双边市场、不完全信息与二级价格歧视

本文研究了双边市场二级价格歧视问题。本文构建了包括广告商、消费者、垄断平台在内的两阶段博弈模型，研究了在最优与次优情况下平台的定价机制，分析了二级价格歧视对平台利润、社会福利等的影响。研究表明：（1）“顶部无扭曲”或“底部无扭曲”并不严格成立；（2）平台对观众提供的节目质量、广告插播量均可能出现类型逆转的情况；（3）二级价格歧视会增加社会总福利；（4）“会员制”是平台可能的占优定价机制之一。     

产业链的合作机制选择与低碳产品定价及碳减排策略

生产链上下游企业选择合适的合作机制对低碳产品定价及碳减排有重要影响。通过构建博弈模型分析三种不同合作机制下的低碳产品定价及碳减排问题:第一种合作机制即制造商与零售商进行合作,当两条生产链都选择这种合作机制时,能带来较高的碳减排率和较低的零售价格,这对制造商、零售商、消费者和环境都是有利的。第二种合作机制即两条生产链的制造商之间、零售商之间分别合作,这会带来较低的碳减排率和较高的零售价格,对两个制造商有利,而对零售商和消费者不利。分析前两种合作机制的利与弊提出第三种合作机制,即零售商和制造商共享利润下的有利于碳减排的策略。最后,结合案例讨论和数值分析的研究结果表明:当制造商和零售商收入共享比在一定范围内时,第三种合作机制可以给制造商和零售商带来更高的利润。由此为企业选择最佳的合作机制及合理的碳减排策略提供了理论指导。     

Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries

The growing importance of inter-network exchanges in infrastructure-based utilities influences regulatory choices and access pricing for downstream services using the networks. We analyze this problem in a setting where the infrastructure managers of two bordering countries are in charge of pricing the access to their networks for downstream transport firms that provide international services. Network costs can be financed through public funds and user charges.In this context, access prices are affected by the incomplete internalization of consumers' surplus and infrastructure costs; we analyze how this distortion at the access pricing level generates a distortion in the levels of public funds dedicated to infrastructure financing.Because of these distortions, it turns out that in a non-cooperative setting the second-best outcome might consist in the simultaneous adoption of a no-subsidy system. However, multiple equilibria typically exist and the second-best outcome is never a stable equilibrium. Other properties of the different possible equilibria are studied, as well as the impact of supra-national policies aimed at encouraging the development of international services. Finally, we show that the coordination problems deriving from the existence of multiple equilibria can, sometimes, be solved by separating the choice of a regulatory mode from the access pricing stage, thereby allowing the infrastructure managers to commit to use a specific financing system before setting the access price.     

On the optimality of the full-cost pricing

This article is aimed at defining the full-cost pricing as a leader-follower game in two-tier organizations: (i) the upstream unit fixes the production capacity and uses it as a cost driver to compute the average cost; (ii) the downstream unit operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the average cost. In the Cournot oligopoly case, the full-cost pricing is compared with other pricing rules. There exists a wide range of values of the fixed cost, for which the full-cost pricing dominates any other pricing rules, in terms of gross profit.     

Modelling and predicting the competitive effects of vertical mergers: The bargaining leverage over rivals effect

A new competitive effect of vertical mergers, based on the Nash bargaining model, has begun to play an important role in antitrust authorities’ evaluations of vertical mergers in the United States, Canada and abroad. The key idea is that a vertical merger will increase the bargaining leverage of the merged firm over its downstream rivals. Its bargaining leverage increases because it now takes into account the additional profit that its own downstream division will earn if it withholds inputs from downstream rivals, which changes its threat point in the bargaining game with downstream rivals. Consequently, the merged firm can increase the price that it charges rival downstream firms for inputs. One strong appeal of this theory is that it provides a simple and very intuitive formula to measure the upward pricing pressure caused by a vertical merger due to changes in bargaining leverage, based on variables whose values can generally be estimated using available data. This article describes this new competitive effect, which will be called the bargaining leverage over rivals (BLR) effect, and derives the upward pricing pressure formula. It also explains why this new competitive effect is distinct from the older raising rivals’ costs (RRC) effect that has been widely discussed in the economics literature, and discusses the relationship between the two different effects.     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.     

