全球价值链分工与产业集聚——基于省级面板数据

本文分析全球价值链分工对产业集聚的影响机制,估计影响产业集聚的各个效应边际效益.通过理论分析,使用省级面板数据的空间计量模型分析全球价值分工程度通过要素禀赋效应、金融外部性效应、技术外部性效应和贸易成本效应影响制造业产业集聚机制.结果显示,我国制造业在国际竞争中具有劳动力和资本的竞争优势,随着参与国际分工程度的加深,金融外部性和技术外部性对于产业集聚有明显正向影响,但贸易成本效应会阻碍产业集聚进程.     

中国银行业竞争的外部性经济学溯源

中国金融业全面对外资开放,银行业的竞争格局面临重塑.分析了中国银行业竞争态势,揭示了中外银行业竞争格局异同的深层文化因素和外部性理论的起源及其在金融产业经济中的发展过程,提出外部性理论演进对中国银行业竞争的启示.     

生态税的经济学基础分析

(一)经济学基础之一:“市场失灵”。根据英国经济学家庇古的外部性理论,由于自然环境提供的服务不能在市场像其他普通商品一样进行交易,市场机制无法对经济运行主体在生产和消费过程中可能产生的环境污染进行调控。庇古将这种以危害自然为表现形式的外部性,称为“负的外部性”。由此看来,生态环境污染是负外部性的典型表现形式。作为微观经济活动的主体,生产者在生产过程中产生的污染成本未参与其产成品的生产成本核算,只是一种社会成本。由于企业无须参与社会成本的负担,在追求其利益最大化的驱使下,按照“边际收益=边际成本”的原则,安排…     

食品安全违法成本的经济学分析

在分析食品安全违法成本构成的基础上,从经济学的视角,利用外部性理论分析了食品安全违法存在着外部不经济,即食品安全违法的边际社会成本高于其边际私人成本;食品安全违法具有信息不对称性,同时,利用博弈论的方法分析了对食品安全违法的监管问题;提出加强政府监管,完善政府立法,以及突出食品行业协会的作用,加强食品企业社会责任意识等保障食品安全的措施。     

中外银行业有效竞争的外部性比较

从银行业竞争的沿革、监管体制、稳定性等方面比较分析我国银行业和外国银行业的竞争格局的外部性特征，对中国银行业国内银行与外资银行竞争格局态势作对比分析，由此提出优化银行业竞争环境的政策建议。     

银行业的竞争对企业外部融资的影响——基于中国制造业的分析

本文分析了我国银行业竞争程度对制造业外部融资行为以及制造业本身发展的影响,并据此判断银行业竞争程度的动态变化对我国经济发展的影响。首先,通过Panzar-Rosse模型测度了1998～2008年间我国银行业市场的竞争程度,结果表明,我国银行业市场竞争度在样本期内呈现出上升的趋势;其次,运用OLS方法分析了银行业市场竞争度对不同外部融资依赖程度的制造业部门的影响,结果发现,银行业市场竞争度的上升为制造业的外部融资行为提供了便利,有利于外部融资依赖度较高类型的制造业部门的发展。因此,本文得出的结论为,银行业竞争程度的上升促进了制造业的发展和经济增长。     

外部性理论在森林环境资源定价中的应用

本外部性理论是解释经济活动与森林生态环境问题的基础理论。本文利用外部性理论对森林环境外部性的计量分析进行初步的演绎和推算，推出公式为森林环境资源价格=森林资源产品原木的国际价格-边际生产成本-边际使用成本。     

民营银行发展的外部效应分析

民营银行具有异质产权的基本特征,它的进入,用主导厂商模型来分析,可以使国有商业银行的需求曲线和边际收益曲线发生显著移动,从而导致整个银行业市场结构的变化,产生有效竞争并增加产出;表现在HHI指数的变化趋势上,可以看出有正的外部效应发生。     

企业内部资本市场的边界确定

内部资本市场有效性与其边界息息相关。内部资本市场的边界确定则主要取决于内部资本市场带来的边际收益和边际成本增加之间的权衡。产业外部竞争压力和收益波动性、企业内部管理水平、法律规定及企业契约的约束、外部资本市场的完善等因素也会影响内部资本市场边界的确定。我国转轨时期企业内部资本市场运作的边际收益和边际成本都远远高于发达市场经济国家,积极完善企业集团内部治理机制和外部制度环境对于合理科学的确定我国企业内部资本市场边界具有更加重要的意义。     

论外部性与生育行为——有关生育的外部性经济分析

外部性是经济学中进行制度分析时常用的经济范畴。如果将经济行为主体扩展为生育行为主体,这一理论同样可以适用于人类的生育行为分析,即人类的生育行为存在外部性。生育外部性以家庭为单位,将生育行为视为一种家庭行为,分析生育孩子而造成的外部成本或收益。主要从经济学和人口学两个视角来归纳梳理了与生育有关的外部性理论,阐述了多种外部性与生育行为的关系。创新之处在于尝试从经济学以及人口学的理论角度重新分析影响家庭生育行为的生育外部性问题,提出了通过生育政策对外部性的影响使得生育行为外部性内在化,从而为进一步统筹解决人口发展问题提供了新的思路。     

Optimal Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists with Endogenous Market Structure

This paper examines the optimal output taxes for polluting oligopolists under endogenous market structure, in the presence of external costs that vary exogenously with aggregate output. For general functional forms, we show that (i) the equilibrium number of firms in an industry may differ from the socially optimal number of firms and (ii) the second-best optimal taxes under imperfect competition could be less than, equal to, or greater than marginal external damages depending upon the curvature of market demand.     

