预算软约束问题再讨论

本文首先说明了预算软约束本身是个矛盾的概念,任何一条"软"的预算线都是一条画错了的预算线。通过对具体问题的分类,我们说明了任何曾经被"预算软约束问题"所概括过的具体问题中都存在一个"硬"的预算约束,这使得我们认识到这些问题都有其原本归属的分析框架,并不必要与预算软约束发生联系。最后我们说明了从"软"约束角度出发讨论的经济转型、银行规制以及财政分权等问题所得出的所有结论都可以在其原本的框架下做出相应的调整并获得更好的解释。这为研究我国经济体制改革与转型提供了新的视角。     

政策性负担与长期预算软约束

经济学家们很早就注意到了政策性负担对预算软约束的影响,然而现有的有关政策性负担的理论模型主要集中讨论政策性负担与企业补贴的关系,但企业补贴并不等于预算软约束。为此,本文首先建立了一个简单的三阶段动态博弈模型,在该框架下我们可以准确地定义预算软约束问题,并分析政策性负担对预算软约束的影响。然后,我们利用重复博弈的思想将本文的基本模型动态化,建立了长期预算软约束的基本理论框架,这在现有的预算软约束文献中是不多见的,有助于更加全面地考察影响政策性负担、预算软约束和道德风险问题的各种因素。本文的主要结论是,政策性负担是导致企业出现预算软约束问题的重要根源之一,但如果政府和企业之间的博弈可以重复进行,预算软约束问题能够得到有效缓解。     

预算软约束、融资溢价与杠杆率——供给侧结构性改革的微观机理与经济效应研究

本文针对我国部分企业中存在的预算软约束问题及其造成价格扭曲、资源错配的现实背景,在金融加速器理论的基础上,首先建立嵌入预算软约束的金融加速器机制,通过企业与金融机构债务契约优化问题,得到预算软约束企业的融资溢价方程,阐述预算软约束造成价格扭曲及资源错配的内生机理。然后构建动态随机一般均衡模型,阐释供给侧结构性改革"三去一降一补"五大任务对经济变量的具体影响,并通过参数调整揭示供给侧结构性改革削弱预算软约束,增强宏观调控政策有效性以及促进长期经济增长的微观机理和经济效应,进而为推进供给侧结构性改革和经济长期可持续发展提供理论依据和政策建议。     

企业生态责任:性质本源、目标约束与政策导向

国有和私营企业都有承担生态责任的现实需要,但由于企业性质和目标约束之间存在着一定的差异而导致其生态责任也各有不同。从国有和私营企业的性质出发,将其生存和发展的根本目标分为经济和生态目标,分别从其面对的经济目标硬约束和生态目标软约束出发讨论各自的生态责任,既可以进行有效地控制以促进企业担当生态责任,也能够帮助政府给予更加有效的政策指导,从而最终实现国有和私营企业经济价值和社会价值。     

声誉、软预算约束与混合所有制经济发展

本文以D-M模型为基础,构建了一个声誉条件下混合所有制投资软预算约束模型,探索软预算约束对混合所有制投资项目的影响.研究发现,在无声誉条件下,混合所有制投资项目存在逆向选择问题,是软预算约束的产物;将借贷双方声誉引入后,声誉对于硬化混合所有制投资软预算约束、抑制逆向选择的作用是毋庸置疑的.但声誉功能的发挥面临一些限制条件,制约了声誉在硬化软预算约束上的有效性,是制约中国混合所有制经济发展的障碍之一.对此,需要积极采取各种市场与非市场政策,努力培育成熟的市场经济.     

银行重组、金融稳定和软预算约束：中国经济转型时期的国家-银行关系及其政策含义

本文区分了银行软预算约束和非金融企业软预算约束、银行重组和软预算约束、制度性和政策性软预算约束、软预算约束和“太大不能倒闭”等概念,讨论了银行软预算约束的内涵和外延,总结了中国的银行软预算约束的特点,为讨论中国的银行问题提供一个软预算约束的视角和理论框架。本文认为：（1）银行软预算约束揭示了国有商业银行改革的内在逻辑。1994年以来,国家主导的一系列国有商业银行重组和改革本质上是对银行软预算约束政策的补充和强化。从这一逻辑出发,转型以来国有商业银行重组和改革的特征可以概括为“软预算约束下的银行改革”。（2）银行软预算约束解释了中国在国有商业银行长期处于技术性破产状态下仍然得以实现银行体系稳定的主要原因。是中国在没有建立正式存款保险制度、中央财政控制能力下降的情况下,得以实现银行体系稳定的一个关键性制度安排。中国的金融稳定模式可以概括为“软预算约束下的金融稳定模式”,银行软预算约束对于讨论转型时期中国金融稳定的成本-收益、是否具有普遍借鉴意义等问题具有重要的政策含义。（3）银行软预算约束体现了国家-国有商业银行关系的本质,是讨论国有商业银行改革和发展必需关注的制度环境和分析前提,对于进一步讨论国有银行体制、政府-企业关系、政府作用和定位等具有重要的理论和政策含义。     

