Political business cycles and construction licensing

We analyze the effects of opportunistic and partisan politics on the licensing of construction activities, which in turn determines the level of housing supply. In line with Political Business Cycle theory, we hypothesize that the municipal incumbent may manipulate the supply of construction permits before (general and local) elections in order to boost economic activity and voter satisfaction, or to accommodate special‐interest groups. Our findings, based on time‐series data from post‐socialist Tirana (Albania), are consistent with opportunistic and partisan incentives’ creating cycle effects in the licensing of construction permits. However, we find that the direction of opportunistic election cycles depends critically on the interaction between the municipal incumbent and the central‐level government. Our paper raises important questions about the effects of transition politics on spatial development in post‐socialist cities.     

Election cycles and mining-sector governance in post-conflict Kosovo

Political business cycles are typically linked to the manipulation of fiscal or monetary policy instruments. In a recent article, Imami, Lami and Uberti (ILU) argue that opportunistic politicians may also choose to manipulate non-fiscal/non-monetary policy instruments. Here, we extend ILU’s study using time-series data on mining-sector licensing from post-conflict Kosovo (2001–2018). We find robust evidence that is consistent with electoral opportunism in the allocation of mining permits, despite the checks-and-balance mechanisms introduced by Kosovo’s international administrators in an attempt to reduce the politicisation of licensing. That said, the cycle effect is only observed prior to scheduled, as opposed to early, elections. Disaggregating the data by licence type, in addition, we find that the observed election cycle is driven primarily by the manipulation of licences for the mining of construction materials. We argue that, in the context of post-conflict Kosovo, this is the category of licences whose strategic manipulation offers the greatest pay-off to the incumbent. The results raise some questions about the feasibility of fighting political opportunism (and, relatedly, corruption) by establishing formal check-and-balance mechanisms.     

Electoral cycles in perceived corruption: International empirical evidence

I examine whether elections influence perceived corruption in the public sector. Perceived corruption in the public sector is measured by the reversed Transparency International's Perception of Corruption Index (CPI). The dataset includes around 100 democracies over the period 2012–2016, a sample for which the CPI is comparable across countries and over time. The results show that the reversed CPI was about 0.4 points higher in election years than in other years, indicating that perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections. The effect is especially pronounced before early elections (1.0 points) compared to regular elections (0.4 points). Future research needs to investigate why perceived corruption in the public sector increased before elections.     

Variable rational partisan cycles and electoral uncertainty

Variable rational partisan theory of political business cycles suggests differences in inflation under left-wing and right-wing governments. Fluctuations of economic activity result from uncertainty about the electoral outcome and the exact timing of elections. However, the core hypothesis that post-electoral booms and recessions depend upon the degree of electoral uncertainty has rarely been tested. Using polling data, we provide empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis of the existence of variable rational partisan cycles.     

经济转轨、集体腐败与政治改革--基于中国转轨经验的经济学分析

腐败是经济转轨国家中普遍存在的现象,中国当前的腐败问题呈现集体腐败的特征.文章主要是运用博弈理论对集体腐败行为进行解释.文章证明了在中国这样的经济转轨国家,由于缺乏一个独立的监督机构,一般都是上级官员作为其下级官员的监督者,他们非常容易合谋,形成集体腐败.随后文章对中国集体腐败问题做了实证分析,并且提出了相应的政治改革措施.     

Real earnings and business cycles: new evidence

In the time domain, the observed cyclical behavior of the real wage hides a range of economic influences that give rise to cycles of differing lengths and strengths. This may serve to produce a distorted picture of wage cyclicality. Here, we employ frequency domain methods that allow us to assess the relative contribution of cyclical frequency bands on real wage earnings. Earnings are decomposed into standard and overtime components. We also distinguish between consumption and production wages. Frequency domain analysis is carried out in relation to wages alone and to wages in relation to output and employment cycles. Our univariate analysis suggests that, in general, the dominant cycle followed by output, employment, real consumer and producer wages and their components is 5–7 years. Consistent with previous findings reported in the macro-level literature, our bi-variate results show that the various measures of the wage are generally not linked to the employment cycle. However, and in sharp contrast with previous macro-level studies we find strong procyclical links between the consumer wage and its overtime components and the output cycle, especially at the 5–7 years frequency.

