中国资本市场的战略地位与前景展望

建立与完善资本市场是中国金融体制改革的主要目标之一。中国金融体制改革已进入新的发展阶段。发展中国资本市场要重新研究成熟市场国家的发展经验，要进一步解放思想，充分认识资本市场在国民经济发展中的战略地位，调整金融结构和金融布局，加快国际化、市场化步伐，着力解决制约资本市场发展的体制和机制问题，大力推进资本市场健康发展。     

国际市场冲击、名义汇率和股票市场收益——基于汇改后数据的经验研究

运用协整理论和时滞增广VAR模型,研究自2005年7月人民币汇率改革以来我国A股市场、外汇市场和美国股票市场的联动关系及其传导机制,发现美国股票市场通过流量渠道对我国股票市场和人民币汇率产生影响。我国资本市场受到国际资本市场影响的最根本原因在于中国实行的是出口导向型经济增长方式,而不是人民币汇率制度。因此,维护我国资本市场稳定的关键在于转变经济增长方式,在转变过程中要保持人民币汇率的相对稳定。     

论中国风险资本市场的培育与架构

本分析了目前中国风险资本市场的现状及存在的诸多障碍，提出了培育我国资本市场的目标模式及策略。     

交叉上市的资本成本效应之实证研究

交叉上市的资本成本效应是从公司理财角度研究交叉上市的核心领域。本文以截止2008年6月30日在内地、纽约与香港交叉上市的11家中国公司为样本,分别采用CAPM和Gordon模型估算分析公司在内地、纽约和香港三个市场的资本成本,结果表明:(1)在A股市场CAPM模型下的资本成本要高于Gordon模型下的资本成本,而在N股市场和H股市场,结果相反;(2)采用CAPM模型与Gordon模型均证明公司在A股市场的资本成本(β系数)低于其在N股和H股市场的资本成本。A股市场较低的资本成本反映出我国股票市场对投资者利益保护不足,我国股票市场亟需加强对投资者利益的保护。     

海外上市:规则变迁折射新阶段

中国企业海外上市始于20世纪80年代.当时,随着市场经济发展,对资本市场认识的加深,企业越来越深刻地认识到资本市场对于企业发展的重要作用,中国企业开始积极利用资本市场筹集资金,促进公司治理水平提高.但是由于中国内地资本市场当时刚刚起步,而且主要定位于配合国有企业脱困,能够在A股市场上市融资的企业数量相对于有意上市的企业数量有限,难以在A股市场融资的企业于是开始选择其他资本市场.     

14.47亿港元何以"缩水"至1.06亿港元--兼谈民企在海外上市中的风险与控制

近年来有不少中国企业到境外上市.但有一些不仅没有达到预期的目的.而且还因此陷入困境。由亿万富豪陈顺利所创立的特种纤维就是这样一个例子。本文研究该公司上市后不久就清盘破产的原因,指出国内民营企业在海外上市时需要注意的风险因素及其控制方法,希望有助于国内企业经理人员更好地认识香港资本市场,避免有关决策上的盲目性和片面性. 同时也为国家外汇管制政策的改革提出建议     

央企整体上市再探讨

在熟悉中国交建的国资分析人士眼里,香港资本市场备受推崇的中国交建,在A股市场IPO兵败如山倒、创造一系列不可思议的"传奇",并不意外。在市场环境不佳的情况下,央企要做出牺牲。这成为分析人士给予中     

主板退出机制 尚需完善

2019年,中央经济工作会议专门提出要“健全退出机制”。健全退出机制指明了资本市场退市制度改革的目标与方向,有利于完善优胜劣汰机制、畅通资本市场出口,也有利于提升整个市场及上市公司质量。回顾2019年,资本市场“面值退市”指标收到奇效,因跌破面值而退市的股票已达6只。不过,除此之外,其他退市红线尤其是财务类退市红线发挥的作用并不明显,市场出现上市公司卖房或通过获得政府补贴保壳等招数。     