Pricing inputs to induce efficient Make-or-Buy decisions

We investigate input pricing regimes that induce efficient Make-or-Buy decisions by entrants when there is constant returns in the production of the input(s) and simultaneous noncooperative price competition in downstream retail markets. Necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient Make-or-Buy decisions are derived. The necessary condition shows that input prices are relevant for Make-or-Buy decisions except under restrictive and often unverifiable assumptions on the demand structure, and that the least informationally-demanding way to ensure efficient Make-or-Buy decisions is to price inputs at marginal cost provided changes in the entrant’s cost have a “normal” effect on the entrant’s profit. The conditions also show that pricing the incumbent’s input at the entrant’s marginal cost always ensures efficient Make- or-Buy decisions. The extent to which input prices can depart from marginal cost while still inducing efficient Make-or-Buy decisions increases with the efficiency differential between the incumbent and entrant and with the demand displacement ratio.      

Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input

What price should downstream entrants pay a vertically integrated incumbent monopoly for use of its assets? Courts, legislators, and regulators have at times mandated that incumbent monopolies lease assets required for the production of a retail service to entrants in efforts to increase the competitiveness of retail markets. This paper compares two rules for pricing such monopoly inputs: marginal cost pricing (MCP) and generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR). The GECPR is not a fixed price, but is a rule that determines the input price to be paid by the entrant from the entrant's retail price. Comparing the retail market equilibrium under MCP and GECPR, the GECPR leads to lower equilibrium retail prices. If the incumbent is less efficient than the entrant, the GECPR also leads to lower production costs than does the MCP rule. If the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, however, conditions may exist in which MCP leads to lower production costs than does the GECPR. The analysis is carried out assuming either Bertrand competition, quantity competition, or monopolistic competition between the incumbent and entrant in the downstream market.     

Financing a competitive recycling initiative in Switzerland

The purpose of the paper is to enhance the understanding of different pricing systems within the real world of solid waste management: first the effect on recycling behaviour of citizens, and second the effect on the budget goals, and third the operational logic of different economic measures will be analyzed. Hence it helps practitioners understand and cope with the challenge of meeting the zero profit budget goal in public solid waste management while inducing behaviour change in the regional solid waste system. The question “How can robust recycling strategies be financed?” is addressed.The analysis draws on a system dynamics model for solid waste management that is based on a model framework on human behaviour and public policy that embraces an evolutionary feedback perspective. The model structure was deduced from an ex-post analysis of observed phenomena in solid waste management such as recurring budget deficits at the local level in Switzerland. The paper illustrates how the model was used as a policy lab in which various pricing and incentive strategies were tested that allowed addressing “what-if-questions” under controlled conditions. The various policy-experiments illustrated crucial trade offs between zero profit budget goals at the local level and the administration of a successful recycling initiative. Different scenario-experiments show that under worst-case conditions economic instrument are not sufficient in order to yield a robust policy outcome.     

On the social optimality of make-or-buy decisions

This article examines the impact of input prices on an entrant’s make-or-buy decision and on the subsequent social welfare level for three alternative models of downstream competition. For each particular model, it derives the range of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake: (a) the productively efficient make-or-buy decision; and (b) the socially optimal make-or-buy decision. The main conclusion of this article is that the entrant’s efficient make-or-buy decision is always socially optimal in the case of the Hotelling model, is socially optimal for the set of input prices that induce the entrant to undertake the efficient decision in the case of Cournot competition and is not necessarily socially optimal in the Bertrand vertical differentiation model. Last, this article examines the conditions under which the efficient and/or socially optimal make-or-buy decision undertaken by an entrant fulfills the regulatory two-fold goal of promoting service-based competition and encouraging facilities-based competition. Therefore, this article also provides the optimal access pricing policy that results in the best feasible outcome in terms of social welfare, productive efficiency, competition level and investment level for a given downstream competition model.     

