Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries

Many believe and argue that fiscal, or budgetary, transparency has large, positive effects on fiscal performance. However, the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling. To analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation, we present a career-concerns model with political parties. This allows us to integrate as implications of a single model three hitherto-separate results in the literature on deficit and debt accumulation: that transparency decreases debt accumulation (at least by reducing an electoral cycle in deficits), that right-wing governments (at least for strategic reasons) tend to have higher deficits than left-wing governments, and that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation. To test the predictions of the model, we construct a replicable index of fiscal transparency on 19-country OECD data. Simultaneous estimates of debt and transparency strongly confirm that a higher degree of fiscal transparency is associated with lower public debt and deficits, independent of controls for explanatory variables from other approaches.     

Price and quantity adjustments in the Austrian labour market

Austria is among the very few countries in the European Union which have managed to maintain comparatively low unemployment rates and high employment rates. This study looks at the price and quantity adjustment mechanisms in the Austrian labour market which may have contributed to this favourable outcome. After reviewing briefly the basic theoretical reasoning an empirical investigation is began into gross flow dynamics in the labour market and the cyclical volatility of employment and unemployment in Austria. In international comparison Austrian unemployment is very stable over the business cycle. This is due mainly to the high sensitivity of the labour force on cyclical conditions and, partly, also on the relatively weak responsiveness of employment to cyclical fluctuations in output, the latter being possibly attributable to the high degree of real wage flexibility in Austria. The study proceeds to show that the long-run elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment is indeed quite high in Austria. However, evidence was also found for outsider effects in the Austrian wage setting process. Relative wage structures, on the other hand, appear to be rather rigid.     

The Effects of Fiscal Consolidation and Welfare Composition of Spending on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from US Gubernatorial Elections between 1978 and 2006

This study attempts to make a contribution to the field of spending aspects of fiscal policy and their impacts on electoral outcome. Due to varying degrees of financial responsibilities and commitments to provide public goods and services, US state governments serve as a perfectly natural laboratory to test the electoral significance of fiscal policies. We adopt a probit model, with several specifications, to determine significant impacts of fiscal consolidation and increases in welfare spending on US gubernatorial elections from 1978 to 2006. The analyses show that voters are more concerned about the increase in debt than current budget deficits. An increase in welfare spending is negatively associated with reelection. Moreover, the impact of taxation on gubernatorial elections turns out to be insignificant. In particular, findings suggest that the political business cycle model does not hold true in US gubernatorial elections. Expansionary fiscal policy right before the election may not have crucial impacts on the chances of an incumbent winning the election.     

Political instablility and seigniorage: An inseparable couple — or a threesome with debt?

In the literature, political instability is shown to raise seigniorage and/or debt, but there is no debt‐seigniorage trade‐off. However, what happens when the IMF gets involved? Based on a political economy model of intertemporal public finance this paper presents qualitatively new and robust results. First, political instability causes myopic government behaviour and produces more debt, not more seigniorage. Second, IMF policies requiring debtor countries to achieve both monetary and fiscal stability at the same time are ineffective. Third and surprisingly at first sight, debt conditionality aiming at monetary stability is particularly effective in heterogeneous societies with unstable governments.     

Accounting for the business cycle: Nominal rigidities, factor heterogeneity, and Austrian capital theory

An Austrian interpretation of the New Keynesian small menu cost model of the business cycle is proposed. Austrian and New Keynesian business cycle theories share the feature that the cycle is generated by rigidities which prevent the economy from adapting instantaneously to changing conditions. Austrian business cycle theory is capital-based, focusing on credit expansion which artificially lowers interest rates and causes an investment boom and unsustainable business expansion. In contrast, the New Keynesian small menu cost model of the business cycle is based on nominal rigidities which prevent markets from clearing. Small menu costs introduce dichotomous behavior, where firms find it locally optimal to avoid instantaneous output price adjustments in the face of the cost, but this local optimum results in economy-wide output and employment fluctuations which are much greater in relative magnitude. The small menu cost model of the business cycle is extended and reinterpreted in light of Austrian business cycle theory with heterogeneous, multiply-specific capital, thus providing a rigorous formalization of the Austrian business cycle. The Austrian interpretation of this New Keynesian model fortuitously addresses several of its shortcomings. JEL classification B53, E12, E23, E32     

A MODEL OF AN OPPORTUNISTIC-PARTISAN POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

According to political business cycle theory, separate opportunistic and partisan approaches exist. It is obvious, as seen from theoretical and empirical points of view, that politicians aim for both opportunistic as well as partisan goals. This paper presents a model of a pre‐election political business cycle that manifests an indication of competence and a post‐election political business cycle that occurs because of the uncertainty of an election's winner monetary policy. In the pre‐election period competent governments expand the economy. The post‐election cycle depends on whether a leftist or a conservative government is in power in the pre‐election period, and if they are re‐elected or not.     