Observed real wages are not constant over the cycle, but neither do they exhibit consistent pro- or counter-cyclical movements. This suggests that any attempt to assign systematic real wage movements a central role in an explanation of business cycles is doomed to failure. (lucas 1977)

     

Taxation and corruption: theory and firm-level evidence from Uganda

This article develops a simple framework to analyse the negotiation over bribe and tax payments during the tax collection process. We show that the larger the bribe a firm offers to a tax collector, the larger the tax rebate it gets. More particularly, we show that the negotiation over bribe and tax payments hinges on four other factors: firms’ official liabilities, detection, firms’ negotiation power and red tape costs imposed on firms. Some of the predictions from the theoretical model are tested using firm-level data from Uganda. We find that bribe and tax payments are inversely related, thereby supporting the hypothesis of a negotiation taking place between firms and tax collectors. In particular, a 1% point increase in average bribe payments per employee is associated with a 7% point reduction in average amount of tax payments per employee. Results are robust to various instruments dealing with the endogenous relationship between bribes and taxes.     

Economic uncertainty and corruption: evidence from a large cross-country data set

A vast amount of research has considered numerous causes and correlates of corruption. Also, there have been many studies of the consequences of various forms of uncertainty. However, exploration of the nexus between economic uncertainty and corruption appears scarce. After providing an intuitive and heuristic linkage between general economic uncertainty and corruption, this article uses a large cross-country data set to augment a fairly standard model with simple proxies for uncertainty and to investigate how economic uncertainty might affect the prevalence of corruption. In addition, a quantile-regression framework is used to judge how the strength of various covariates may differ with the level of corruption. Seven main points emerge from the estimates. First, economic uncertainty is associated positively with corruption, and the relation seems to be robust across measures of uncertainty and corruption. Second, quantile-regression estimates indicate considerable parametric heterogeneity across the distribution of corruption. Third, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has the expected corruption-mitigating role. Fourth, increased political rights and civil liberties also appear to lower corruption. Fifth, greater government consumption is associated with lower corruption. Sixth, while the hyperinflation dummy lacks significance in most OLS regressions, its significance varies across the distribution of corruption. Seventh, neither police force nor government subsidies shows significance, but transition economies have more corruption.     

Determinants of business cycles in small scale macroeconomic models: the German case

We identify measures of shocks to total factor productivity and preferences from two real business cycle models and subject them to Granger causality tests to see whether they can be considered exogenous to other plausible sources of the German business cycle. For West German data from 1960.i to 1989.iv we conclude that our measures of shocks are indeed exogenous. This contrasts with similar studies for other countries that question the exogeneity of either productivity or preference shocks. For the period 70.i to 01.iv we find that M3 Granger causes all of our shock measures. We attribute this to the breaks in our time series associated with the German reunification in 1990 and the European Monetary Union in 1999.Earlier versions of this paper circulate as University of Augsburg economics discussion paper no. 213 and Kiel Institute for World Economics working paper no. 1158, respectively.     

Capability and opportunism: Evidence from city officials in China

Opportunism is prevalent in political competition and public policy making. This paper investigates how opportunism is mitigated by capabilities among city leaders in China. Taking advantage of China’s institutional setup with ample bureaucratic transfers, the paper estimates leaders’ capabilities as their personal contributions to local economic growth. The paper finds strong evidence of political business cycles – a typical form of political opportunism – as manifested by a significant boost in the growth rate preceding the Communist Party’s national congress. However, more capable leaders are found to generate more modest political business cycles than less capable ones do. The findings suggest that, to the extent that political selections are associated with the long term reputation of officials, career-concerned opportunism is at least partially moderated by the selection of capable officials in China. The paper provides supportive evidence for the reputation model of political business cycles as well as enriches the study of government officials in weak institutional environments.     

