财政支出类型、人力资本积累与积极财政政策效力

基于高质量发展阶段中国更加注重人力资本等民生支出的经济事实,构建了包括财政支出结构和人力资本的动态随机一般均衡模型,以考察不同类型财政支出政策的宏观经济效应。研究发现：消费性政府支出在短期对居民消费和就业具有显著的促进作用,但其政策效力不具持续性;投资性政府支出对私人支出具有较强的挤出效应,且其政策效力取决于公共资本的生产性对企业生产率的边际影响;政府人力资本投资在中长期不仅不会挤出私人支出,而且有利于物质资本和人力资本积累,是推动经济高质量发展的新引擎。因此,应当将减少消费性政府支出、转变投资性政府支出的思路和方向、增加人力资本支出作为财政支出结构优化调整的方向,以此推动积极财政政策提质增效。     

日本政府财政支出的经济增长效应及启示

政府财政支出与经济增长存在一定的相关关系,但孰为因果莫衷一是。通过对1956-2008年日本政府财政支出与经济增长的协整分析和格兰杰因果关系检验,发现日本政府财政投资性支出与财政消费性支出均与经济增长长期内存在稳定的正向协整关系及单向因果关系,经济增长是财政支出增长的格兰杰因,而财政支出无论是投资性还是消费性支出都不是经济增长的格兰杰因。从这一结论出发,我国应吸取日本的经验教训,在实施积极的财政政策时,要控制规模、优化结构、确保质量、提高效益。     

地方政府支出与农村居民消费需求变动——以我国省级面板数据为例

本文在理论诠释地方政府支出对农村居民消费需求的传导机制下,通过建立地方政府支出与农村居民消费支出之间的个体固定效应变截距模型,运用我国31个省(市、自治区)1998～2007年的经验数据进行实证检验.结果表明:地方政府财政支农支出对农村居民消费具有显著的挤入效应,而转移性支出与农村居民消费的相关程度并不明显.     

财政支出政策的减贫效应:相对贫困治理视角

为了厘清财政支出政策的减贫效应和作用机制,充分发挥政府支出工具治理相对贫困的积极作用,本文首先运用PSM方法验证了政府转移性支出扶贫效应和投资性支出的增收效应;其次,构建包含两类家庭的异质性动态一般均衡模型以揭示财政支出政策治理非李嘉图家庭相对贫困的经济机理;最后,构造"相对贫困指数"以评估财政支出工具治理相对贫困的动态效应.研究发现:积极的政府转移性(扶贫)支出政策具有迅速治理相对贫困的功效,但是对非李嘉图家庭工资收入存在"挤出"效应;虽然积极的政府投资性支出政策挤出私人投资,但能有效提升非李嘉图家庭就业和劳动收入,具有良好的相对贫困治理效应;积极的政府消费性支出政策会刺激短期需求、促进就业、拉动总产出增长,从而增加非李嘉图家庭收入、减少相对贫困,但是,长期而言会挤出居民消费,并且政策效应的持续性和有效性不及投资性支出.因此,"精准导向"的积极财政支出政策能够提升相对贫困的治理效果.     

中国经济转型期地方政府财政支出对城镇居民消费的影响——基于1997年～2009年省际面板数据的实证分析

本文通过跨期替代模型,利用面板数据考察了地方政府财政支出总量和结构对城镇居民消费的影响.研究结果表明:1、地方政府行政管理性支出对城镇居民消费具有挤出效应;2、经济性支出和社会性支出对城镇居民消费具有挤入效应,但后者的效应较弱;3、由于财政支出结构的不合理,导致地方政府财政支出总额对城镇居民消费虽然具有挤入效应,但挤入效应较弱.此研究结果为转变政府职能,调整财政支出结构,引导居民消费,促进经济增长提供一定的理论依据.     

财政支出结构对居民消费率影响及传导机制研究——基于三部门动态随机一般均衡模型的模拟分析

文章在动态随机一般均衡(DSGE)模型框架下,将政府消费性支出和转移支付引入家庭部门,将政府投资性支出和服务性支出引入生产部门,并利用贝叶斯估计方法,分析政府消费性支出、转移支付、投资性支出和服务性支出对居民消费、消费率的影响与传导机制。结果表明:(1)增加政府消费性支出在长期内不仅挤出居民消费,而且导致居民消费率下降。(2)增加政府转移支付能够有效刺激居民消费,具有挤入效应,并且在长期内促进居民消费率提高。(3)增加政府投资性支出在长期内对居民消费具有挤入效应,但在一段时期内会导致居民消费率下降。(4)增加政府服务性支出能有效挤入居民消费,并在长期内促进居民消费率提高。     

