Market and regulatory forces in the pricing of legal services

New data on individual law firms and attorneys is used to examine the effects of professional licensing restrictions and market forces on prices of legal services. The data allow detailed testing of the hypothesis that licensing restrictions serve to increase the price of professional services as well as the incomes of those providing these services. In general, little support is found for this hypothesis. Instead, the estimates show that market forces are most important in explaining variations in prices and attorney incomes.Dean Lueck is on leave from Louisiana State University. We thank William Boiger, Executive Director of the National Resource Center for Consumers of Legal Services, for providing data on law firms. Andrew Dick, Philip Hersch, Andy Kleit, Bill Kovacic, Fred McChesney, Jeff Moore, and two anonymous referees provided helpful comments on earlier versions. Chris Diener, Jim Larkins, Robert Pace, and Darrin Timothy provided research assistance.     

Responsive pricing

We study the efficiency property of responsive pricing, a scheme that proposes to increase prices as a function of the level of capacity utilization in environments where traditional allocation schemes (e.g. competitive markets, non-linear pricing) cannot be implemented in practice. We show that although responsive pricing implements allocations that are arbitrarily close to full capacity utilization (no wasted capacity and no excess demand), these allocations are not always efficient. We identify conditions under which efficiency occurs and discuss implications for the use of responsive pricing. We would like to thank seminar participants at the LSE, Venezia, Toulouse, and Copenhagen as well as Piero Gottardi, Karel Mertens, Marco Ottaviani, Markus Poschke, Karl Schlag, and Sanne Zwart for useful comments.     

软件产品定价的常见问题及定价策略

本篇文章首先对软件产品定价方式进行阐述,从定价模式问题、价格变动问题、定价针对性问题等多个方面,对软件产品定价的常见问题进行分析,并以此为依据,提出软件产品定价策略。     

Average cost pricing versus marginal cost pricing under moral hazard

This paper presents a general framework for analyzing shadow wages in LDCs. We focus on (i) the differences between the domestic and international prices, (ii) the equilibrating mechanisms in the economy, (iii) the endogeneity of earnings in industry and agriculture, (iv) the consequences of industrial employment creation on agriculture, and (v) the nature of migration and unemployment.We identify those reduced form relationships which are central in determining the shadow wage, and use them to obtain general formulae for the shadow wage. These formulae can be specialized to alternative technological, behavioral, and institutional settings. This yields many new results concerning the relationship between the shadow wage and the market wage. Also, earlier results on shadow wages are derived as special cases of our formulae.     

Cooperative oligopolistic pricing

The main purpose of the present paper is to show that the equilibrium price in an oligopolistic market with cooperative pricing but noncooperative production as a rule approaches neither the monopoly price (when there are few firms) nor the competitive price (when there are many firms). Instead it is equal to that price which maximizes collective sales revenues if the industry's demand curve is inelastic, while it is “almost” competitive if demand is elastic.     

Robust monopoly pricing

We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information. In the robust version, the seller faces model uncertainty and only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. We characterize the pricing policies under two distinct decision criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin utility and (ii) minimax regret. The equilibrium price under either criterion is lower then in the absence of uncertainty. The concern for robustness leads the seller to concede a larger information rent to all buyers with values below the optimal price without uncertainty.     

Strategic nonlinear pricing

The objective of this paper is to examine the role of nonlinear strategies in a standard oligopoly framework. We demonstrate that nonlinear pricing may indeed emerge as an equilibrium strategy, but only when firms produce differentiated products, when one firm retains market power due to a cost advantage, or as part of an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In addition, we examine the role of nonlinear pricing in a spatial-competition framework. Our main conclusion is that in highly competitive markets, nonlinear pricing strategies are not likely to emerge as an equilibrium.     

Second-best pricing for incomplete market segments: Application to electricity pricing

Due to technological, political, or practical considerations, most price mechanisms are not fully differentiated by time, location, and contingency of delivery. Rate or tax designers then face a trade-off between the costs and benefits of using more complex price schedules. This paper studies the second-best problem of designing, for a given market segment, a linear pricing schedule with a limited number of distinct prices while facing exogenous constraints within a large and practically relevant family. Interestingly, we find that second-best prices may be computed using simple machine learning techniques. As an illustration, we apply our framework to retail electricity pricing in California.     