浅析政策性负担与杠杆治理失效——一个预算软约束视角下的理论模型

本文以预算软约束理论为基础,通过对经济转型时期我国企业面临的制度环境进行分析,指出地方政府转移到企业身上的政策性负担是软化预算约束的来源,并通过构建预算软约束下银行与企业之间的博弈模型,对杠杆治理失效的现象进行理论诠释.     

论预算软约束下相关影响因素变化所导致资本结构理论的变化

预算软约束是影响企业融资行为异化的重要因素之一。预算软约束存在于各种经济体中,并影响着不同制度背景下的公司融资模式。本文在回顾已有资本结构理论及其相关经验证据的基础上,试图构建预算软约束对资本结构作用机理的理论模型与可验证的假设。为此,首先提出预算软约束的分析框架;然后通过放宽预算硬约束假设来分析已有资本结构理论,重点关注了在预算软约束环境下资本结构不同影响因素的变化及其导致的资本结构理论变化;最后总结了预算软约束和资本结构的相互作用及其理论假设,并提出了进一步研究的建议。     

政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束

本文在一个动态博弈的框架下 ,考察了政策性负担与转轨经济中企业的预算软约束问题。在信息不对称情况下 ,政策性负担将导致国有企业经理的道德风险 ,从而导致国有企业的低效率 ;当市场竞争达到一定程度时 ,政策性负担必然带来国有企业的预算软约束。而且 ,预算软约束同企业的公有制性质无关 ,在同样承担政策性负担的条件下 ,私有企业比国有企业更容易产生预算软约束 ,并且要求政府提供更多的补贴。当国有企业承担政策性负担时 ,政府剥夺企业的生产自主权往往是一种次优的制度安排     

转轨经济、软预算约束与财政分权

我国正处在经济转轨时期,软预算约束问题仍然存在。财政分权能够通过增强制度约束来缓解动态过程中因事前事后承诺不一致而导致的软预算约束问题,同时,也可以通过促进地方上及地方间的竞争来在一定程度上缓解软预算约束问题。     

企业、银行和政府三方还贷博弈研究

预算软约束已成为国有企业改革的阻碍因素,并影响经济转型期的政企、银企关系,而政府对于债务的软预算约束是企业信贷违约的原因之一,根据企业还贷过程中相关利益者的相互博弈,建立一个企业、银行、政府之间三方博弈模型来分析它们之间的行为及其目标差异对企业信贷违约的影响。模型分析表明：政府出于政治和经济利益的考虑,通过补贴银行和企业来实施对企业还贷的软预算约束,而银行在衡量了政府补贴和清算得失之后有可能对企业再贷款。解决预算软约束和企业信贷违约的关键在于＂政府、银行、企业＂之间的关系处理,企业完全按市场化运作,建立科学的法人治理结构,让政府从企业中逐步退出,硬化企业的预算约束环境,从而降低企业的信贷违约的概率。     

国有企业存在双重效率损失吗——与刘瑞明、石磊教授商榷

国有企业在改革中发展壮大与独立商品生产者地位的确立,表明刘瑞明、石磊教授提出的国有企业存在双重效率损失的两个重要假设——国有企业效率相对低下和政府对国有企业存在软预算约束,是不符合实际的。本文利用中国2000—2008年29个地区的省级面板数据,实证分析证明了国有企业对经济增长具有显著的正向效应,而不是增长拖累。据此提出,就研究方法而言,不能简单套用过去的研究结论作为今天的研究起点;就国有经济与民营经济关系而言,不要片面强调国有经济从竞争性领域退出,不能把国有经济和民营经济对立起来。     

国有企业预算约束硬化与财政分权

软预算约束导致国有企业低效率。在向市场经济转轨的过程中,国有企业软预算约束问题仍然存在。硬化国有企业预算约束是改革的一项重要内容。在要素自由流动的条件下,从中央向地方的财政分权引起地方政府之间的竞争;竞争提高了对亏损国有企业进行救助的机会成本,从而有助于硬化国有企业的预算约束。     

Do China's State-Owned Enterprises Maximize Profit?