财政支出、经济外部性与政府双重角色转换——基于DSGE模型的理论分析和实证研究

将政府财政支出分解为消费性支出和生产性支出,建立了政府消费性支出与私人消费之间、政府资本与私人资本之间的非线性替代关系函数。将政府公共生产性服务和公共消费性服务的双重角色加入动态随机一般均衡(DSGE)模型,分析不同经济结构下政府的双重角色对中国宏观经济的影响差异。实证结果显示:政府生产性支出的弹性系数正在变小,政府生产性支出对中国宏观经济的影响在逐渐消失;在合理监管下,政府消费性支出有利于改善和提高人们的生活质量,并且不会对私人投资产生挤出效应。因此,政府应加大对财政消费性支出的监管力度。     

财政理论应重视对政府储蓄的研究

人们往往把储蓄与金融学的研究联系在一起。实际上,储蓄与财政分配之间也有着十分密切的关系。特别是,作为国民储蓄组成部分的政府储蓄,它与财政分配之间的联系更直接、更明显。1.政府储蓄是财政收支运动的结果。在现代经济学中,储蓄是一个含义相当广泛的概念,它是指一定时期收入中未用于消费后的部分,即储蓄等于收入减消费。依据储蓄的这一基本定义,政府取得财政收入,安排财政支出,其结果也会形成一定的储蓄,即政府储蓄。这是因为,政府的财政支出中包含有两种性质完全不同的支出:一种是经常性支出即消费性支出,另一种是资本性支出或投资性…     

地方政府财政支农支出与农村居民消费——来自中国29个省市面板数据的经验证据

本文在消费者最优消费路径选择的基本框架下,构建了一个政府财政支农与农村居民消费的动态最优化模型,理论分析表明:地方政府财政支农支出的增加,对于农村居民消费水平的提高具有促进作用。基于1995-2008年的省际面板数据,采用工具变量GMM方法对该结论进行的实证检验发现:在通过多工具变量克服变量内生性之后,地方政府财政支农支出对农村居民消费具有显著的促进作用,地方政府财政支农支出每增加1%,我国农村居民消费将增加0.1367%;进一步的因素分解显示,地方政府财政支农支出对农村居民消费的平均贡献度为8.72%,且有逐年增大的趋势。此外,财政支农支出对农村居民消费的影响存在区域差异性,即财政支农支出对我国中西部地区农村居民消费的影响程度大于东部地区。     

转型期国有资本收益的公共福利性支出

国有资本收益支出结构取决于经营投资性支出与公共福利性支出对全民福利之边际贡献比较.一方面,随着经济的发展和转型.我国总的公共福利性支出参照国际水平,已严重滞后于自身的经济发展程度及社会公共需要.与这一转型相伴的是我国个人收入差距的扩大,要求扩大政府支出;另一方面,人均资本积累水平的提高以及国有资本盈利能力的增强为国有资本收益适量用于公共福利性支出提供了条件.从操作层面来说,各级政府的国有资本收益用于公共福利性支出比例应由全国人大来决定,且用于公共福利性支出的部分应上交中央财政、全国统筹使用.     

Does fiscal decentralization affect local governments' strategic behaviours? Evidence from South Korea

Local governments tend to show strategic behaviours when making their spending decisions. However, few studies have examined strategic behaviours when promoting fiscal decentralization. Thus, this study empirically examines the presence of strategic interactions in expenditure decisions in South Korea as well as how fiscal decentralization affects those interactions, using a panel data set from 2010 to 2017. The results demonstrate that a local government mimics other governments' spending when those governments' residents share similar age demographics. Moreover, local governments in South Korea engage in strategic interactions as their expenditure side becomes more decentralized. However, local governments tend to demonstrate less isomorphic behaviour in welfare spending decisions when they have higher revenue decentralization. This is because local governments have no motive to emulate other welfare policies, as the central government delegates the provision of social services to local governments by providing grants with strings attached.     

A political foundation of public investment and welfare spending

This paper develops a political economy model to examine the implications of political selection under an authoritarian regime. We formalize the fiscal policy choice of local governments, focusing on two political selection mechanisms and their implications for public investment and welfare spending. A growth-oriented promotion system induces local officials to increase public investment, which may increase output but crowd out welfare transfers. This mimics the recent investment-driven growth in China and relatively low effort to tackle high inequality. Under a broader incentive structure, we show that it is possible for an authoritarian regime to attain the social welfare of a democracy.     

Interregional infrastructure,competition for capital,and local public expenditure policies: Evidence from China's high-speed rail network

Interregional infrastructure promotes market integration and enhances the mobility of capital, thereby intensifying fiscal competition among local governments. Exploiting the expansion of China's high-speed rail (HSR) network as plausibly exogenous shocks, this study examines how Interregional infrastructure affects the fiscal competition among local governments. We find that after connecting with the HSR network, city governments tend to dedicate a lower proportion of public spending to consumption goods, which benefit immobile households, and invest more in productive inputs, which attract mobile firms. We also find that the negative effect of HSR connection on the proportion of consumption goods is more pronounced in peripheral cities than core cities because periphery cities face a larger increase in capital mobility due to the core–periphery effects of trade integration induced by HSR. Our findings indicate that the behavioural responses of local governments should be accounted for when assessing the social welfare of interregional infrastructure.     