Mixed markets in bilateral monopoly

Should we expect to see patterns in the privatization of a public bilateral monopoly? To address this question, the paper analyzes the welfare implications of privatization and examines the interplay of firm location in the vertical stream, differential priorities on private and public profit in welfare and cost asymmetries in a mixed bilateral monopoly. We conclude that merely comparing cost savings from privatization upstream/downstream, is inadequate. If public profit is relatively insignificant in welfare, then only relative cost savings matter. However, if public profit is sufficiently important, then privatization downstream will maximize welfare if it is as (or more) cost effective compared to privatization upstream. We find that downstream privatization can be better than upstream privatization even when the latter is more cost effective than the former.     

PRICING IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

The pricing in private and public enterprise differs primarily on the supply side. In the long run, private enterprises must cover total costs and provide an adequate return necessary to attract venture capital. In contrast, extra-commercial considerations may influence pricing in public enterprises. They may incur losses in the public interest under explicit directives from the government. A number of theories of pricing in public enterprises have been put forward. Most important of these are: (1) marginal cost of production theory; (2) no profit, no loss theory; (3) average cost of production theory; (4) theory of making profits. All these theories suffer from a number of weaknesses and none of them taken individually is a satisfactory guide for determining the prices of the products of public enterprises. There however exists a strong case for public enterprises, particularly in developing countries, to earn reasonable profits in pricing their products. Public enterprises fostered on public revenues must yield surpluses which can be used either for their own expansion or for financing the general development plans of the country. The profits which a public enterprise can earn are an important indication of the justification for the use of economic resources in that economic activity. Upholding the test of profit not only lessens possibilities of the investment decisions being subjected to political pressures but also safeguards against inefficiency in management. A policy of profits is essential for attaining the goal of building a socialist society. The amount of profits expected from different enterprises, however, cannot be uniform because of diverse objectives sought in the setting up of public enterprises, degree of essentiality of their products, nature of the services provided by them, size of their market, class of their consumers and their paying capacity, conditions of market under which they operate, their role in stimulating growth and social benefits conferred by them.     

Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation

The canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent's participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract, typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type. Upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into the agents' outside options, we find that some of the received wisdom from mechanism design and nonlinear pricing is not robust and the richer model which allows for stochastic participation affords a more general empirical specification. We develop a multi-dimensional methodology for addressing this class of problems, providing two important applications to nonlinear pricing. First, with nonlinear pricing by a monopolist the familiar "no-distortion-at-the-top" result persists, but in tandem with the surprising conclusion that there is either no distortion at the bottom or bunching. Second, in a simple model of product differentiated duopolists competing with nonlinear pricing we show that, generally, the duopoly outcome is qualitatively similar to the monopoly outcome. However, when marginal costs are symmetric and competition is sufficiently intense, distortions disappear and the equilibrium outcome takes a remarkably simple form: efficient quality allocations with cost-plus-fee pricing.     

A mark-up pricing model for price simulations

This paper develops an input/output model of pricing using a mark-up pricing formula. The connection between mark-up pricing and competitive pricing is analyzed through the determination of sectoral equilibrium profit mark-up rates as a function of the profit rate and the capital intensity of each sector. The model is used to analyze the effects on relative prices and the aggregate price level of exogenous changes in the nominal wage rate, tax rates, the exchange rate and world prices. Exogenous changes in the prices of domestically produced commodities are modelled via the imposition of ad valorem tax rates, which yield a measure of the net effect of the exogenous changes. Simulations are carried out under passive price adjustment as well as adjustment with price ceilings. In this last instance the model calculates the endogenously determined reduction in profit mark-ups. Lastly, empirical results of various simulations are presented using data from the Mexican economy.     

Access to an Essential Facility: Efficient Component Pricing Rule or Unrestricted Private Property Rights?