Ramsey pricing in a hierarchical structure with an application to network-access pricing

This paper studies a hierarchical structure where an upstream regulated industry sells an intermediate good to a downstream regulated industry. Some sufficient conditions for all Ramsey prices to exceed marginal costs are derived. This hierarchical structure is shown to decrease the profit margin of the intermediate good but preserve its sign. Further, the hierarchical structure also decreases the profit margin of the final good sold by the downstream regulated industry. This is because this final good is a hierarchical complement to the intermediate good sold by the upstream regulated industry. The impacts upon other publicly produced goods, however, could be said to be neutral. Therefore, the hierarchical structure has asymmetric impacts upon publicly produced goods. Accordingly, the equiproportional output-reduction statement of Ramsey rule does not survive. This paper ends with providing an application to the network-access pricing problem.     

Rethinking real-time electricity pricing

Most US consumers are charged a near-constant retail price for electricity, despite substantial hourly variation in the wholesale market price. This paper evaluates the first program to expose residential consumers to hourly real-time pricing (RTP). I find that enrolled households are statistically significantly price elastic and that consumers responded by conserving energy during peak hours, but remarkably did not increase average consumption during off-peak times. The program increased consumer surplus by $10 per household per year. While this is only one to two percent of electricity costs, it illustrates a potential additional benefit from investment in retail Smart Grid applications, including the advanced electricity meters required to observe a household’s hourly consumption.     

Peak-load pricing in duopoly

In this paper, we consider peak-load pricing by duopolists that maximize profit (not social welfare). We compare price levels and profits across peak-load versus uniform pricing regimes. Our main result is that the introduction of peak-load pricing can plausibly reduce prices by making price competition more severe and thereby reducing profits. This result suggests that competing firms may engage in collusion by not committing to peak-load pricing. Therefore, from the regulator's perspective, it will be desirable to encourage firms to engage in peak-load pricing to intensify competition.     

Cryptocurrencies and asset pricing

We demonstrate that investors obtain abnormal returns by trading cryptocurrencies daily on the London Stock Exchange from 2014–2017. Excess returns persist once we account for systematic risk, size, value, momentum, profitability and investment. Investor abnormal returns in cryptocurrencies implies inefficiency.     

Beliefs and arbitrage pricing

This paper investigates the necessary restriction on investor beliefs implied by a no-arbitrage price system. In addition, Stone's theorem is invoked to study the existence of equivalent probability measures, and to relate our approach to the existing literature.     

Loss-leader pricing and upgrades

A new theory of loss-leader pricing is provided in which firms advertise low (below cost) prices for certain goods to signal that their other unadvertised (substitute) goods are not priced too high. The theory is applied to the pricing of upgrades. The results contrast with most existing loss-leader theories in that firms make a loss on some consumers (who buy the basic version of the good) and a profit on others (who buy the upgrade).     

Second-best pricing with upstream distortions

Optimal pricing by a public firm facing an upstream monopolist and monopsonist is compared with the first-best rule, itself a modified Ramsey formula. Deviations from marginal cost are larger and occur even in the absence of a budget constraint.     

Asset pricing with adaptive learning

We study the extent to which self-referential adaptive learning can explain stylized asset pricing facts in a general equilibrium framework. In particular, we analyze the effects of recursive least squares and constant gain algorithms in a production economy and a Lucas type endowment economy. We find that (a) recursive least squares learning has almost no effects on asset price behavior, since the algorithm converges relatively fast to rational expectations, (b) constant gain learning may contribute towards explaining the stock price and return volatility as well as the predictability of excess returns in the endowment economy but (c) in the production economy the effects of constant gain learning are mitigated by the persistence induced by capital accumulation. We conclude that in the context of these two commonly used models, standard linear self-referential learning does not resolve the asset pricing puzzles observed in the data.     

数字产品及其定价策略

数字产品具有与传统产品不同的物理和经济特征，这就决定数字产品不适合采用边际成本定价策略，而更适合采用市场价值定价策略，主要包括个性化定价策略、群体定价策略、版本划分策略、转换成本与锁定策略。     

Ecological pricing and economic efficiency

There is a need to accurately account for the contributions of environmental assets to the overall economy. Such accounting would permit policies that allow protection of important natural resources and aid the analytic process to determine an accurate basis for a sustainable economy. The aim is to develop an accounting framework for ecology that is sufficiently consistent with the economic framework that the two can be fruitfully combined. With appropriate definitions of the flows, the two systems can be connected into a common framework. No single measure of the system productivity and efficiency can be given for the combined system, however, until the ecosystem metabolism can be converted into economic terms. This could be done with a series of economic valuation techniques. Ecological prices could then be estimated and a single measure of ecological economic output could be given. With the net combined system input and output now in common terms, a technical system efficiency measure can logically be proposed. Because human activity inevitably involves dissipation, such emissions would now have a monetary price. Because such emissions are irrecoverable, the total output of the combined system is greater than it is under the current definition, giving rise to a technical system-wide efficiency measure.