The art of truth telling: handling failure with disclosure and apology

There are sentinel events and near misses associated with leadership and management, as well as the clinical process of health care. We should hold ourselves accountable to the same level of rigor and analysis of these events and near misses as we expect from clinicians. Research and analysis will continue to help us understand the science behind the power of truth telling and apology.     

Social choice and merit goods

Existing formulations of merit good social preferences, which are usually thought to be non-individualistic, are shown to be implied by three assumptions taken from the Arrowian social choice theoretic framework. Thus an individualistic foundation is provided for merit goods.     

Social choice rules and real-valued representations

Under commonplace assumptions, it is shown that social choice rules can be given real-valued representations. The usefulness of this characterization is that the general structure of abstract choice rules can be analyzed by investigating the form of their representation and the particular structure of rules can be analyzed by examining the properties of functions that represent them. After the possibilities of representation have been fully analyzed, this is demonstrated with the use of several examples. The analysis suggests a useful technique for studying social choice rules.     

Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model

This paper extends the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the related undominated set to a general set of alternatives and an arbitrary measure space of voters. We investigate the properties of social preferences generated by simple games; we extend results on generic emptiness of the core; we prove the general nonemptiness of the uncovered and undominated sets; and we prove the upper hemicontinuity of these correspondences when the voters’ preferences are such that the core is nonempty and externally stable. Finally, we give conditions under which the undominated set is lower hemicontinuous.     

Social choice and welfare economics under representative government

In his Impossibility Theorem, Arrow demonstrated logically that certain a priori conditions cannot all be satisfied by a rule of social choice. Those conditions, however, are admittedly value judgments, and how ethically impelling they are remains in dispute. To appraise that matter, the theorem is properly seen in a political context, and Arrow himself has seen it so, but he focuses in effect on ‘direct democracy.’ Further clarification may result from reference instead to different forms of ‘representative government.’ The same inquiry may also illuminate another still controversial matter: the import of the theorem for welfare economics.     

Social security and the choice between full-time work,part-time work and retirement

This paper investigates the determinants of retirement decisions in the UK. To deal with the endogeneity bias introduced by the piecemeal linear budget constraint generated by the social security system, it specifies a utility function in income–leisure space and assumes that individuals maximise it over three discrete regimes: full-time work, part-time work, and retirement. Using maximum likelihood techniques, it estimates the utility function and quantifies the influence of pensions, wages and personal characteristics (age, health, status, etc.) on the probability of partial and complete withdrawal from the labour market.     

Clever enough to tell the truth

We conduct a field experiment on 427 Israeli soldiers who each rolled a six-sided die in private and reported the outcome. For every point reported, the soldier received an additional half-hour early release from the army base on Thursday afternoon. We find that the higher a soldier’s military entrance score, the more honest he is on average. We replicate this finding on a sample of 156 civilians paid in cash for their die reports. Furthermore, the civilian experiments reveal that two measures of cognitive ability predict honesty, whereas general self-report honesty questions and a consistency check among them are of no value. We provide a rationale for the relationship between cognitive ability and honesty and discuss its generalizability.     

Models as speech acts: the telling case of financial models

This paper intends to bring Austinian themes into methodological discussion about models. Using Austinian conceptual vocabulary, I argue that models perform actions in and outside of the academic field. This multiplicity of fields induces a variety of felicity conditions and types of performed actions. If for example, an inference from a model is judged according to some epistemological criteria in the scientific field, the representation of the world which the model carries will not be judged by the same criteria outside the scientific field. A model can be considered as a standard in a strict scientific framework, while not being used as part of public policies, or vice versa. However, we focus on the dynamics between different fields.     

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota.     

Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness

When truth conflicts with efficiency, can verbal communication destroy efficiency? Or are lies or vagueness used to hide inconvenient truths? We consider a sequential 2-player public good game in which the leader has private information about the value of the public good. This value can be low, high, or intermediate, the latter case giving rise to a prisoners? dilemma. Without verbal communication, efficiency is achieved, with contributions for high or intermediate values. When verbal communication is added, the leader has an incentive to hide the precise truth when the value is intermediate. We show experimentally that, when communication must be precise, the leader frequently lies, preserving efficiency by exaggerating. When communication can be vague, the leader turns to vague messages when the value is intermediate. Thus, she implicitly reveals all values. Interestingly, efficiency is preserved, since the follower does not seem to realize that vague messages hide inconvenient truths.