Investment scaling up and the role of government

This article studies the fiscal and welfare implications of a scaling up of public investment when the government is subject to inefficiencies on the spending and on the tax collection side. In our simulations, the scaling up of public investments results in higher long-run output and consumption levels but requires a fiscal stabilization package in order to preserve fiscal sustainability. The effects on consumers’ welfare after the fiscal adjustment are nontrivial. Our welfare analysis shows that consumers’ welfare is increased when the government smooths the fiscal adjustment via higher borrowing and not through an increase in taxation. Moreover, the comparison between several stabilization packages via tax adjustment shows that higher welfare is achieved when the government relies mostly on taxation of capital as this allows higher levels of consumption. Lower fiscal costs that do not undermine fiscal sustainability can however be achieved if the government manages to reduce inefficiency in tax collection. Finally, we consider a change in the trade regime that causes a decline in revenues. We find that the higher fiscal burden required to preserve fiscal sustainability would completely wipe out the welfare gain of higher public investments.     

分权的“悖论”：“省管县”改革对居民医疗服务满意度的影响

财政分权是否有助于提高与本地居民偏好更加匹配的公共服务水平未有定论。借助“省管县”改革这一准自然实验,文章旨在从微观需求角度考察地方分权对公共服务改善的效果。采用2005年的县级宏观数据和 CG S S2005居民调查数据,本文对“省管县”改革与公共医疗服务满意度的关系进行了实证分析。 Logit模型结果表明,“省管县”财政体制的实施未能使当地政府提供让居民更加合意的医疗服务,反而恶化了居民对公共医疗服务的满意度。在排除了“改革错觉”、“预期效应”以及“滞后效应”的干扰后,这一结论依旧稳健。文章认为,财权扩大加剧了地方政府间竞争,使得县级政府有更大的激励将财政资金投入到基建领域而非民生领域,这将导致医疗服务供给相对不足,进而引起满意度的下降。中介分析证实了这一推理。文章研究有助于从微观视角评析分权改革的公共福利效应。     

财政农业支出对农村居民消费影响的经验分析

本文采用广义最小二乘法对财政农业支出与农村居民消费的关系进行了经验性探讨。结果表明:财政用于农业支出对农村居民消费有拉动效用,其中,支农支出和农业基本建设支出对消费有明显促进作用,但未发现农业科研和农村救济费对消费有影响。笔者结合财政支农资金总量及结构变动趋势,认为建立财政用于农业支出的长效投资机制,倾向于农业生产性投资的支出结构,是刺激农村消费的有效途径。     

Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

Financing government investment and its implications for public capital: A small open economy perspective

Expenditure reductions played a key role in many small open economies during fiscal consolidation, with large declines in public investment. This led to a reduction in public capital stock and affected the competitiveness of these economies. After the sovereign debt crisis, the governments that consider increasing investment to replenish the public capital stock have limited fiscal space and have to avoid external imbalances. We show that using budget-neutral investment spending can generate long-term benefits of higher public capital stock while at the same time limiting negative consequences for the public finances and the trade balance. The best way of financing government investment, which preserves fiscal and trade balances, and increases welfare, is by reducing other government spending. The second-best is financing investment with value-added tax. Financing with debt worsens fiscal and trade balances, while using distortionary labour taxes reduces labour supply, increases wage costs and worsens the trade deficit in the short run.     

是何因素制约着中国居民消费

居民消费增长相对缓慢给我国经济的持续健康发展带来挑战,扩大居民消费加快形成消费、投资、出口协调驱动经济增长的新局面是我国经济发展到新阶段后的客观要求。本文基于预防性储蓄理论分别从不确定性、收入分配和公共支出三个视角系统地研究中国居民消费的制约因素。研究分析表明,居民谨慎的消费行为、收入分配的不合理,公共支出转型滞后等都严重地制约着我国居民消费的增长,并据此提出相应的政策建议。     

The effects of fiscal consolidations on the composition of government spending

ABSTRACT

In response to increasing debt paths, governments often implement fiscal consolidation programs. This paper studies the impact of these programs on the composition of government spending. System-GMM estimations performed on a sample of 53 developed and emerging countries over 1980–2011 reveal that fiscal consolidations significantly reduce the government investment-to-consumption ratio, i.e. a composition effect. Robust to a wide set of tests, including when using the narrative approach to identify fiscal consolidations, this significantly stronger contraction of government investment with respect to government consumption is at work particularly when debt is high and in the low phase of the economic cycle. Therefore, in such contexts, fiscal consolidations aimed at short-run stabilization may hurt the economy in the long-run through their detrimental effect on public investment, calling for a reflection upon how they could be re-designed to allow avoiding such undesirable consequences.