China's state enterprise reform is often believed to have made profit the most important goal of SOEs. Nonetheless the poor performance of SOEs relative to other forms of enterprises remains puzzling. We offer an explanation based on the incentive aspect of the reform, which complements the theory based on a soft budget constraint. Under certainty, the incentives of enterprise managers to maximize their own compensation are consistent with profit maximization with or without a soft budget constraint. Under uncertainty, however, the managers' incentives generally deviate from expected profit maximization. This deviation is dampened by, but still exists even without a soft budget constraint.     

Investment decisions and the soft budget constraint

This paper investigates the investment behaviour of a large panel of Hungarian firms in the period 1989–99, in order to assess the impact of institutional and regulatory changes on the efficiency of credit allocation. We find that the role of financial factors for investment decisions has changed significantly after the introduction of major financial reforms, and that firms were affected differently depending on their ownership type. Reforms have hardened the budget constraint of private domestic firms, particularly small ones, and reduced informational problems for foreign‐owned firms. State‐owned firms remained subject to a soft budget constraint. In particular, small state firms became more sensitive to financial conditions, whereas large state firms were unaffected and kept operating under a soft budget constraint.     

Patient selection in a mixed oligopoly market for health care: the role of the soft budget constraint

Competition in hospital care is often implemented through mixed markets where public and private hospitals compete for patients. The optimality of this market form has long been debated in the literature. In this paper, we investigate the role of soft budget constraint in affecting patient selection within a mixed market. Patient selection is the undesired effect of hospital competition when three conditions are met: asymmetry in hospitals’ objectives, presence of hospital’s private information and inability to enforce hard budget constraint. The paper shows that soft budget is a pre-condition for the existence of patient selection. Our paper adds an important dimension to the existing literature which considers asymmetry of information as the only cause for this market failure. The understanding of the mechanisms leading to patient selection makes it possible for the regulator to design measures to reduce such undesirable effect.     

State enterprise performance and soft budget constraints: The case of Bulgaria

This paper analyses the performance of state enterprises in Bulgaria during 1992-94. Consistent with the literature on other transitional economies, this paper finds that one key factor underlying (the lack of) enterprise adjustment in Bulgaria during this period was the availability of financing. Empirically, the (lack of) past adjustment and the softness of finance are the best predictors of current adjustment. Many state enterprises, mostly smaller ones, appear to have adjusted to the new economic structure, partly in response to tighter budget constraints. However, a number of large, hard-core lossmaking state enterprises did not adjust, due primarily to the soft budget constraints that they faced. These enterprises crowded out profitable enterprises, both public and private, through their large financing requirements, adversely affecting economic growth. Moreover, continued bank financing of these large loss-makers decapitalized the banking system, and budgetary financing of their losses, largely through tax arrears, has undermined fiscal policy. This lack of enterprise adjustment and the resulting financial indiscipline lies at the core of the macroeconomic difficulties that Bulgaria has recently faced.     

Firm growth and productivity in Belarus: New empirical evidence from the machine building industry

Using a unique dataset comprising information for (up to) 153 firms in the machine building sector in Belarus, we investigate the determinants of firm growth for an economy where state ownership of enterprises is widespread. We use panel data models based on generalizations of Gibrat’s law, total factor productivity estimates and matching methods to assess the differences in firm growth between private and state-controlled firms. Our results indicate that labor hoarding and soft budget constraints play a particularly important role in explaining differences in performance between these two groups of firms.     

Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market

This paper surveys the theoretical literature on the effect of soft budget constraints on economies in transition from centralization to capitalism; it also reviews our understanding of soft budget constraints in general. It focuses on the conception of the soft budget constraint syndrome as a commitment problem. We show that the two features of soft budget constraints in centralized economies – ex post renegotiation of firms' financial plans and a close administrative relationship between firms and the centre – are intrinsically related. We examine a series of theories (based on the commitment-problem approach) that explain shortage, lack of innovation in centralized economies, devolution, and banking reform in transition economies. Moreover, we argue that soft budget constraints also have an influence on major issues in economics, such as the determination of the boundaries and capital structure of a firm. Finally, we show that soft budget constraints theory sheds light on financial crises and economic growth.     

预算软约束与资产价格理性泡沫

文章将预算软约束引入资产价格理性泡沫的分析之中,在给出一个预算软约束情形下资产均衡价格决定模型的基础上,得出了资产价格理性泡沫的表达式.模型分析表明,当存在预算软约束时风险资产的理性泡沫为正;同时,风险资产对应企业面临的预算软约束越大,该风险资产价格中的理性泡沫越大.