In this paper, we compare the access to an essential facility in two different property rights regimes. In the first, the owner of the facility has an unrestricted private property right of the essential facility. In the second, access is regulated according to the efficient component pricing rule. Proponents of the second regime claim that this rule is efficient, for it forecloses the complementary market only to inefficient producers. We prove that, as far as entry is concerned, the two legal frameworks are equivalent if we do not consider the possibility of the transfer of the property right, and that if this is allowed the efficient component pricing rule might exclude efficient suppliers.     

Behavioral rules,inventory adjustments and the stability of macroequilibria

This paper extends the static analysis of Nikaido (1974) and the temporary equilibrium analysis of Day-Fan (1980) to a full disequilibrium analysis by introducing inventories explicitly into the Keynes-Kaldor-Nakaido framework. Two different inventory adjustment processes are considered. The first is based on the micro behavioral assumption that each producer coordinates his safes, production and inventory departments so that inventories can be adjusted to the desired level through intra-firm shipments. The second follows the traditional approach of treating inventories as part of investment demand. Coupled with the two behavioral rules of price-output determination, namely full-cost pricing and perceived profit maximization four models are generated. These models are studied for their dynamic behaviors in disequilibrium. It is found that the adjustment trajectories of both the full-cost pricing and perceived profit maximization models with intra-firm inventory adjustments exhibit damped cycles, whereas those of both models with inventories treated as investment demand are inherently unstable.     

Free entry into telecommunications?

The two leading principles of pricing for public enterprises are outlined: Value based and cost based pricing. It is shown that optimal pricing à la Ramsey-Boiteux is closely related to value based pricing which itself is connected with Lindahl pricing of public goods. Cost based pricing is related to the pricing in competitive markets. Opening up of telecommunication to competition implies a change from value based (public good) pricing to cost based (pritate good) pricing. It is shown why specific developments in telecommunication technology make a switch to cost based pricing and a competitive environment appropriate. At the end a proposal is developed for a gradual change towards competition which would meet less political resistance.     

买方抗衡势力与制造商定价决策

本文研究了买方抗衡势力的存在对上游制造商定价决策的影响,讨论了制造商在不同定价形式（线性定价、两部收费制和转售价格维持（RPM））之间的选择问题,并构建了两阶段动态博弈模型,引入买方抗衡势力,比较分析了制造商在零售商具有和不具有买方抗衡势力两种情况下,制造商最优定价形式的选择。研究发现当零售商不具有买方抗衡势力时,制造商选择两部收费制和RPM是无差异的,都能使上游制造商获得相等的最优利润;当零售商具有买方抗衡势力时,对于上游制造商来说两部收费制优干RPM,RPM又优于线性定价。此外,本文还发现存在一个由抗衡势力和零售商替代程度决定的临界条件,当满足这一条件时,两部收费制是上游的最优选择;一旦这一条件不满足时,RPM就成了上游的最优选择。     

Transfer Pricing Rules,OECD Guidelines,and Market Distortions

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on prices, firms' organizational structure, and consumers' utility in a two‐country monopolistic competition model with source‐based profit taxes. Firms can either be multinationals and serve the foreign market through a fully controlled affiliate, or be exporters and serve the foreign market by contracting with an independent distributor. The use of the OECD's comparable uncontrolled transfer price (CUP) rule distorts firms' output and pricing decisions, because the comparable arm's length transactions between exporters and distributors—which serve as the benchmark—are not efficient. We show that the CUP rule is detrimental to consumers in the low‐tax country, yet benefits consumers in the high‐tax country when compared to the benchmark of unconstrained profit shifting. Using the OECD rule increases tax revenue at the expense of consumer surplus. Those results also hold under the alternative cost‐plus transfer pricing rule.     

Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets

The effects on consumer welfare of requiring a utility facing cost or demand risk to use either a fixed retail price or marginal cost pricing are assessed. With marginal cost pricing and cost volatility an efficient futures market allows consumer welfare to be at least as high in every state as with the fixed price. With demand risk marginal cost pricing can benefit the consumer in every state without harming the firm if the profit difference is transferred to the consumer. A futures market can act as a partial replacement for the transfer.