Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?

Abstract. This paper explores how the introduction of an experience-rated system of unemployment insurance affects employment and welfare in a model where implicit contracts between firms and workers give rise to wage rigidities and unemployment. In the literature, it has been argued that experience-rated systems of unemployment insurance may reduce long-term employment as firms anticipate the higher costs of layoffs implied by experience rating. Our analysis shows that the introduction of experience rating may increase or decrease long-term employment but it unambiguously raises welfare.     

Layoffs,wages and unemployment insurance

The influence of unemployment insurance on wage and layoff behavior is analyzed in the context of optimal labor contracts. Responses of contract terms to changes in economic parameters are shown to depend in general on the nature of the initial contract, the degree of workers' risk aversion, and the resolution of bargaining conflict. Layoffs are not necessarily reduced by an increase in experience rating or a reduction in the UI benefit. Product demand fluctuations tend to induce procyclical employment fluctuations but not wage fluctuation. An implication of optimal contracts with private insurance suggests a reason for government intervention in UI provision.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EXPERIENCE RATING: INSURANCE VERSUS EFFICIENCY*

Unemployment insurance (UI) distorts firms' layoff decisions by reducing the cost of laying off workers. To dampen this increase, it has been suggested that UI should be financed with an experience‐rated tax. Despite the fact that increasing the level of experience rating can reduce unemployment, it can reduce the insurance coverage workers receive. With high experience rating, firms may reduce their severance payments by more than the UI benefit. We build a model where competitive firms offer contracts with severance payments to risk‐averse workers. Frictions in the labor market lead to incomplete insurance. This article shows that less than full‐experience rating enables the government to increase the insurance coverage workers receive. Welfare implications are also investigated.     

Experience Rating versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model where Firms Monitor Workers*

While layoff costs in the U.S. are mostly due to experience‐rated unemployment insurance, layoff costs in European labour markets are primarily a consequence of employment protection laws. In this paper we compare the effects of experience rating and employment protection laws on employment and welfare in a model where unemployment arises due to efficiency wage setting and where labour turnover is inefficiently high. We show that a revenue‐neutral introduction of experience rating reduces labour turnover and increases employment and welfare. The introduction of employment protection laws may also reduce labour turnover but employment declines.     

Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Employment History

In existing unemployment insurance programmes, it is standard to condition eligibility on the previous employment record of unemployed workers. The purpose of this article is to study conditions under which the efficient contract exhibits these properties. In order to do so, we characterize the optimal unemployment insurance contract in asymmetric information environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. We show that if quits cannot be distinguished from layoffs, it is optimal to condition the benefits paid to unemployed workers on their employment history, in particular, the coverage should increase with the length of previous employment spells.     

Optimum income taxation and layoff taxes

This paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment. It is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income. The optimal layoff tax is equal to the social cost of job destruction, which amounts to the sum of unemployment benefits (that the state pays to unemployed workers) and payroll taxes (that the state does not get when workers are unemployed).     

Optimal unemployment insurance and redistribution

We characterize optimal income taxation and unemployment insurance in a search‐matching framework where both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous and Nash bargaining determines wages. Individuals decide whether to participate as job seekers and if so, how much search effort to exert. Unemployment insurance trades off insurance versus search and participation incentives. We also allow for different productivity types so there is a redistributive role for the income tax and show that a piecewise linear wage tax internalizes the macro effects arising from endogenous wages. Type‐specific lump‐sum taxes and transfers can then redistribute between individuals of differing skills and employment states. Our analysis embeds optimal unemployment insurance into an extensive‐margin optimal redistribution framework where transfers to the involuntarily and voluntarily unemployed can differ, and nests several standard models in the literature.     

Social Security Benefits and Employer Behavior: Evaluating Social Security Early Retirement Benefits As a Form of Unemployment Insurance

Employers often shed older workers by encouraging them to "take" early retirement. An implicit contract model suggests that this behavior will be influenced by the social security early retirement program. When demand is weak and layoffs are necessary, social security benefits can act like a form of unemployment insurance, effectively subsidizing workforce reductions by lowering the cost to the firm of shedding older workers. Since social security benefits are not subject to experience rating, the result is an inefficiently high level of early retirements. This paper concludes with a discussion of policies for restoring early retirements to efficient levels.     

Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision

This paper analyzes a model of private unemployment insurance under limited commitment and a model of public unemployment insurance subject to moral hazard in an economy with a continuum of agents and an infinite time horizon. The dynamic and steady‐state properties of the optimum private unemployment insurance scheme are established. The interaction between public and private unemployment insurance schemes is examined. Examples are constructed to show that for some parameter values increased public insurance can reduce welfare by crowding out private insurance more than one‐to‐one and that for other parameter values a mix of both public and private insurance can be welfare maximizing.     

Unemployment insurance,recalls, and experience rating

In the United States, almost half of the workers who separated from their jobs ended their unemployment spell by returning to work for their last employer. In this study, we explore the impact of the experience rating (ER) system on recalls. In states using reserve ratio ER, and for a firm that is not at the minimum or the maximum tax rate, each layoff of a worker receiving unemployment benefits increases the future tax rate while each recall reduces it. This provides a natural incentive for firms to recall former workers receiving unemployment benefits. We use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators dataset, which provides information on recalls at the county level, and exploit the differences in tax schedule across states to estimate the impact of ER on recalls. We show that the recall share from hires increases with the degree of ER. We then develop a search and matching model with different unemployment insurance (UI) status, endogenous UI take-up, endogenous separations, recalls, and new hires. We illustrate that this model reproduces the effects of ER on recalls admirably. We show that an increase in the intensity of ER translates into a higher recall share at the steady state, especially for unemployed workers collecting unemployment benefits. We then use this model to analyze the labor market dynamics under alternative financing schemes. We show that ER has stabilization virtues—the higher the degree of ER, the less volatile the unemployment rate.     

充分发挥失业保险促进就业功能的探析

失业保险既是社会保障体系的重要组成部分,又是积极就业政策的重要支柱。20世纪80年代以来,我国逐步建立了失业保险制度,有效保障了失业人员的合法权益,为人力资源体系建立发展提供了有力的保障,对维护社会稳定、促进社会和谐发展发挥了重要作用。然而,由于制度框架的限制等原因,近年来失业保险促进就业的功能体现不明显,出现了失业保险扩面难、基金结余过多等问题,影响到失业保险制度的健康发展。当前,国际金融危机蔓延,给我国经济发展和人民生活带来严重影响,随着部分企业特别是劳动密集型中小企业生产经营困难,就业形势趋于严峻,要求国家实施更加积极的就业政策。从实际来看,失业保险基金实力增强,具备承担促进就业、预防失业的能力。对此,文章通过重点分析云南省失业保险运行状况,结合当前经济形势的需要,并借鉴国外在失业保险制度改革方面的带有共性的经验和做法,指出失业保险应由保障生活、促进就业向预防失业方向扩展,以充分发挥其在人力资源体系建设中应有的作用;同时,根据失业保险属性,提出在政策上要有相对灵活性,建议失业保险对象应扩展到用人单位。     

Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving search incentives while reducing the risks arising from unemployment. This paper identifies the conditions under which integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration. We show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement, the optimal system involves exclusive reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. This system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives. We also argue that joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated with each other.     

失业保险金与再就业行为

现有的失业理论及实证研究都认为失业保险金的提高会增加失业者的失业持续时间。在本文中,我们试图从失业者面临工作机会的工资分布结构出发,对失业保险金与失业者再就业工资分布的关系进行描述。通过对传统工作搜寻理论模型的扩展,我们证明失业保险金对失业持续时间的影响存在三种不同的传导路径,同时我们得到两个推论:失业保险金的增加一方面将提高失业者接受"高"工资工作机会的概率;但另一方面对失业者从事"低"工资工作机会的影响是不确定的。如果将正式工作视为"高"工资的工作机会,而将非正式工作视为"低"工资的工作机会;则基于微观层面的数据所进行的实证研究结果验证了我们的推论。     

Unemployment insurance design: Inducing moving and retraining

Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals can affect their job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain. Realistically, such an opportunity only arises for some individuals and the identity of those may be unobservable ex ante. The problem of characterizing constrained optimal unemployment insurance in this case has been neglected in previous literature. We construct a model of optimal unemployment insurance where multiple incentive constraints are easily handled. The model is used to analyze the case when an incentive constraint involving moving costs must be respected in addition to the standard constraint involving costly unobservable job-search. Absent wealth effects on behavior, we derive closed-form solutions showing that when the moving/retraining incentive constraint binds, unemployment benefits should increase over the unemployment spell, with an initial period with low benefits and an increase after this period has expired.     