资讯要览

要点国务院:要防范系统性金融风险据中国证券报报道国务院提出,要进一步促进资本市场稳定健康发展,强化跨境资本流动监管,防范系统性金融风险。     

资本市场的制度与绩效

中国资本市场融资主体的资本结构不合理、市场体系缺乏统一性和层次性等制度特征,决定了资本市场行为主体筹资者以圈钱为目的的融资需求膨胀,投资者的投资行为投机化,最终导致中国资本市场资金使用效率低下、企业管理优化动力不足、二级市场价格信息失真。中国资本市场的改造需要一个系统性的目标,打补丁式的资本市场改进方案无助于提高其整体效率。中国资本市场的系统性改造需要一整套互补性制度安排做出保证。     

tay's as good as cay

The empirical evidence that the consumption–wealth ratio, cay, has strong in-sample predictive power for future stock returns has been interpreted as evidence that consumers take account of future investment opportunities in planning their consumption expenditures. In this paper we show that the predictive power of cay arises mainly from a “look-ahead bias” introduced by estimating the parameters of the cointegrating regression between consumption, assets, and labor income in-sample. When a similar regression is run, replacing the log of consumption with an inanimate variable, calendar time, the resulting residual, which we label tay, is shown to be able to forecast stock returns as well as, or better than, cay. In addition, both cay and tay lose their out-of-sample forecasting power when they are re-estimated every period with only available data.     

上善若水工行人

28年的风雨兼程,她由小变大;28年的千锤百炼,她由弱变强;28年的栉风沐雨,铭刻着几代工行人艰苦奋斗、拼搏进取的缩影,他们在平凡的岗位上,传承敢于承担、乐于奉献,兢兢业业、奋勇争先的精神,创造了一个又一个金灿灿、沉旬甸的硕果。     

Sustainability as Adaptability

Most corporations now view sustainability as a key requirement for competitive advantage, but few claim to have achieved it. One of the key obstacles separating intention from execution is that the sustainability frameworks employed by companies tend to be insufficiently clear, precise, or comprehensive to guide decision making. One of the most pressing challenges for corporate leaders today is, of course, to sustain the economic viability of the core businesses. But given the implicit “beyond business” focus of most sustainability efforts, corporate executives would be better served by a more integrated, holistic framework—one that enables them to make tradeoffs among the economic, social, and ecological aspects of business. This article introduces such a framework—one that redefines sustainability as the ability of companies to adapt to change in three different spheres of operation—ecological, social, and economic—with a near‐term as well as a longer‐term planning horizon. Without such adaptation, business models become obsolete for reasons that can range from economic failure, to competitive inferiority, to social or ecological limits. This ability to adapt can be measured and valued by using the BCG Adaptive Advantage Index, a composite measure of corporate performance during market downturns. The BCG analysis also shows that although the most adaptive companies tend to report lower profits and have lower values during periods of relative stability, such companies perform consistently better over full cycles. Creating social and ecological value alone doesn't automatically confer economic rewards, but—with the right business model and capabilities—it can. The authors explore some of the business model archetypes that successfully achieve this “co‐optimization.”     

Money as stock

The fiscal theory determines the price level from the value of nominal government debt as a claim to government primary surpluses, just as private stock is valued as a claim to corporate profits. Valuation equations are not constraints, so this theory does not mistreat the government's intertemporal budget constraint. I anchor the analysis in a simple cash in advance model. When money demand falls to zero, I show that the price level can still be determined by the government debt valuation equation.     

Strategy as ecology

Microsoft's and Wal-Mart's preeminence in modern business has been attributed to any number of factors--from the vision and drive of their founders to the companies' aggressive competitive practices. But the authors maintain that the success realized by these two very different companies is due only partly to the organizations themselves; a bigger factor is the success of the networks of companies with which Microsoft and Wal-Mart do business. Most companies today inhabit ecosystems--loose networks of suppliers, distributors, and outsourcers; makers of related products or services; providers of relevant technology; and other organizations that affect, and are affected by, the creation and delivery of a company's own offering. Despite being increasingly central to modern business, ecosystems are still poorly understood and even more poorly managed. The analogy between business networks and biological ecosystems can aid this understanding by vividly highlighting certain pivotal concepts. The moves that a company makes will, to varying degrees, affect the health of its business network, which in turn will ultimately affect the organization's performance--for ill as well as for good. Because a company, like an individual species in a biological ecosystem, ultimately shares its fate with the network as a whole, smart firms pursue strategies that will benefit everyone. So how can you promote the health and the stability of your own ecosystem, determine your place in it, and develop a strategy to match your role, thereby helping to ensure your company's well-being? It depends on your role--current and potential--within the network. Is your company a niche player, a keystone, or a dominator? The answer to this question may be different for different parts of your business. It may also change as your ecosystem changes. Knowing what to do requires understanding the ecosystem and your organization's role in it.     