Determinants of co-movement and of lead and lag behavior of business cycles in the Eurozone

In this paper we study business cycle correlations in the Eurozone and its determinants. Additionally, we also analyze the determinants of the lead and lag behavior of business cycles in the Eurozone. We explore the relevance, in the Eurozone context, using GDP and employment as the business cycle measures, of the determinants of business cycle synchronization identified in the literature, namely bilateral trade intensity, dissimilarity of labor market rigidity, dissimilarity in industrial structures, financial openness, and foreign direct investment relations. We estimate a simultaneous 4-equations model by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and three-stage least square to investigate empirically the above-mentioned determinants of business cycle correlation. Bilateral trade relations present a positive influence on business cycle correlations, while the dissimilarity of labor market rigidity presents a negative influence. The rest of the above-mentioned variables are non-significant. These results are robust to the use of the Hodrick–Prescott-filter and first differences as the de-trending methods, as well as the use of GDP as the business cycle measure, excluding the financial crisis years (2008 and 2009). Results for employment as the business cycle measure are in contrast with the previous ones, and found industrial dissimilarity to be the relevant variable to determine business cycles synchronization. In what concerns the determinants of the lead and lag behavior, results show that the member states of the Eurozone that usually lead the cycle are the ones that are wealthier, with strict employment legislation, more specialized in construction and finance sectors, and more prone to international capital movements. Differences in the determinants between contemporaneous business cycles and lead and lag behavior of business cycles are especially important for policy-makers in the Eurozone to know about, in particular if asymmetric shocks between countries are set in place.     

Remittances over the business cycle: Theory and evidence

We examine the behaviour of remittances over the business cycle and their potential to act as a ‘stabilizer’ during periods of high business cycle volatility. Two main findings are reported. First, remittances are less volatile than other foreign currency flows and do not appear to systemically comove with business cycle fluctuations. Second, remittances are relatively stable even during episodes of sharp business cycle volatility, such as those associated with sudden stops and financial crises. We also provide an overview of the theoretical literature on the implications of different motives to remit for the cyclical behaviour of remittances.     

Growth and welfare effects of business cycles in economies with idiosyncratic human capital risk

This paper uses a tractable macroeconomic model with idiosyncratic human capital risk and incomplete markets to analyze the growth and welfare effects of business cycles. The analysis is based on the assumption that the elimination of business cycles eliminates the variation in idiosyncratic risk. The paper shows that a reduction in the variation in idiosyncratic risk decreases the ratio of physical to human capital and increases the total investment return and welfare. If the degree of risk aversion is less than or equal to one, then economic growth is enhanced. This paper also provides a quantitative assessment of the macroeconomic effects of business cycles based on a calibrated version of the model. Even for relatively small degrees of risk aversion (around one) the model implies that the elimination of business cycles has substantial effects on investment in physical and human capital, economic growth, and welfare.     

Fiscal policy,business cycles and discretion: evidence from the Western Balkans

While previous research has examined the macroeconomic performance of the New Member States during the boom–bust cycle of the 2000s, very little has been written on the experience of the Western Balkans. In this article we investigate the responsiveness of fiscal policy to business cycles in the Western Balkans, examining whether expenditure moved counter-cyclically and whether a larger proportion of expenditure was ‘discretionary’; that is, related to the political cycle rather than economic conditions. Our results suggest that fiscal policy did not move counter-cyclically in the Western Balkans. Instead, countries overspent in the boom years and then reduced spending as a result of financing constraints during the crisis. Furthermore, the discretionary component of fiscal policy, defined here as spending unexplained by inertia and economic conditions, appears to be somewhat larger in the Western Balkans than in the European Union. This has important policy implications that affect the effectiveness of fiscal policy in dampening economic fluctuations.     

Endogenous business cycles and Harrodian instability in an agent-based model

The article presents an original stock-flow consistent macroeconomic agent-based model with the aim to reexamine Harrod’s instability principle as an explanatory element of macroeconomic dynamics. The main findings are that bottom-up economic models can be subject to Harrodian instability and can produce endogenous cycles without introducing innovation waves, monetary wage spirals, or financial instability. Upward instability is stopped by the ceiling of full employment, and downward instability can be tamed by introducing an autonomous expenditure that feeds aggregate demand.     

