Optimal Loan Interest Rate Contract Design

This paper analyzes optimal loan interest rate contracts under conditions of risky, symmetric information for one-period (static) and multi-period (dynamic) models. The optimal loan interest rate depends upon the volatility of, and co-variation among the market interest rate, borrower collateral, and borrower income, as well as the time horizon and the risk preferences of lenders and borrowers. For a risk-averse borrower with stochastic collateral, variable interest rate contracts are, in general, Pareto optimal. For plausible assumptions, the optimal loan interest rate for the multi-period model often exhibits muted responses to changes in market interest rates, making fixed rate loans a reasonable approximation for the optimal loan. Hence, in the absence of optimal contracts, long-term (short-term) borrowers tend to prefer fixed rate (variable) contracts.     

再制造系统最优合同设计

再制造工程的经济、环保、自然资源节约以及缓解就业压力等方面的作用,已经在工业发达国家得到充分的证实。在分散决策的情况下,由零售商进行废旧品回收的模式是最优的,但与集中决策的供应链绩效相比还表现出一定的低效率或不效率。本文在比较分散决策与集中决策供应链绩效的基础上,对分散决策模型进行优化改进,设计最优激励合同,以提高实际分散决策的绩效,为工业实践提供理论指导最后指出了未来的研究方向。     

论信息非对称下债权契约的优化设计

由于信息的非对称,作为债券投资者的债权人与作为负债方的股东或经理就必然存在利益冲突。优化设计债权契约可以避免企业经理或股东对债权人的财富进行掠夺,或把债权人的财富损失减小到最小程度。债权契约的创新性设计主要是在债权契约中加入可赎回条款和可转换条款等内容,而所有这些设计都是为了解决信息不对称问题,即让债务人说真话。     

The Design of an Optimal Area Yield Crop Insurance Contract

This article focuses on the design of a crop insurance contract when the indemnity is based on the aggregate yield of a surrounding geographical area. Coinsurance under a critical yield often provides an efficient sharing of systemic risk. Under a linear relationship between individual yield and aggregate yield, the optimal form depends on the individual beta coefficient, which measures the sensitivity of individual yield to aggregate yield. The optimal hedging position of the producer on the yield options market is to buy put options or call options depending upon whether his beta coefficient is positive or negative.     

Disappointment and the Optimal Insurance Contract

This paper studies the optimal insurance contract under disappointment theory. We show that, when the individuals anticipate disappointment, there are two types of optimal insurance contract. The first type contains a deductible and a coinsurance above the deductible. We find that zero marginal cost is just a sufficient but not a necessary condition for a zero deductible. The second type has no deductible and the optimal insurance starts with full coverage for small losses and includes a coinsurance above an upper value of the full coverage.     

Insurance Contract Design When the Insurer Has Private Information on Loss Size

This article examines the optimal indemnity contract in an insurance market, when the insurer has private information about the size of an insurable loss. Both parties know whether or not a loss occurred, but only the insurer knows the true value of the loss and/or to what extent the losses are covered under the policy. The insured may verify the insurer's loss estimate for a fixed auditing cost. The optimal contract reimburses the auditing costs in addition to full insurance for losses less than some endogenous limit. For losses exceeding this limit, the contract pays a fixed indemnity and requires no monitoring. The optimal contract is compared with the contracts obtained in cases where it is only the insured who can observe the loss size.
     

信息不对称下订单农业合约设计

基于绿色成本信息不对称,运用博弈方法,构建二级绿色订单农业供应链,考量订单农业合约设计.结果表明:信息不对称下,采用批发价合同,公司利润可能受损,当公司高估绿色成本时,农户获利;采用收益分享合同,公司利润可能受损,但有利农户.无论信息是否对称,当农户的保留收益、绿色努力成本系数或产出不确定性较小时,公司宜选择收益分享合同;反之,宜选择批发价合同.与批发价合同相比,菜单合同可以降低信息不对称性和供应链的"双边际"效应,激励农户增加绿色投入,促进优质绿色农产品供给和各主体增收.     

Optimal Hedging and the Partial Loss Offset Provision

In this paper, we examine how taxation affects the optimal hedging behaviour of an investor exposed to price risk under partial loss offset provision. In this regime, only part of the loss is refunded through the tax. As such, it implies a non-linearity in the taxation schedule. More specifically, we look at an individual endowed with some fixed quantity of a commodity and facing a price risk. The optimal hedging policy is derived. The comparative statics of a tightening of the PLO provision and a changing risk aversion are analysed. We show that the response of the optimal hedging policy to a change in the tax rate can be signed by a preference free or a preference related sufficient condition, involving the notions of cost-of-carry and partial risk aversion.     

Capital Structure as an Optimal Contract Between Employees and Investors

The ex ante optimal contract between investors and employees is derived endogenously and is interpreted in terms of debt, equity, and employees' compensation. Although public equity financing is feasible in this model through verified accounting income, debt is needed to force value-enhancing restructuring before the income realizes. The optimal debt level, however, is lower than that which maximizes the value of the firm when there is nonmonetary restructuring-related cost to employees. The paper explains how stock prices react to exchange offers, how earnings can be diluted by a decrease in leverage, and why employees' claims are generally senior to those of investors. New testable implications about leverage and compensation levels are derived.     