Fiscal policy over the real business cycle: A positive theory

This paper explores the implications of the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) [8] for the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle. The model predicts that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical with debt increasing in recessions and decreasing in booms. Public spending increases in booms and decreases during recessions, while tax rates decrease during booms and increase in recessions. In both booms and recessions, fiscal policies are set so that the marginal cost of public funds obeys a submartingale. When calibrated to the US economy, the model broadly matches the empirical distribution of debt and also its negative correlation with output. However, the predictions of pro-cyclical spending and counter-cyclical taxation do not find empirical support. The calibrated model generates the same fit of the data as a benevolent government model in which the government faces an exogenous lower bound on debt. Nonetheless, the two models have very different comparative static implications.     

The rise and fall of the subsistence fund as a resource constraint in Austrian business cycle theory

The “subsistence fund” was once an integral part of Austrian business cycle theory to indicate the resource constraint on the ability to complete investments. Early agrarian and industrial economies were constrained by resource availability in a manner consistent with that alluded to by the subsistence fund. This link became more tenuous as the growth of the financial economy in the twentieth century removed the apparent importance of pre-saved goods to complete investments. At this point the subsistence fund came to be used only as a metaphor and was jettisoned from Austrian business cycle theory. The present paper points to the merits of the subsistence fund in explaining the turning point of the business cycle as compared to alternative explanations. It also works out the deficiencies in historical expositions of the Austrian theory based on the subsistence fund, and traces the evolution of the resource constraint at the core of Austrian economists´ treatment of the business cycle.     

The view from Vienna: An analysis of the renewed interest in the Mises-Hayek theory of the business cycle

We review the post-crisis literature that engages Austrian business cycle theory and we discuss what is being said that is correct, what is being said that is incorrect, and what is not being said that ought to be said. This last category is important due to the fact that the post-crisis literature engaging Austrian business cycle theory has not addressed advances in the theory made since the days of Mises and Hayek. We also highlight three key areas of contemporary economics where Austrian business cycle theory has the potential to do significant work.     

Political frictions and public policy outcomes

We study the role of political frictions in public policy outcomes. We propose a simple model of fiscal policy that combines a lack of commitment by the government, political turnover, and another political friction that can be interpreted either as political polarization or as public rent-seeking. We show that political turnover increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public rent-seeking leads to higher public spending. We evaluate the importance of different political frictions for fiscal policy outcomes using a sample of twenty developed countries. We find that the data on political instability combined with the data on public rent-seeking explain 25% of the variation in public debt levels.     

Government efficiency,institutions, and the effects of fiscal consolidation on public debt

We study the evolution of the ratio of public debt to GDP during 132 fiscal episodes in 21 OECD countries in 1981–2008. Our main focus is on debt dynamics during 40 consolidation periods. To define these periods we use data on the evolution of the underlying cyclically adjusted primary balance, and as such avoid biases that may be induced by one-off budgetary measures. The paper brings new evidence on the role of public sector efficiency for the success of fiscal consolidation. First, we confirm that consolidation programs imply a stronger reduction of the public debt ratio when they rely mainly on spending cuts, except public investment. Government wage bill cuts, however, only contribute to lower public debt ratios when public sector efficiency is low. Second, we find that a given consolidation program will be more effective in bringing down debt when it is adopted by a more efficient government apparatus. Third, more efficient governments adopt consolidation programs of better composition. As to other institutions, consolidation policies are more successful when they are accompanied by product market deregulation, and when they are adopted by left-wing governments. By contrast, simultaneous labor market deregulation may be counterproductive during consolidation periods.     

