Trade Policies for Exporting Industries under Free Entry

This paper computes optimal export taxes and domestic production subsidies for exporting industries under free entry. We show that domestic welfare is not at maximum, as is typically believed, when the export price is a monopoly price, and the domestic price is a competitive price, because a market structure effect has to be taken into account. Furthermore, we show that the optimal tax/subsidy formulas for an oligopoly coincide with those under perfect competition, if foreign and domestic demand functions are both linear. We also discuss optimal trade policies when only one instrument is available, and we run numerical simulations to determine and compare optimal trade taxes under endogenous and exogenous market structures.     

Consumption externality, efficiency and optimal taxation in one-sector growth model

In an economy with consumption externalities, existing studies find that a competitive equilibrium is efficient in the long run and remains efficient in transitions if preferences are homothetic. This paper revisits the efficiency issue in an otherwise standard one-sector growth model where consumption externalities affect a utility via their effects on the time preference. We find that even if preferences are homothetic, the externality changes the marginal rate of substitution between now and future and leads to a disparity in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between the centrally planned economy and a decentralized economy. As a result, a competitive equilibrium is inefficient in transition dynamics. We characterize an optimal tax/subsidy structure that enables the allocation in a decentralized economy to replicate the social optimum.     

Using distance functions to understand interest taxation

One of Terence Gorman's insights was that if one wants to derive rules about optimal commodity tax rates (or prices) one should treat quantities consumed as the instruments. This paper builds on Angus Deaton's development of this idea using distance functions. I identify necessary and sufficient conditions for uniform commodity taxation in a static model and the efficiency of various tax structures in a life‐cycle model. One implication is that the optimal interest tax rate may be higher when ordinary or compensated labour supply elasticities are lower.     

Climate policies and learning by doing: Impacts and timing of technology subsidies

We study the role of technology subsidies in climate policies, using a simple dynamic equilibrium model with learning by doing. The optimal subsidy rate of a carbon-free technology is high when the technology is first adopted, but falls significantly over the next decades. However, the efficiency costs of uniform instead of optimal subsidies, may be low if there are adjustment costs for a new technology. Finally, supporting existing energy technologies only, may lead to technology lock-in, and the impacts of lock-in increase with the learning potential of new technologies as well as the possibilities for early entry.     

Export Subsidies and Exchange Rate Pass‐through

This paper investigates effects of exchange rate on optimal trade policies and market prices within a standard export subsidy model. Shifts in exchange rate change relative efficiencies of firms in different countries. We show that depreciation of own currency increases subsidy levels when marginal cost is constant. Import dependency weakens this relationship, decreasing sensitivity of subsidy levels to depreciation. In general, subsidies reduce exchange rate pass‐through. Additionally, perverse exchange rate pass‐through effect arises with sufficiently intensive subsidies.     

Coping with a decline in world energy prices: Macroeconomic and income distribution effects in Thailand

This paper analyzes the effects of a short-run decline in world oil prices in Thailand. The outcomes of two policy responses are explored. What happens if — under a liberal policy - domestic prices follow world prices down in the short run and back up in the medium run? And what happens if — under a moderate policy - domestic prices are kept pretty much the same in both the short and medium runs? The SIAM2 Model tracked the effect of these policies on economic growth, on the resource balance, and on employment and the distribution of income. Over a 10-year horizon, growth is about the same under the two policies, though with differences for some periods and sectors. Nor is there much difference between the two policies in their effect on employment and income distribution — though the formal and informal sectors perform differently in different subperiods. The most important difference is in the resource balance. Under the liberal policy, the current account balance changes little, but it improves rapidly under the moderate policy.     

Quantity competition vs. price competition under optimal subsidy in a mixed oligopoly

This paper reconsiders the literature on the irrelevance of privatization in mixed markets within which both quantity and price competition are investigated under product differentiation. By allowing for partially privatization of a state-controlled firm, we explore competition under different timings of firms' moves and derive the conditions under which an optimal subsidy allows to achieve maximum efficiency. We show that, irrespective of the mode of competition, while the ownership of the controlled firm is irrelevant when firms play simultaneously, it matters when firms compete sequentially, requiring the leader to be publicly-owned for an optimal subsidy to restore the first-best. The paper also focuses on the extent to which a subsidy is needed to attain the social optimum in the considered scenarios, providing an ordering which highlights the subsidy equivalence between Cournot (Bertrand) private leadership and simultaneous Bertrand (Cournot) under duopoly, and the dominance of the former in oligopoly.     

