Central Banking in a Democratic Society

This Tinbergen lecture addresses two issues. The first concerns the principles of monetary policy in a low-inflation environment. The second, more fundamental, issue concerns the institutional arrangements by which monetary policy is set in a democratic society. Three conclusions are drawn: (1) Monetary policy matters. Despite some major mistakes, American postwar economic policy has led to far greater stability of the economy. (2) Strategies of opportunistic disinflation or pre-emptive strikes are based on hypotheses for which there is little empirical support. An alternative strategy, called cautious expansionism, would be preferable. (3) A central bank must be accountable and sensitive to democratic processes; there must be more democracy in the choice of decision makers and more representativeness in the governance structure.     

Designing a central bank: Social player,monetary agent,or banking agent?

This paper reviews recent advances on the role of the central bank in the money supply process and its effects on inflation. The literature is presented according to a three-stage process, with the central bank acting first as social player, then as monetary agent, and finally as a combined monetary and banking agent.     

Maastricht: New and Old Rules

Thanks to the Maastricht Treaty and similar arrangements, central banks nowadays enjoy considerable independence. This is generally believed to be the result of relatively recent debates, which led to the conclusion that sheltering monetary authorities from the pressures of fiscal policymakers is a prerequisite for monetary stability. However, in history this point has in fact been a recurrent tenet. We start with David Ricardo’s arguments in favour of central bank independence and against monetisation of public deficits. After WWI, the latter issue was at the heart of the 1920 International Financial Conference of the League of Nations, which fostered and guided the establishment of many new central banks, and shaped various policymaking arrangements of today’s monetary authorities. JEL Classification Numbers: B12, B22, E42, E58, E61     

Fiscal policy in monetary unions: Implications for Europe

This paper analyzes how the feasible mix of government expenditure and financing arrangements may change with the establishment of a monetary union such as that planned by members of the European Community. We find that a monetary union reduces the feasible divergence across countries in their present discounted levels of fiscal spending. Wide differences across countries in their present and future time patterns of spending are still possible, however. Examination of the empirical evidence suggests that the movement toward greater exchange rate fixity associated with the EMS and participation in quasi monetary unions havenot been accompanied by significant fiscal convergence. The experience of member states of several existing monetary unions, however, suggests that a more effective constraint to budgetary discipline arises within full-fledged unions in operation over long periods, even in the absence of binding central rules on government deficit and debt positions.     

货币从紧政策下央行票据的货币调控效果探析

我国目前的货币政策工具中占主要地位的是央行票据。它的发行引起了社会的广泛关注。它代表了中央银行对目前宏观经济的调控方向。本文从它收缩市场上流动货币的能力及它与各项经济指标的关联性入手,分析它在货币政策调控中的效果。     

Devaluation and monetary policy with import compression

The consequences of exchange rate and monetary policies are investigated under two foreign exchange regimes. The analysis is motivated by the experiences in sub-Saharan Africa. The supply side of the open economy model developed by Buffle (1986) is modified to take into account the import dependency of the region. In the first regime, with endogenous foreign savings, overvalued exchange rate and expansionary monetary policy tend to increase the current account deficit. In the second regime, when intermediate imports are rationed to handle the foreign exchange shortage, overvaluation and monetary expansion are shown to be likely sources of output contraction. The cost of policy reorientation is reduced investment.     

An Empirical Observation on Central Bank Independence and Real Output

This note reviews the relation between central bank independence and real output for the 1970s and 1980s. A new statistic, based on the total amount of real output available in a decade, is proposed in order to broaden the analysis of the impact of central bank independence on real output. The results show that, although there is no correlation between central bank independence and average growth, central bank independence had a significantly negative impact on the sum of real output during the 1980s. For the 1970s, central bank independence had no influence on the total quantity of real output.     

Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU

Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that montary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetary Union (EMU), while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services.     

Research on principal-agency of stockholders and managers under asymmetric information condition

In modem enterprises, a separation of the right of ownership and management results in asymmetric information problems between stockholders and managers. In conditions of principal-agency relationship, the game behaviors between principle and agency within enterprises are impacted by asymmetric information. This study discusses the game behaviors between stockholders and managers by using information economic theories from the perspective of asymmetric information. Based on the model of the principal-agency relationship between stockholders and managers, our research uses quantitative analysis to reveal how to achieve maximum profit expected of stockholders through an incomplete contract, under asymmetric information condition.     

Micro-aspects of monetary policy: Lender of Last Resort and selection of banks in pre-war Japan

This paper explores how the Bank of Japan (BOJ) dealt with the trade-off between stability of the financial system and the moral hazard of banks in pre-war Japan. The BOJ concentrated Lender of Last Resort (LLR) loans with those banks that had an established transaction relationship with the BOJ. At the same time, the BOJ carefully selected its transaction counterparts, and did not hesitate to end the relationship if the performance of a counterpart declined. Further, the BOJ was selective in providing LLR loans. Through this policy, the BOJ could avoid the moral hazard that the LLR policy might otherwise have incurred.     

Central Bank Independence,Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio

Using a theoretical model in which the degree of central bank independence affects the degree of inflation persistence and therefore the speed of disinflation, this paper suggests that sacrifice ratios are lower when central bank independence is higher. Empirical tests, using estimates of sacrifice ratios based on disinflation episodes for 18 OECD countries during the 1960–90 period, show that this result also holds empirically. This finding seems to be consistent with the credibility hypothesis by pointing out that an independent central bank may produce a credibility bonus.     

Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers: Inflation versus Money Supply and Exchange Rate Targets

Some recent papers have shown how a simple contract can eliminate the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy. This paper shows that if the central banker is risk averse, a contract in terms of money is superior to one in terms of inflation. The paper also shows that, if the central banker cares about his reappointment, an exchange rate target might always leads to the implementation of the optimal policy.     

Central Bank Autonomy,the Exchange Rate Constraint and Inflation: The Case of Italy, 1970–1992

This paper analyzes the determinants of inflation in Italy over the period 1970–1992. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of central bank independence in influencing monetary growth, and on the role of monetary growth and of the Exchange rate Mechanism (ERM) in affecting inflation. In the 1970s and early 1980s, when the Bank of Italy lacked independence and the ERM was still not credible, monetary growth was highly unstable and was the main determinant of Italian inflation, although oil price and tax shocks also played a role. After the March 1983 general exchange rate realignment and the French U-turn, the ERM became more credible and monetary growth stopped being a significant determinant of inflation; instead, the German inflation became the main variable influencing Italian inflation.     

Central Bank Independence and Sacrifice Ratios: Some Further Considerations

The existing literature reports a positive relationship between sacrifice ratios and central bank independence. This paper discusses two critical points related to the usual procedures employed by this literature. One concerns the issue of non-stationarity of the inflation rate, the other the problem of correlation between the error terms for different disinflation episodes in the same country. The way in which the sacrifice ratio-central bank independence relationship is tested is reconsidered taking into account these points. Our results shed considerable doubts on the nature and robustness of such a relationship and on the usual interpretation given to it in the literature.     

Macroeconomic stabilization through monetary and fiscal policy coordination: Implications for European Monetary Union

In a two-country model, we consider the implications of monetary and fiscal policy coordination for macroeconomic stabilization. We show that the optimal regime is one of monetary and fiscal policy coordination under flexible exchange rates. In the context of the European Community, this suggests that the desire to fix exchange rates may not be costless. In addition, we show that fiscal coordination requires a relatively high degree of flexibility in fiscal policy. This result suggests that limits on the flexibility of fiscal policies, as suggested in the Delors Report, may hinder macroeconomic stabilization.     

货币政策公布效应、投资者情绪与市场状态

从世界范围来看,我国证券市场属于新兴资本市场。所以从实践来看,宏观经济政策调控会对证券市场产生影响,其传递路径主要通过对投资者心理产生作用,进而会影响到投资者价值与价格的比较判断,最终导致证券市场的非正常波动。本文在结合国内外研究的基础上构建基于最小二乘的多元回归模型研究货币政策公布效应。研究结果显示:投资者心理指标的变动与证券指数有显著的相关性,而货币政策的调整幅度、虚变量市场状态对应的P值大于对应的显著性水平α,显示货币政策信息公布时点及调整幅度在市场处于牛市或熊市下不能一致性地产生溢价收益。     

ECB Foreign Exchange Intervention and the EURO: Institutional Framework,News, and Intervention

Using a unique intervention news data set, this paper investigates the impact of ECB intervention and intervention-related news (newswire reports) on the Euro exchange rate. A time-series study of news generated by ECB officials and market participants regarding intervention and the value of the Euro as well as an event study of firm reports of ECB intervention is conducted. Both studies find significant short-run effects on the Euro value, while only negative statements (official statements denying past intervention or ruling out future intervention) appear to have persistent effects.     

Modeling coordinated foreign exchange market interventions: The case of the Japanese and U.S. interventions in the 1990s

During the past thirty years, central banks often intervened in foreign exchange markets. Sometimes they carried out foreign exchange market interventions on a unilateral basis. However, central banks often coordinated their foreign exchange market interventions. We develop a quantitative reaction function model that renders it possible to study the factors that made central banks switch from unilateral to coordinated interventions. We apply our model to the intervention policies of the Japanese monetary authorities and the U.S. Federal Reserve in the yen/U.S. dollar market during the period 1991–2001. To this end, we use recently released official data on the foreign exchange market interventions of the Japanese monetary authorities. JEL no. F31, F33, G14, G15     

Cultural policy and urban regeneration in Western European cities: lessons from experience, prospects for the future

This paper reviews the uses of cultural policy and planning as tools of urban regeneration in western European cities. Following a brief assessment of the evolution of European cultural policy in recent decades, the paper studies the origins and development of the European City/Capital of Culture programme and explores the experience of cities considered to have succeeded in re-imaging and regenerating themselves through cultural activity and special events. The paper ends with a reflection on the notion of cultural planning and its potential as an integrated alternative to urban cultural policy, and offers recommendations for further development within the UK context.     

The need for economic policy coordination between Europe,Japan, and the United States: Policy recommendations for the 1990s

Better policy coordination between Europe, Japan, and the United States is urgently needed in order to restore economic growth and to diminish mutual trade imbalances. Using the EC Compact model it is shown how coordinated fiscal policies can contribute to reaching these goals in the 1990s. For Europe, the most plausible fiscal policy option seems to be a combination of lower direct taxes, public spending cuts, and wage moderation; for Japan a more expansionary fiscal policy is feasible. For the United States, however, public spending cuts or tax increases are necessary conditions for better economic performance. In addition, for all three blocks a swap between tax reduction and wage moderation is recommended.