Fiscal Prudence and Growth Sustainability: An Analysis of China's Public Debts

This paper analyses and assesses China's current fiscal system, including its basic institutional arrangements, the relationship between central and local governments, and the fiscal balance and public debt. This paper pays special attention to the local government borrowings that have increased dramatically in recent years, and tries to measure the “overall public debt risk” by including all kinds of eligible debts. This paper finds that although the large expansion of local government debt during the fiscal stimulation response to the global financial crisis was devastating, the all‐inclusive total public debt to gross domestic product ratio remains under 50%, and as long as the local debt stops growing, the risk is quite manageable. This paper also points out that more attention should be paid to improving and reforming the Chinese fiscal system, particularly the reform of the fiscal relationship between central and local governments, and the legal framework for local government debt management.     

The political economy of seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960–1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.     

Empirical Evidence on the Austrian Business Cycle Theory

The Austrian business cycle theory suggests that a monetary shock disturbs relative prices, such as the term structure of interest rates, systematically altering profit rates across economic sectors. Resource use responds to those changes, generating a cyclical pattern of real income. The divergence of the interest rate structure, from the previous and unchanged time preferences, means that the expansion is unsustainable and must end in recession. Quarterly data for eight U.S. business cycles, 1950:1 through 1991:1 are standardized by time period and used to explore business cycle facts and relations between money, interest rates, capacity utilization and income. Results are consistent with the hypotheses of the Austrian theory of a business cycle caused by a monetary shock and propagated by relative price changes.     

Assessing the stochastic stability of public debt: the case of Austria

This paper characterizes the long-run distribution of Austrian public debt using a Markov chain model of the debt-GDP ratio and several key macroeconomic variables. We apply Bayesian techniques to estimate the transition probabilities of the model which allows to incorporate information from other countries. Based on the model, we argue that the historical record of Austrian fiscal policy is consistent with a stable long-run distribution of the debt-GDP ratio with an expected value close to the 60% threshold of the Maastricht treaty. Our results suggests that the strong increase in the debt-GDP ratio in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis should be seen as a transitory tail event rather than as a sign of long-run unsustainability. However, we also show that the existence of a stable long-run distribution depends on a continuing tendency of fiscal policy to “lean against debt” by reducing the primary deficit in face of rising debt. Finally we assess how exogenous shocks to the primary deficit and real GDP growth affect the model-implied distribution.     

Do business cycle peaks predict election calls in Canada?

This paper examines the empirical regularity that in Canada business cycle peaks and federal elections have tended to arise together over the long post-Confederation time period following 1867. We argue that rather than being simultaneous, the two events are related sequentially and that causality can be identified properly if the selection issue associated with observed events is addressed carefully. Our results suggest that business cycle peaks lead federal elections rather than the other way around. Such a finding reinforces the hypothesis of strategic election timing for such countries and is insightful in helping to explain why the presence of a political business cycle is harder to establish for parliamentary governments where the date of the next election is under the control of the incumbent governing party than in democratic systems where governing durations and election dates are fixed.     

Do political determinants affect revenue collection? Evidence from the Indian states

In a recent study, Dash and Raja (2013) have shown that the size and composition of public expenditure of Indian states are systematically linked with political determinants such as the extent of government fragmentation, strength of opposition, electoral years, and ideology. This study extends the questions to whether there are similar links to revenue collections by the governments that rule the different states in India. Using the same time period of the previous study, four revenue measures related to tax collection and internal debt are considered and four different sets of hypotheses are developed by linking the political determinants with each of the revenue measures. The overall findings of the study suggest that the government-specific political determinants are significant and robust determinants of revenue collections of the Indian states.     

How do financial cycles affect public debt cycles?

We employ the duration framework to study determinants of public debt cycles in 57 advanced and emerging economies over the 1960–2014 period, with a particular focus on the impact of financial cycles. The results suggest that the association between financial and debt cycles is asymmetric. Debt expansions preceded by overheating in credit and financial markets tend to last longer than other expansions, but there is no significant association between financial cycles and debt contractions. There is strong evidence of duration dependence in both phases of the cycle, with the likelihood of expansions and contractions to end increasing with the length of their respective spells. Higher initial level of debt increases the spell of contractions (persistence of adjustment effort hypothesis) and reduces the spell of expansions (debt sustainability hypothesis). The results are robust to the inclusion of global factors, openness, political stability, and debt crisis indicators as additional controls.     

“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.