ASSET‐BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE*

This article studies a model of consumption, savings, and job search in which a borrowing constraint limits self‐insurance. The government administers the unemployment insurance program that may condition on an individual’s asset position, but not on her efforts of finding a job. To compensate for the impediments to self‐insurance, benefit payments should optimally be set higher at lower wealth levels and peak for borrowing‐constrained individuals with zero liquid funds. A quantitative exercise reveals that the U.S. unemployment insurance program is surprisingly close to optimal for the asset poor, but far too generous for wealthier individuals.     

On optimal unemployment

Some unemployment may be optimal in all states of nature for certain production and utility parameters and firm-provided insurance. For other specifications, uniformly varying hours for all workers is optimal.     

Does unemployment insurance crowd out home production?

In this paper, we study the interaction between self insurance and public insurance. In particular, we provide evidence on a negative correlation between unemployment insurance benefits and home production using the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and the state-level unemployment insurance data of the U.S. The empirical results suggest that moving to a two times more generous state would decrease time spent on home production about 22% for the unemployed. Then, we pursue a quantitative assessment of this empirical finding using a dynamic competitive equilibrium model in which households do home production as well as market production. The model is able to generate the empirical facts regarding the unemployment benefits and home production. The fact that unemployment insurance benefits crowd out home production is interpreted as a substitution between the two insurance mechanisms against loss of earnings during unemployment spells.     

Aspects of optimal unemployment insurance : Search, leisure, savings and capital market imperfections

Unemployment insurance is analysed in the optimal taxation framework. Benefits discourage search and thus raise unemployment. A perfect capital market model is developed and solved explicitly for a constant absolute risk aversion utility function. For ‘realistic’ parameter values low replacement rates (less than 50%) are optimal. If there is no lending or borrowing the optimal rates rise to about 75%. Alternative models also admit leisure as a good and the input to search; this reduces optimal replacement when the capital market is perfect. When it is nonexistent the optimal benefits depend on the value of leisure - rising as it falls. Alternatives to constant benefits conditional on continued unemployment are considered.     

A Critique of the Private Health Insurance Regulations

The private health insurance sector is one of the most regulated sectors in Australia. The Private Health Insurance Incentives Scheme, along with community rating, is intended to make private insurance equitable, profitable and popular. We argue that the subsidy to health insurance ought to be a very effective tool for increasing insurance–but it was ineffective because community rating was ineffective. Using data from the Household Expenditure Survey we find that despite community rating rules which prohibit age‐adjusted premiums, young adults paid considerably less for their insurance than older adults. We conclude that insurers circumvented community rating through plan design, screening older consumers into more expensive plans. We also find that the penalty of 2 per cent per year for delaying insurance, introduced as part of the lifetime cover plan, is too low to be effective. We reflect on the New Zealand experience, where a completely deregulated insurance industry continues to be profitable and enjoys similar rates of coverage to those of Australia, and we ask whether Australia too could not benefit from complete deregulation.     

A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance

In an influential paper, Baily (1978) showed that the optimal level of unemployment insurance (UI) in a stylized static model depends on only three parameters: risk aversion, the consumption-smoothing benefit of UI, and the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the benefit rate. This paper examines the key economic assumptions under which these parameters determine the optimal level of social insurance. I show that a Baily-type expression, with an adjustment for precautionary saving motives, holds in a general class of dynamic models subject to weak regularity conditions. For example, the simple reduced-form formula derived here applies with arbitrary borrowing constraints, durable consumption goods, private insurance arrangements, and search and leisure benefits of unemployment.