Interregional negotiations and strategic delegation under government subsidy schemes

We examine the strategic delegation problem in the context of interregional negotiations under the subsidy policies of a central government. It is well known that when such negotiations are delegated to representatives, each region in a country elects its representative strategically, resulting in inefficient negotiation outcomes. This study focuses on a common subsidy policy called a cost-matching grant to examine whether an optimal grant exists that restores the efficiency of negotiation outcomes. Our results show that the central government obtains this optimal grant if the manipulability of the negotiation breakdown outcome is sufficiently weak. The strength of the manipulability is important because introducing a grant generates a new kind of manipulation of negotiation breakdown outcomes. However, when a new representative is elected after a negotiation breaks down, the new manipulability is negated. Hence, the central government always obtains the optimal cost-matching grant.     

The Emergence of Structural Faults on the Supply Side in Deregulated 'Energy Only' Electricity Markets

This article examines the effect of plant entry and exit in a deregulated ‘energy only’ electricity market. A partial equilibrium framework is presented that determines the optimal portfolio of base, intermediate and peaking plant for a given electricity load curve. An optimal result for Queensland is compared against the actual plant stock. Analysis of the portfolio indicates that deregulation is failing a key objective, namely enhancing dynamic efficiency, because too much base plant has been delivered. The research presents scenarios of structural corrections, using the theory of the generalised war of attrition to develop the cases. Results from simulation experiments are clear—consumers will secure lower electricity prices in the short run. But oversupply of base plant may suppress prices to such an extent that they fail to signal timely entry of peaking plant—the consequence of this failure being eventual price shocks and, potentially, load shedding.     

Reforming Food Subsidy Schemes: Estimating the Gains from Self-targeting in India

The paper uses the theoretical framework of the theory of tax reform to analyze whether a “small” change in an existing food subsidy program can be both welfare‐improving and revenue‐neutral. It shows how existing econometric methods can be adapted to estimate demand parameters even when household‐level data exhibit little price variation because the government controls food prices. The methodology is used to estimate welfare changes from shifting a rupee of subsidy on existing commodities to coarse cereals in the Indian public distribution system.     

食品价格上涨对城镇家庭消费与福利影响研究——基于EASI模型

文章基于与2015年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主迪顿的接近理想需求系统 AIDS 来源相同的EASI需求系统 ,采用CHNS调查数据 ,运用 EASI需求系统实证分析了各类食品价格上涨对不同收入等级城镇家庭消费与福利的影响 ,并比较了收入补贴与价格补贴的经济效果.研究发现:(1)我国城镇居民动物性食品消费支出占食品总支出的比重最大 ,其次是粮食和蔬菜 ,城镇居民的食品消费结构为"动物性食品+粮食+蔬菜" ,这说明动物性食品价格上涨对我国城镇居民日常膳食消费的影响相对较大.(2)粮食价格对困难户和最低收入家庭的福利影响最大 ,动物性食品价格对较低收入家庭的福利影响最大.(3)对低收入家庭而言 ,当动物性食品价格上涨时 ,收入补贴政策的效果优于价格补贴政策 ;当粮食价格上涨时 ,价格补贴政策的效果优于收入补贴政策.文章最后从生产、补贴政策和分配制度的角度提出了政策建议.     

Are Co-integrated Stock Prices Consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis?

This paper responds to the unsatisfactory argument that there is no correspondence between co-integration and the efficient market hypothesis. A law of one co-integrating vector of prices is proposed for the exchange rate and domestic and overseas stock prices. Markets must therefore be efficient in long-run equilibrium because no arbitrage opportunities exist. However, arbitrage activity via the disequilibrium error correction allows above-average (risk-adjusted) returns to be earned in the short run. The elimination of these arbitrage opportunities means that stock market inefficiency in the short run ensures stock market efficiency in the long run.     

A Note on Optimal Industrial Policy Towards Bertrand Homogeneous Duopoly

Recent studies in strategic trade and industrial policy analysis suggest that an investment subsidy, in the form of an R&D subsidy, a capacity subsidy or an advertising subsidy, would be a robust industrial policy recommendation towards an international differentiated oligopoly. However, in this paper, we show that this result does not carry over to the case of a Bertrand homogeneous duopoly. This result together with the fact that the optimal industrial policy is to set an investment subsidy when in product market competition firms play a Cournot output game, imply immediately that there hardly exists a robust industrial policy recommendation towards homogeneous goods industries.     

