainability holds in the light of changes in the institutional structure of the budget process and changes in internal House governance rules. The results indicate that certain aspects of sustainability are related to the underlying institutional structure and governance of the budget process. The authors wish to thank the editors and three anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors remain our own.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy when the nominal interest rate is subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint in a stochastic New Keynesian economy. In the baseline model calibrated to match key features of the U.S. economy, it is optimal for the government to increase its spending when at the ZLB in the stochastic environment by about 60 percent more than it would in the deterministic environment. The presence of uncertainty creates a unique time-consistency problem if the steady state is inefficient. Although access to government spending policy increases welfare in the face of a large deflationary shock, it decreases welfare during normal times as the government reduces the nominal interest rate less aggressively before reaching the ZLB.     

The impact of credit and fiscal policy under a liquidity trap

This study examines the interaction of non-conventional credit policy and fiscal policy when adverse financial conditions drive the economy to a deep contraction and conventional monetary policy becomes ineffective as the policy interest rate reaches its effective lower bound. Consistent with other studies, under counter-cyclical financial intermediation costs, credit easing policies aimed at reducing credit spread ameliorate the response of the economy and lead to a faster recovery. More importantly, I find that expansionary fiscal policy during an episode of liquidity trap is associated with a large multiplier effect that prevents an otherwise deeper and longer recession. Moreover, the large impact of expansionary fiscal policy is maintained even if credit policy is already in place.     

Determinants of discretionary fiscal policy in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper explores economic, political and institutional determinants of discretionary fiscal policy in 11 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries from 2000 to 2013 and compares discretionary fiscal reactions before and during the global economic crisis. We find that fiscal policy was procyclical to the output gap both before and during the crisis, while no fiscal reaction to the absorption gap was captured. Our results also indicate a negative relationship between the level of public debt and deficits over the entire period and the pre-crisis period, suggesting that rising public debt represented a brake on future deficits. We also find that election cycles affect the fiscal deficit, but only during the pre-crisis period, while no evidence of a relationship between fiscal policy and government fragmentation was captured. We find some evidence that in the pre-crisis period the CEE countries with a fixed exchange rate regime ran lower deficits than those with a floating regime, whereas during the crisis no impact of the exchange rate regime on the fiscal deficit was found. There is also some evidence that an arrangement with the IMF was associated with lower deficits for the entire sample period. However, no impact of EU accession on the fiscal stance was identified.     

Public infrastructure investment,output dynamics,and balanced budget fiscal rules

We study the dynamic macroeconomic effects of public infrastructure investment under a balanced budget fiscal rule, using an overlapping generations model of a small open economy. The government finances public investment by employing distortionary labor taxes. The balanced budget rule implies a negative short-run output multiplier that exceeds (in absolute terms) the positive long-run output multiplier. Larger public capital spillovers sharpen the intertemporal output tradeoff. In contrast to conventional results regarding public investment shocks, we obtain dampened cyclical responses for plausible parameter values. The cyclical dynamics arise from the interaction between the labor tax rate, the tax base, and the intergenerational spillover effects. We show that financing scenarios involving public debt creation can substantially reduce the short-run output contraction and the transitional macroeconomic fluctuations induced by public investment.     

Innovation dynamics and fiscal policy: Implications for growth,asset prices,and welfare

We study the equilibrium implications of different fiscal policies on macroeconomic quantities and welfare by utilizing an endogenous growth model that matches asset pricing data well. The fiscal instruments of interest are (i) subsidies to R&D expenditure, consumption and capital investment, and (ii) cuts in labor and corporate tax rates. Our equilibrium analysis provides new insights on the interplay of innovation dynamics and fiscal policy. Importantly, we find growth and welfare to be inversely related when changing R&D subsidies. However, this depends on how well the model reproduces asset pricing dynamics. Moreover, only subsidies to capital investments and cuts in the corporate tax rate have the potential to increase both growth and welfare.     

Democratic transition and fiscal policy in the Arab world

This paper investigates the relationship between democracy and public debt in the Arab world over the period 2002–2013. The results show strong evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and public debt. This means that democratization is associated with lower debt only when a certain level of democracy is reached. In an attempt to explain these findings, we assume that the effect of democracy on public debt operates mainly through its impact on government spending and government revenue. Our results show that the inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and public debt stems from the inverted U-shaped democracy-government spending path and the U-shaped democracy-government revenue pattern. This implies that, at the earlier stages of democratization, democracy is associated with an increase in government spending and a decrease in government revenue, which stimulates public debt. However, beyond a certain level of democracy, further democratization reduces government spending and enhances government revenue, leading to lower levels of public debt. Hence, achieving some level of democracy is a key prerequisite to improve the effectiveness of public spending, enhance tax compliance, and thereby control public debt.     

Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.     

Public spending and economies of scale in partial fiscal decentralized governments: The case of Chile

This article evaluates economies of scale in local public spending in Chile, emphasizing the country's geographical features and high fiscal heterogeneity. We leverage balanced panel data for ten years and 307 municipalities in order to estimate the population level at which a reduction in the average cost of local public goods provision occurs and to differentiate between levels of market potential. We follow a theoretical model of cost efficiency that considers spatial interactions and spillover effects among neighboring jurisdictions. Our findings suggest that Chilean municipalities reach an optimum population level at around 700,000 inhabitants, which is high considering that only two cities qualify. When differentiating for levels of economies of scale according to levels of market potential, municipalities with a low potential reach their optimum at around 28,000 inhabitants, those with a medium potential reach it at approximately 124,000, and those with a high potential reach it at approximately 680,000.