The recent process of job polarization in Japan: evidence from 1980 to 2010

This study investigates the recent process of job polarization in Japan. We focus on three particular aspects: the relationship with business cycles, total hours rather than employment and age cohorts. We find that, regardless of whether the focus is employment or total hours, job polarization is concentrated in recessions and that job polarization has occurred mainly in younger-age cohorts.     

Business cycles and productivity growth: Are temporary downturns productive or wasteful?

This paper investigates the relationship between the structure of the business cycle and total factor productivity (TFP) growth in U.S. manufacturing. Previous empirical studies on cycle-growth interactions have been conducted at the aggregate level, and have produced mixed results. In contrast, we examine the dynamic linkages between temporary employment shocks and TFP at the industry level, using the NBER Productivity Database. Given the substantial differences in factor intensities, costs and the nature of innovation and productivity-enhancing activities across industries, there are good reasons why cycle-growth interactions may be more readily captured at the sectoral level. We construct an exactly identified Vector Autoregressive model for employment and TFP growth, and find strong support for the “opportunity-cost” view of business cycle-productivity growth interaction. This result suggests that recessions can lead to TFP growth through reorganization and restructuring effects. On the other hand, we find little support for the notion that temporary booms increase TFP through “learning-by-doing” effects. The responsiveness of TFP to employment shocks also seems to be related to the degree of job reallocation within individual industries and the capital intensity of the industry in question. This is further evidence in favour of the view that employment shocks can trigger reorganization effects. Finally, we suggest possible future avenues for this research, including the adjustment of TFP measures to allow for variable factor utilization over the cycle.     

Extracting business cycles with three filters: A comparative study and application in the case of China

This paper aims to evaluate the performances of the wavelet, Hodrick–Prescott (HP), and Baxter–King (BK) filters in extracting cyclical information and to use an appropriate method to analyze China's business cycles. First, we use a second-order autoregression (AR (2)) and random walk, based on Monte Carlo simulation experiments, to generate the data-generating processes (DGPs) with different frequency characteristics. Second, the HP, BK, and wavelet filters are applied to extract the cyclical components of the respective DGPs. Third, the filtering abilities of the three methods are statistically compared. The results show the following: (1) Under the condition that the DGP is low frequency (long cycle) and trend dominated, the filtering performance of the three methods will remain unsatisfactory. (2) If the DGP is high frequency (short cycle), all three methods can serve as effective methods regardless of whether they are trend dominated or cycle dominated. However, it can be seen that the BK and wavelet filters present better performance than the HP filter. (3) In other cases, better filtering performances can be observed in the wavelet. Finally, the three methods are applied to estimate China's business cycles. In conclusion, this paper argues that the wavelet can effectively replace HP and BK filters to extract cyclical components.     

Politics and the stock market: Evidence from Germany

We analyze the interaction of stock market movements and politics in Germany. Evidence from popularity functions and VAR-based evidence suggests that stock market returns have affected the popularity of German governments. We only find weak evidence that the political process has had an impact on the stock market. In contrast to empirical evidence for the U.S., we do not find that German stock market returns tend to be higher during left-wing than during right-wing governments. Also in contrast to results for the U.S., we find no evidence for an election cycle in German stock market returns.     

Tax tilting and politics: Some theory and evidence for Latin America

A government budget deficit can exist for at least two possible reasons: tax smoothing and/or tax tilting. Under tax-smoothing, deficits are temporary phenomena resulting from the decision not to vary the tax rate in response to fluctuations in government spending (as a share of output). This is done in order to minimize the distortionary cost of taxes. Tax tilting occurs whenever the government has an incentive to discount the losses to society from taxes at a higher rate than society discounts them; hence it delays taxes or advances spending introducing an upward trend in total government debt. This paper develops a model that implies that tax-tilting tends to increase with political risk. An increase in political risk, measured by the probability of losing power, increases the rate at which the government discounts the future, causing government policy to be relatively more myopic. Hence it delays taxes or advances spending and its deficit increases. Using data from a panel of 19 Latin-American countries for the period 1984–2009, the paper presents estimation results that strongly support the proposition that an increase in political risk increases the degree of tax-tilting.