Diversity as strategy

IBM's turnaround in the last decade is an impressive and well-documented business story. But behind that success is a less told people story, which explains how the corporation dramatically altered its already diverse composition and created millions of dollars in new business. By the time Lou Gerstner took the helm in 1993, IBM had a long history of progressive management when it came to civil rights and equal-opportunity employment. But Gerstner felt IBM wasn't taking full advantage of a diverse market for talent, nor was it maximizing the potential of its diverse customer and employee base. So in 1995, he launched a diversity task force initiative to uncover and understand differences among people within the organization and find ways to appeal to an even broader set of employees and customers. Gerstner established a task force for each of eight constituencies: Asians; blacks; the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered community; Hispanics; white men; Native Americans; people with disabilities; and women. He asked the task forces to research four questions: What does your constituency need to feel welcome and valued at IBM? What can the corporation do, in partnership with your group, to maximize your constituency's productivity? What can the corporation do to influence your constituency's buying decisions so that IBM is seen as a preferred solution provider? And with which external organizations should IBM form relationships to better understand the needs of your constituency? The answers to these questions became the basis for IBM's diversity strategy. Thomas stresses that four factors are key to implementing any major change initiative: strong support from company leaders, an employee base that is fully engaged with the initiative, management practices that are integrated and aligned with the effort, and a strong and well-articulated business case for action. All four elements have helped IBM make diversity a key corporate strategy tied to real growth.     

Strategy as revolution

How often does the strategic-planning process start with senior executives asking what the rest of the organization can teach them about the future? Not often enough, argues Gary Hamel. In many companies, strategy making is an elitist procedure and ?strategy? consists of nothing more than following the industry's rules. But more and more companies, intent on overturning the industrial order, are rewriting those rules. What can industry incumbents do? Either surrender the future to revolutionary challengers or revolutionize the way their companies create strategy. What is needed is not a tweak to the traditional strategic-planning process, Hamel says, but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution. Hamel offers ten principles to help a company think about the challenge of creating truly revolutionary strategies. Perhaps the most fundamental principle is that so-called strategic planning doesn't produce true strategic innovation. The traditional planning process is little more than a rote procedure in which deeply held assumptions and industry conventions are reinforced rather than challenged. Such a process harnesses only a tiny proportion of an organization's creative potential. If there is to be any hope of industry revolution, senior managers must give up their monopoly on the creation of strategy. They must embrace a truly democratic process that can give voice to the revolutionaries that exist in every company. If senior managers are unwilling to do this, employees must become strategy activists. The opportunities for industry revolution are mostly unexplored. One thing is certain: if you don't let the revolutionaries challenge you from within, they will eventually challenge you from without--in the marketplace.     

tay's as good as cay: Reply

In a recent comment on our published work [Lettau, M., Ludvigson, S., 2001. Consumption, aggregate wealth, and expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 56, 815–850], Michael Brennan and Yihong Xia [2005. tay's as good as cay. Finance Research Letters 2, 1–14] advance the following argument: A “mechanistic” variable tay, where t is a linear time trend, forecasts stock returns. Since “t has no foresight,” the argument goes, the predictive power of this variable must be attributable to what they call “look-ahead bias.” The authors assert that cay is subject to the same look-ahead bias (generated because we use the full sample to estimate the cointegrating parameters in cay), implying that its forecasting power must be spurious. In this response, we explain why this critique is misplaced.     

尽快调整外汇储备的投资组合

中国外汇储备走势越来越为人们所关注,《国际融资》记者就有关外汇储备投资、外汇储备如何内用等热点话题采访了美国耶鲁大学金融学教授陈志武。