Sovereign Debt: Optimal Contract,Underinvestment, and Forgiveness

In this paper we develop a time consistent rational expectations model which analyzes the equilibrium loan contract between a borrowing country and a foreign bank. The loan contract specifies both the amount of the loan and the promised interest payments, and rationally reflects the investment decisions of the country and the possibilities of renegotiation and repudiation of the debt. An important feature of the model is that at the initial negotiation of the loan there is uncertainty about whether the country will renegotiate for partial forgiveness in the future, and whether it will eventually repudiate the debt, even having successfully renegotiated. Moreover, the probabilities of renegotiation and repudiation, and the amount of possible forgiveness are endogenously determined. In the model the repudiation decision is directly related to the underinvestment problem; the objective of the renegotiation is precisely to alleviate this problem. The model is used to analyze the effects of four variables on both the optimal contract and the country's welfare: the degree of penalties that a bank can impose on a defaulting country, the uncertainty of production, the productivity of investments and the riskless interest rate. The analysis has policy implications as well as testable predictions.     

An Extension of Arrow's Result on Optimal Reinsurance Contract

We consider the problem of finding reinsurance policies that maximize the expected utility, the stability and the survival probability of the cedent for a fixed reinsurance premium calculated according to the maximal possible claims principle. We show that the limited stop loss and the truncated stop loss are the optimal contracts.     

创业企业中的双边道德风险与最优融资合约

创业家和创业资本家都付出不可观察的努力来提高企业的效率,创业企业面临双边道德风险.本文解释了创业企业融资合约中常见的可转换证券的融资安排.当创业家和创业资本家的联合努力有助于提高项目的收益时,双方的努力程度与投资的数量相关.论文证明当投资者的投资比例低时,她必须被赋予普通股,而当其投资比例高时,她获得可转换债券或优先股.此外,通过比较三种创业投资市场结构下最优合约的特征,本文表明在创业投资市场中,垄断比竞争更能有效率地控制双向道德风险.     

金融期货合约规模设计研究

金融期货合约规模的大小会对市场交易造成影响。过小的合约规模将增加交易者的交易成本，而过大的合约规模却会阻止一些小额交易者进入市场，使得成交量减小，买卖价差价值扩大，市场交易效率降低。合约规模是否合理可通过比例法和合约风险价值法来判断。我国开展金融期货，可采用先大合约规模、后小合约规模方式进行。     

金融合约设计的因素分析

通过一个模型说明,隐藏信息、隐藏行动、逆向选择和风险态度是影响金融合约设计的4个主要因素,但这是在要素市场上的局部均衡分析,在此之上加入产品市场作了一般均衡分析,得出市场结构也是影响金融合约设计的因素。隐藏信息和隐藏行动的存在激励参与方签订债务合约;对于具有项目风险的逆向选择情况来说,参与方倾向于签订股权合约。     

信息不对称下私募股权投资金融契约的选择

本文在金融契约理论基础上,分析了金融契约的要素,对不同国家私募股权投资的金融契约进行了对比分析,强调私募股权投资金融契约的动态设计,最后分析了中国的制度框架对私募股权投资金融契约设计的约束。     

购房合同解除对银行借款合同、抵押合同的影响分析——一起购房合同解除引发借款合同和抵押合同解除的案例启示

基本案情1999年7月30日,王永辉与王都实业有限公司(以下简称王都公司)签订《商品房购销合同》,王永辉购买王都公司开发的位于B市小庄区新村河边街1号五福世家C幢8楼1号房屋一套,总房款为793336元。合同签订后,王永辉向王都公司首付房款243335.60元,余款为银行按揭。1999年8月11日,王永辉与A银     

绿色PPP项目组合的最优契约:经济与环境效应的福利视角

绿色PPP搭配高收益项目的激励方式是吸引社会资本参与环境治理的举措之一。本文基于经济与环境的双重福利效应,从理论上研究了该激励方式的契约设计问题,阐释了博弈均衡的存在性以及最优特许期的形成逻辑和关键决定因素。研究表明:第一,绿色PPP搭配高收益项目能够提高企业利润,激发社会资本参与环境治理来应对环境风险。第二,政企双方博弈决策模式决定了契约能否订立。如果独立决策,使企业利润最大的特许期也能够带来最高的环境效益,但此时博弈结果展现为“刀刃上的均衡”,契约难以建立;如果合作博弈,双方最优特许期选择达成一致,契约得以订立,政府向企业让渡经济利润而收获环境效益,最终实现经济与环境福利的双赢。第三,绿色PPP搭配高收益项目优于传统政府补贴的激励方式,在收获同等环境效益的基础上,能够带动社会总福利的提升。研究结论为绿色PPP搭配高收益项目激励方式的推广实施、从而助力实现碳达峰和碳中和战略目标提供了契约设计理论依据和相关框架。     

企业契约性质 管理会计系统职能及其设计原则

本文从现代企业契约的性质出发 ,重新认识和讨论了管理会计的职能以及管理会计系统设计的原则等基础性理论问题 ,试图为管理会计的基础理论研究提供一个新的视角。     

试析国外住房抵押贷款合同设计

本文运用非对称信息经济学原理,研究国外住房抵押贷款合同设计,以此提出我国开发固定利率住房抵押贷款合同以及在合同中设定点数的重要性。     

不确定性、信息不对称与风险投资契约工具选择

现代契约理论认为，契约结构在很大程度上由信息分布决定。由于人力资本内生不确定性导致的信息不对称，使得可转换优先股在风险投资契约中被广泛使用。本文认为，其原因在于可转换优先股隐含了更多的选择权，可以更好地适应风险投资过程中的不确定性。