Road Transport Externalities

During the last decade much progress has been made in defining & measuring the external costs of transport. As the cost of tolling equipment falls, the set of realistic policy options to internalise these externalities will continue to grow. This will determine the research and policy agenda. We make three points. Firstly, empirical work is still necessary to better identify marginal external costs, including congestion, accident and environmental costs. Secondly, any assessment of policy options should treat externalities simultaneously. The use of pricing instruments and emissions standards are discussed within this framework. Thirdly, we emphasise the role of government. Designing the optimal road-pricing institutions requires consideration of horizontal and vertical tax competition, while double-dividend arguments are central to the question of securing public support.     

A Note on Strategic Trade Policy and Endogenous Quality Choice*

This paper shows that some of the main policy implications in Park (2001 ) and Zhou, Spencer, and Vertinsky (2002 ) are sensitive to their assumptions on marginal production costs. The unilaterally optimal policy for investment towards quality improvement is analyzed, assuming constant and non‐negative marginal production costs under vertically differentiated international duopoly. If marginal production costs are different across firms, the optimal policy for each exporting country may be opposite in its sign from that shown by the existing papers under Bertrand competition. The policy reversal may also occur for the low‐quality exporting country under Cournot competition.     

WHOLESALE PRICES AND COURNOT‐BERTRAND COMPETITION

This note considers the competing vertical structures framework with Cournot‐Bertrand competition downstream. It shows that the equilibrium wholesale price paid by a Cournot (Bertrand)‐type retailer is above (below) marginal costs of a corresponding manufacturer. This result contrasts with the one under pure competition downstream (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand), where the wholesale price is set below (above) marginal costs in case of a Cournot (Bertrand) game at the retail level.     

Tax evasion and competition

Using a Cournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, we show that more intense competition may have the negative side effect of increasing tax evasion, thereby, lowering public revenues and welfare. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave, or convex and inelastic. The result of more competition, less evasion and higher public revenues will be obtained if (a) marginal production costs fall and demand is convex and elastic or (b) the demand elasticity increases. As a policy implication, we prove that tax enforcement should be intensified if there is a negative trade‐off between competition and evasion.     

External Effects of Agricultural Production in Italy and Environmental Accounting

This paper deals with the valuation of some negative external effects arising from agricultural production in Italy. External effects are treated in a transformation function as a bad output additional to the normal output of a production activity. In this case we can distinguish a price component or shadow price of the external effect and a quantity component and estimate them separately. In order to calculate the price component of the external effects we first estimate one point on the marginal external costs curve and then try to obtain the whole curve, i.e. external costs associated to different levels of emissions in different years. As to the quantity component, net emissions of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Potassium have been estimated. The aggregate value of external effects is then calculated for thirty years from 1961 to 1991 and deducted from the value added of the agricultural sector, as a first step towards the correction of national accounting aggregates to take environmental degradation into account.     

Competition in the Portuguese economy: insights from a profit elasticity approach

The article uses the elasticity of profits to marginal costs, as in Boone (Econ J 111:1245–1261, 2008b), to measure the degree of competition in the Portuguese economy in a period characterised by the reallocation of resources towards the non-tradable sector and the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances. Using firm-level data for the period 2000–2009, we find that there is lower competition intensity in the non-tradable sector. The least competitive markets within this sector lay in professional services, network industries and segments of retail trade. We also find that reductions in competition intensity are relatively widespread in the economy, but in terms of sales, gross value added and employment they are more substantial in the non-tradable sector. Results suggest that some network industries and other services exhibit low and a declining competition intensity in the period under analysis. In addition, the article discusses the coherence of the profit elasticity with classic indicators of market power, such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index and the price-cost margin, and find that in more than half of the markets there is an agreement in the dynamics of competition intensity.     

SSNIP, state-owned enterprises, public goods and complements

State-owned enterprises sometimes operate in markets below marginal costs in order to provide public goods. In practice it happens that they can cross-subsidize their activity in other markets since regulation is not perfect. Based on a simple model, I show that such cross-subsidization reduces at least consumer welfare. In competition law, the SSNIP test is used to identify market power. If the state-owned enterprises have some scope for price discrimination, the paper argues that the paradox of the SSNIP test that companies operating below marginal costs are a monopolist on a ??relevant market?? makes sense. The paper recommends imposing a duty to deal as a special responsibility for these companies. Finally, it is argued that some criteria are necessary to refine the applicability of competition law in such situations. Subadditivity of the underlying cost structure should be one sufficient condition to apply competition law.     

Foreign competition and social efficiency of entry

We consider social efficiency of firm-entry in the presence of foreign competition. If the labour markets are competitive, entry is insufficient for the domestic country if the transportation cost is low and the marginal costs of the domestic firms are sufficiently higher than the marginal cost of the foreign firm. In the presence of a domestic labour union, entry is always socially insufficient for the domestic country. Hence, the anti-competitive entry-regulation policy may not be justified in an industry facing foreign competition, and it may depend on the transportation cost, the marginal cost difference between the firms and the domestic labour market structure.