Subsidies for renewable energy in inflexible power markets

This paper analyses how short-term operational efficiency and the \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions of a power system depend on different subsidies for wind power and on the flexibility of the power system. This is analysed in the framework of a numerical power market model, calibrated to Danish data, where the start-up costs and other constraints in fossil-fuelled power plants are taken into account. The main conclusion is that flexibility is crucial for the costs of integrating wind power in an existing system. If thermal power plants are inflexible, subsidies for wind power should strive to increase the flexibility of the market by passing market signals to wind power. A subsidy that conceals market signals from wind power producers (a production subsidy) or disconnects wind power incentives from the market signals altogether (a fixed price) increases costs considerably. An inflexible power system should aim to introduce optimal subsidies (an investment subsidy) instead of production subsidies or a fixed price. The design of the subsidy scheme should take into account both the characteristics of the existing system and the characteristics of renewables.     

Foreign direct investment subsidy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms

This study analyzes the macroeconomic impacts of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are determining whether to enter or how to serve foreign markets. We show that a small FDI subsidy scheme induces consumption gains and delivers short‐term welfare improvement for the FDI host country if firms differ in productivity. However, the subsidy generates a new problem and results in the wealth reallocation effect, leading to welfare deterioration for the host country in the long run. Moreover, we find that a subsidy program induces a welfare improvement for the host country if it is offered to all domestic producers instead of foreign producers only in the host country.     

Trade Policies and Industrialisation*

In this paper, the three-commodity model of Gruen and Corden is used to examine the effects of import restriction policies designed to promote industrial development. It is shown that under circumstances which might reasonably be expected to exist in developing economies such policies will likely appear successful in the short run, but may fail in the long run, if the import-competing sector's expansion is largely achieved by the diversion of resources from an infant manufacturing sector producing exportables. An export subsidy is the more appropriate policy under these circumstances.     

Growth and optimal policies in an R&D-growth model with imperfect international capital mobility

In this paper, we examine the effects of international capital mobility on innovation, growth, and optimal growth policies in a small open economy with R&D-driven growth. Households can borrow funds from an imperfect international capital market to finance their investment in R&D firms. We show that the economy can reach a higher growth rate if international capital is more mobile. This result is consistent with recent empirical findings. Moreover, we show that the common growth-enhancing policies, such as patent protection and the R&D subsidies, have an additional negative welfare effect when households can access the international capital market. Accordingly, the optimal patent protection and R&D subsidy should be smaller when the degree of international capital mobility is higher.     

The effect of subsidy policies on the product quality improvement

This paper analyzes the effect of government subsidy policies on creating an incentive for domestic firms to improve their product quality before exporting to an outside market. The goal of the government is to minimize the time it takes to reach the appropriate product quality level at low costs. We simulate a dynamic profit maximization problem of the firm and derive the optimal path of the product quality development, then test the efficiency of the three types of subsidy methods: Constant Subsidy, Quality Matching Subsidy and Time-limited Subsidy methods. Our model yields a number of intriguing results: (i) not every subsidy methods guarantee product quality development, although the same amount is subsidized. (ii) the matching fund style subsidy is more efficient than providing constant amount of subsidy. (iii) Time-limited Subsidy improves product quality faster than the unlimited subsidy method. (iv) Time-limited Subsidy improves quality much faster than other methods with less subsidy cost. (v) there is an optimal combination between the subsidy and the time limits.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

Poverty alleviation and tax policy

This paper examines public good provision and tax policy—optimal non-linear income taxation and linear commodity taxation—when the government departs from purely welfarist objective function and seeks to minimise poverty. This assumption reflects much policy discussion and may help understand some divergences of practical tax policy from lessons in optimal tax analysis. In contrast to Atkinson and Stiglitz (J. Public Econom. 6 (1976) 55), it may be optimal to use differentiated commodity tax rates, including the taxation of savings, even if preferences are separable in goods and leisure. The optimal effective marginal tax rate at the bottom of the distribution may be negative, suggesting that wage subsidy schemes can be optimal. Finally, optimal provision of a public good is analysed under poverty minimisation.